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Abstract
Recent years have witnessed growing concern with 'child labour'; the prevention of
which has, at least in rhetoric, shot to the top of childhood research and policy
agendas in both developing and industrialised countries. Little primary data exists,
however, to support or challenge the major theories upon which policy and
programming are based, a situation which this thesis seeks to redress.
This research embraces Nader's (1980) suggestion that those studying children
should consider the hierarchies which impact on the lives of those children they
research. One of the most important hierarchies involved in child labour at present is
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations agency with the
global mandate to work towards the progressive elimination of child labour. The
thesis explores the labyrinthine world of the Organisation in the light of the realities
of child labour; using multi-locale ethnographic research conducted between 1999
and 2000 in the International Labour Office (ILO) in Dar Es Salaam, in ILO
headquarters in Geneva and in Mirerani, a mining village in Northern Tanzania.
This thesis explores two key hypotheses. The first relates to current anthropological
thought, expounded by Foucault influenced theorists such as Boyden, which argues
that failure of organisations such as the ILO to successfully tackle child labour is due
to the adoption of a 'Northern construction of childhood', which is then exported
globally and imposed in culturally distinct countries. My hypothesis is that the vision
of childhood used by the ILO is a far more complex process of negotiation and re¬
negotiation. I use historical and contemporary evidence to explore the roots of the
campaign against child labour (Chapter 2) and the vision of childhood promoted by
the ILO (Chapter 3). I draw on the arguments of Gardner and Lewis (2000) to argue
that the 'Northern construction of childhood' theory denies agency to the many
li
activists in non-Northern countries who have been central in developing and fighting
for the vision of childhood promoted by the ILO.
My second hypothesis is that it is not a particular vision or 'construction' of
childhood which is responsible for failure to translate good intentions into successful
programme implementation but specific bureaucratic procedures, power relations and
human failings within the machinations of international bureaucracies. Drawing on
the unique opportunity of working within the ILO for 14 months, I explore the
multiple discourses and practices of those responsible for implementing the ILO
'vision' in Geneva and Tanzania (Chapters 4 and 6) in an attempt to explore what lies
under the apparently rigid and 'dehumanised' organisational structures. Chapter 5
attempts to move beyond 'vision' and towards reality and considers the factors that
led to the growth of child labour in Tanzania generally and in Mirerani specifically.
Chapter 7 takes one particular case study of the development of a child labour
intervention programme in Mirerani. I explore the particular factors which prevented
so many 'good intentions' from being translated into effective practice for the benefit
of the children, drawing primarily on the work of Hertzfeld (1992), Fineman (1993)
and Chambers (1983, 1997, 1998). Chapter 8 considers 'the missing link', the
children themselves, and the cultural constructions of childhood and work which are
dominant in Mirerani. I argue that 'children's voices' should come first and yet are
superseded in importance and in resource allocation by the need to negotiate
bureaucratic procedures, power relations and 'people' issues within the Organisation.
The final chapter attempts to take a step back from the ethnography itself and to
place the two central hypotheses into a wider context by considering how these
findings contribute to wider anthropological debates, knowledge and practice.
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1. Situating the Research
Recent years have witnessed growing international concern in the problem of child
labour or what is seen to be the 'unsuitable work' of children. The prevention of child
labour has, at least in rhetoric, shot to the top of the global research and policy agendas
in both developing and industrialised countries. The topic is an emotive one and strikes
at the very heart of key anthropological concerns such as knowledge and power,
structure and agency, kinship, constructions of identity and childhood as well as taking
us to the core of wider contemporary concerns; from globalisation and the growth of the
capitalist agenda to human rights and poverty. Little primary data exists, however, to
support or challenge the major theories upon which child labour policy and
programming are based, a situation which this thesis seeks to redress.
The initial inspiration for this research was Nader's (1980) suggestion that those
studying children should consider the hierarchies which impact on the lives of those
children. One of the most important hierarchies involved in child labour at the present
time is the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations agency which
has been given the global mandate to work towards the progressive elimination of child
labour. I therefore take what Nader terms a 'vertical slice' in order to gain a fuller
understanding of ILO child labour intervention: from the ILO Area Office, to
Headquarters, via the child labour field itself. This thesis is based on multi-locale
ethnographic research conducted between 1999 and 2000 in the International Labour
Office (ILO) in Dar Es Salaam and in ILO headquarters in Geneva. Findings are
considered in the light of the realities of child labour in the third field site, Mirerani, a
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mining township in Northern Tanzania. Through careful ethnographic analysis, I hope to
explore the labyrinthine world of the Organisation and gain a holistic view of the
dynamics which lead to the development of particular child labour discourses and
practices. Such a study is essential to further our understanding of the almost invisible
machinations of the international bureaucracies which impact on the lives of child
labourers. While this research is clearly limited in time and space to the ILO child labour
programme in Tanzania and Geneva, the ethnographic approach taken allows us to
examine a number of important elements which can influence wider programme success
and failure.
First, it is perhaps useful to define exactly what is meant by 'child labour'. 'Child labour'
is the generic term used to describe a phenomenon which occurs throughout the world,
in both rich and poor countries, in both rural and urban areas and in a diversity of
settings from the home to the mining site. The term has different meanings and usage in
different contexts and to different people but is generally taken to refer to children
engaged in undesirable forms ofwork. There has been much debate as to the distinction
between child 'work' and child 'labour'- does 'labour', for example, imply all work
conducted by children or just the most hazardous occupations? Fyfe (1989) makes a
clear distinction between child work and child labour, arguing that not all work is bad
for children and work can be a positive element in a child's development. Others such as
Boyden argue that the term child 'labour' has become so confused with the broader
notion of child work that it is no longer useful in precise discussion (Boyden et al. 1998:
19). White has also suggested that it may be best to abandon the term and to adopt a
continuum of child work situations, from 'best' to 'worst' (White 1996: 837).
I do not propose to go further into this debate, which Myers (1999: 21-22) has described
as 'tedious beyond words' and which has 'engendered rancour among allies, exasperated
both practitioners and researchers to the end of their patience, and resisted all attempts to
minimise or resolve it'. I take the view that it is unhelpful to extend the debate further,
particularly as in most languages there is no distinction between the two terms 'labour'
and 'work' and in Swahili only one term, kazi, exists. In this thesis I therefore use the
words 'labour' and 'work' intermittently.
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Beyond the theoretical definitional debates, growing international concern in the work of
children has had dramatic consequences, not only for working children and their families
but also for local and national economies. Media denunciations of children in developing
countries being forced to work long hours in appalling conditions to manufacture items
for rich countries has stirred up public outcry as well as increasing research interest, and
the result of consumer boycotts and other pressure in rich countries has often been the
sacking of children engaged in work that is not considered to be suitable, as was the case
in a number of Bangladeshi garment factories in 1993 (Macdonald 1997: 9). Subsequent
studies by O'Malley (1997) and Boyden, Ling and Myers (1998) have revealed,
however, that 'saving' children from work can in fact leave them more vulnerable than
before. Child labour is thus a complex issue, embedded in a system which is far wider
than that of the local area in which children work. Figure 1 below illustrates this system
visually in an attempt to group together the key dynamics which impact on child labour.
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Figure 1: Linkage diagram
practice






Each box is inter-linked, leading to a dynamic situation in which the wider context in
terms of socio-cultural norms and political economy lead to developments in child
labour policy, in the organisational bureaucracies responsible for working on child
labour issues and ultimately on child labour practice itself. Child labour policy in turn
can impact on the political economy and socio-cultural norms as well as on
organisational bureaucracies and child labourers. Children are also starting to have an
impact on the functioning of the bureaucracies, on child labour policy and on socio-
cultural norms, predominantly through the growing recognition of the importance of
children's participation, as discussed in Chapter 3.4. Child labour also affects the
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national and global political economy, by virtue of the economic value of the work as
well as of the consequences ofboycotts, as mentioned above.
An extensive literature review revealed that one of the greatest problems with writing on
child labour is that a holistic approach is rarely taken. The anthropological literature has
mainly focused its attention on detailing the lives of child labourers themselves and the
specific socio-cultural contexts within which they work as well as on critiquing child
labour policy. Nieuwenhuys (1994) and Reynolds (1991) provide detailed ethnographies
of the local conditions in which children work in India and Zimbabwe respectively,
highlighting the importance of critically assessing the work routine of children within
the context of household organisation, gender, kinship, state ideology and gender. They
show that cultural constructions of childhood and work play a fundamental role in
determining child labour (see also Chapter 8). Boyden (1997 [1990], 1998) and White
(1994, 1996, 1999) use anthropological understandings to challenge the universality and
simplicity of international child labour policy. In contrast, the media and political
science attention has predominantly focused on the wider context in terms of the
political economy (Klein 2000, Observer 2001) as well as on graphically documenting
the suffering and misery of children labouring in predominantly poor countries. An
extensive literature review revealed, however, that no detailed ethnographic attention
has been given to gaining an understanding of the international bureaucracy which has
been given the global mandate to develop child labour policy and to attempt to counter
the impact of the wider political economy: the International Labour Organisation. It is
this Organisation which has become the focus of this ethnographic study; although I do
not separate the Organisation from the holistic picture and attempt to consider wider
issues of policy, context and the child labourers themselves. I argue that it is essential to
keep this wider framework in mind when considering child labour, as analysis of any
one dynamic will be incomplete without considering the consequences for the other
dynamics.
In this thesis, I draw on development theory, organisation theory and childhood theory;
my guiding theoretical framework strongly influenced by a postmodernist approach. My
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pledge to retain a holistic perspective means that a pragmatic approach to the use of
theory is adopted. I have chosen a path which enables me to use different theories in
ways which allow me to consider universalised child labour policy, the wider political
economy, different socio-cultural norms, the practical needs of the international
bureaucracy and its staff, as well as the realities of the child labourers.
In terms of development theory, the latest wave in development critique has been
pioneered by authors such as Ferguson (1997 [1990]) and Escobar (1995) who use a
Foucauldian postmodernist approach to argue that knowledge, power and action are
intrinsically linked in the practices of development agencies which impose particular
discourses1 upon those they seek to 'develop'. Ferguson (1997 [1990]: xv) shows that
the institutionalised production of certain forms of knowledge has important effects and
the production of this knowledge plays a key role in the production of structural change.
He suggests that anthropologists should examine the real social effects of the
implementation of particular ideas or 'discourses' by organisations and the ways in which
they connect with wider social processes. To apply this to my study would be to argue
that the ILO as an institution produces certain ideas about 'the child labourer', which are
then institutionalised through the production of policies, projects, documents, videos and
legislation, which are then globalised and imposed throughout the world. Chapter 3 will
reveal that leading child labour commentators have adopted this approach to argue that
international organisations such as the ILO are exporting and imposing a 'Northern
construction of childhood'. I argue in this thesis, however, that such an approach
provides an oversimplified portrayal of the ways in which the discourse is developed and
imposed and I propose an alternative frame of reference.
In Chapter 2, I take a genealogical approach to the development of the child labour
debate to examine how the child labour discourse became established within the ILO. I
explore the roots of the child labour debate and consider the external and internal
influences which shaped discourse and propose that there is no such thing as 'The ILO
child labour discourse'. Instead there are multiple discourses which develop through
1
According to Foucault, 'discourses' are historically variable and powerful ways of specifying knowledge
and truth (Foucault in Ramazanoglu 1993: 19).
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ongoing internal and external dialogical processes. In Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7, I expand
upon the findings of Chapter 2 to explore how contemporary influences shape the
multiple discourses and practices and to show that within any development 'discourse' or
organisation there is a multitude of discourses and individuals working within their own
frames of reference and belief systems. Each individual uses his or her own agency to
impact on the functioning of a particular organisation.
Authors such as Phillips and Edwards (2000) and Gardner and Lewis (2000) also
criticise the perspective of Ferguson and Escobar which, they argue, sees the
construction of knowledge as amounting to a unilateral exercising of power by the
development organisation over its so-called 'beneficiaries'. The critics claim that
Ferguson and others leave no scope for resistance within and outside the organisation.
Gardner and Lewis (2000: 16) argue that development organisations do not simply
impose their discourse in a top-down manner but are subject to political activism and
resistance both from within and outside of the organisation:
Rather than presenting 'development' as invariably top-down, hegemonic and
static, the challenge for anthropology is to show how political activism both from
within and outside the institutions and networks which produce development
discourses can help problematise and overturn dominant paradigms.
The 'development as discourse' approach thus suffers from some degree of over¬
simplification2 but to what extent is it true to say that it serves a purely polemical
purpose, leading to political disengagement as Gardner and Lewis (2000: 15) argue?
Having reviewed the literature as well as the policies of different development agencies,
I argue that the 'development as discourse' approach has played a central role in moving
the anthropology of development forward and has even had directly practical and
2
Furthermore, the 'development as discourse' argument gives an over-inflated importance to the
development apparatus. Local communities have and use their agency in a number of ways, as revealed in
7 and 8. Discussions reveal that where people do not agree with a project they simply won't participate in
it. They are very capable of identifying their own priorities and not simply absorbing those imposed up on
them. In Mirerani, informants expressed how much they required assistance in helping the children
working in the mines and this was before the possibility of IPEC assistance was established. Concerned
individuals felt that while their efforts were beneficial to individual children they needed technical and
financial assistance to implement a more concerted strategy.
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political outcomes in that it has opened the way for alternative discourses. Evidence
reveals that the deconstruction of dominant development discourses in the 1980s has led
to a number of agencies such as the Department for International Development (DFID)
and the World Bank reviewing their policies; exemplified by the introduction of new
ideas such as 'partnership' and 'participation'. Ultimately, however, my research
supports Gardner and Lewis's (2000: 16) argument that we are now at the stage where
reducing everything to discourse makes it difficult to move beyond critique and point
out productive avenues for change3.
On the other hand, focusing solely on the bureaucratic realities of the Organisation in
order to point out productive avenues of change can also lead to a disregard for the ways
in which knowledge, power and action are intrinsically linked and used by international
organisations such as the ILO. Focusing on individual agency also means that the 'bigger
picture' in terms of the overall effect of the actions of individual agents is ignored.
Starting from this point, therefore, I propose not to reject the 'development as discourse'
approach but to use it as a tool, subject to particular flaws, within a broader theoretical
framework, to move forward and to explore the relationship between the ideas and
practices of a 'development' organisation, namely the ILO. Through doing so I explore
the reasons behind successes and failures and attempt to move the debate one step
further by using these findings to suggest possible ways to overcome failures and to
build upon successes. My evidence will show that by understanding and acknowledging
the ways in which the ILO's dominant 'child labour' discourse is applied and modified
in practice, the Organisation can develop in ways which allow for greater flexibility at
field level, rewarding innovation and impact as opposed to the following of bureaucratic
procedures which, whilst sustaining the dominant discourse, achieve questionable results
as far as eliminating child labour is concerned.
3
Furthermore, the 'development as discourse' approach is subject to some of its own criticisms: For
example, it raises concerns about the failure of development to address political complexity and yet it fails
itself to address the political complexities facing practitioners working within development, who are often
well aware that there are a number of discourses to which they are subject and which they themselves use,
interpret and/or resist in a number of ways (see also Czamiowska 1997: 200).
17
In terms of theoretical frameworks for considering child labour itself, anthropologists
such as Reynolds (1991) and Nieuwenhuys (1994) have taken a social construction of
childhood perspective in order to argue that child labour is a culturally defined task4.
Such an approach, however, is inadequate in terms of the holistic perspective which I
have chosen to use as it pays insufficient attention to the wider framework of global
capitalism. For many child labourers, work is an expression of freedom but this
'freedom' must be seen as embedded in the wider context of the 'un-ffeedom' of their
position (see Sen 1999). For example, child labourers in Mirerani expressed their
freedom through choosing to migrate in search of a better life for themselves. This
freedom, however, must be seen in the context of growing poverty in Tanzania, an
education system which is inaccessible to many (in terms of finance, distance and
curriculum) and the lack of alternative means of survival or of obtaining the desired life
style in their home area (see Chapter 8). To use cultural relativism to romanticise the
freedom of children to choose to work can therefore be a short-sighted analysis. While it
is clearly important to recognise the importance of individual agency in breaking out of
poverty and other forms of deprivation, it is also important to recognise that individual
agency is often constrained by social arrangements in terms of the social, political and
economic opportunities available to us (Sen 1999: xi-xii). Lavalette (1999) takes a
similar approach to argue that, in view of the economic pressures imposed by capitalism
which force children to work, it becomes meaningless to talk of a deliberate and
informed decision by the children. While Chapter 8 reveals that children do make
deliberate and informed decisions to engage in labour, I argue in Chapter 9 that it is
important to understand that this decision is made within a particular economic, social
and political system which has resulted in growing poverty for many people. Children
should therefore have the right to work but they should also have the right not to work.
Having briefly highlighted some of the theoretical ideas which have influenced this
thesis, it is equally important to introduce the author and to consider the ways in which
her positioning has also affected the research process.
4 This argument has been taken on by 'liberationists' such as Boyden (1990) who argue that children have
the right to work and has been opposed to the view of 'protectionists' such as the ILO who argue that
children have the right not to work, an argument discussed further in Chapters 3 and 9.
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1.1 Situating the Researcher in the Research Process
Social Anthropology, perhaps more than any other discipline, has developed a highly
individualised style of research practice which usually consists of the anthropologist
engaging in intensive participant observation in a particular community for an extended
period of time (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 25)5. Recent anthropological debates have
centred on the issue of reflexivity, with key commentators arguing that there can be no
such thing as an objective ethnography as the socio-historical locations of the
anthropologist will shape his/her orientation (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Okely 1992;
Hammersley and Atkinson 1995)6. In this section, I take a reflexive approach and focus
on the impact that my 'personal biography as a gendered researcher, who speaks from a
particular class, racial, cultural and ethnic community perspective' (Denzin and Lincoln
1994: 11) may have had on my relationships with informants. Such an approach is not
being used as a justification, as a 'device for establishing authority', but merely as a way
of situating myselfwithin the research process (Rabinow 1986: 144).
As my research relates to child labour in Tanzania, it is important to explore my own
childhood experiences as these have been influential in directing my thinking7. As a
member of a close-knit, English-French, middle-class nuclear family, my childhood was
privileged and my time was mainly divided into 'play' and school. My 'work' experiences
consisted of a paper round from the age of 11 and then shop work from the age of 14.
Both jobs would be considered 'exploitative' in the sense that I was extremely underpaid
and working below the legal age limit (ILO Convention 138, 1973). However, I was
very happy to earn a bit ofmoney to prove my independence to myself and to my family
and peers. My experiences thus contrast starkly with those of my Tanzanian child
5This model was pioneered by Malinowski who outlines his 'scientific method' in Argonauts of the
Western Pacific (1961).
Contemporary ethnographies, such as Marjorie Shostak's Nisa: The life and words of a IKung woman
(1990), represent a move away from the Malinowskian scientific ideal and consider the position of the
researcher in the field, revealing that the ethnographic process is a two-way relationship which may have
important consequences for the community.
7For a fuller discussion of the benefits of a reflexive approach for childhood researchers, see James, Jenks
and Prout (1998: 171).
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informants, a large number of whom have migrated independently to Mirerani to seek
their fortunes and live outside family structures, working long hours to build their
futures, to contribute to household survival or to pay for their schooling or for the
schooling of their siblings (see Chapter 8). My experiences do also, however, reveal
certain similarities in that, as a child, I was also subject to the disciplinary powers of
adult 'authority' (be it in the form of parental authority, community authority or school
authority) which could determine the activities in which I could and could not engage
even where this was against my will and better judgement.
My privileged background meant that at 18 I was able to go to University to study Law
with the aim of becoming a human rights lawyer. My experiences of working with a law
firm led to disillusionment and disappointment whilst voluntary work in Algeria and
Brazil led me to an MSc in Development Administration and Planning and to casual
employment with the Department for International Development (DFID). This
eventually resulted in my obtaining a place on DFID's training programme for Social
Development Advisors (Associate Professional Officer's Scheme/APOS). The scheme
runs over three years, the first and third years ofwhich are spent at a university studying
for an M.Phil., the second year of which is spent on placement. I was sent to Edinburgh
University to the Social Anthropology Department where I was advised to study for a
PhD and underwent a crash course in 'becoming a social anthropologist'. The
Department became my 'field-site' and I initially felt like Malinowski; 'suddenly set
down surrounded by all (my) gear, alone on a tropical beach close to a native village,
while the launch or dinghy which has brought (me) sails away out of sight' (1961: 4). I
felt intellectually estranged; my previous training of little use in this new world. I had to
learn the language of social anthropology; that of tropes, hermeneutics, of techne and
o
metis, m order to convince the 'natives' of my worth . Having experienced over three
years in the social anthropology 'field' I feel that I can now understand the 'natives' better
and have in fact 'gone native', identifying myself as a social anthropologist with a tool-
bag of valuable skills to facilitate effective participant observation in the 'field'.
8My experience would therefore appear to respond positively to Clifford's question: 'Can the University
itself be seen as a kind of field site- a place of cultural juxtaposition, estrangement, rite of passage, transit
and learning? (Clifford 1997: 210).
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In September 1999, I was seconded to the ILO's International Programme for the
Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) in Tanzania 'in order to provide IPEC Tanzania
with additional research and analytical capacity to inform programme design' (DFID
1999a.). I was expected to conduct my fieldwork whilst carrying out my employment
duties for the ILO as a DFID employee. This combination of roles placed me in an
interesting position and has been useful in revealing the difficulties involved in
attempting to negotiate employment conditions within a power structure in which I have
little authority. This situation, whilst clearly less extreme, is helpful in understanding the
difficulties faced by child workers attempting to negotiate a fair work contract with a
'power-full' adult employer whose position is sustained through creating and employing
'docile bodies' (Foucault 1977).
My ethnographic research took the form of what Marcus (1986) has termed a 'multi-
locale ethnography'. Between September 1999 and December 2000, my time was
divided between the field office in Dar Es Salaam (eight months), a mining township in
Northern Tanzania, Mirerani (four months), and ILO HQ in Geneva (two months), as
shown in Box 1.1 below.
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Box 1.1 : The Research Process: A Chronology
September 1998 - September 1999 Preparation in Edinburgh
January 1999 Field visit to Tanzania to look at the overall
child rights framework and collect
secondary data
September 1999 - September 2000 Field work in Tanzania: Time divided
between ILO Office in Dar Es Salaam (8
months) and Mirerani Mines (4 months)
October 2000 - December 2000 Field work in ILO HQ, Geneva
January 2001 - December 2001 Writing- up in Edinburgh and cross¬
checking of ethnography with informants
First and foremost, my social positioning as a white, middle-class, university educated,
European female impacted on my intellectual disposition as well as the way in which I
was received in all three locales9. At ILO-IPEC, I was seen as a DFID social
development 'expert' with set functions and targets and also as a potential source of
much needed funding. In fact ILO-IPEC requested that one of my key activities be 'the
design of a sectoral programme for consideration by DFID'. The research opportunities
provided by such a position were substantial as I was given free and privileged access to
ILO-IPEC partners and resources. The key challenge, however, was reconciling my
various roles of committed child labour activist, ILO internee, DFID employee and
social anthropology PhD researcher.
In Mirerani, my position as an unmarried, childless woman meant that I was seen by
many as no more than a child, particularly by children themselves who saw me as far
younger than I am (27). My multiple identities were also a source of some confusion:
some saw me as a student, others as a link to ILO funds, others as a friend. This was
quite useful, however, as it allowed me to adopt different personae when attempting to
9An interesting discussion of positionality by a student in a similar position to myself is that of Crewe
(1992:4).
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obtain different types of information. For example, the hierarchical structures of
Tanzanian bureaucracy meant that as a young, female student it was quite difficult to
access information. As a white employee of a UN agency, however, I was perceived to
be a powerful person, regardless of gender, and was therefore given access to people and
documents which would have been harder to obtain by my student persona10. This also
meant, however, that information was given to me as a staff employee and not as a
researcher, which brought with it a different set of responsibilities with regard to
confidentiality and the use of data collected. Relationships of trust were formed by my
different personae and it was important not to breach confidentiality by my other
persona using the information for purposes other than that for which it was intended.
I found that different roles came to the fore in different moments: pre-fieldwork, initial
fieldwork and 'writing-up' were times very much associated with my social
anthropologist researcher self. My DFID identity became more dominant as proposals
were being put forward to DFID for funding and as the ILO bureaucratic procedures got
in the way of effective action, causing many delays (Chapter 7). As I became more and
more involved with people in Mirerani and consequently developed more empathy with
their lives, I found that my child labour activist self came to the fore, sparked principally
by my concerns with conducting what I felt to be extractive research. These children and
other community members had been interviewed by others before me and nothing had
ever come of the interviews, either by way of reports being sent back to the township or
by way of project funding. When it became clearer that DFID were not going to fund the
project proposal, for reasons entirely outside the project's control (Chapter 7), my social
anthropologist persona came to the fore in an attempt to understand how the less than
satisfactory chain of events could have been prevented. In Mirerani, the researcher
persona continued to carry out her research but the activist persona remained dominant,
using research findings to attempt to raise funds locally for the project proposal and also
becoming a member of the Board ofDirectors of the local NGO proposing to work with
child labourers. My role in the process was therefore as multifaceted as the process
10
An experience which was quite common in the early days of research when my student persona was
dominant.
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itself. In Geneva, I encountered similar identity crises: once again employed by DFID to
carry out specific tasks and yet also seen to be some form of ILO 'insider' due to the
Tanzania experience. This blurred identity, however, allowed me to continue with
participant observation and to get access to otherwise hidden data.
This section has thus revealed the importance of considering the social positioning of the
researcher when conducting research. The impact of social positioning is clearly
substantial and demonstrates that despite our best efforts there can be no such thing as an
objective ethnography: both researcher and informant are closely woven into a web of
personal experience, each interpreting the other in a way which reflects not only their
own positioning but the way in which the other's positioning has influenced their worlds.
1.2 Some methodological considerations:
Ethics, Access and Method
In terms of overall methodological approach, I adopted a participatory stance in my use
of ethnographic participant observation. It was very important for me to allow the
multiple voices to which I had privileged access to express themselves in as open a
manner as possible. In turn, it was therefore important that I was as open as possible
about my different personae and consequently I took on what Fine and Sandstrom
describe as 'explicit cover' (1988: 18), which involves being very open and honest about
my different roles. My 'participant observer' role was one which developed throughout
the research process: sometimes I saw myself very much as a participant, observing a
process in which I was also a central player. At other times, I was very much an observer
as opposed to a player, taking on a predominantly facilitatory role, as was the case with
focus group discussions, for example11.
11 Focus group discussions were a useful tool in that they allowed me to obtain concentrated amounts of
data from a number of people on the exact topics that I was interested in, as well as to note non-verbal
communication; they also enabled the observation of group dynamics which led to new research
questions. For further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of focus groups see Boyden and
Ennew (1997); Morgan (1997); Stewart and Shamdasani (1990).
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In terms of ethics, the selection of methods was more complicated when conducting
research with children in Mirerani than with the Organisation. The fact that I was
working with children, mainly in their place of work, meant that I had to be very
sensitive to the potential adverse consequences arising from my presence. Research of
this kind may be seen as challenging the status quo and may therefore be perceived as a
threat by those with a vested interest in child labour. I was concerned that employers
might dismiss or abuse children who revealed that their employment conditions were
exploitative. Furthermore, the research process may cause psychological distress to
informants or jealousy and feelings of rejection amongst those who felt excluded. It was
therefore important for all informants to consider the potential impact of their
12involvement before agreeing to take part in the research process (Johnson 1996: 31) .
Confidentiality was also an important issue and it was crucial that my informants felt
that they could trust me not to report them to the authorities, particularly in view of the
illegal nature of much of their work (not just in terms of age but in terms of working
without licences or safety equipment). Real names are therefore never used in this thesis
(ASA guidelines, www.lesl.man.ac.uk/asa/ethics.htm).
With regard to working with children, another relevant aspect ofmy positioning is my
status as an adult. Researchers have employed a range of techniques in forming
relationships with child informants. In the past, children were often ignored as research
subjects and attempts to find out about children's lives were often made through
questioning responsible adults, such as parents and teachers (James, Jenks and Prout
1998: 172-174). With the development in the late 1980s and 1990s of an 'anthropology
of childhood', based on a social constructionist perspective of childhood, the relationship
between adult researcher and child informant was transformed and certain researchers
have tried to narrow the distance between themselves and children. During her fieldwork
'^Another issue to consider is that of taking children from their work, education or leisure time. The research
process should interfere as little as possible with children's daily activities. Johnson suggests that the researcher
should go to where the children are conducting their activities and help with tasks (1996: 32). During my
fieldwork, it was completely inappropriate to help them with their tasks, as this would have involved going
down a private pit or helping them sort through their sand which would both have been appropriate due to the
fear of theft (I went down a pit belonging to the family with whom I lived on several occasions). It was very
important throughout the research to show that I was not interested in gem-stones as this would have put me in
the role ofbuyer or employer rather than researcher-activist.
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with young children in England, Anna Laerke sought to locate herself as firmly as
possible on 'the children's level' which involved dressing in similar ways to the children,
eating with them, addressing adults in the deferential ways expected of children,
imitating children and 'rejecting the instruments of adult domination' (1998: 3). Such a
novel technique clearly challenges a number of assumptions about how adults interpret
children but I did not feel comfortable adopting such a role and I would question how
children would feel with such an 'invasion'. I am clearly an adult in terms of size, age
and experience and children would see straight through my 'child' persona. This is also
an argument used by Fine and Sandstrom who suggest that:
Like the white researcher in black society, the male researcher studying women,
or the ethnologist observing a distant tribal culture, the adult participant observer
who attempts to understand a children's culture cannot pass unnoticed as a
member of that group (1988: 13)13.
My position was therefore to recognise the differences between child informants and
myself and to consider the significance of these differences as well as the role of age and
culture in defining childhood (Chapter 8). As a white, female adult my presence was one
of novelty as well as power. Regardless of this, however, the children were so engaged
with their work that only those with whom I had built a rapport would give me more
time than a simple comment. My response to this, as well as to my concern with
conducting extractive research by virtue of the fact that I was taking children away from
their work and giving them little in return, was to give all mining children informants an
item of clothing (facilitated by my DFID one tonne freight allowance). This was a useful
technique and many children in fact sold the clothes on to make some cash, which meant
that there was some recompense for the time spent talking with me and my research
assistant.
In terms of language, it is important to note that although I had studied Swahili for a
year before going on field work and spoke the language relatively well I was always
l3Geertz's argument that anthropologists do not have to turn native to argue from a native's point of view
can also be used to argue that childhood researchers do not have to pretend to be children (Geertz 1983
cited in James, Jenks and Prout 1998: 183).
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accompanied by my research assistant/interpreter who was a male miner and who played
a vital facilitatory role throughout the research process. This was also essential in terms
ofmy safety: women are not supposed to go up to the mines for their own security (see
Chapter 5.2) and I found myself in extremely dangerous situations on more than one
occasion. In view of the large sums ofmoney going through the area, many people carry
guns and it was therefore important for my own protection to be with a well-known male
miner. Mirerani is also a multi-lingual area with different groups of people speaking
different tribal languages. My research assistant spoke Chagga (a dominant language),
Swahili and 'miner language' which consists of Swahili slang particular to the mines and
often used to mask illicit activities (see for example, the discussion on the township
name in 5.2).
With regard to my work in the ILO, the dominant method employed was participant
observation. The primary concern throughout the process related to confidentiality.
Access was never an issue, with the Director of ILO Tanzania and one of the Geneva
Directors giving me full access to any information that I requested. Staff and social
partners were extremely open to being interviewed and to my taking part in meetings.
This was facilitated by the fact that I was seen as 'one of us', in that I was also working
for the Organisation. Only on one or two occasions was I told that information was 'off
the record' and this applied to personal opinions about other staff members. I did,
however, have to self-limit the type of material used as the reality is that both the ILO
and DFID will read this thesis and it is therefore important that staff members are not
identifiable as this could lead to problems not just for myself but for them.
Another difficulty I faced was the fact that a number of staff informants became friends,
emphasised by the fact that we had similar cultural backgrounds and objectives in terms
of our professions. I therefore found myself in the difficult position of attempting to
carry out a critique of their work, in which I was also implicated as a staff member: a
problem also facing other organisational ethnographers:
Having been deeply entwined in the lives and views of those with whom I spent
so much time, I felt a sense of protectiveness towards them. Yet at the same time
I felt critical of some of things that they had done. These different impulses were
not easy to marry; and all made writing an especially awkward process of
negotiation and expression. (MacDonald 2001: 92)
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Initial writing up was thus difficult to negotiate but with time I was able to 'detach'
myself from the process, to move away from the emotional ties, and to 'make the
familiar strange'. This was facilitated by a genuine desire to understand the process and
what it was that led to the delays and failure to reach the children themselves.
1.3 Outlining the Thesis
This thesis attempts to explore two key hypotheses. The first relates to current
anthropological thought, expounded by Foucault influenced theorists such as Boyden,
which argues that failure of organisations such as the ILO to successfully tackle child
labour is due to the adoption of a 'Northern construction of childhood', which is then
exported globally and imposed in culturally distinct countries. My hypothesis is that the
vision of childhood used by the ILO is a far more complex process of negotiation and re¬
negotiation. I use historical and contemporary evidence to explore the roots of the
campaign against child labour (Chapter 2) and the vision of childhood promoted by the
ILO (Chapter 3). I draw on the arguments of Gardner and Lewis (2000) to argue that the
'Northern construction of childhood' theory denies agency to the many activists in non-
Northern countries who have been central in developing and fighting for the vision of
childhood promoted by the ILO.
My second hypothesis is that it is not a particular vision or 'construction' of childhood
which is responsible for failure to translate good intentions into successful programme
implementation but specific bureaucratic procedures, power relations and human failings
within the machinations of international bureaucracies. Drawing on the unique
opportunity of working within the ILO for 14 months, Chapter 4 explores the multiple
discourses and practices of those responsible for implementing the ILO 'vision' at
headquarters in Geneva in an attempt to explore what lies under the apparently rigid and
'dehumanised' organisational structures. Chapter 5 attempts to move beyond 'vision' and
towards reality and considers the factors that led to the growth of child labour in
Tanzania generally and in Mirerani, a mining township in Northern Tanzania,
specifically. The way in which the ILO conducts its child labour programme in Tanzania
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is explored in Chapter 6 and notions such as 'top-down', 'power-distance' and
'organisational culture' are explored in order to deepen our understanding of the
organisational dynamics. Chapter 7 takes one particular case study of the development
of an intervention programme in Mirerani. I explore the particular factors which
prevented so many 'good intentions' from being translated into effective practice for the
benefit of the children in Mirerani, drawing primarily on the work of Hertzfeld (1992),
Fineman (1993) and Chambers (1983, 1997, 1998). Chapter 8 considers the missing
link, in other words, the children themselves and the cultural constructions of childhood
and work which are dominant in Mirerani. In this Chapter I argue that 'children's voices'
should come first and yet are superseded in importance and in resource allocation by the
need to negotiate bureaucratic procedures, power relations and 'people' issues within the
Organisation. The final chapter, Chapter 9, attempts to take a step back from the
ethnography itself and to place the answers to the two central hypotheses into a wider
context by considering how these findings contribute to wider anthropological debates,
knowledge and practice.
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2. Child Labour and the ILO:
A Historical Analysis
Growing international concern in the problem of child labour has culminated in the
universal adoption14 of a new international convention on the worst forms of child
labour, ILO Convention 182 (1999). Convention 182 has already achieved the fastest
ratification pace in ILO history (ILO 2000b: 1), 100 ratifications by September 2001,
demonstrating the high profile nature of the child labour agenda.
The ILO has been committed to the abolition of child labour since its inception in 1919
and its programme on child labour has become its flagship, so successful in attracting
donor money that it has the largest budget of any ILO programme (see Chapter 4). It is
useful to briefly highlight the historical development of ILO involvement in the fight
against child labour in order to better contextualise our present day understanding of the
Organisation. This chapter attempts to explore the reasons for the creation of the ILO,
one of the first international human rights organisations, and for the inclusion of child
labour, one of the first universal 'child rights' issues. The final section explores the
development of the child labour agenda within the historical development of the ILO.
14 'Universal' in terms of adoption by all 175 ILO member states. It is important to note that adoption does
not mean ratification. Adoption is the commitment made by delegates at the International Labour
Conference whereas ratification is the act by which member states formally undertake to make the
provisions of a Convention effective in their national laws and practices. For further discussion on
ratification see Osieke (1985: 152).
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2.1 What were the historical developments which led to the creation
of the ILO?
The special treatment accorded to the social problem by the peace makers of
1919 can be understood only in the light of the past. In the history of institutions,
thought has always preceded action (ILO 1931: 22)
Although the ILO was formally established by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, its
constitution embodied in Part XIII of the Treaty which emphasised the importance of
fair and decent labour conditions to social justice and universal peace, the formal
constitution of the Organisation was merely the end result of a long historical process in
which lobbyists such as philanthropic factory bosses, the fast-growing trade union
movement and parliamentary reformers, amongst others, argued for 'international'
agreement on labour standards (Brett 1994: 24)15. This section attempts to highlight the
key factors which led to the creation of the ILO, the first ever League ofNations/ United
Nations specialised agency, to explore the thought which preceded the action, and brings
with it the usual caveat of any historical analysis based on limited sources16. It is hoped
that such an analysis will shed light upon a number of questions which will arise in later
chapters.
According to many commentators, the ideological origins of the ILO are to be found in
the nineteenth century with the advent of the industrial revolution, which produced 'a
new industrial working class whose problems ceased to be local and became national
and international' (ILO 1933: 5, see also Ghebali 1987: 21-22). The 'human costs' of the
industrial revolution led to the development of two complementary sets of ideas: the
need for international regulation of work as well as the need for an international labour
15
Although the literature refers to 'international' processes, the origins of the ILO and of the moves for
international labour regulation are firmly rooted in West European, and to a lesser extent North American,
history.
16 Available texts refer mainly to the same limited sources and yet within their analyses there are a number
of conflicting statements, particularly with regard to dates. The version I present is the result of extensive
analysis and cross-referencing of the various sources with the aim of presenting the most accurate picture
possible.
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organisation. The main arguments brought forward were: humanitarian, the need to
improve the conditions of workers; political, social peace is dependent on the protection
of workers; and economic in that unequal working conditions between countries would
affect competition (Ghebali 1987: 23). The political motivation will be discussed further
below but it is perhaps useful to refer to some primary sources in order to gain a better
understanding of the humanitarian and economic motivations.
The misery brought about by the industrial revolution and the difficulties faced by
workers is brought vividly to life by commentators from the 1820s and 1830s, who
express their shock at the situation ofmany workers:
Some of these lords of the loom have in their employ thousands of miserable
creatures. In the cotton spinning work these creatures are kept, fourteen hours in
each day, locked up, summer and winter, in a heat of from EIGHTY TO
EIGHTY FOUR DEGREES. The Rules which they are subjected to we saw as
no negroes were ever subjected to. (William Cobbett, Political Register, 20th
November 1824, Vol. II cited in Tames 1971: 91, emphasis in original text).
And:
The vast deterioration in personal form which has brought about in the
manufacturing population, during the last thirty years, a period not extending
over one generation, is singularly impressive (..) Their complexion is sallow and
pallid (..) Their limbs slender, and playing badly and ungracefully. A very
general bowing of the legs (..) A spiritless and dejected air (P Gaskell, The
Manufacturing Population of England, 1833, Chapter 4, cited in Tames 1971:
132-133).
The misery and poverty brought about by the industrial revolution led to campaigns by a
number of philanthropists for the introduction of national labour standards. Activists
from these countries consequently argued that national standards would lead to unfair
economic competition from countries without such standards and therefore started to
call for international standards to be set in place.
The fear of the introduction of national labour standards on competition was clearly
expressed by the resolution of a group ofwool manufacturers meeting in Halifax in 1831
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and which referred to the introduction of a Parliamentary Bill limiting the hours of
labour in textile factories to eleven hours daily:
It will raise the price of goods to the consumers, which will affect the home trade
considerably, and will produce the most serious effects on the prosperity of this
district, by tending to foster the manufacturers of foreign nations, our trade with
whom depends on the cheap advantageous terms on which we now supply them
with goods, and whose manufacturers would be enabled by an advance of price
successfully to compete with the British merchant (Follows 1951: 13, citing
Kydd 1857 : 109)
This fear is similar to that expressed by some commentators in poor countries today who
argue against the introduction of a number of international labour standards on the basis
that such measures would reduce their competitiveness and therefore be detrimental to
their economic development (see 3.4).
Therefore, while the misery and poverty of the working classes motivated the fight of
the philanthropists at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the fear of unfair
competition inspired the development of private, voluntary organisations fighting for
international labour standards during the second half of the nineteenth century17
(Ghebali 1987: 24-25). The best example of one of these private organisations is the
1900 International Association for the Legal Protection ofWorkers, which can be seen
as the direct antecedent of the ILO. The International Association was composed of
intellectuals and others, with governments invited to appoint a representative to the
committee of the Association. One of its most active members, Ernest Mahaim,
described the Association as 'consisting of middle-class reformers sympathetic to the
working classes' (Phelan undated: 30). According to Albert Thomas, first director of the
ILO (Thomas 1996 [1921]: 264), the International Association had two fatal
weaknesses. Firstly, proposals could only be adopted through diplomatic channels i.e.
through lengthy conference proceedings and then submitted for final
17 The idea that labour problems are international was expressed as far back as 1788 by Louis XVI's
former financial adviser. The argument against factory regulation was that it would raise the costs of
production which would handicap manufacturers who compete with foreign producers. See Follows
(1951: Preface).
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approval/rejection/amendment to diplomats who had little expertise in the issues.
Secondly, the nature of the organisation itself was problematic as members of
employers' and workers' organisations were never included in discussions.
The liberal reform movement of the nineteenth century, based on the humanitarian and
economic issues discussed above, led to the creation of a number of forerunners to the
ILO, such as the 1890 International Convention on Labour Law in Berlin organised by
the Swiss government; the 1900 International Association for the Legal Protection of
Workers set up by a group of scholars and economists in Paris to convene international
labour conferences and which was responsible for the adoption of two draft labour
conventions in 1906 banning night shifts for women workers and prohibiting the use of
phosphorous in match production; the 1916 Leeds, 1917 Stockholm and the 1918 Berne
conferences on labour where the demand for a permanent international labour office was
formalised (see ILO 1931:22-25; Brett 1994: 24-25; Guerin 1995: 17-21; Raman 1978:
9-14).
1 R
It was not until the First World War that the voice of the labour movements who were
campaigning for international labour legislation began to be heard (Beguin 1959: 406;
Ghebali 1987:27-28). The formation of the International Working Men Association or
the First Internationale in London in 1864 led to the first International Workers'
Movement. This Movement was later to split into the Second (Socialist) Internationale
and then again to form the International Federation of Trade Unions (Raman 1978:14).
During the First World War these organisations as well as other trade union movements
held a number of national and international conferences (see above), the common theme
being that any peace treaty must include social clauses as well as provision for the
creation of a body to monitor these (Ghebali 1987: 29). The sacrifices of wartime left
many with the feeling that peace must mean something more than a return to the pre¬
war conditions. A new order needed to be created; and the workers' delegates at the
international conferences of 1916, 1917 and 1918 argued that peace should:
18 For an extensive history of labour movements in Europe, dating back to the Romans, see Durkheim
(1968: Preface to the 2nd Edition ).
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safeguard the working class of all countries from the attacks of international
capitalist competition and assure it a minimum guarantee of moral and material
order as regards labour legislation, trade union rights, migration, social
insurance, hours ofwork and industrial hygiene and safety (quoted in ILO 1931:
2519).
By the time of the drafting of the Peace Treaty international labour regulation had
become a central political concern. The war-time campaigns for the rights of workers
and for the establishment of an international body could not be ignored by the
governments, who felt not only that the workers deserved some compensation for their
war time sacrifices but also feared the contagious effect of the socialist revolutions that
90
had occurred elsewhere in the world . The victory of the Bolsheviks was threatening
established order throughout Europe and unrest and strikes were to mark the end of the
war, even in countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands which had not been
engaged in the hostilities (Beguin 1959: 406-407; Ghebali 1987: 29; Stewart 1969: 4-5).
The response of the Peace Treaty drafters was to set up a 15-member Commission on
International Labour Legislation, representing delegates from Belgium, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States21. The
Commission was not just composed of Government representatives but also of
individuals who had influenced the 'intellectual' development of the pre-war labour
movement, such as Arthur Fontaine and Ernest Mahaim, but also trade union
representatives, notably George Barnes and Samuel Compers, the Commission's
19 The reference for the quote is not given in the text but is presented as a quote by the workers delegates
of the Leeds, Stockholm and Berne conferences.
20 For commentaries from British parliamentarians see Hansard (1918: 1580; 1919: 968- 978).
21 Certain countries had more than one delegate, explaining the apparent number mismatch. Non-allied
forces were not invited to join which meant that neither neutral Switzerland not Germany, who had
respectively organised and hosted the 1890 Berlin international convention on labour law, were party to
the discussions. This meant not only that their expertise was lost but is interesting in the light of the fact
that the ILO sits in Switzerland and that Germany was later to become the instigator and primary funder of
IPEC.
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President (Ghebali 1987: 31). Phelan (undated: 17) described Gompers22 as a 'fortunate'
choice, 'only a chairman of exceptional ability and long experience could have presided
with success over a meeting in which so many issues had to be discussed'. The aim of
the Commission was :
To enquire into the conditions of employment from the international aspect and
to consider the international means necessary to secure common action on
matters affecting conditions of employment, and to recommend the form of a
permanent agency to continue such enquiry and consideration in co-operation
with and under the direction of the League ofNations (ILO 1931: 26).
A number of proposals were submitted to the Commission but it was the document of
the British Delegation which was finally approved. According to Ghebali (1987: 30),
three points are worth noting with regard to the drafting of the ILO constitution. Firstly,
the two men primarily responsible for the drafting process, Harold Butler and Edward
Phelan, were later to become ILO Directors; secondly, the starting point for the
organisation was the concrete experience of the International Association for the Legal
Protection of Workers; and thirdly, the concept of tripartism (direct involvement not
only of government but of the employers and workers as well) was included from the
very first stages. The key question which arises here, however, is where did this
revolutionary idea of tripartism come from? Ghebali (1987:30) tells us that Edward
Phelan was influenced by the writings of the socialist writer Leonard Woolf, who had
published an article in 1916 in the London Fabian Society journal advocating tripartism.
Beguin (1959: 409) also attributes the inclusion of tripartism to Edward Phelan, arguing
that Phelan based his proposal on the experiences of the British Board of Trade which,
concerned with the problem ofwar stoppages and the need to sustain the war effort, had
created joint councils of workers and employers within non-unionised industries where
salaries were especially low. The idea of tripartism was not, therefore, a proposal of the
22 Phelan spells the name as Gompers, unlike Ghebali who spells it Compers. For a revealing and personal
account of the gomgs-on of the Commission see Phelan (undated).
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trades union movements, nor of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, nor of the employers.
Instead it was the brainchild of a British civil servant23.
The final proposal of Great Britain, officially submitted by George Barnes, the labour
representative in Lloyd George's coalition government, involved the creation of a
permanent administration which would hold periodic conferences in which delegates
would represent government, workers, and employers, each with an equal voice. Other
than the inclusion of tripartism, the proposal held another radical suggestion: the break
with the diplomatic 'tradition that treaties had to be adopted by unanimous vote, signed
by plenipotentiaries, and ratified by sovereigns with, where appropriate, the advice and
consent of parliaments' (Beguin 1959: 412). This lengthy process often ended in failure.
Phelan's proposal was that all member governments must propose any decision arrived
at by a two-thirds majority before their national parliament. Thus the process would be
speeded up by this new approach to international convention making. It is important to
note that the proposal to create the ILO was only one part of the wider Peace Treaty,
although the proposal gave rise to considerable debate:
Luckily for the ILO, when the time came to examine the text that was to become
its fundamental charter, the Powers were at sword's point on all the basic
problems of the Peace Treaty. Preoccupied with this political impasse, the
plenipotentiaries unanimously accepted as a whole the proposal of the
Commission on International Labour Legislation (Beguin 1959: 412).
This is significant as it would appear that the proposal of the ILO was 'rushed through'
in a sense and therefore a number of its more original and radical aspects, such as
tripartism, were approved with almost no debate. This is fortunate when one considers
the extremity of views expressed within the Commission itself before a final proposal
could be approved and the fact that the final proposal was only accepted by 8 votes to 7
(Phelan undated: 32).
For further detail on the history of Phelan and tripartism see Beguin (1959: 408-411) and Phelan (undated: 3).
The influence of the individual is one that we return to again in this thesis, see Chapters 4, 6 and 7, particularly
with regard to the conflicting theories which regard the Organisation as a sovereign, non-human body and those
which see the organisation as merely the end product of the activities of individuals.
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And so the constitution of the ILO was approved in April 1919, later to be Part XIII of
the Treaty of Versailles, in an atmosphere of dynamism, enthusiasm and more
importantly optimism for a world in which collective agreements could solve
fundamental problems of social justice and peace. Chapters I and II ofPart XIII form the
actual constitution of the ILO and regulates its working and the obligations assumed by
member states24. As important, however, are the Preamble, which precedes Chapter I,
and Section II, which give the 'soul' to the Organisation (ILO 1931: 28).
It is worth quoting the preamble in its entirety in order to illustrate the optimism and the
ambition that lay behind the Constitution of the ILO :
whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal
peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice;
and whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and
privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace
and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those
conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of
work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the
regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision
of an adequate living wage, protection of the worker against sickness, disease
and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young
persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the interests
of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the
principle of freedom of association, the organisation of vocational and technical
education and other measures;
Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in
their own countries;
The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as
well as by the desire to secure a permanent peace of the world, agreed the
following:
The 'following' being Chapters I and II. The Preamble was thus an emotional plea to
governments and employers to respond to the needs of workers in a concerted effort to
bring about universal peace and social justice. Section II lays down the General
24 The Constitution is explored further in Chapter 3.
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Principles which required immediate action, including the right of association, payment
of a reasonable wage, the adoption of an eight hour day and a 24 hour weekly rest
period, the abolition of child labour, the principle of equal remuneration for work of
equal value for men and women, equitable economic treatment of all workers and a
system of inspection to ensure the enforcement of laws and regulations25. The
significance of the document is perhaps brought even better into perspective when one
remembers that this was written twenty five years before the advent of the United
Nations and its plethora of specialised agencies. In a time when we are continually
bombarded by talks of'social justice', 'peace', 'development', 'aid' etc. it is all too easy
to forget how radical these ideas were at the end of the First World War, as well as the
campaigns fought by committed individuals to even get these words into the common
language and practice of the politicians.
The creation of the ILO was thus the result of a century long process during which
different groups of people, with different interests, campaigned for international labour
legislation and the creation of an international labour organisation. The abolition of child
labour was one of the priorities of the constitution drafters, the protection of children
highlighted in the preamble and the abolition of child labour included in the priorities for
action listed in Section II. What were the factors, however, which led to the inclusion of
child labour in the list of international labour priorities?
25 None of which are guaranteed to this day, even in Northern Europe.
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2.2 What led to the inclusion of child labour in the ILO objectives?
The protection of children against industrial exploitation is one of the first fields
in which labour legislation was adopted. Many Governments had adopted
legislative measures to protect children long before they thought of intervening
in the regulation of conditions of adult labour. (..) And when the movement in
favour of international labour legislation began to develop, one of the questions
which appeared in the forefront of every programme was the protection of
children. It was therefore natural that when the International Labour
Organisation was established by Part XIII of the Peace Treaty in 1919, a
prominent place should have been given in its constitution to the legal protection
of children (ILO 1926: 1).
The above quote from a 1926 ILO publication is useful in demonstrating that the
protection of children was at the forefront of concern for labour regulation. To what
extent, however, is the inclusion of the child labour abolition objective in the ILO
constitution really 'natural'? In order to explore this question it is useful to explore the
wider historical context of the development of the international movement for labour
regulation itself. In addition, however, any discussion of child labour must be
contextualised within conceptions of childhood and child development (Boyden, Ling,
Myers: 1998: 27). Extensive historical analyses of the development of'childhood' have
been already conducted (Aries 1986 [I960]; Cunningham 1991, 1995a, 1995b; Jenks
1996; Hendrick 1997; James, Jenks and Prout 1998; Lavalette 1999) so I propose to
highlight only the key developments pertinent to our study of child labour.
According to Hendrick (1997 [1990]: 35):
the numerous perceptions of childhood, which have been produced over the last
200 years or so, can only be fully comprehended within the context of how
different generations and social classes have responded to the social, economic,
religious and political challenges of their respective eras.
It is therefore useful to briefly consider the perceptions of childhood which led to the
inclusion of child labour as one of the international community's priority areas for
action towards social justice, as laid down in the ILO constitution. It is important to
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remember at this point that the primary drafters of the ILO constitution were British and
that the experiences of Great Britain would therefore have been foremost in the minds of
the drafters. Furthermore, 'the Industrial Revolution developed first in Great Britain; it
was there that it first victimised childhood, and consequently it was there that the legal
protection of young persons first got under way' (ILO 1933: 5). It is for this reason that I
select mainly British sources for this section26.
According to Hendrick (1997: 36), who provides a succinct summary of the writings of
previous commentators, particularly Cunningham (1991, 1995b), there is 'a general
agreement among historians that from the late seventeenth century a new attitude
towards children (and notions of childhood) began to manifest itself. This attitude was
one, inspired by the writings of Locke and Rousseau, which saw childhood as a 'natural'
state i.e. as distinct from adulthood. Children therefore had different and particular
needs. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Romantic and Evangelical revivals had
led to a new vision of childhood in which childhood was seen as a quality, the 'source of
'innocence" in the words of Hendrick (1997 [1990]: 37), as opposed to a state of
preparation for adulthood. With the industrial revolution and the Evangelical revival (see
Hendrick 1997 [1990]: 38-30) came alternative visions of childhood, each group arguing
that their's was the correct one. The domain of 'childhood' thus became, and continues
to be, a contested terrain. In the years that were to follow, particular theories of
'childhood' were used by various groups of adults to argue for their particular visions of
society.
Where does our particular interest, that of child labour, fit into these conflicting visions
of childhood? Until the end of the eighteenth century, child labour was an issue which
was relatively ignored (Alden 1909: 3, Hendrick 1997 [1990]: 39), although as early as
1284 a Venetian glass makers' statute forbade the employment of children in certain
dangerous branches of the glass making trade and in 1396 a Venetian declaration
prohibited work for children under 13 in certain trades (Weiner 1991: 110). Work was
26 It would be useful to conduct a comparative survey of the development in thought on childhood and
child labour across Europe, although De Wilde's (2000) text on Belgium is particularly useful in
illustrating the similarities between Belgian and British thought and experience.
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seen as a form of life education in which children would learn important lessons
necessary to the transition to adulthood as well as a necessary component to family
survival strategies (similar to the Tanzanian perspective explored in 5.1). Lavalette
(1998) provides a particularly useful historical summary of child labour during 'proto-
industrialisation' i.e. the period before the 'take-off as well as during the industrial
revolution. He argues that while children and their families laboured under harsh
conditions during proto-industrialisation, it was the spread of the competitive market
relations and the commodification of labour which led to an intensification of child
labour. When production outstripped local consumption middle men or 'merchant
capitalists' took control over the production process, their access to markets allowing
them to control prices and force down wages, forcing families to hire out their children
to increase family income. In the words of a British child welfare commentator writing
in 1909:
Up to the end of the eighteenth century it would not be unjust to say that
practically no consideration whatever had been given to the child, except on the
part of a few philanthropists, and not even a beginning of legislative work for the
welfare and education of children had been made. But with the end of the
eighteenth century commenced the industrial revival which grew rapidly (..)
amongst the new and complex social problems which arose was the question of a
sufficient supply of cheap labour for the new industries which are being started
in all directions in the manufacturing districts. Choosing the line of least
resistance, our statesmen, our administrators, our employers, turned with one
accord to the child, who was consequently engaged in large numbers (Alden
1909:3-4).
Children, along with other groups of workers, thus found themselves employed in
miserable, slave-like conditions. Alden continues to describe the pitiful condition facing
these children:
The average number of hours worked by these gangs of little children was from
12-14, but frequently 16 or 18 hours was the period a which quite little children
were engaged in unhealthy labour. Naturally the death rate amongst these
children was very high, and even where they did not die, the effect of the hard
labour for excessive hours, the unhealthy air of the factory the bad or insufficient
food, was an enfeebled and wretched maturity (Alden 1909: 4-5).
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This quote raises a number of issues worthy of comment. Firstly, it was this type of
depiction of the misery faced by child labourers that led to a change in the vision of
'childhood'. The child was no longer seen as purely 'innocent' or 'natural' but as a
'victim' (which can be seen as a sequential progression from the other two categories) in
need of adult protection. School came to replace the workplace as the natural
environment of the child. Secondly, the conditions faced by children were also faced by
many adults (see 8.1.1 where I argue that child labour should be seen more as a 'class'
or 'group' labour issue than as an 'age' specific issue). Thirdly, the quote is striking in
that the vision portrayed and the language used is almost identical to descriptions of
child labour in poor countries today. Finally, it is worth noting the subjective nature of
Alden's depiction. De Wilde (2000: 12) provides an extremely interesting analysis of the
voices of working children in Belgium between 1800 and 1914 and argues that the
common portrayals of the child labourer are flawed in that they present only the most
terrible aspects of child labour and minors are seen as inarticulate, defenceless victims.
Indeed this portrayal of the child labourer as victim persists to this day. The argument
that many child labourers are active participants in forming their life paths, choosing to
engage in child labour for a variety of personal and economic reasons has only recently
emerged (see Ennew 1994; Boyden, Ling and Myers 1998). This is a theme to which
return in Chapters 3 and 8.
It has thus been shown that the vision of 'childhood' has been in a state of constant
27flux . The child labour phenomenon, however, was largely responsible for inspiring one
of the most pervasive visions of childhood as a state of dependence, of passivity, of
potential victimisation. This vision is still used to this day, although recent
commentators have argued for a new 'sociology of childhood' (James and Prout 1997
[1990]; James, Jenks and Prout 1998), inspired largely by wider postmodernist and
deconstructionist movements.
27 The argument that childhood is a modern concept is one which is extremely controversial (see debates
around Aries 1960). I take the view that the various life stages of the human being have always been
'known' and that the seventeenth century cannot be seen as the birth of 'childhood' although it can
perhaps be seen as the birth of the 'modem' vision of childhood.
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Having briefly explored child labour within the context of the wider 'childhood' debates
it is also important to consider child labour within the wider social reform debates of the
post industrial revolution nineteenth century. Hendrick argues that many commentators
of the time saw the plight of the child labourer as :
symbolic of profound and often little-understood changes in British society,
changes that often appeared to threaten what was held to be a natural order. In
campaigning against child labour, reformers - of varying persuasions- were in
effect arguing about much else besides, including the direction of
industrialization and, within this context, the meaning of progress (Hendrick
1997: 40, italics in original text).
Again this quote is striking in its applicability to today's debates on child labour in poor
countries. Furthermore, it helps us to understand the prominence of the issue for
nineteenth century campaigners. It was very difficult for politicians and others to dispute
the 'inhumane' and 'uncivilised' treatment of the wretched factory child. Child labour
9 o
thus became one of the flagship issues of social campaigners . Cunningham (1991) and
Hendrick (1997) provide a useful analysis of the wider historical context which gave
strength to the anti-child labour campaigns29. It is useful to merely highlight a number of
them as parallels can be drawn to the situation facing present day child labour
campaigns. Firstly, middle and upper classes were afraid of the impact of the growing
labour movement on social order and national security. Child labour was a relatively
unthreatening issue which could be taken on board with the hope of appeasing
campaigners. Secondly, discussions leading to the 1802 Factory Act made clear that
children were not equal participants in the drawing up of labour contracts and were
therefore in a different situation to adult workers, who were seen as 'free'. Thirdly, the
anti-child labour campaign coincided with the anti-slavery movement of the time. With
slaves being freed in far away countries, it was hard to justify the existence of British
children working in slave-like conditions.
28 This is interesting in the light of 4.1 which reveals that the ILO child labour programme is its flagship
programme.
29 See also chapters on child work in Walvin (1982), Hopkins (1994).
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Fourthly, the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, 1802, failed to apply to children
working in the more hazardous industries. Campaigners argued that the special character
of children meant that they were more vulnerable to the physical and moral dangers of
labour and that their exposure to these could threaten the reproduction of society.
Finally, it is important to note the threat of the growing demand for the labour ofwomen
and children to the 'natural' order in which the wages of men were to provide for the
family. Instead there was a growing situation of unemployed fathers, made redundant in
favour of the cheaper labour of their wives and children30.
From 1802 onwards there was a string of parliamentary acts with the aim of reducing
child labour (Hopkins 1994). The campaigners had at least succeeded in getting their
issue onto the public agenda. The Berlin conference of 1890 (2.1) stated that no children
under the age of 12 should work in industry, there was also a draft convention banning
the night work of children under 16 developed at the 1913 Berne conference (2.1),
(Stewart 1969: 3). It would therefore appear that it was inevitable that the ILO
constitution should, in reflecting the key priority labour issues of the day, take the
abolition of child labour to be one of its primary areas of intervention. A closer look at
the debates of the time reveals that the inclusion of child labour was not so clear cut. In
Phelan's personal memories (undated: 2), he describes a conversation with Professor
Shotwell, an American delegate, during a series of Peace Treaty meetings:
Shotwell outlined a memorandum he had written proposing that a provision
should be inserted in the Peace Treaty prohibiting child labour. This, he argued,
was the one question of social reform which had no connection with class
warfare, and one that made a universal appeal to humanitarian sentiment. 'The
Congress of Vienna banned the slave trade; the Congress of Paris must save
children' was his eloquent conclusion. Impressive though this was, his approach
seemed to me to be curiously remote from the realities of the situation (..)
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States had declared federal
legislation on child labour unconstitutional, and it hardly seemed likely that the
Government of the United States would take the initiative in proposing
international action on the subject.
30 This situation is similar to one observed in Tanzania by a UNICEF study (1995) which revealed that
work traditionally assigned to men is being passed on to children. See Chapter 5.1.
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The quote is revealing in illustrating the motivation for some behind the inclusion of the
child labour objective as well as the fact that its inclusion was by no means a fait
accompli. Eventually, however, the objective was included in article 427, paragraph 6,
of the Treaty of Versailles, later to become article 41 of the ILO constitution, and which
stated that:
The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour
of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure
their proper physical development
was to be of 'special and urgent importance' to the High Contracting Parties31. The
abolition of child labour was thus definitively linked to the ultimate goals of the ILO.
2.3 The evolution of the child labour objective
The early days of the ILO were characterised by 'boundless enthusiasm and explosive
energy' (Morse 1969: 13) and the belief that collective action could lead to a future in
. • 32
which there would be universal peace and social justice . No time was lost m getting
started and the first session of the International Labour Conference was opened in
Washington on 29 October 1919, with the employment of children on its agenda (ILO
1931: 143). It was at this first Conference that the ILO adopted its first minimum age
convention33 and since then there have been nine further sectoral minimum age
conventions as well as the more comprehensive Minimum Age Convention, no. 138
(1973) and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, no. 182 (1999)34. It would
31
Although remaining legally in force Article 41 was later removed but it is unclear exactly when or why.
It has been argued that the article became unnecessary with the signing of the 1944 Philadelphia
Declaration of Principles in that the basis of the Declaration was article 41 and therefore superseded it.
There is no mention in the Declaration, however, of child labour, except article III (4) which places the
obligation on ILO to further 'provision for child welfare'.
32 The ILO was actually established in Geneva before the League ofNations itself (Morse 1969: 13).
3j ILO C5 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, 1919.
34 For a full listing see Haspels and Jankanish (2000: 87).
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therefore appear that throughout the historical development of the ILO the issue of child
labour, at least with regard to legislative development, has remained firmly on the
agenda. Has this really been the case, however?
This section explores the evolution of the child labour objective within the wider
development of the ILO. Such a historical analysis allows us to explore the extent to
which the wider context has influenced the various directions which the ILO has chosen
to take through time as well as to examine the patterns behind fluctuations in interest in
child labour abolition, if any. Unfortunately, the texts which proved so useful to our
understanding of the rise of the child labour issue until the creation of the ILO only
provide data up to the First World War. There is a dearth of data on the international
community and child labour from this period until the 1990s when there was an
explosion in writing on child labour, amongst other child related issues35. In fact most of
the writings on eighteenth and nineteenth century child labour were also written in the
1990s. The available data is primarily ILO material (ILO 1926; ILO 1931; ILO 1933;
ILO 1969; Morse 1969; ILO 1978; ILO 1985; ILO 1989)36.
Before embarking on this section, it is useful to briefly highlight a number of key
developments in the wider child rights' movement as these provide an important back¬
drop for the evolution of the child labour objective within the ILO. Firstly, it is
important to note that at the same time as the setting up of the ILO, an equally important
organisation in the international campaign for children's rights and for child labour
intervention was also established: the Save the Children Movement, dedicated to child
protection and responsible for the first global charter on child rights; the Declaration of
Child Rights (Ermew 2000: 44). This Declaration was later embodied in the League of
Nations' 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which included the right
j5 The debate surrounding the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 was largely responsible for
this explosion.
36 We focus more on the publications of the 1990s in later chapters, as unfortunately the majority of these
publications provide little historical context.
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not to be economically exploited (Black 1996: 21) . This right is thus embedded in the
first international child rights Declaration, and not just in the first International Peace
Organisation, demonstrating its importance as a universal rights issue. The 1924
Declaration was later incorporated into the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the
Child. Ennew (2000) argues that these declarations all took the child as objects of
human rights law as opposed to subjects of rights and it was not until the International
Year of the Child in 1979 that the international community started to see children as full
subjects of rights, influenced primarily by the Polish government's proposal for a
Convention on the Rights of the Child, based on the Declaration of 1959. From 1979 to
1989, government representatives met annually to turn the Declaration into a human
rights instrument which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989. The
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) thus came into being and has been of
extreme importance in moving the child rights' agenda forward. In the words of Maggie
Black (1996: 139):
The pursuit of rights as a rallying cry helped redefine the children's cause. It
provided a framework in which to view childhood universally, across cultures
and societies, across the North-South, rich-poor divides.
The CRC was thus a stimulus for the world-wide attention on children that was seen in
the 1990s, with many donors, including DFID, jumping on the bandwagon to prove that
they were, at least in rhetoric, taking children's rights as a serious development issue.
Within this wider movement of enthusiasm for action on children's rights, the CRC also
had a substantive impact on child labour movements. While the impact was far ranging,
I wish to focus on two issues at this stage. Firstly, the 'child' was defined as anyone
under 18, which brought a whole new meaning to 'child' labour, as until then ILO
legislation had taken a differentiated approach to minimum age, offering different age
limits for children working in different circumstances, as seen below. Secondly, the
CRC recognised the right of children to participate in any decisions affecting them. This
'7 The other principles were: the child's right to the means for moral, material and spiritual development;
to special help when hungry, sick disabled or orphaned; to first call on relief in distress; to an upbringing
that installed a sense of responsibility towards society.
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provided legitimisation to a number of organisations who had already been taking a
participatory approach to children and to those child labour movements, primarily in
poor countries, composed of children who had been arguing that they had the right to
10
engage in labour, such as ENDA in Senegal and MANTHOC in Peru .
It has thus been seen that in parallel to the child labour campaigns of the ILO there was
also an active non-govemmental movement advocating the rights of children^9. This
movement has played a monitoring and pressure group role as far as the ILO and child
labour is concerned and has also been important in bringing the issue of child labour to
the forefront of international attention. Without this outside contribution it is doubtful
whether the ILO would have had as much influence and funding as it has had in recent
years. It is time, however, to return to the ILO itself.
Legislation was the primary tool used by the ILO to regulate child labour. There have so
far been eleven Minimum Age Conventions as well as a Convention on the Worst Forms
ofChild Labour. Ifwe return to the origins of the ILO, we will recall that it was founded
on the belief that the collective action of governments would enable the creation of
greater social justice. This explains the belief in international legislation as a tool.
Ratification of an ILO Convention brings with it the obligation on member states to
incorporate the Convention into national law. The relatively high ratification rates of
early conventions, namely the 1919 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, the 1920
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention and the 1921 Minimum Age (Agriculture) which all set
14 as the minimum age, led commentators within the ILO to question whether they were
in fact not aiming high enough:
It is perhaps doubtful whether the success of the first three of these Conventions
is a matter for unqualified satisfaction. It may merely indicate that the
Conventions do not aim high enough, and that their ratification involved
38 It is interesting to note that the ILO's latest publication on child labour which provides a summary of
relevant articles of the CRC does not refer to the participation right (Haspels and Jankanish 2000: 76-77).
j9
UNICEF, the UN child rights agency, has also played an important role, primarily in facilitating the
1990 World Summit for Children which was the largest ever meeting of heads of state and had the
objective of getting universal ratification of the CRC. The non-governmental movement has, however,
played a far more important role in moving the agenda forward (see Ennew 2000: 45; Black 1996: 22;
Boyden 1997 [1990] : 216).
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practically no change in national custom even where that custom was quite
unsatisfactory. It may indeed be asked whether the limit of 14 years of age meets
the demands of modern social life. Has a child completed his physical
development at the age of 14? Has it acquired all the knowledge and all the
education which will enable it to live a complete human life in this modem
world?40 (ILO 1931: 143).
The author then raises two important questions, which remain unanswered to this day
and are still relevant in the context ofmany countries. What is to be done where there is
a gap between the age of completion of schooling and the age of admission to
employment? The author suggests that the ILO should maybe take on the role of
campaigning for a higher age for completion of schooling (an issue still being
considered seventy years later!). The second question posed relates to the need to protect
children working in the entertainment industry as well as the need to prohibit or regulate
the employment of children 'in occupations deemed as dangerous, or unhealthy or
immoral and to organise their work in such a way that they can continue their
intellectual education and become capable of enjoying human life to the full'. It is in
these words that we can recognise what would become, 42 years later, Article 3 of the
Minimum Age Convention 1973.
The 1931 International Labour Conference took the comment regarding children
working in non-industrial sectors on board. This led to the 1932 Minimum Age (Non-
Industrial Employment) Convention41, which maintained 14 as the minimum age. In
1936 the Minimum Age for industrial, non-industrial and employment at sea
Conventions were revised, the minimum age raised to 15. During this time, however,
there was the feeling that the ILO had been moving too fast and over-producing
Conventions (a feeling which remains to this day). A curb was placed on the
40 The reference to the child as 'his' and then 'it' is interesting and revealing of the ways in which
language has developed through time. Nowadays such wording would be extremely controversial,
particularly in its absence of the child as being potentially female as well as male.
41 In 1930, the Forced Labour Convention No. 29 was introduced. Whilst this was not child labour
specific, the instrument is an important tool in action against forced child labour. Forced labour is defined
as 'work or service which is exacted from a person under the menace of any penalty and for which the
said person has not offered himself voluntarily.'
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development of new Conventions (Morse 1969: 14) and more importantly, the budget of
the ILO was reduced. When Albert Thomas, the first Director of the ILO, died in 1932
he was replaced by Harold Butler who was left with the task of rebuilding the ILO in a
time of global economic recession. One of the most significant results of his time in
office was the increase in non-European membership. Butler resigned in 1938 under
conditions which highlight the 'other' side of having an international civil service i.e.
political appointment as opposed to appointment by merit. Butler refused to appoint an
official in whom he had no confidence but whose candidature was being heavily pressed
by his government (Morse 1969: 24), an issue which has unfortunately never left the
ILO and which I believe has been an important factor in the organisation performing less
well than it could have done. During the Second World War the ILO maintained a
skeletal operation but held an important Conference in 1944 in Philadelphia which was
to develop the new vision for the Organisation, under its new Director, Edward Phelan,
who we will remember as being one of the key figures in the development of the
Constitution in 1919 (see 2.1). The Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 marked a new era
in ILO history:
The earlier concept of protecting workers against the hazards of sickness,
accident and old age was replaced by a more affirmative ideal of social security
to provide a basic income, comprehensive medical care, and effective promotion
of health and well-being (..) After the uncertainties of the wartime years,
Philadelphia symbolised the rebirth of steadfast confidence in the mission of the
ILO. It permitted a start to be made in reconstructing the ILO, which could begin
again to take its place in the mainstream ofworld affairs (Morse 1969: 29-30).
In 1946 the first agreement to be concluded between the United Nations and a
specialised agency was with the ILO, revealing the importance attributed to labour
issues as well as the success of the negotiation skills of the ILO representatives. It is
beyond the scope of this study to explore the origins and development of the UN but it is
important to note the extent to which the ILO is an 'invisible' agency in much of the
literature on the UN. Texts, such as that by Whittaker (1997), provide useful
descriptions of the development of the UN but omit to mention the relevance of the ILO.
Jenks (1971: 8) describes the importance of the ILO to the development of the UN
system:
Historically, the impact of the ILO on the development of the UN system was so
far-reaching as to be fundamental. The UN system is, of course, the resultant of
so many complex influences (...) but the record shows conclusively that the
example and action of the ILO were significant and dynamic influences (...) The
ILO afforded the prototype for the creation of specialised agencies in the UN
system.
The ILO was thus an important element in the development of the UN system, for a
number of reasons (see also Ryan 2000: 137) despite its 'invisibility' to many42.
In 1949, the new Director-General (DG), David Morse, (the same Morse who has been
providing much of our data) announced his intention to turn the ILO into an 'operational
organisation', engaging in technical assistance in the 'utilization ofmanpower resources,
including organization of employment services, vocational guidance, and technical
training' (Morse 1969: 46-47). This list is a far cry from the 'we can do anything'
approach currently found in the ILO but signifies an important change of direction for
the ILO, from Convention drafting to direct in-country action. This also linked in with
Morse's decentralisation agenda in which 'field offices' were opened on a regional level
(Chapter 6). Finally, during this period a number of ex-colonies were gaining
independence and it is interesting to note that many chose to join the ILO, demonstrating
the perceived prestige of the organisation as well as the importance attributed to labour
issues.
What of the child labour agenda during all this time? Other than the documentation
relating to the introduction of the various pieces of legislation, and an international
survey on the laws governing the employment of children and young people, it would
appear that the ILO was relatively silent on this issue. In 1926, the ILO produced a
publication entitled 'The International Labour Organisation and the Protection of
Children'. What is striking about this is its similarity with the type of publication which
one would expect from the ILO today, though without the glossy cover and emotive
42 This was also confirmed during the vast majority of conversations with people in Tanzania and in
Britain. The statement that I was working with the ILO was generally met with a blank stare to which I
would have to answer 'It is part of the UN' or 'It is like UNICEF'.
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photographs. The document provides an analysis of the legislation introduced as well as
referring to other relevant, non child-specific legislation, such as technical and
vocational training and social insurance, an example of what in today's language is
termed 'taking a holistic approach', often presented as a 'new' concept. Furthermore, the
document refers to collaboration with other organisations, what is today termed
'partnership', another example of an old concept being repackaged as an 'innovative'
approach by many development organisations, not only the ILO (see, for example, DFID
1997). The next ILO report on children and the ILO (1933) is based on a similar model,
with an important difference. The document refers to 'children and young persons', a
return to the language of the Preamble and an acknowledgement perhaps of the fact that
it is maybe inappropriate to refer to fifteen and sixteen year old workers as 'children'43
(see 8.1). Significant in both documents is the lack of reference to 'child labour', the
emphasis instead on 'employment of children and young people'.
In fact in the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, which laid down the aims and purpose of
the ILO and which forms an Annex to the ILO Constitution, the abolition of child labour
objective has been removed. Instead Article Hid refers to the solemn obligation of the
ILO to further provision for child welfare and maternity protection. What does this
mean? Does this revoke article 41 of the ILO Constitution (see 2.2), which refers to the
'abolition of child labour'? According to an authoritative ILO informant:
Article 41 is still legally in force. The 1944 International Conference adopted the
Philadelphia Declaration which was the programme for future action, post World
War Two. It was seen as taking on the provisions of article 41 and that maybe 41
was therefore not necessary but there was no formal decision. It disappeared
without formal decision. It is a strange way and it the only time this method has
been used. You need to see it in historical context, in the definition of the
organisation's mandate (..). We have a mandate which has been defined in
general terms to include all conditions ofwork, including child labour. Maybe it
was felt that there was no need to mention child labour as children are
automatically included in the mandate. As for the issue of suppression, this is
political and was dealt with through earlier minimum age conventions, (pers.
43 This issue of language is a hotly debated one with many independent young workers in poor countries,
refusing the labelling of'child' labourers.
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comm. Italics refer to informant speaking in French, translated as 'abolition' or
more recently 'elimination').
Whatever the justification and despite the argument that the ILO 'automatically' deals
with child labour issues, the fact that the abolition of child labour is not included in the
Declaration reflects the lack of its prominence as an issue in the minds of the drafters,
for whatever reason. This lack of interest is again reflected in the series of speeches
given by David Morse, the DG of the ILO in 1969 in which there is not one single
reference to child labour44. It is important to return to the wider world in order to further
our understanding of the relative silence surrounding the child labour objective in the
1960s. This period was known as the First Development Decade, and efforts of the
international community were firmly placed on 'rescuing' the developing world from its
backwardness and wide-scale poverty (Black 1996: 150). Intellectual thought was more
focused on developing grand, regional prescriptions than on the needs of specific
groups, such as child labourers. Having said this, there was an ILO publication in 1969,
entitled 'The ILO and Youth' which could indicate a lack of linkage between
management and the day-to-day activities of staff (to which we return in Chapter 7). The
progress of technology is evident between this document and the previous two. There is
a photograph of hard-working children and 'youth' on every page and it is interesting to
note that the picture of a young Asian girl harvesting the crops is still used by the ILO to
this day! Again, it is interesting to note the change in language: 'Children and young
persons' has been replaced with 'Youth'. The pamphlet is a response to the 1959
Declaration on the Rights of the Child (see above), and is described as seeking 'to show
some of the ways in which the International Labour Organisation, within its sphere of
competency, works towards the achievement of the aims and objectives of the Rights of
the Child' (ILO 1969: 5). There are a number of issues which are worthy of comment
and which are useful to bear in mind when we return to the current child labour activities
of the organisation. Firstly, the document takes a holistic approach highlighting its
'responsibility' to regulate and progressively limit child labour with a view to eventual
44 There is one reference on p.67 to the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention but this is not even
mentioned in relation to child labour.
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abolition everywhere and to protect young workers45. Secondly, child labour is defined
for one of the first times in a public text; described as 'work by children under 14-15
years of age'. The two basic problems of child labour are seen to be 'poverty and lack of
schools', factors which are still seen as primary (see Chapters 5 and 8). There is a strong
emphasis on vocational training and assistance in preparing for work and finding work.
The 1970s saw a return to the prioritisation of child labour within the ILO agenda with
the introduction of a new minimum age convention as well as the International Year of
the Child in 1979. The backdrop to these developments was the Second Development
Decade, which became known as the 'alternatives' era (Black 1996: 150). It was a time
of experimentation and of recognition of the 'basic needs' of the poorest groups in
society. Child labourers clearly fell into this category and the way was thus paved for the
approval by the International Labour Conference in 1973 of the Minimum Age
Convention, no. 138. Convention 138 remains to this day the key international
convention on child labour. Article 1 reaffirms the original ILO goal of total abolition:
Each member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to pursue a
national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labour and to
raise progressively the minimum age for admission to employment or work to a
level consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of young
persons.
The question which arises, however, and which has been subject to misinterpretation, by
those within and outside the organisation, is what is actually meant by the 'abolition of
child labour'. Recent commentators see this as meaning that no child under the age of 18
must labour. But this is because they are ignoring the historical context of the legislation
as well as its actual wording and are focusing on the CRC definition of child as under 18
(see above). 18 is set as an age limit in Article 3, which refers to work that 'is likely to
jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons'. Where the health, safety and
morals of the young person are protected and where they have received relevant
instruction or vocational training, they may engage in such activities from the age of 16.
45
Protection is a term which has almost disappeared in the current discourses of the ILO. The emphasis is
now on 'progressive elimination of child labour'. See Convention 182 and 6.1.
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In all other cases, the minimum age standard is set at not less than the age of completion
of compulsory schooling and not less than the age of 15, or 1446 in countries 'whose
economy or educational facilities are insufficiently developed (Article 2). Children of 12
in the latter case or 13 can engage in light work which is not 'likely to be harmful to
their health or development' or which does not 'prejudice their attendance at school,
their participation in vocational orientation or training programmes' (article 7). 'Child'
labour is thus seen as applying to under 14 or 15 year olds, except in specific conditions.
The next paragraph shows that this was not an arbitrary age laid down by the ILO but
was the accepted UN definition of 'child' at this particular time. It is useful to mention
that 138 applies to all forms of economic activity, not just wage employment - a
recognition that child labour could exist in other spheres, although work in education
institutions (8.1.2.1) and family farm work for local consumption are exempt (Article 5).
In 1978, the ILO prepared a policy framework for the 1979 International Year of the
Child (IYC). The document was prepared by the ILO IYC focal point, based in the
Office for Women Workers' Questions, illustrating the lack of emphasis placed on the
issue, which it would appear was seen as an 'add-on' to the issue of women's work
rather than as a labour issue in its own right. In the document there is an interesting
reference to definition of'child' as under 14 or 15 (see above):
The UN Secretary-General's report to ECOSOC on IYC was to be children and
not children and youth. Though there is no explicit reference to the age of
children in that report, or in the resolution, the Preparatory Committee to ACC
(May 1976) states that 'the Year should focus on children from birth to about age
14 or 15. (ILO 1978: 1, underlining in original text).
The rest of the text refers to ILO activities and policy orientation, which focused on
prohibition of child labour, protection of children at work, development of children for
work, attacking the basic causes of child labour and protection ofworking mothers.
46 14 was the age of the original 1919 convention on minimum age in industry. It would thus appear that
138 was allowing countries to 'catch up', so to speak.
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In 1981, a general survey by the ILO committee of experts on the application of
Minimum Age Convention 138 was presented to the International Labour Conference.
The report was extremely comprehensive, exploring the various elements of the
Convention and the extent to which these had been applied by Member States. It
concludes that:
It will be apparent that only a few States have achieved anything approaching
full compliance with all the detailed requirements of the Convention and the
provisions of the Recommendation. In most cases this is understandable (..) The
Committee is struck, however, with the extent to which the general principle of a
minimum age for admission to employment or work has been recognised. There
is not a single State among all those which have provided information which has
not set some standards in this field (ILO 1981: 162).
This provides, in the usual language of international diplomacy, an optimistic picture. It
is important to note, however, that until recently Convention 138 was the least ratified of
the core Conventions47. Furthermore, the fact that each country had some form of
legislation cannot be attributed to 138, except perhaps in a minority of cases. 138 was
ratified 54 years after the first minimum age convention and even longer after some
countries had passed their own national legislation. For example, the first British piece
of legislation was passed in 1802 (2.2) and in Tanzania the Employment ofWomen and
Young Persons law was passed in 1940 (3.1 below)48. Moreover, the text does not
indicate how many States did not provide information and how serious the issue of child
labour is in such countries49.
4' There has been a dramatic leap in the number of ratifications since 1999 which could be due to the high
profile of the CI 82 ratification campaign, which also seeks to encourage states to ratify 138, as well as the
inclusion of child labour abolition in the Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work by the
International Labour Conference in 1998.
48 It is important not to forget that the majority of the activities considered to be 'labour' and which have
been regulated on were introduced to many colonies by those European powers that were responsible for
the setting up of the ILO and for developing labour legislation. We will return to this in 3.1 and 5.
49 Under the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998 all countries
who have not ratified core conventions, which include 138 and 182, must make annual reports on progress
towards ratification.
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By 1982, responsibility for child labour had been transferred to the Conditions of Work
and Welfare Facilities branch (CONDIT) of the wider department TRAVAIL,
demonstrating the recognition of child labour as a labour issue in its own right, at least
with regard to the administrative structure of the organisation. The task was assigned to
Assefa Bequele, who was to become the primary driving force of the ILO child labour
agenda. At this time, child labour was not seen as an important issue:
It was a subject that no-one thought was important. Someone even said to me
'child labour is not a sexy subject'. There was considerable scepticism,
sometimes even opposition (Senior ILO official, pers. comm.).
According to my informant, opposition was based on three arguments:
Firstly, there was the intellectual argument that the approach was wrong as child
labour was a poverty based issue and the problem should be tackled through
poverty eradication. The second argument was of a qualitative nature in that
some argued that child labour was not a suitably important issue throughout the
world in terms of numbers of children. The third area of opposition was based on
practical grounds centring on what could be done about the problem (Senior ILO
official, pers. comm.).
What stands out here to anyone accustomed to the child labour debate is that these three
arguments have yet to be resolved. It is also important to note that this opposition was
expressed at a time of world-wide economic recession and growing poverty for many-
the 1980s were known as the Tost decade of development' (see Black 1996: 149) - and it
is highly likely that the child labour agenda was initially lost in the multitude of requests
for ILO resources.
In 1983, however, members of the ILO were forced to consider child labour as an
important issue- it was the theme of the 1983 Director-General report to the
International Labour Conference, which for the first time took child labour as its key
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issue50. The report provides a situation analysis as well as pointing out future directions
for work and commenting that:
In spite of growing awareness of the prevalence and harmful effects of child
labour and the vast literature on the subject, policy and programme-oriented
research remains surprisingly meagre (ILO 1983 : 34).
This statement was to mark a new direction in ILO action, from the strictly legalistic
approach of the past to a more policy and action oriented programme.
Further to this report the ILO found itself taking the innovative step of changing its
strategy from the strictly legalistic approach of the pre-1980s to one of trying to engage
in advocacy and policy development through more systematic research into the realities
of child labour. A number of important ILO documents were produced at this time,
which were to form the basis of policy and programme development in the 1990s (such
as ILO 1985, Bequele and Boyden 1988, Rodgers and Standing 1981). According to my
informant there were three phases in the development of ILO child labour intervention:
There were three phases, a first phase took us well up to the early 1980s, late
1970s and which was characterised by standard-setting, international labour
standards, minimum age conventions. The second phase which was really in the
1980s was concerned with documenting the problem and policy responses. Work
up to the mid-1980s was primarily documentation, rather than the pure
legislative approach, we tried to go further and engage in advocacy and policy
development, the only way to do this was by documenting the problem, the
extent, the magnitude, what had already been tried, what had had a degree of
success. This is where some of us came in. There was a major research
programme on problems and policies. In the third phase, work was policy and
programme development. This was the type of work, as of the late 80s and early
90s. Now this does not mean that there is such a clear cut date of starting, there
was always an overlap (Senior ILO official, pers. comm.)
In the early 1990s, the Director-General made child labour one of the three inter¬
departmental projects of the 1992-1993 biennium budget51. The Inter-Departmental
50 Director General reports are drafted by the responsible department although are officially written by the
Director General himself.
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project on child labour (INTERDEP) was established and the campaign against child
labour was thus pushed to the core of the ILO's mission52. The INTERDEP took a two
prong approach:
First, was to promote a world-wide movement against child labour. Well into the
early 90s in many parts of the developing world there was considerable apathy
and even downright hostility. One of the first things was to give attention to the
issue and to put it onto the national and international agenda. And so we felt that
we should adopt a very supportive and even subversive approach, in that we
needed to create a movement which would put pressure on national and
international governments where political will was lacking and support were
political will existed. The second strategy we tried to follow was to provide
direct support to governments in policy formulation and programme
development. As we were the only organisation working on this at the time, there
were two fortuitous events - the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which came into force in 1990 and which gave momentum to world-wide
concern for children. Secondly by then the ILO had started to give visibility to
the problem and the German government came up with the grant of around $10
million for child labour (Senior ILO official, pers. comm.).
This substantial grant of DM 50, 000, 000 from the German government, to be used on
child labour abolition, led to the expansion of ILO child labour activities and to the
creation in its own right of the International Programme on the Elimination of Child
Labour (IPEC) in 199253. Germany had in fact expressed interest in funding child labour
activities in September 1990, 'soon after the decision of the Director- General of the
ILO to make the elimination of child labour a major theme of integrated and
concentrated Office-wide action' (ILO 1991: 1), demonstrating the time it takes for
projects to get set up (Chapter 7). IPEC was to provide technical assistance to countries
signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the ILO. It has now become one of the
ILO's flagship programmes, so successful in attracting donor money that it has the
51 The other two were Gender and Structural Adjustment.
52 It is useful to remember that Morse was advocating direct action in 1949, so this third phase of direct
action seems to be out of step with the rest of the developments in ILO action, probably because of the
lack of prioritisation given to it until the CRC gave the necessary push.
53 The distinction between INTERDEP and IPEC can be quite confusing so it is important to briefly
highlight it. INTERDEP was a regular budget programme of the biennium and provided the internal basis
for IPEC, which was an extra-budgetary programme.
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largest budget of any ILO programme (see 4.1). In terms of regular budget IPEC's
allocation for 2000-01 is only around $7 million, including Programme Support
Income54, whereas the technical co-operation allocations budget, which includes core
funding (donor money which can be spent as IPEC chooses) and project funding (donor
money allocated for a specific project), is $77.5 million (as ofDecember 2000), which is
around one fifth of total ILO extra budgetary technical co-operation55. In 1999, IPEC
became the InFocus Programme on Child Labour: IPEC. The new programme
incorporates all ILO child labour activities (although the workers and employers'
departments, ACTEMP and ACTRAV, continue to have their own small activities) and
49 countries have now signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the ILO to
implement a child labour elimination programme. The ILO has thus maintained its 1919
commitment to child welfare and abolition of child labour and has played a fundamental
role in transforming the strictly legal commitment of member states to various
conventions to a worldwide movement encompassing NGOs, workers and employers
organisations, the media, businesses, consumers and, to a much lesser extent, children's
organisations56. Child labour has not, however, been abolished. On the contrary, with the
context of growing poverty and inequality for many, the number of children labouring
has grown.
2.4 Chapter Conclusions
A historical exploration of the factors leading to the creation of the ILO and to the
inclusion of the abolition of child labour as a primary area of intervention has thus
34 This is the 13% added to project costs by the ILO to cover general service staff. These technical aspects
of IPEC will be expanded on in Chapter 4.
55 ILO 1999 Programme and Budget Proposals for 2000-01, p.52. The figures given of $7 and $77 million
were obtained from the IPEC finance officer in December 2000. It is important to note that the figures are
constantly changing as more donor funds come in. The results of the US election campaign are also
significant as there is concern that the new government may reduce the allocation of US funds which are
central to IPEC activities.
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Clearly the climate for a child labour movement was also ripe, especially with the passing of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child which brought a whole new dimension to the thinking on children's
rights.
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revealed several factors relevant to our understanding of current day child labour policy
and programming.
Firstly, the process leading to the setting up of the ILO was a lengthy one, inspired by
many different individuals with different motivations; from philanthropic factory bosses,
parliamentary reformers and scholars to trade unionists and civil servants. This is
revealing of the various conflicts of interest which persist in the Organisation today
(Chapter 3) as well as of the importance of individual agency in moving agendas
forward, a theme to which we return throughout this thesis, notably in Chapters 7 and 9.
Secondly, the vision of childhood as a time of innocence, passivity and potential
victimisation, which inspired early child labour campaigners, persists to this day despite
the growth in movements led by and for child labourers, primarily in developing
countries, who argue that this is not their reality and therefore that the solutions of
industrialised nations may not be the most adequate solutions for them (see 2.3). This
issue is considered in detail in the following chapter.
Thirdly, the historical analysis of the child labour agenda within the ILO has allowed us
to briefly explore the wider context which has influenced the various directions taken by
the ILO. It has been seen that child labour has fluctuated in importance through time.
Extremely important to the founders of the Constitution, the issue was lost in the wider
debates that followed World War Two. The advent of the CRC led to a prioritisation of
children's issues within the wider 'development' agenda of both developed and
developing countries. Within this agenda of children's rights, child labour came through
as one of the primary issues, not just for the ILO but for other agencies such as DFID. It
is this context which provides some of the backdrop for the ethnography presented in
this thesis.
In the following chapters, we explore the development of IPEC child labour policy and
programming in greater detail, from the points of view of the policy makers, of staff in
HQ and in the field, and some of the potential 'recipients' and 'partners'.
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3. Voices of the Formal Policy Makers57
... under colonial rule and the more recent influence of the United Nations
and international legislation of children's rights, the images of childhood
favoured in the industrial North have been exported to the South
(Boyden 1997 [1990]: 202)
Recent years have seen an explosion in theorising on the child. The most influential
body of thought has come from a social constructionist perspective, notably as a result of
James and Prout's (1990) ground-breaking collection of essays. In one of these essays,
the notion of a 'Northern' construction of childhood was proposed (Boyden 1990). This
construction of childhood, it has been argued, has been exported globally and imposed in
countries with radically different cultural contexts through international organisations,
such as the ILO. This statement has since been echoed or welcomed by many child
labour commentators (such as Nieuwenhuys 1994 and 199658; White 1994 and 1996)
and has been used to explain the apparent failures of international initiatives to improve
the lives of children labouring in poverty situations. Before embarking on fieldwork, I
was seduced by this argument as it offered a seemingly obvious explanation to the
failures of so many child labour initiatives. In fact, my research proposal title was:
571 use the term 'formal' policy makers to refer to those who are in formal positions of power to influence
and develop the policy making process i.e. the tripartite partners (government, trade unions and
employers). This term also implicitly acknowledges the existence of informal policy makers such as the
staff described in Chapters 4 and 6 and the various pressure groups capable of informally influencing
policy development.
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Nieuwenhuys refers to studies by the ILO and others: 'Typical of these publications is a moral
preoccupation with abolition through legislation and a zealous belief in the desirability of extending
Western childhood ideals to poor families worldwide' (1996: 241).
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'Cultural constructions of child work: A research proposal to explore the ways in which
western notions of childhood are applied by the International Programme for the
Elimination of Child Labour in the cultural context of Tanzania' (Groves 1999),
reflecting the assumption that western or 'Northern' notions of childhood were being
applied.
Field work revealed, however, that whilst such a perspective has been useful in opening
up the child labour debate and in the development of a 'participatory approach' to child
labour initiatives, it does not address the real reasons for failure to improve the lives of
working children, which are further explored in Chapter 7, and, more seriously, is in fact
based on incomplete analysis of the work of international organisations, such as the ILO.
The result is to deny the agency of the many activists in non-'Northern' countries who
have played a fundamental role in developing the ILO's child labour policy and practice.
I argue in this thesis that the 'Northern construction of childhood' is too simplistic an
explanation for the failures of the Organisation. This chapter examines Boyden's
argument in detail and then brings in the ILO's particular construction(s) of child labour.
I explore who it is in the ILO who is responsible for developing such constructions i.e.
the formal decision-makers: the employers', trade unions and governments. To what
extent are these voices 'Northern' or based on a 'Northern' construction of childhood?
Finally, I will take the recent adoption of the ILO's latest child labour Convention, No.
182, to illustrate the complexity of the decision-making process and the consequent
difficulty of imposing any one pre-determined construction of childhood.
3.1 A 'Northern' construction of childhood?
Let us briefly return to Boyden's argument in order to gain a clearer idea of what she
was really saying:
The major tenet of contemporary rights and welfare thinking is that regulation of
child life should give priority to making childhood a carefree, safe, secure and
happy phase of human existence (..) To this end, child life has been characterised
by a range of appropriate contexts, experiences, relationships and behaviours (..)
Significantly the norms and values upon which this ideal of a safe, happy and
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protected childhood are built are culturally and historically bound to the social
preoccupations and priorities of the capitalist countries of Europe and the United
States (1997 [1990]: 191-192).
Let us take this quote in sections. First is the argument that contemporary rights and
welfare thinking prioritises the making of childhood as a carefree and secure phase of
the life cycle59. This is based on Piaget's (1972) theory that child development is a
unitary process, marked by a series of stages through which the child develops from
immature child to mature adult. Such a theory legitimates the idea that childhood is a
natural and universal phase of the life cycle and that if children are to mature correctly
they must follow the linear pattern of growth, 'school' being the appropriate context for
development. Those who do not follow the set path, such as child labourers, are seen as
at risk and in need of protection. This recognition has led to a proliferation of agencies
aiming to 'protect' children; 'the anxiety about young people in the present day is such
that the political and social condition of whole societies is now gauged by the status of
their children' (Ibid.: 191. See also Jenks 1996: 67). In the next part of the quote we see
that Boyden is criticising the vision because it has led to the creation of a series of
norms, a 'range of appropriate contexts, experiences, relationships and behaviours' of
what a 'happy and protected childhood' should consist of. This 'normalised' childhood
has led to the dichotomisation of childhoods - on the one hand there is the innocent,
victimised child in need of protection and on the other there is the 'unsocialized or anti¬
social child, the deviant or trouble maker' (Ibid.: 194). The latter is the child who does
not fit into the normalised childhood category and who needs to be controlled. Boyden
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Despite the global acceptance of such a theory of child development, anthropological studies of children
have demonstrated that childhood is neither a universal nor an absolute category; its definition varies
through time and culture and according to class, gender, ethnicity and age (Mead 1928; Stainton-Rogers
and Stainton-Rogers 1992; Jenks 1996; Nieuwenhuys 1994; Boyden et al. 1998). Childhood is now seen
as a social construct which is constituted in particular socially located forms of discourse (Jenks 1996: 29).
The construction of the child is therefore not neutral but moral and political (ibid.: 69), which has
important implications for universalised child rights legislation, such as ILO conventions, and means that
the use of the term must primarily be assessed within a local context. The ILO tries to do this through the
use of differentiated age limits as well as allowing governments to define 'worst forms' of child labour, see
3.4. White (1999: 141) argues that C.182 is in fact a compromise measure between the need for
universalised legislation and the importance of relativism: 'It appears therefore to represent an attempt to
incorporate relativist principles in a global standard-setting exercise, and therefore to have side-stepped
the issue of cultural relativism.'
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thus concludes that 'adult protectiveness towards children, then, is tempered by the
perceived need for control' (Ibid.: 194), a point with which White (1994: 849) concurs
when he points out that although children are not the only group vulnerable to
exploitation in the labour market they are the only structurally disadvantaged group
whose exploitation is addressed by attempts to remove them from the labour market (see
8.1.2.2). This reveals that the chief concern is the fact that child labourers are 'children'
as opposed to exploited and vulnerable 'labourers'.
A Foucauldian (1977) analysis informs us that this need for control is expressed in the
development of a number of 'concerted strategies for control', such as the division of
childhood spaces (school is seen as the 'natural' place for the child, whereas the street or
mining site is not) and the 'control of activity' (times of sleep, work, school are strictly
defined for most 'normalised' children) and 'instruments of discipline', such as the
'means of correct training', through hierarchical observation involving a complex chain
of authority and training and 'normalising judgement' i.e. that which transgresses the
disciplinary 'norm' is defined not only as bad but as abnormal. Such an analysis could
be used to argue that child labourers are deviant in that they are not in their 'normal'
space i.e. school/home, many control their own activities in that they are self-employed
and are outside of the means of correct training. Moves by organisations, such as the
ILO, to 'help' or 'protect' them could thus instead be seen as means of 'controlling'
child labourers (see Rose 1990: 121). I would not agree with this fully but it is a useful
perspective for understanding the power relations between child labourers and those
institutions developed to 'protect' them. Boyden's argument is thus useful in leading us
to a greater understanding of the power relations of adult-developed institutions over the
children they aim to 'protect'60.
The second section of the paragraph quoted is the one which I would like to consider
further in this chapter. It is suggested that these norms of childhood as 'safe, happy and
protected'61 are built on 'the social preoccupations and priorities of the capitalist
60 This issue of power relations will be discussed further in Chapters 1, 6 and 7.
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'Safe, happy and protected' are terms which are clearly subject to different interpretations by different
people in different contexts but for these purposes are to be seen in terms of the construction of childhood
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countries of Europe and the United States' and are then, she argues later in her paper,
exported and imposed in countries with different cultural contexts. In Chapter 2, we saw
that the child labour agenda, embodied in the ILO, did indeed come from the
experiences of Northern Europe and to a lesser extent the United States. Does this mean,
however, that that these norms are not prevalent in other countries?62 In order to
consider the question further, it is useful to deconstruct Boyden's 'social preoccupations
and priorities' into two categories: those of individual nationals of a country and those of
the institutions which are set up to reflect the prevailing norms within the country. With
regard to the first category, fieldwork revealed that many informants in Tanzania
expressed very similar ideals of childhood as a time that should ideally be safe, happy
and protected, as will be discussed further in Chapter 8 where their voices are expressed
in full. When presented with the idea that this vision was 'Northern', imposed into the
Tanzanian context, the response was one of laughter and disbelief that we 'Northerners'
could be so arrogant as to believe this. Time and time again, the opinion that in an ideal
/ST
world children should not be 200 metres underground but at school or somewhere else
such as vocational training was expressed, not just by parents, but by teachers,
politicians, mining children64 (nyoka in Swahili) and non-mining children and others:
Working in the mines is very difficult for children. It is not good for us. I do not
think that children should work in the mines. I must because I have my problems,
for me it is good because I can get money (nyoka, pers. comm.).
I will not let my son go to the mines. It is bad there and dangerous. I want him to
go to school. He will not go to the mines (parent, pers. comm.).
which sees children as needing to be protected from the dangers of mining work. 'Happy' is harder to
define but as will be seen in Chapter 8, the majority of nyoka informants did not feel 'happy' to be working
in the mines but felt that they had to engage in the work because of the lack of alternatives.
62 It is important to reiterate at this point that my research interest is specifically focused on the worst
forms of child labour, particularly mining, and I can not therefore claim to comment on other, less
hazardous and perhaps more controversial forms, such as family based agriculture, for example.
63 See Serpell (1993) for a revealing account of the often dysfunctional impact of the institutionalisation of
Western style schooling into the African context, not only for the young people who enrol in it but also for
the wider community.
64
As will be seen in Chapter 8, 71% of nyokas interviewed argued that children should not be working in
the mines.
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With regard to the second category, institutionalised norms, the first piece of child
labour legislation, the Employment of Women and Young Persons Ordinance, was
passed in Tanzania in 1940 while the country was a British Protectorate (2.3). It could
therefore be argued that the legal norm that children needed to be protected from certain
forms of employment was introduced by the British. At this point, however, it is
important to point out that the type of labour from which children were prohibited -
industrial undertakings (Section 91)- was the very one introduced by the 'Northern'
colonising countries of Germany and Britain (see 5.1.2 and 5.1.3) and was also the one
from which children were protected by legislation in Britain since the first 1808 Factory
Act and internationally by the 1919 ILO Minimum Age (Industry) Convention. 1940
was thus extremely late in the day for the British to introduce child labour legislation in
Tanzania, having signed up to the principles of the ILO, as expressed in the Preamble to
the Constitution, in 1919. I would suggest that there was considerable pressure at home
for the British Government to do so, and that the 1940 Ordinance was a compromise
measure (see Shivji 1985). I say compromise as the vast majority of children in Tanzania
were (and still are) employed in the agricultural, and not the industrial, sector. The
interests of the colonial administration were, however, firmly rooted in the agricultural
sector and it has been suggested by Tanzanian academics that the British Government
neglected to introduce protective or restrictive legislation in this sector, the primary
employer of child labour, to protect its own interests (Rwegoshora, Mbeo and Amma
1997: 32, see also Nieuwenhuys 1996: 240). Protecting children from work was thus not
a priority for the colonial government although the British government had been
legislating on child labour in Britain for over a century (see Chapter 2). The 'social
preoccupations and priorities' of Britain with regard to child labour did not therefore
extend to its colonies.
On gaining independence, the Tanzanian President, President Nyerere, made his 'social
preoccupations and priorities' towards children very clear: everyone who was able to
work must do so with the exception of small children (Nyerere 1968a: 15). There is no
definition of 'small children' but it would appear that Nyerere expected all older
children to work. This is exemplified in his vehement critique of the tendency for school
children not to contribute to household work (Nyerere 1968a: 49). Nyerere was clear,
however, that all workers must receive a just return for their labour and that no-one has
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the right to exploit others (Nyerere 1968a: 15). Children were thus to be protected from
exploitation and small children were not to engage in work. This ideal seems much the
same as those of Northern governments as described by Boyden. Since Nyerere's
statements the Tanzanian government has repeatedly affirmed its belief in the ideal of a
safe, happy and protected childhood, ratifying a number of ILO child labour
conventions, including 138, and the UN CRC. During field work, I sat through a number
of Government, and other, meetings on the ratification of 182 and it was clear that many
participants held strong personal beliefs in the rights of children to be protected and safe.
With regard to the second part ofBoyden's quote, I would therefore have to add that the
ideal of 'a safe, happy and protected childhood' builds not only on the 'social
preoccupations and priorities of the capitalist countries of Europe and the United States'
but also on those of other countries, such as Tanzania. This will be illustrated further
below.
One important consequence of the values and norms discussed above has been the
increase in welfare protection and legal regulation, at both national and international
levels. While this led to an increase in Foucauldian style regulation and control it had the
positive effect of ensuring that children in Britain, for example, can access schooling and
basic social services. While these clearly can be improved, there is no doubt that what
exists is an improvement on the situation facing children at the beginning of the
industrial revolution, as described in Chapter 2.2. In Tanzania, although it has been
shown that there are similar ideals and values at an institutional level as well as on an
individual level, the development of normalising structures (such as free education and
health care, recreation facilities and family support services) has been slower for a
number of historical and other reasons and it is unlikely that the government will be able
to 'generate in the near future the social surplus that the maintenance of these institutions
requires' (Nieuwenhuys 1996: 247).
It is worth noting, perhaps, that Boyden herself seems to have moved away from her
'Northern' construction argument, adopting the term 'global construction' in the 1997
postscript to her 1990 paper (p. 222). Her paper remains extremely influential, however,
and her coining of the term 'Northern construction' has taken on a life of its own and
what started out as a social constructivist alternative to normalising theory has, I suggest,
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become normative in itself, with generations of students6" and others continuing to refer
to the imposition of a 'Northern construction of childhood' on to Southern countries66.
My data suggests that it is important to avoid the dichotomization of North-South in
terms of constructions of childhood. The fallacies of referring to a 'Northern' or a
'Western' set of values are also pointed out by Amartya Sen, amongst others, in his
inspirational book Development as Freedom (1999), in which he argues that:
Our understanding of the presence of diversity tends to be somewhat undermined
by constant bombardment with oversimple generalizations about "Western
civilisation", "Asian values", "African cultures" and so on. Many of these
readings of history and civilisation are not only intellectually shallow, they also
add to the divisiveness of the world in which we live (1999: 247).
In terms of childhood, it would therefore perhaps be more appropriate to refer to
'dominant' constructions, reflecting the fact that there are particular groups of people
who have similar ideals, be they from the North or South. For example, most of my
informants in Tanzania, including the children themselves, felt that children should not
be working in the mines, i.e., in a 'worst form of child labour' (see Chapter 8). In terms
of worst forms of child labour therefore they shared a similar and, I would argue,
'dominant' construction of childhood with many people in the 'North'.
Other forms of child labour remain more controversial, however, and again I suggest
that the 'North-South' dichotomy is unhelpful. The conflict between the constructions of
childhood of child labour activists and those of commercial interests is illustrative. A
business person in the South may share similar business values with a colleague in the
North, with both arguing that grass-roots activists campaigning on child-labour issues in
England or Tanzania are hindering economic growth. Grass-roots activists, in turn may
share similar values which clash with those of the business people. While the cultures of
65 In a recent child-focused conference, for example, two student papers referred to the 'Northern
construction' without even questioning its validity (Children in Their Places 2001).
66 It is important here to consider this within the context of the academy itself: the hierarchical and
exclusive nature of the institution leads to the reification of particular perspectives, which then become
dogma and, I would suggest, are often applied to contexts far beyond that intentioned by the original
author.
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each may be very different, particular values, I suggest, may be very similar.
Recognising this takes us away from the distraction provided by entering into a 'North-
South' debate and towards the very real issue of competing interests. We are currently in
a situation where two dominant images are being sent out to children labouring in poor
countries. On the one hand, children are being told that they should not have to work
under particular circumstances deemed harmful (Chapter 2.3) and on the other, they are
being exposed to the global, read American, capitalist dream. To obtain the dream they
must work, no matter what the circumstances.
This is supported by White (1996: 830-831) who argues that:
All over the world, media and peer pressures make it increasingly important for
children not just to have sufficient food and clothing, time for recreation etc. but
to have certain (non-traditional) kinds of clothes, ornaments and other
possessions, to consume certain kinds of foods and beverages, and to engage n
certain kinds of recreational activity which are considered to be the attributes for
'proper' people. The majority of the world's children, of course, do not have
access to all these things, but that does not mean that they are not aware of them
nor that they are free of the need for cash to buy them (..) We can thus speak of a
new kind of child labour: alongside the cases that are better known and
publicized - of children forced into labour by parents or unscrupulous labour
recruiters- there are many children, all over the world who simply decide that
they need to earn money, (italics in original text).
It has been all too easy to forget or underestimate the power of globalisation forces
which have ensured that a large number of the world's population have access to the
vision of childhood prioritised by global and capitalist consumer culture, television,
radio, advertising, newspapers etc.67 Fieldwork revealed that Masai youths would walk
many miles from Masai villages to come to Mirerani to watch television, mainly
Affican-Ajnerican sitcoms or African-American pop videos. Many would even swop
their traditional dress for combat trousers and trainers whilst in the township. Other
children came to the mines in order to get cash to buy themselves 'nice things', these
being determined by fashion, i.e., by what cool young people on Coca-Cola billboards
67 For a fascinating account of the globalisation of 'brands' and marketing, see Klein (2000).
scattered throughout the area were wearing. On the basis of my data, I would therefore
argue that these children were subject to forces far stronger than that of the ILO or any
other development or human rights agency, whose impact is in fact negligible in the
context of the predominantly US commercial interests, which are currently determining
the global order65. If any construction of childhood is thus being imposed on children in
Tanzania and throughout the world, therefore, it would have to be that of the commercial
interests of organisations such as Coca-Cola.
In the remainder of this thesis, I provide empirical evidence against the notion that the
ILO is exporting and imposing a 'Northern' construction of childhood. As Sen argues
such a notion is not only 'shallow' but can also add to the 'divisiveness of the world in
which we live' as it sets 'Northern' constructions of childhood and child labour apart
from those of non-Northerners. Furthermore, such an approach also denies agency to the
many non-Northerners who are strong campaigners in the fight against child labour and
who are fully supportive of the ILO approach. In the next section I therefore propose to
explore the ILO's 'construction' of the 'child labourer'.
3.2 Who is 'the child labourer' for the ILO?
In the previous chapter it was shown that the development of international labour
regulation, including child labour intervention, was largely based on the historical
experience ofNorthern Europe. Does this therefore mean that 'the child labourer' subject
to such regulation is based on a construction of childhood that is purely 'Northern'? To
answer this, we must explore whether the ILO's vision of'the child labourer', as a target
of intervention, has remained constant since 1919 and secondly (3.3), whether those
68 At this point it is useful to place the 'power' of the ILO and other such agencies into perspective:
According to Ryan (2000) the total UN budget is equivalent to the amount spent on alcohol consumption
by British people in 15 weeks and the total staff employed by the UN is one third of McDonald's total
staff. The commercial interests of the private sector are thus far more powerful and influential than any
construction of childhood being imposed by the likes of the ILO. As far will explored further in Chapter 7,
even within the aid hierarchy the ILO falls quite low in terms of power and influence.
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responsible for developing this vision have been 'Northern' or at least basing themselves
on a 'Northern' vision of childhood.
In Chapter 2 we explored the development in thinking on child labour within the ILO
but let us briefly return to the various pieces of legislation which have laid down the
ILO's definitions of 'child labour'. Such an analysis reveals that there is not one ILO
'child labourer' but many. The child labour objective of the ILO constitution, as laid
down in article 41, advocates:
The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour
of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure
their proper physical development.
There is no definition here of who exactly 'the child labourer' is but one interpretation
would be that child labourers are children whose labour prevents them from continuing
with their education and hinders their proper physical development. The first pieces of
child labour legislation, Minimum Age Conventions 5, 7 and 10, set the minimum age of
admission to industrial, sea and agricultural labour at 14. Minimum Age Convention 15
banned all those under 18 from working as trimmers and stokers. The definition of
'child' thus depended on the type of labour. In the cases of industry, sea and agriculture
'the child labourer' was defined as under 14 years of age and yet in what was considered
to be the more dangerous activity of stoking and trimming the 'child labourer' was under
18. In 1932, another labour activity was added to the list with Convention 33 on non-
industrial employment which set 14 as the minimum age limit, although children of 12-
13 years could engage in Tight work', and 18 as the limit for working more than twelve
consecutive hours at night. In 1936 and 1937, the first three Conventions and
Convention 33 were revised and the minimum age was brought up to 15, although
children could still engage in light, non-industrial work from the ages of 12-13 (see 2.3
for factors leading to these changes). 'The child labourer' was thus defined according to
the labour activity in which he or she engaged and the minimum age for each activity
was one which changed over time. In 1969, an ILO publication specifically defined
'child labour' for the first time as 'work by children under 14-15 years of age' (ILO
1969: 5). This is interesting, as it does not refer to the higher age limit of 18 set down by
Convention 15 for stokers and trimmers.
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In 1973, a new piece of legislation was introduced which was to supersede all previous
documents. Minimum Age Convention 138 set out the basis for a world-wide definition
of child labour. The document offers a flexible age limit, which may differ depending on
the kind of work, whether it is a developing or industrial country and on the age of
completion of primary education (see Chapter 2.3). The basic rule, however, is 12
(poorer countries)-13 for light work, 18 for work which is particularly harmful and 14
(poorer countries)-15 for all other work.
This highlights one of the primary problems which arises when developing international
Conventions to be applied on a 'universal' basis - how to make them flexible enough to
meet the needs of all member states, whatever their level of social and economic
development. Article 19 (3) of the ILO Constitution provides that:
In framing any Convention or Recommendation of general application the
Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions,
the imperfect development of industrial organisation, or other special
circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different and shall
suggest the modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the
case of such countries.
The latest convention, No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999, has helped to
identify the 'child labourer' further, at least as far as the worst forms of child labour are
concerned. C. 182 takes the CRC age limit of 18 in its definition of 'child'69 (article 2)
and clearly states three situations considered to be 'worst': slavery and similar practices;
prostitution and involvement in pornography; and other 'illicit activities'. There is a
return to C. 13 870, however, in article 3(d) which once more takes a qualitative approach
to definition stating that other worst forms comprise 'work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of
69 C 138 also uses 18 as the age limit for engagement in work or employment which is likely to jeopardise
the health, safety or morals of children (article 3).
70 As well as to article 32 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that under 18s
must be protected from 'economic exploitation and from any work that is likely to be hazardous or to
interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual,
moral or social development'.
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children'. It is this subjective and qualitative element which has been most criticised by
those arguing that the common interpretation of this will be taken from a Northern
constructionist stance. This argument, however, is less viable in the light of article 4,
which states that the activities to be included in 3(d) are to be determined by the national
laws/ regulations of the competent national authority after consultation with employers'
and workers' groups71.
It has thus been seen that according to ILO legislation, there is not one but many 'child
labourers'. The profile of the child labourer is thus determined by type of labour activity,
which in turn determines age limits, and the economic and educational status of the
country in which he or she is labouring. In other words, not all work done by children is
to be considered child labour and certain forms of work may be acceptable for children
at particular ages. The new Director-General of the ILO, Juan Somavia, confirms this in
the current ILO 'brochure':
Child labour is not jobs for kids. It is neither valuable work experience not
apprenticeship combined with schooling that enhances a child's present and
future prospects. Child labour- in its worst forms- is abuse of power. It is adults
exploiting the young, naive, innocent, weak, vulnerable and insecure for personal
profit (ILO undated: 3)72.
For a further analysis of Boyden's idea of the ILO's child labourer let us return to her
text (1997 [1990]: 201) in which she recognises that the ILO has changed its stance
through time:
Whereas at one time the International Labour Office advocated total abolition of
child labour, the overwhelming impact of poverty in the South has forced it to
adopt a compromise in recent years. The present aim, therefore, is to encourage
policies that prohibit child labour in occupations damaging to health and
development and to regulate child labour in non-hazardous occupations (Bequele
and Boyden, 1988). A further distinction is made by the International Labour
71 White (1999: 141) argues that this article provides the compromise between the need for universal
standard setting and the cultural relativist arguments expressed by many national states and academics.
72 While I would have to add that it is not just adults exploiting children for personal profit, as many
children engage in worst forms of work on a free-lance basis (see Chapter 8), I would also have to argue
that it is adults who have created the system whereby children are having to engage in such work.
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Office between child work and formal labour or employment, on the grounds that
while the latter is often highly exploitative, the former may not be harmful to
children and may even be beneficial. The only real concern of labour policy is to
regulate the waged or semi-waged occupations of children; non- remunerated
labour, self-employment and so-called 'informal' activities are considered to fall
within the confines of social welfare intervention.
The analysis in Chapter 2 leads us once more to question the generalised statement of
this leading child labour researcher. If we recall the original ILO constitution, we will
see that Boyden's stated present compromise of 'encouraging policies that prohibit child
labour in occupations damaging to health and development and to regulate child labour
in non-hazardous occupations' is almost identical to the 1919 aim of 'the imposition of
such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their
education and assure their proper physical development.' The abolition of child labour
always was and remains the overall goal, with the imposition of limitations as a means
for achieving this. It is not the goal therefore that has changed- this has always been the
same. What have changed are the age and labour categories within legislation through
time. Originally the ILO distinguished between child and young person. 'Children' were
seen as under 14, this was then raised to 15 and with the advent of the CRC all under the
age of 18 are defined as 'children'.
With regard to the second part of Boyden's statement, I would like to highlight two
points. First of all the apparent criticism that the ILO distinguishes between child work
and child labour. This is interesting as usually the criticism is that they do not make such
a distinction and that they do not appreciate the socialisation value of certain forms of
culturally defined work (Reynolds 1991, Nieuwenhuys 1994), an argument countered by
the Somavia quote above.
Unfortunately, many commentators do not go back to original sources before making
their comments, leading to a situation where there is a gross misunderstanding of what
the ILO stands for, how it works, and what its objectives are. It must not be forgotten
that many of those involved in drafting statements, such as the above, come from poor
countries and so the argument of the 'western imposition of ideas' is far more complex
than some would have us believe, as will be revealed further in 3.4.
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Secondly, I also disagree with the final statement that 'informal' activities fall within the
73confines of social welfare intervention. The adoption of IPEC m 37 countries has been
significant in that it has brought these activities directly under the responsibility of the
labour ministries. Child labour in the mines in Mirerani was very clearly informal, the
children were self-employed and mostly non-remunerated (until gemstones were
discovered) and yet it is a target area of IPEC intervention, as determined by the
Tanzanian Ministry of Labour (see Chapter 5).
The vision of 'the child labourer' as in need of protection has thus not changed through
time. Children of certain ages must be protected from working in certain industries74
through banning their employment. The vision has developed, however, as experiences
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are gamed . This was shown by the increase in age limits, the expansion of activities as
well as current moves in the post-CRC years to include children in the decision making
process (See also Chapter 3.4 below).
3.3 The nature and structures of the ILO decision-making process
In order to understand how the 'child labourer' is defined in ILO legislation and
programme activity it is important to understand the formal decision making structures
of the Organisation. Such an analysis also reveals the complexity and the multi-voiced
nature of the decision making process and therefore the extent to which it is difficult to
argue for a 'Northern' construction of childhood which is then exported and imposed into
different cultural contexts.
7j
Preparation is underway for IPEC to be extended to a further 31 countries and IPEC is supported by 21
donor agencies.
74 There does remain, however, the issue of the nuance within a particular type of industry, what is bad
and what is good i.e. mining children in Mirerani saw surface mining as 'worst' and 'pit' mining as 'best',
unlike Recommendation 190 which saw underground mining as 'worst'- we will focus on this in Chapter
8.
75 In fact the ILO sees change as key to its success :'If there is one lesson from eight decades of ILO
history, it is that renewal, change and adaptation have been vital to its success' (ILO undated: 3).
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First it is important to say a brief word about the nature of the organisation. It was seen
in Chapter 2 that the ILO was not created overnight but was the result of a lengthy
process, culminating in the Peace Treaty talks which involved protracted negotiations
between governments on the one hand and employers' and workers' organisations on the
other. What was significant about the ILO was that it possessed an independent legal
status and could adopt decisions which would create binding obligations for members.
Prior to the creation of the Organisation member states were sovereign in issues
pertaining to labour. Through ratifying the ILO Constitution, however, member states
were in fact limiting their sovereignty, placing 'a voluntary and deliberate limitation
based upon the conscious realisation that the improvement of the conditions of labour all
over the world would be better and more effectively attained by international collective
action through an autonomous independent body with limited, but autonomous, legal
status, and functions and powers' (Osieke 1985:7). This demonstrates the lengths to
which states were prepared to go to ensure decent labour conditions. In today's climate
where governments ratify Convention upon Convention, such a step does not seem
particularly controversial but at the time, the loss of sovereignty, to whatever degree,
was seen as a very important move. This is an emphasis I want to maintain throughout
this thesis: people fought long and hard for labour rights and legislation and the
ratification of the ILO Constitution is not something that sovereign states undertook
lightly. The setting up of the ILO was, and remains, an important step in international
human rights law and practice.
One of the primary features of the Organisation is its political character. It is composed
of 175 states with different interests and ideologies. This political dimension is often
forgotten by commentators (Osieke 1985: 9) who see the Organisation as a
homogeneous entity, imposing the will, or even the 'construction of childhood', of the
rich nations onto the less rich. It is important to note, however, that more poor countries
than rich are members of the ILO and that their representatives are not simple 'yes men'
to the rich 'Northern' nations. That would be a far too simplistic explanation of a highly
complex and often conflictual process. The ILO cannot exercise its functions and powers
without the consent of member states, usually by a majority vote or in the case of the
adoption of Conventions and Recommendations by a two third majority (Articles 17(2)
and 19(2) of the Constitution). Traditionally, members have voted according to general
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political divisions: the 'Group of 77'76, the industrialised market economy countries
(IMEC) and until recently the Group of Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe. The
Group of 77 constitutes a clear majority and can therefore cause a proposal to be adopted
or rejected. According to Osieke (1985: 11):
This 'automatic' majority in international organisations has been subjected to
severe criticisms by some legal commentators on the ground, i.a., that very often
resulting decisions are politically motivated and do not take account of the
legitimate interests and legal rights of the minority which are expected to
implement them.
This view point of legal commentators is interesting in that it appears quite distinct from
the anthropological opinion on international organisations dealing with child related
issues that western countries impose their particular constructions onto poorer countries.
Instead, it would appear that all too often it is the Group of 77 which imposes its will
onto the rich nations; the main funders of the organisation. There are a number of
examples of where G-77 countries have taken constitutional aspects of the organisation
to task and where they have won, as will be discussed below.
While the Organisation clearly functions according to political divisions it is important
to note the other two forms of division: regional (Africa, Asia, Latin America and
Europe) and representational (workers, employers, governments). These divisions are
also pertinent to the ways in which delegates to the International Labour Conference and
elsewhere choose to vote (see Osieke 1985). The introduction of tripartism to the ILO
was explored in Chapter 2 but it is important to remember the 'revolutionary' nature of
tripartism in 1919 and its impact on sovereign states. Member Governments, by ratifying
the ILO Constitution, were agreeing to share their sovereignty with workers and
employers organisations and to this day the ILO is the only UN agency to include non¬
governmental representatives on the same basis as government representatives within its
power making structure. In addition to workers' and employers' organisations, article 12
(3) of the ILO Constitution authorises the Organisation 'to make suitable arrangements
76 The Group of 77 consists of 133 members and was developed to ensure representation of the interests of
'Third world' countries in the UN system. See www.g77.org.
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for such consultation as it may think desirable with recognised non-governmental
international organisations'. As seen below, the drafting of Convention 182 was carried
out with substantial consultation with the NGO sector.
All this reveals that the imposition of one particular construction of childhood, be it
Northern or otherwise, is difficult in a context where different countries and different
groups within those countries, from employers, workers, NGOs and government, are
present and vocal in the formal decision making process. To argue that the 'North'
imposes its particular construction (which I would dispute even exists in view of the
diversity of opinions and policies relating to childhood issues- see New Zealand's
dissenting opinions in 3.4 below) is to arrogantly deny the agency of these various
representative groups, all with different ideologies, motivations and experiences, as well
as to over-inflate the importance of groups from the 'North'.
There are two representative organs within the ILO- the International Labour
Conference (ILC) and the Governing Body of the International Labour Office (GB). The
International Labour Office is the international secretariat of the ILO and is based in
Geneva. The Director-General (DG) is the Chief Executive of the Organisation. Whilst
the functions of each are complex and multi-dimensional it is important to briefly
summarise their roles in order to gain a clearer understanding of the wider functioning of
the Organisation (See also Box 3.3; Osieke 1985).
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Box 3.3
International Labour Organisation: Structure
3.3.1 The International Labour Conference and the Governing Body
The International Labour Conference is the ILO's plenary body, in which all member
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states, workers' and employers' organisations are entitled to be represented . The ILC is
composed of four representatives of each member state: two from Government, one
from the Workers and one from the Employers (see 2.1 and above for history of this
division). The ILC usually meets once a year and the agenda is determined by the GB.
'7 Formal functions are laid down in the Constitution but its main tasks are: adopting the programme and
budget for each biennium, examining and adopting Conventions and Recommendations (see 3.2),
reviewing the application of existing international standards, electing GB members and admitting States to
ILO membership. Informally, the ILC provides an important forum for government and non-government
delegates to discuss issues with their contemporaries from all over the world.
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Each Conference delegate is entitled to one vote and is free to vote individually (which
may lead to delegates from the same member state voting against each other).
The Governing Body is the executive organ of the Organisation and meets three times a
year, in March, June and November78. Article 7 of the Constitution lays down that the
GB is to consist of 56 persons: 28 from government, 14 from employers and 14 from
workers, thus maintaining the tripartite nature of the Organisation. One of the most
controversial aspects of the ILO is the fact that:
of the twenty-eight persons representing governments, ten shall be Members of
chief industrial importance, and eighteen shall be appointed by Members selected
for that purpose by the Government delegates to the Conference, excluding the
delegates of the ten Members mentioned above (Article 7 (2)).
This aspect is important in considering Boyden's argument of the imposition of a
'Northern' construction of childhood, especially as the GB is the primary organ
responsible for ILO policy. Who, therefore, are these 'members of chief industrial
importance'? At present they are: Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The ten members
have changed through time, however. Canada was a member until recently when it was
replaced by Brazil, which had been previously dismissed in 1980 when the United States
resumed its membership of the ILO79. The criteria for determining the ten states has also
varied through the years, although the primary criteria relate to national income,
contributions to the ILO budget and economically active population (Osieke 1985: 105).
The other 18 Government members are elected by the Conference every three years (the
78 It is elected for a term of three years and is responsible, amongst other functions, for appointing and
supervising the DG, determining the ILC agenda, considering complaints and representations against
member states for failure to implement ratified Conventions and recommending action. In other words, the
GB is responsible for directing and approving the Organisation's policies.
79 For explanation as to the mechanisms of dismissal and replacement see Osieke (1985: 38, 129-132). The
US submitted its letter of withdrawal from the ILO in 1975, giving the constitutional two year notice
period. The four reasons given for withdrawal were the erosion of tripartism, selective concern for human
rights, disregard of process, and the increasing politicisation of the ILO. After withdrawal a UN member
country may regain membership by simply addressing to the DG their formal acceptance of the
Constitutional obligations (non-UN members must apply to Conference). For further discussion of US
withdrawal see Osieke (1985: 35).
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last elections were held in June 1999) and the Employer and Worker members are
elected in their individual capacity.
The question of the ten states of industrial importance is one which the Group of 77 has
disputed, arguing that the maintenance of permanent seats is contrary to the principle of
the sovereign equality of states and that all seats should be elective. The counter¬
argument was that the ten states contributed 71% of the ILO budget, 60% of the
population of the world and 65% of the world's labour force (Osieke 1985: 129) and
were therefore representative. The 1974 Working Party on the Structure of the ILO
recommended a new system in which there would be 54 government seats all of which
would be elective and distributed on the basis of four regions, with regional delegates
selecting representatives (Osieke 1985: 130, citing International Labour Conference, 65th
session 1979, Provisional record no.2: 6). The Record of Proceedings of the 1986
International Labour Conference reveal that an instrument for the amendment of the ILO
Constitution was adopted which would, inter alia, allow changes to the composition of
the GB. While this instrument of amendment was adopted, however, it still needs to be
ratified by two thirds of the members of the Organisation. This has not yet occurred as
there are currently only 89 ratifications and therefore the amendment has not come into
force80 (ILO official, pers. comm.).
3.3.2 The Director-General
The Director-General's role (DG) is to ensure 'the efficient conduct of the International
Labour Office and for such other duties as may be assigned to him' (article 8). The DG
is generally elected for five years, which may be extended for further periods of five
years. The current DG is Mr Juan Somavia who was elected in March 1999. Returning
to Boyden's argument, it is interesting to note that Mr Somavia is from Chile and is
therefore less likely to be concerned with imposing a 'Northern' vision of childhood. His
predecessors, however, were all from the 'North'. There have been two DGs from
France, Britain and the United States respectively and one from Ireland and one from
80 At the 1995 Conference, modifications were made to the voting procedures for electing GB members.
These changes addressed a number of concerns which were raised in the 1986 amendment.
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Belgium. Whilst the presence of European and North American DGs might have been
justified in the early stages of the ILO as it developed out of historical developments in
Europe and North America, there seems no clear reason as to why more recent DGs
should be so over-representative of these particular countries. It has been seen that the
DG is elected by the GB, the majority of whom are not from Britain, the US, France or
Belgium. Could it simply be that the previous DGs have simply been the best candidates
for the job or do the nations from which they belong wield tremendous influence on the
other member states?
One of the DGs, Elarold Butler, resigned from his position over the appointment of an
official whom he felt to be unsuitable but whose candidature was being heavily pressed
for by his government (2.3). Unfortunately, the issue of political appointments affects
many organisations, international or otherwise. During fieldwork I heard of a number of
incidents where UN staff were complaining about people in positions of authority who
were felt to have been appointed because of political pressure from their governments
rather than on merit. This is especially the case where countries have few representatives
O 1
and m the interests of 'universalism' people are kept on despite proven incompetence .
It would, however, be inappropriate to comment on the appointment of DGs as this was
not a specific focus ofmy study. Suffice it to say, that the fact that the DG is elected by
the GB as opposed to the ILC has given rise to controversy within the organisation
(Osieke 1985: 118-119). The question was examined in 1967 by the Working Party on
the Programme and Structure of the ILO. The majority of the Party, however, were
against transferring the power to appoint the DG to the ILC but felt that there needed to
be some compromise to accommodate the conflicting views and therefore recommended
that the Chairman of the GB should formally notify the Conference of the election of the
DG. In 1975 a new procedure was introduced by which the GB would elect the DG and
then submit their choice to Conference for approval and in 1976 the Constitution was
amended accordingly (Osieke 1985: 119 cites International Labour Conference 1976:
241). In my copy of the ILO Constitution, published in 1998, however, article 8(1) does
81 The counter-side of this problem is that highly competent people may feel that they are excluded due to
their nationality. See below. This issue seems to be a universal problem relating to all quota-based
recruitment systems.
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not appear to have been amended and still reads that the DG shall be appointed by the
GB. It was seen earlier that for amendments to come into force they require a two third
majority, and there have currently only been 89 ratifications.
Interviews revealed that it is the DG who retains the real power in the organisation:
The power is in the DG. He is the one who sets out lines and influences what is
going to be discussed in the Governing Body and at the Conference, he must
keep everyone happy. The Governing Body is not full time, there is a relation of
trust between the DG and Governing Body, they won't interfere in his decisions.
(ILO official, pers. comm.)
3.3.3 The International Labour Office
Finally, it is time to turn to the International Labour Office, the permanent secretariat of
the International Labour Organisation. The Office employs some 1,900 officials of over
110 nationalities at the Geneva headquarters and in 40 field offices around the world. In
addition, some 600 experts undertake missions in all regions of the world under the
programme of technical co-operation (see www.ilo.org)82. The budget for the current
biennium (200-2001) is US$467, 470, 000. The Office is responsible for servicing
meetings by providing reports, interpretation, translation and other administrative and
research support. It is also expected to 'accord to governments at their request all
appropriate assistance within its power in connection with the framing of laws and
regulations (..) and the improvement of administrative practices and inspection' (Article
10 (b) Constitution). Furthermore, the Office houses a research and documentation
centre and a printing house issuing a broad range of specialised studies, reports and
periodicals.
With regard to staffing, the Office is not tripartite but is composed of permanent
international officials, appointed by the DG. Article 9 (2) of the Constitution states that
'so far as is possible with due regard to the efficiency of the work of the Office, the
82 The staff numbers have thus been reduced since 1985 when there were over 3,000 staff (Osieke 1985:
123)
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Director-General shall select persons of different nationalities'. Such a policy is laudable
and to be expected in accordance with the principle of universality. It has led to a rich
and diverse range of staff with different experiences and perspectives. The policy has
also been controversial, however (see 3.3.2). During the course of my ethnographic
fieldwork, Junior Professional Officers often told me, that they knew that they would
never be employed after their term was up because their country was over-represented83:
As a Dutch person, it is almost impossible that I will get a permanent job with
the Organisation as there are so many of us already working there (pers. comm.).
Such positive discrimination is revealed in a web advertisement for recruitment to the
ILO's young professional training scheme: 'Preference is given to nationals from ILO
member States that are not represented or are under-represented'
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/pers/vacancy/ ypcep.htm, 05.02.2001)
The recruitment process was even described by one official as 'a game':
It's a big game, this person talking here, and another lobbying there. It's a
strategy. (...) There are loads of people who are not doing much here (..) Also if
you look at personnel lists, people don't get sacked. Even with fixed-term
contracts, they just get renewed, there is extremely low turnover. That is not
normal.
The issue ofmanagement and staffing is one to which we return in the Chapters 4, 6 and
y84
Finally, it is important to remember that the structures in place are firmly based in the
history of the Organisation. The structures are thus 82 years old. While there have been
modifications to the Constitutional arrangements as well as further recommendations for
83 Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) are young professionals, funded by their governments to work for
UN agencies for a defined period, usually two years. The geographical proximity of the Geneva-based
Office is one important reason why many North European countries are over-subscribed.
84 The issue of political appointments in the UN is not unknown. In a speech to the Rockefeller
Foundation in New York, Clare Short, British Secretary of State for Development, publicly stated that in
the UN recruitment system 'competence should be put above considerations of nationality' and that the UN
should be searching for the 'brightest and the best, not just the politically connected' (DFID 2001: 8).
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change, which have yet to be implemented, there are points of controversy which have
yet to be resolved. This can be attributed to the 'determination of some members and
entities to protect their individual and collective interests' (Osieke 1985: 141). This self-
interest, within the universalist agenda, has led to many of the problems facing the
Organisation. Has it led, however, to a situation where the self-interests of the 'North'
have led to their imposing a particular vision of childhood? In order to answer this
question, we will explore the debates and processes leading up to the adoption of the
latest child labour Convention, No. 182.
3.4 ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour:
Formal and Informal Adoption Process
To gain an accurate understanding of the various mechanisms of the decision-making
process, it is useful to take a concrete example of the passing of a piece of legislation. I
propose to take the example of the most recent piece of child labour legislation:
Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999, in order to explore the
various processes at work in developing a particular 'construction' of the 'child
labourer'. It was seen above that the ILO had a significant number of Conventions and
Recommendations prior to the adoption of 182. Why, therefore, did it need another one?
What were the motives behind its introduction and what vision or 'construction of
childhood' was it in fact exporting? Finally, what formal and informal processes led to
the eventual adoption of 182?85
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My primary sources of information here were ILO documents and discussions with ILO officials. The
documents are mainly official minutes of meetings, published as committee reports. They are therefore
summaries of the debates and do not provide detailed information of participants other than their
nationality and whether they are from tripartite or other groups. The reports are however extremely
valuable in that they are do provide the actual wording ofwritten submissions as well as an as accurate as
possible transcription of verbal communications during meetings. The reports are for administrative
recording purposes as opposed to for publicity or other purposes and are therefore, I would argue, quite
reliable. What they lack, however, is the passion and emotion of the actual debates, an issue to which I
shall return in Chapter 4.3.
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A combination of events led to the recognition of the need for a new child labour
convention. By the mid 1990s, the question of linking trade policies to human rights was
becoming more and more prominent (Klein 2000). There were growing concerns as to
86the negative impact of increasing trade liberalisation for poorer groups in society.
Child labour was one concern which grabbed the attention of North American and
European media, consumer groups and other non governmental organisations.
Politicians were quick to latch on to this highly emotive issue and child labour soon
found itself high on the global agenda, linking as it does the free trade agenda with the
growing poverty elimination agenda of major donors and multilateral aid agencies,
including the World Bank and the ILO. 1994 was the year of the Uruguay Round- the
most comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations ever. It was through these
negotiations that the World Trade Organisation came into being: its task to implement
and enforce the wide ranging multilateral agreements negotiated during the Uruguay
Round (http://www.southcentre.org/papers/wto/wtotasks-01 .htm; Hirst and Thompson
1999: 210). The agreements were not without controversy, however, and the opening of
world markets led to many commentators arguing that international differences in
environmental and labour standards and regulations, such as child labour, distorts the
world trading system and creates unfair advantages in favour of countries with lower
07
standards . On the other side of the debate, many poor countries have argued that the
requirement for higher standards is simply a protectionist ploy on the part of rich
countries (Beynon and Dunkerley 2000: 263-264). In 1994, the ILO set up its first
Working Group on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalisation of Trade which would
work towards ensuring that member states could meet their WTO and ILO commitments
to a parallel development of trade liberalisation and social progress
(http://www.ilo.org/public/englislT/bureau/inf/pr/96-9.htm) as well as to attempt to
address some of the concerns expressed above. According to an informant, one
conclusion of the above discussions was the recognition of the need for a new
Convention on child labour. With the acknowledgement by the Copenhagen Summit on
86 For a useful analysis of recent developments in the global economy and trade relations see Hirst and
Thompson 1999.
87 Similar arguments were used by British wool manufacturers in the 1800s, see 2.1.
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Social Development of the elimination of child labour as a fundamental principle and
right at work, the case was further strengthened. I would also argue that in view of the
above controversies linking trade standards to protectionism a Convention on the Worst
Forms of Child Labour would prove far more acceptable to ILO member states than C.
13888 (the high ratification rate of C.182 noted in the introduction to Chapter 2 seems to
indicate that this is true; see also ILO 1996a).
Having briefly explained a few of the events leading up to the recognition of the need
for a new instrument it is time to return to the ILO procedures for adoption of new
89 ... •
legislation . Once a need for legislation is recognised, the GB requests the Office to
prepare a comparative study of the laws and practices of member states relating to the
proposed issue. The GB then makes the final decision as to whether or not to continue
with the process. With regard to the worst forms of child labour, the GB felt that it
should continue and in 1996, it put the development of a new instrument onto the
Conference agenda. Once the new instrument is on the agenda, the Office is requested to
develop a more detailed law-and-practice report as well as to outline the proposed text,
in the form of a questionnaire (Standing Orders, article 39). In the case of the worst
forms of child labour, the Office produced a document called 'Child Labour- Targeting
the Intolerable', published in 1996 and later to become Report VI (1), 6th Item on the
Agenda of the 1998 ILC (ILO 1996a.). The report and questionnaire were sent out to all
member states, who were expected to consult worker and employer groups in drafting
their reply.
The replies to the questionnaire were analysed by the Office's TRAVAIL department,
and were then compiled into another report- Report VI (2) on Child Labour
(International Labour Office 1998c.)- which was then circulated to the governments
88
An obstacle to greater ratification of Convention 138 has been that some member States view the text as
too complex and too difficult to apply in its entirety.
89 The events leading up to the recognition of the need for a new instrument could form a thesis in
themselves so it would not be possible to detail them here. The above summary is useful however in
highlighting the key events.
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prior to the ILC90. Out of 175 member states, 108 had submitted replies by the time the
report was compiled91, a figure which was seen by staff informants as well as official
ILO documentation as an indication of overwhelming interest in the new instrument:
The interest in new standards on child labour is evidenced by the record number
ofmember States replying to the questionnaire; the governments of 108 member
States replied, and there was an almost equal number of additional replies from
employers' and workers' organizations. The general observations reflect a
consensus that the persistence and seriousness of the child labour problem
warrants renewed international action, including new instruments specifically
focused on intolerable or extreme forms of child labour (International Labour
Office 1998c: 9).
The 'record' number of states that provided comments clearly included non-'Northern'
nations with their own culturally distinct practices and ideologies of child raising and yet
there was an overwhelming 'consensus' as to the need for renewed international action.
To say that the view of 'Northern' nations was imposed on those in the South is to deny
the latter agency. Most comments on the questionnaire were from the South- not just
from governments but from workers' and employers' organisations. An exploration of
these replies reveals the degree of ffeethinking and agency which non-Northern
delegates expressed. Of the 105 responses to the first question as to whether there was a
need for a new instrument there were only two negative responses; from Cameroon and
qj
Bahrain . When one thinks that the answers were drafted in the relevant offices within
the member State, it becomes harder still to accept that there was any 'imposition' by
'Northern' states. It could also be argued that the latter were educated in the 'North' and
had therefore been influenced by the 'Northern' construction of childhood, but as far as
the people I met in Tanzania were concerned, this was only the case in exceptional
90 In 1997, three conferences were held to provide inputs to the new Convention: The February
Amsterdam Conference (see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/comp/child/conf/amsterdam/
background/htm.), the June Trondheim conference and the October Oslo conference.
91 It is extremely common for replies to arrive after deadlines, which are usually flexible in view of this.
Replies which arrived after compilation of the report could, however, be consulted by delegates at the
conference (International Labour Office 1998c: 1).
92 Cameroon was in fact in favour of a new instrument abolishing the 'most intolerable forms of child
labour' and was merely disagreeing with the 'broad reference to the elimination of child labour'
(International Labour Office 1998c: 12). Bahrain's comments are not included in the document.
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circumstances. Interestingly, one of the few countries which often replied in the negative
was New Zealand, a 'Northern' nation!93
Once all the questionnaire analysis was compiled, the ILC appointed a tripartite
committee to examine the proposals and the agreed text was then submitted to the
plenary of the Conference, with a resolution to place the question on the agenda of the
following year's Conference with a view to adoption. What was significant regarding
these meetings was the general consensus regarding issues (International Labour Office
1999c: 5). The tripartite committee originally comprised 181 members but attendance
fluctuated over the 18 sittings (International Labour Office 1998d: 1-2), because of
members attending other meetings scheduled for the same time94. It is apparent from the
report of the committee meetings that the Global March on Child Labour was extremely
influential:
This unprecedented manifestation of the concerns of ordinary people, of local
and international media, of activists, of NGOs and of children themselves
demonstrated the high expectations that had been raised and hence the
importance of the Committee's work (International Labour Office 1998d: 4).
While the Convention would have no doubt been approved anyway, the impact of the
March was substantial. The Global March, started in 1997, was the first time in history
that civil society around the world had agreed to a common platform on the issue
(www.globalmarch 1999: 12). To return to our central question regarding the 'Northern'
construction of childhood, it is important to note that the international secretariat of the
Global March is in New Delhi, India and that the key activist behind the March is
93 The most controversial question appears to be the one of the age of 'child'. The report maintains that 83
replies were affirmative as to the age limit of 18 but detailed scrutiny revealed this in fact to only be 81. 17
countries answered that the age limit should be lower, all of these were countries from the 'South' except
New Zealand. Analysis of the answers, however, reveals substantial confusion surrounding this issue. For
example, Eritrea felt that 18 would be inconsistent with Convention 138 but 138 itself defines 18 as the
age limit for worst forms of child labour. New Zealand felt that 'there needs to be a more flexible
approach to take account of national differences' (International Labour Office 1998c: 39). South Africa,
Ghana, Slovakia and Slovenia all argued that 18 was too high as the age limit for compulsory schooling
was considerably lower.
94
Conference only lasts a few days and many meetings are held, which often leads to timetable clashes.
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Kailash Satyarthi, an Indian national95. At this point, it is important to bring up the
influence of the NGOs themselves on the decision-making process. In 1997, the
Amsterdam Conference on Child Labour was held to discuss, amongst other things, the
proposal for a new Convention. NGOs were actively involved and a group of child
labourers were invited to present their views (New Internationalist 1997). NGOs were
then formally consulted in 1998 about the new Convention through the NGO Group for
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sub-Group on Child Labour. NGOs from
over 50 countries replied and 85% responded that there was a need for a new instrument
on the worst forms of child labour (Anti-Slavery International 1998). NGOs were
involved in the drafting process on a 'consultative' basis, as provided for in the ILO
Constitution. NGOs based in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe were involved in
the Committee meetings as was a representative from the Global March (International
Labour Office 1999c: 16-17). NGOs were also influential through formal lobbying of
their government representatives as well as informally through discussions with the
government, worker and employer representatives. The Global March, for example,
'worked hard to maintain public attention on the issue of child labour and lobby for
specific improvements on the Convention. The Global March identified access to
education, children in armed conflict, and the direct participation of child labourers as
key issues and these became the main topics for discussion' (www.globalmarch 2000:
13).
During one of the Committee meetings, Worker members suggested that the instruments
might refer to 'worst' forms of child labour, instead of 'extreme' forms (International
Labour Office 1998d: 5). This was an important step as there had been long debate
regarding the wording. According to one informant who has worked with IPEC for
many years:
Extreme gives the impression that other forms of work are not extreme,
intolerable gives the impression that some forms of labour are tolerable so 'worst
forms' was chosen. We didn't want to say that other forms were acceptable
(Male ILO official, pers. comm.)
95
An excellent report is available from the Global March web site which answers many questions relating
to the Convention and Recommendation. See www.globalmarch.org/worstformsreport/info/q-a.html.
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After the Conference a third report was developed, which included the proposed text of
the new Convention and Recommendation. The text was circulated in July and August
1998 (International Labour Office 1999a). The final replies were to be submitted by
November 1998 and were compiled into a fourth report (International Labour Office
1999b). The governments of 83 member states replied, 35 of them having no comments
to make. Most other replies were favourable. Issues which gave rise to comment
included whether the instruments should refer to 'worst' or 'extreme' or something else
(see comments from Bahrain, Portugal) as well as the time-frame referred to by
'immediate action'96. Previously the Convention was to deal with 'immediate
suppression of all extreme forms of child labour' (International Labour Office 1998c:
173) and then the 'prohibition and immediate suppression of the worst forms of child
labour (International Labour Office 1999d: 5) but the protests of many countries from
the South led to this being changed to 'the prohibition and immediate action for the
elimination of the worst forms of child labour' in the final text. This again reveals that
the voice of'Southern' countries is powerful and not systematically subject to the views
of the Northern countries pushing for immediate suppression.
Regarding children's participation there were very few comments, indicative of the
adult-centred bias of the majority of commentators and the belief that adults know what
is best for children (see 3.1)97. Turkey commented that 'the views of children affected by
child labour and of their families must be sought and included in future action
programmes designed to prevent child labour' (p. 16). This was supported by the Irish
trade unions (p. 81) and the New Zealand government and trade unions (p. 72). These
were the only comments, however, regarding involving children in the decision-making
process. Article 6 of the Convention does provide for 'consultation with other groups, as
appropriate' with regard to the design and implementation of programmes of action but
not with regard to the definition of worst forms. This means that children and their
96
Jordan, Mexico, United States- with the US arguing that 'immediate' means 'without delay' and the
other two countries stating that that would not be possible.
97
Boyden (1997: 22) points out the irony of the CRC which lays down the right of children to participate
in decisions affecting them and yet children did not formally participate in the drawing up of the document
supposedly designed to further their best interests.
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families may be consulted, if governments, employers and workers feel it to be
appropriate. Whilst it is clearly not appropriate to consult children at all stages, I would
argue that it is important to recognise their role as primary stakeholders and therefore to
consult them where appropriate (according to the particular circumstances) if there is to
be any chance of designing effective and sustainable policy and practice. This is normal
practice when discussing the labour activities of other working groups who are
represented by their worker organisations and I firmly believe that this right should be
extended to child and young adult workers.
The Recommendation (which is not binding but is merely a proposal for recommended
action) takes a different approach to the Convention with regard to children's
participation, arguing that programmes of action must take into 'consideration the views
of the children directly affected by the worst forms of child labour, their families and, as
appropriate, other concerned groups committed to the aims of the Convention and
Recommendation'. The emphasis is therefore on always consulting children and their
families. The 'as appropriate' applies to 'other concerned groups'. This is more in line
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child which calls for children to be consulted
in all decisions affecting them (Articles 12 and 13). It is important to note that children's
participation was strongly pushed for by the NGOs but one commentator argues that 'it
was felt to be impractical' to always include working children in the decision-making
process (Crawford 2000: 14). In fact, 'other concerned groups' were only included at the
final committee stage, the previous texts referring only to consultation 'with relevant
government institutions and employers' and workers' organisations (International
Labour Office 1998c: 174, International Labour Office 1999b: 81). This could be due to
the success of the Global March, which had impressed delegates (as shown above) and
shown them the power and commitment of 'other concerned groups' in the fight to
eliminate the worst forms of child labour.
This fourth report (International Labour Office 1999b) was then sent to all governments
at least three months before the 1999 Conference. The draft was then once more
examined in Committee which had 20 sittings, revealing the lengthy debates which
occurred before final submission to the plenary of the Conference for approval
(International Labour Office 1999c). Whilst the first set of meetings in 1998 had been
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relatively straightforward, the first meeting of the 1999 session started with a three hour
and thirty seven minute debate on the title of the Convention. According to a Global
March informant:
While this showed that everyone had a chance to express their views, it certainly
was very frustrating and tedious. With a thick stack of proposed amendments in
front of them, it looked doubtful whether the committee could realistically finish
before its deadline of Friday, June 12. At this point, the Committee adopted a
new tactic of having the key players (the workers' representative, the employers'
representative and leaders of different government groups) hold informal
meetings to negotiate package agreements covering the main issues (..) The
situation became a bit uncomfortable for other members who felt excluded from
the open discussion process they were used to at the ILO, and it wasn't clear that
the discussions wouldn't just end in stalemate. Fortunately, the working group
succeeded and produced a proposal that settled the most contentious issues
(www.globalmarch 2000: 10).
This is revealing of the informal processes adopted when the formal processes are too
lengthy or unfeasible. The official report of the Committee, Provisional Record 19
(International Labour Office 1999c: 2), refers to these 'informal meetings to negotiate
package agreements' as a 'Drafting Committee', illustrating the way in which an
informal decision became formalised within the reporting process.
The Committee incorporated a number of changes requested by members before
adopting its final report98. Once again the process was harmonious, in the words of the
Employer Vice-chairperson:
We worked together to achieve a truly practical, truly realistic instrument. Many
representatives sacrificed their ideal solutions to achieve a genuinely consensual
document. No votes were taken, no representatives were intimidated, all views
were heard in the interest of finding solutions to enable ratification by all
member states.(International Labour Office 1999e: 2; emphasis in text)99.
98
A detailed exploration of the changes is given in International Labour Office (1999c: 18-70).
99 To assess the extent to which this statement is true it would be useful to explore factors such as
constitution of the group, process involved and the success of using the break-away group further.
Unfortunately, this data was unavailable. I do believe,' however, that the nature of the issue was the key
factor leading to such a consensual outcome.
95
This illustrates that the Convention and Recommendation dealt with issues which all
member states and employer and worker groups could agree upon and was built with a
sense of consensus and compromise. This is revealed by the way in which African and
Asian governments pushed for 'immediate suppression' to be changed to immediate
action to 'eliminate', their position winning over in the end. The US and UK
governments, in turn, pushed for the Convention not to include the involvement of
children in armed conflict as their national legislation allowed 17 year olds to be
recruited on a voluntary basis. They won their case despite the African and Latin
American government groups, the workers group and some IMEC governments pushing
for there to be a complete ban on children being involved in armed conflict. Some
commentators argued, however, that the Americans did not plead their case with
compromise in mind:
In the end it became a serious game of power politics, with the United States
cranking up the pressure through all its available channels. The stakes were high
since President Clinton was scheduled for an all-star appearance at the
Conference and he was prepared to give the Convention his personal
endorsement if the United States could ratify it (www.globalmarch 2000: ll)100.
In the end the terminology referred to 'forced or compulsory recruitment of children for
use in armed conflict'. The use of children as soldiers can still, however, be considered
to be work which is likely to 'harm their health, safety or morals' and could therefore
still be prohibited under article 3 (d). The US and UK did not therefore entirely win their
battle.
Although the general attitude to the decision-making process was one of compromise
and consensus there were thus dissenting voices regarding specific issues. To return to
the central theme of this chapter- the exportation of a 'Northern construction of
childhood' - it is important to consider the various voices with regard to the overall
100
It is worth noting that the Clinton administration was extremely committed to the reduction of child
labour, making the US the primary IPEC donor. It remains to be seen whether this commitment will be
sustained by the new Administration.
'vision' embodied in the new Convention. Such an exploration reveals that the overall
vision was a universal one101, which consisted ofprotection of children:
The Government member of China underscored the importance of addressing the
worst forms of child labour and confirmed the importance his government
attached to the protection of children (International Labour Office 1999c: 7)
The Government member of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that children
represented the future and hope of mankind and that they had to be protected to
respect their integrity (International Labour Office 1999c: 11)
of the need for a new Convention which would be ratifiable by all;
The Government member of Japan (..) stressed that a new Convention should
contain only those principles which were essential to eliminate the worst forms
of child labour, so that it would be ratifiable by as many countries as possible
(International Labour Office 1999c: 8)
and that international organisations should help countries to develop programmes;
The Government member of the Islamic Republic of Iran considered child labour
to be a dominant issue of our time (..) International organisations, and the ILO in
particular, should provide assistance to countries struggling with child labour
problems and help them develop comprehensive programmes (International
Labour Office 1999c: 8).
The vision being exported was therefore a simple one: children need protecting from the
worst forms of labour and the international community can and should do something
about this. I would argue that this vision is not 'Northern' but 'humanitarian'. The desire
to protect children is not the sole domain of the rich nations but is relevant to all
societies who have adopted the new instruments. To deny this would be to deny the
101 The only difference of opinion came from Venezuela who suggested that 'the governments and civil
societies in countries where poverty is seen as making child labour necessary should devise forms of child
labour that are culturally based, such as theatrical activities and other activities that develop the child's
artistic talents and skills' (p. 18). There is no guarantee, however, that such 'cultural' forms of child labour
would not contravene the provisions of 182.
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agency of all the committed activists in non- Northern contexts who fought very hard to
draw attention to the issues and to ensure that the Convention and Recommendation
were as strong as possible.
The process leading to adoption of a particular Convention is thus a lengthy one, which
involves extensive consultation with tripartite partners from 175 countries as well as
NGOs. With regard to C.182, it was three years before the final document was submitted
to Conference, where both Convention 182 and Recommendation 190 were unanimously
adopted. Informally, however, the process took much longer and it was seen that by the
time of the 1994 Uruguay Round and of the 1995 Copenhagen Summit the need for
some new instrument had been strongly recognised.
3.5 Chapter Conclusions
This chapter has revealed that the need for a new Convention had been expressed by the
world community on a number of occasions. The motives behind the introduction of a
new Convention were that Convention 138 was not providing sufficient protection for
children most in need, i.e., those engaging in the worst forms of child labour although
activists working with child labourers in the field were focusing more and more on the
worst forms (see Chapter 4).
The above discussion has been revealing of the inter-linked issues of power, agency and
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resistance . Boyden suggested to us that one particular vision of childhood, a
'Northern' vision, had been constructed and then exported to and imposed in radically
different cultural contexts through international organisations, such as the ILO. This
argument was rejected in 3.1 in favour of a less simplified perspective which recognises
the two dominant visions to which children labouring in poor countries are exposed: the
vision that children should not have to work under particular circumstances and the
capitalist dream of large international corporations such as Coca-Cola. To obtain the
102 Issues to which we shall return in Chapters 4, 6 and 7.
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dream they must work, no matter what the circumstances. Boyden's text has, however,
successfully drawn our attention to the issue of power within the development of policy.
Policy in the ILO, and other UN agencies, is developed through a complex and lengthy
process, although the ILO is more representative than other UN agencies due to its
tripartite structure and therefore involves even more complex negotiations. Different
interest groups have different claims, each attempting to use their power and resources
to gain the best possible outcome.
This chapter on the formal decision-making processes of the Organisation has revealed
that the ILO constitution lays a number of checks to minimise the domination of one
particular group over another. The Constitution is very clear about the importance of
including all nations equally in the decision-making process, the eventual aim being to
make the ILO a truly universal organisation. Non- governmental bodies - the workers'
and employers' groups- were jointly given an equal voice to that of government and
provision was made for NGOs to play an active role in the decision making process, as
discussed in Chapter 3.3.1 and 3.4. Where there was a conflict of power and interest it
was shown that, at least with regard to the development of 182, there was a spirit of
consensus and compromise, revealed by the way in which two dominant groups (G-77
and the US and UK) succeeded in getting proposals changed in their favour. The
complexity and length of the process has revealed that it is extremely difficult to impose
one particular set of view points or 'Northern construction of childhood'. Finally, it is
important to note that at the end of the day, States choose whether or not to ratify a
Convention. If they feel that the text is inappropriate, they are less likely to ratify, let
alone implement the provisions. The power relations between countries and the
Organisation are, however, complex and we return to these in Chapters 6 and 7 on the
ILO in Tanzania. In order to ensure that countries can ratify, the ILO has clearly made
provision for different States to select appropriate age limits, for example, or to
determine themselves what they feel to be the 'worst forms of child labour' in their
country. To take the 'Northern construction of childhood' argument too far in this case
would therefore be to argue that there is no resistance to the power of 'Northern' nations
and to deny agency to the many non-Northerners who participated in the decision-
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making process103. Such an argument is in fact reminiscent of structural dependency
theory, which placed the developing countries in the periphery and developed countries
at the core of the global system, with the peripheral countries fully bound by and subject
to forces at the core. I have argued in this chapter that not only are the 'peripheral'
countries not straight-jacketed by external 'core' forces but they have in fact played a
vital role in shaping the way in which child labour policy has been and is being
developed.
103 A similar critique can be made of those that argue that 'Development has been and still is the
Westernisation of the world' (Latouche 1993: 160, cited in Pieterse 2000: 178). This clearly denies the
agency of majority world countries in owning development. For further critique of this and other 'post-
development' arguments see Pieterse (2000).
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4. Voices of the Policy Implementers
in HQ
Organizations get likened to many things- machines, armies, garbage cans,
theatrical plays, the human body, and so on. We find the analogy of a river
helpful. Like a river, an organization may appear static and calm if viewed on
a map or from a helicopter. But this says little about those who are actually on
or in the moving river, whether swimming, drowning or safely esconced in boats
(Gabriel, Fineman and Sims 2000: 2).
The previous two chapters revealed the 'vision' behind ILO child labour policy. But
what of the practice? This and later chapters will argue that it is not the vision per se that
is flawed but the power relationships and bureaucratic procedures which take over and
become more important than the achievement of the vision. What is it that sustains the
external and internal power relationships in a way which hinders success? The
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), currently known
as the InFocus Programme on Child Labour: IPEC, is officially responsible for all ILO
child labour activities. I propose to examine the processes which lie behind the
interpretation and implementation of the voices of the formal policy makers, as explored
in Chapter 3. This chapter focuses solely on the Implementors at HQ, i.e. Geneva, level.
Chapters 6 and 7 explore the interpretation process in Tanzania. First of all, I introduce
IPEC as a programme within the wider Office framework, briefly exploring its
development from an 'idea' to the 'flagship programme of the ILO'. I then explore the
formal and informal discourses which surround IPEC action, prioritising the experiences
of those 'who are actually on or in the moving river'.
101
4.1 IPEC: The Evolution of a 'Flagship' Programme
In Chapter 2.3, the historical development of IPEC was briefly introduced. Here we
explore the evolution of the programme, from a small technical co-operation programme
to its current status as the 'flagship' of the ILO, in more detail. It will be shown that the
programme has evolved through an ongoing dialogical process, which involved both
external and internal developments.
It has been seen that child labour has always been an ILO concern, drifting in and out of
fashion as an issue of importance104. Up to the late 1970s, early 1980s, ILO child labour
action was characterised by international standard setting. In the 1980s, there was more
of an emphasis on documenting the problem and developing appropriate advocacy and
policy responses. In 1990, the Government of Germany proposed to make a special
annual contribution of DM 10 million a year to help finance the ILO's programme on
child labour, following the then DG's decision 'to make the elimination of child labour a
major theme of integrated and concerted Office-wide action' (ILO 1991:1). In 1991, the
DG, Mr Hansenne, made child labour one of the three inter-departmental projects of the
1992-1993 biennium budget105.
INTERDEP was put into place prior to the approval of IPEC106. Although funds had
been allocated to what would become IPEC, the bureaucratic process which precedes
project approval is lengthy and it would appear that the ILO wanted to place greater
emphasis on child labour intervention as soon as possible. INTERDEP consisted of each
104 For a discussion of fashion and organisations, see Czarniawska (1997: 116-117).
105 It is important here to remember the context in which INTERDEP was set up. The late 1980s and early
1990s were the years of the development and ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which sparked off an unprecedented debate surrounding the issue of childhood. Many donors and NGOs
found themselves rushing to jump on the bandwagon of children's rights and I am sure that the ILO and
the German government were not immune to this.
106
There is no space here to enter into an evaluation of INTERDEP activities but for an internal evaluation
report, see ILO (1992).
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relevant ILO department (such as NORMES, ACTRAV, TRAVAIL107) assigning one
person to work on child labour to develop tools and instruments for action and to 'create
wider public awareness of the ILO and its principles' (ILO 1991b: 140-14).
IPEC became operational in 1992, when six countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Kenya,
Thailand, Turkey) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the ILO. IPEC
formed a technical co-operation branch under TRAVAIL, the overall ILO department
responsible for developments in labour practice.
From its inception, IPEC has been highly politicised. As one informant advised me:
If you do such a study you will have to focus on the politics, right from the top.
Many of these things are decided by the donors, regardless of the Conference,
Governing Body or whatever. You must focus on politics (ILO Official, pers.
comm.)108.
This clearly applies to any organisational ethnography and throughout this chapter the
issue of politics arises with great regularity. At this particular point, it is important to
note that the dominance ofGerman funding led to a dominance of German management.
The German donors insisted that a German take the job of manager and until 2000 all
managers were German109. In recent years, this has changed as the development of
alternative sources of funding has led to the decline in German dominance. The
Americans in particular are looking to replace the position of the Germans, as seen
below.
107 NORMES is the legal standards department, ACTRAV is the workers' group and TRAVAIL is
responsible for overall developments in labour practice.
108 It is important to see the ILO as working within a wider global system of international development
policy. Within this system there is a clear hierarchy of power as will be explored in full in Chapter 7, when
the relationship between the ILO, DFID and the World Bank in Tanzania is analysed.
109 Kleish (German), Habernicht (German), Stoikov (German), Blenk (German), Roselaers (Dutch),
Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso), Ng. Gek-Boo (Malaysia).
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According to one informant, the early days of IPEC were full of confusion and staff
members experienced hostility from other departments:
INTERDEP were still working on child labour. There was a lot of confusion,
who does what and not me, not me. In IPEC only Bonnet had experience on child
labour. The main problem was confusion. I could not tell anyone where I was
working as people didn't like it. It had too much money. People would come to
IPEC to milk it of its money. It was pretty hostile. I don't know why. Getting
offices and furniture was not easy, we paid for our own furniture. Projects was
another thing, most people were under TC (Technical Co-operation) funds, the
ILO did not want to contribute anything. There was a lot of hostility, it was a
new concept developed between Assefa and Kleish110. Everything was urgent,
urgent, urgent and internally there were many problems as it was so new. People
don't like change in the ILO. (..) People took time to adapt, now everyone wants
to work for IPEC. At the same time as the hostility, child labour was the in thing.
The Germans were giving so much money. I can't understand why in IPEC
everything was such a struggle. The Director111 didn't get any help because he
was from the outside, he didn't know how to do things. When Stoikov came it
was a godsend as she was from the inside and she struggled and she was a strong
woman. You can put up with the workload but not with the hostility (female ILO
official and ex IPEC staffmember, pers. comm., gloss added).
It is useful to consider a number of points made by the informant. She refers to the
confusion surrounding IPEC. Not only was it a new programme but only one staff
member had experience of child labour issues. On top of this, the programme had a lot
ofmoney which led to hostility from other departments. It must be remembered that the
ILO is wholly dependent on donor funding, which has been declining over a number of
years, and departments are often in conflict over financial allocations. The fact that this
new programme was taking an innovative approach and receiving a lot of attention due
to the prominence of child labour in the international arena did not help to appease the
hostility. This was compounded by the fact that the manager was an 'outsider' and
110 Assefa Bequele is the man seen by many long-term IPEC staff as the 'spiritual father' of the
Programme. Kleish was the first Director of IPEC, a German member of ILO staff who was nearing
retirement and who negotiated the funds with the German government.
111
My informant is referring to Hebemicht, Kleish's successor, who came in from the German
government 'with no experience of the ILO or of child labour'.
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therefore did not have his own networks of 'friends' who could help smooth things over,
nor did he have insider knowledge of the Organisation. Furthermore, his 'outsider' status
could have been seen as threatening by many who feared that he would bring in 'new'
approaches. The arrival of an 'insider' as manager helped things along but the hostility
remained. The management of IPEC has remained an issue to this day, with a number of
managers dying or leaving due to stress related illness and others seen as less than
satisfactory by a number of informants. The appointment and dismissal ofmanagers has
also been controversial112 and I will leave that point with the words of one informant:
'Things happen behind closed doors that we do not know about.'
It is useful to explore further what the informant meant by the 'new concept' that was
IPEC. The unique nature of IPEC - a short term 'project' that in fact served as an
'international programme' and proposed to work with and beyond the traditional ILO
tripartite framework- meant that it was set up to as a semi- autonomous entity within the
ILO:
It was set up as semi-autonomous for a variety of reasons. It was a new
programme which needed to experiment, it was developing fast so it needed
flexibility in management style and financial and administrative regulations. Our
view was that although it was semi-autonomous, it still needs to have a clear
direction in terms of accountability (senior ILO official, pers. comm.).
The way IPEC was set up was to avoid bureaucracy, it set up steering
committees, a broad framework, finance direct to the country, no red tape, we
worked quickly, the MoU and the steering committee allowed us to do so (ex-
IPEC, female ILO informant, pers. comm.).
This was clearly controversial within the more traditional ILO framework and may help
to explain some of the antagonistic feelings towards the Programme that were expressed
112 It is not appropriate to enter into detail about the personal traits of various managers as most of this is
founded on gossip and I need to protect my informants from unsubstantiated comments which could have
serious consequences for their careers. We will discuss current management issues further in 4.4. The
heavy workload mentioned by the informant also remains pertinent (4.4.6).
105
above. As the informant told us; 'People don't like change in the ILO' and IPEC did
represent change in quite a dramatic fashion - a highly innovative programme which was
attracting large sums ofmoney, as detailed below.
Furthermore, the different approach was also problematic from an administrative point
of view:
It was evident from the start that an innovative and unique programme as ILO-
IPEC would pose a number of challenges to existing ILO structures and
procedures. The characteristics required for the effective implementation of the
Programme, such as flexibility, fast trouble-shooting and problem-solving, grass-
root activities, risk-taking and experimenting are sometimes difficult to
accommodate within the procedures of an international organization and call for
continuous adjustments and fine-tuning (ILO 1996: 5).
Such issues have yet to be resolved, as seen in Chapters 4.4.5 and 6. What is clear is that
the recipe seems to have worked, at least as far as the donors have been concerned:
What is very special about IPEC is that it started with a small research package
from the ILO but then we started to get the confidence of the donors. Even now
our regular budget is extremely weak but this is being discussed to increase the
regular budget (ILO official, pers. comm.).
In Chapter 2.3, we saw that the regular budget of IPEC was only around $7 million for
the 2000-2001 biennium whereas the technical co-operation budget (money from donors
specifically for IPEC) is $77.5 million. This highlights the sub-text in the above quote
which reveals that as so much of the funding is extra-budgetary, IPEC is almost entirely
reliant on the whims of the donors, discussed further below.
The initial time frame for IPEC was five years during which time the Programme aimed
'to mobilise new actors in the fight against child labour, to conduct a legal review, to
strengthen political commitment and develop experimental action and then to
mainstream action within national government budgets' (ILO official pers. comm.). As
more donors came on board (Belgium in 1992, France, Norway, Spain, Australia and the
US in 1995 and then Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands in 1996 and others such as
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Denmark and the UK since then) IPEC moved to a 10 year framework and now operates
in a non-specified time framework, i.e. until the money runs out. In 1999, a new
Director-General, Juan Somavia, was appointed and one of his first tasks was to
restructure the Organisation, in the process transforming IPEC into the InFocus
Programme on the progressive elimination of child labour.
Somavia streamlined the activities of the Office under one concept, that of 'Decent
Work' (ILO 1999). Under this umbrella, he created four sub-programmes: Standards and
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Employment, Social Protection, and Social
Dialogue. The InFocus Programme on the progressive elimination of child labour: IPEC
is one of the four areas covered by Standards and Fundamental Principles at work113. Its
placing as one of the primary InFocus Programmes reveals the high profile nature that
child labour had gained since the late 1970s: from the initial work of one man on child
labour, to INTERDEP, to IPEC and finally to a core ILO InFocus Programme. It could
also be argued that this illustrates the efforts of top management to bring IPEC back into
the conventional folds of the Organisation. As one of the core programmes, IPEC was
no longer given as much flexibility as before: it was now a major, if not the major, ILO
activity and was therefore to be placed under increasing scrutiny114. The InFocus
Programme was to link all of the Office's child labour work under one initiative as prior
to this different departments, such as NORMES (legal standards) and ACTRAV
(workers' group), were also working on child labour issues :
113 The other three are International Labour Standards, the InFocus Programme on the Declaration and
Relations, meetings and document services.
114 The main reason the project was allowed to be semi-autonomous was that it needed to be responsive
and flexible (see above). Initially a small project there was scope for such autonomy. As the project is now
one of the largest ILO programmes it is under increasing international scrutiny and the ILO management
probably want to maintain a 'panoptical' gaze (Foucault 1977) over action. The personalities of the various
managers are also, I would argue, highly relevant. The first managers were not afraid to set the project up
as semi-autonomous whereas current managers seem happy for the project to become more 'mainstream'.
However, as mentioned above, for ethical reasons I have chosen not to enter into discussion about specific
personality traits ofmanagers.
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Officially it is called the InFocus Programme (IPEC). IPEC was the technical co¬
operation office but there was also research, NORMES etc. When InFocus was
set up it incorporated these but wanted to keep the same name as a brand name
but structured in the way of InFocus programmes (ILO official working on IPEC,
pers. comm.).
The choice of word 'brand' (see 4.2) is interesting but as discussed IPEC was an
innovative and unique structure and successfully managed to carve out its own niche
within the overall ILO framework. Although the name was changed to InFocus
Programme, it is still referred to as IPEC by most people in the ILO, both in HQ and in
the field. I will therefore use 'IPEC' and the 'Programme' intermittently when referring to
the InFocus Programme.
The success of the IPEC 'brand' is evidenced by the rapid growth in interest and support
of its campaign against child labour. From a small programme involving fewer than 10
countries in 1992, it had increased almost ten fold to a global alliance of 99 participating
countries by early 2001- 51 countries of which have signed an MoU with the ILO, 23
countries associated with IPEC in a less formal way (i.e. IPEC has preparatory activities
in these countries but no MoU has been signed yet, which means that there is no formal
commitment from the Government apart from the preparatory activities agreed upon)
and 25 donor countries and contributing organisations providing financial and political
support to the Programme (ILO 2000: 6, see also Box 4.1a and Box 4.1b below).
Box 4.1a The IPEC Donors
'■ ■■ v v . ■ - .. ' ■ - ... • .. .. : ■ ' - L--"' '■
Germany, Belgium, Australia, France, Norway, Spain, United States, Canada,
Demnark, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, European Commission, Italian
Social Partners Initiatives, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, Japan,
Poland, Japanese Trade Union Confederation, Sweden, Comunidad Autonoma de





■ - " ' ' ' * ' ' ' ' ■ ' ' • :
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Such a broad funding base is important to ensure that there is not one dominant donor as
this may lead to imposition of particular ideologies and practices. There is concern,
however, with the growing dominance of the US115 (see 4.4 on informal discourses).
Box 4.1b IPEC Participating Countries (taken from ILO 2000a: 6)
. ' Countries that have signed the MoU Countries associated with
IPEC
Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana,
Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa,








Arab States Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen Syria, West Bank and Gaza
Asia Bangladesh, Cambodia, India,
Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand
China, Viet Nam







Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,




The rapid growth in funding116 has been problematic for the Programme, illustrated by
its low 'delivery rates' i.e. the percentage of allocated funds actually spent in the given
financial period. Expenditure has consistently been below allocation and in 1999 IPEC
115 The US pledged $29.5 million to the 1999 financial year, a similar amount for 2000 and a pledge of
$45 million is anticipated for 2001 (ILO 2000a: 7).
116 From just over $10 million in 92-93 biennium to over $70 million for the current 00-01 biennium (ILO
2000: 7). The rapid growth in funding does not apply to the ILO as a whole which has seen funds
declining, mainly as a result of decreasing UNDP budgets. In 1997, 29% of all ILO expenditure was from
the UNDP. In 1998 this was 26% and in 1999 had dropped even further to 18%.
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delivery rate was only 33%. This low figure was of particular concern to the Americans
who put pressure on the Programme to increase its delivery and an ambitious objective
was set to double delivery in the 2000-2001 biennium. Programme management expect
that this objective will be met (ILO 2000a: 7) and have placed considerable pressure on
the field offices to ensure that it is. The issue of delivery is controversial, however, as
the spending of money does not reflect the quality of spending or the results of the
spending and there is considerable pressure on field offices to develop programmes and
to spend money. These time pressures have meant that field staff have had little time to
strategise and carefully evaluate (see Chapter 6).
In the next two sections we will be exploring the current functioning of the Programme
further but at this point it is useful to explore the success of the Programme, as the
'brand' which has become the 'flagship' of the ILO.
4.2 Why has the IPEC 'brand' been so successful?
So what has led to the IPEC 'brand' attaining such a level of 'success' in selling its
particular brand and attracting not only recipient countries but also donors. There is a
long queue of countries hoping to sign MoUs with IPEC, more than there can ever be
funds for, and all the major donors are involved in supporting the Programme, even the
Americans who have long been reluctant to support UN initiatives. 'Success' in these
terms does not necessarily imply impact as there has been no effort to measure global
IPEC impact117. The Programme is now often called the 'flagship' programme of the
ILO, i.e., the Programme which attracts most publicity for ILO work. How, therefore,
did the programme go from idea in the early 1990s to flagship in 2000?
117
This would of course be an extremely difficult task: can you measure the numbers of children who
have not entered into child labour through mass media and sensitisation campaigns, for example?
Fortunately, it is not my task to do this but merely to point out 'success' in the terms stated above.
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4.2.1 Internal Organisational Factors
According to one ILO informant:
IPEC is the flagship now, the publicity for the ILO. That is for sure. It gets a lot
of money although there is all this chaos. I can't tell you why (female ILO
official with extensive experience of working with IPEC and other ILO
departments, pers. comm.).
The 'chaos' element is one which we shall be discussing further below. Another
informant provides a more detailed response:
What is it that made this so successful? Looking at the internal dynamics it was
the right time, the right people, the right DG, a lot of luck- I don't want to
minimise that. But if you look at it from a programmatic point of view (..) if
there was one critical thing it was the fact that we used international labour
standards, research, statistics, advocacy, policy and programming in an
integrated way. The international labour standards were extremely useful as they
provided the framework within which we viewed the problem and the objectives.
The research and statistics gave us the vital information we need about the
problem (...) We use that information to give visibility to the world. The media
picked up on this human, moral, social and economic problem. We used research
for advocacy purposes, at the same time documenting programmes around the
world by NGOs and governments, putting together the necessary information and
action. An integrated approach was used so it was a very respectable programme.
This is extremely important. You don't get success right away, there has to be
persistent, sustained work (..) we could have failed if it weren't for a) technical
officials and b) committed managers in the organisation who are prepared to
support the programme and third, a very good rapport which developed between
the Office, the international media and child rights groups (Assefa Bequele,
Senior ILO official and one of IPEC founders, pers. comm.).
This quote picks up five very important factors: timing, the development of an integrated
approach to programming, committed management, a good rapport with outside actors,
and luck. Timing was important as IPEC was developed just after the CRC so public
attention was firmly focused on child issues and the momentum had already been
created outside IPEC. The integrated approach was very important and, as a practitioner,
I would argue that programmes must take a holistic perspective and be based on well
founded research if they are to have any chance of success. The way in which it was
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rooted in particular countries was also participatory and has led to a feeling of national
ownership (see Chapter 6). The rapport with outside actors was also facilitated by this
participatory approach, with NGOs and other groups involved right from the start. The
media was quick to pick up on the 'attractiveness' of the issue (discussed further below)
and IPEC fed them frequently with press releases. Luck is clearly important but the
combination of the above factors created the luck as much as anything else. It is perhaps
also useful to contrast Bequele's 'respectable programme' with the first quote in this
section which refers to the 'chaos' element of the Programme. This no doubt reflects the
perspective of each informant: the first was a former IPEC staff member who has
nothing to lose by referring to the chaotic nature of the Programme, while the second
informant was one of the key people to set up the Programme, and therefore has more
self-interest in promoting its image as highly organised and systematic, as opposed to
chaotic. Also the second informant is referring more to the organisational design of the
Programme, whereas the first is referring to the practical, day-to-day reality of
implementing the organisational design. This highlights the fact that however systematic
the design, the reality of implementation often leads to a more 'chaotic' situation, not
necessarily a bad thing if one consider Peters' (1989) best-selling management manual
'Thriving on Chaos' in which he argues that in the modem business world chaos is now
the norm: 'The true objective is to take the chaos as given and leam to thrive on it. The
winners of tomorrow will deal proactively with chaos, will look at the chaos per se as
the source of market advantage, not as a problem to be got around' (op. cit.: preface).
Although this refers to the business world, an important lesson can be drawn for the
public sector: instead of following rational models of organising which suggest that
there can be control through bureaucracy, it is important to recognise the reality of chaos
and work with it instead of battling against it. This is not to say that bureaucracy should
be done away with but that it is important to work from the reality as opposed to the
118ideal . Perhaps IPEC managers were particularly innovative (Bums and Stalker 1961)
in recognising the importance of allowing chaos to occur in order to further the
development of the project, instead of hiding behind bureaucratic rules and regulations?
'18
Chapter 4.4.3 and 7.3.2 argue that Bureaucracy is a valid and valuable form of public sector organising.
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The above factors are mainly internal to the ILO but what of the international context-
how important was this for the success of the Programme? According to Assefa
Bequele, the international framework was important but more important was the internal
ILO leadership which was prepared to take the risk of supporting an otherwise
controversial initiative:
The power and the coherence of the international framework was extremely
crucial but that is not the whole story. It's not enough, supposing the chief was
not interested then it dies or if the DG refused. It was a subject that no-one
wanted to touch. I went to our technical co-operation branch and said to the guy,
a good friend, do you think that you can get money for the child labour project,
and he said no, child labour is not a sexy subject. Those words I won't forget.
Governments did not want to touch it, they were mocking us. So the DG could
have said no but there were people with vision at the level of leadership (Assefa
Bequele, senior ILO official, pers. comm.).
He goes on to emphasise the importance of individuals within the organisation:
Individuals can make a difference within an organisation. I am very appreciative
of the fact that the organisation backed me, through individuals of course. I
personally do not believe that bureaucracy is a problem. It has never been a
problem for me in the ILO, neither has money. Ideas are important and the extent
to which people are receptive to those ideas (pers. comm.).
It is interesting that child labour intervention was seen to be so controversial, as today
more and more governments are becoming involved in the fight against child labour.
The controversial nature of child labour intervention is confirmed by another senior ILO
official:
When I started work in the mid-80s, I was told that child labour was a very
delicate subject. You couldn't talk about child labour to governments as it is too
sensitive. In the mid-80s governments had proposals from NGOs to work on
child labour (..) a number of donors expressed interest and the Germans said they
would provide funding. It was a major breakthrough. HQ said it would be too
delicate. Assefa was funding modest research and then the Indian Ministry of
Labour had a meeting, this was significant as it gave the green light to donors.
The Indian government is important on the GB so the green light was significant
(Female, senior ILO official, pers. comm.).
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This account is slightly different from Bequele's in that it reveals that HQ was also
cautious about getting involved and only gave support once it had become clear that the
Indian government would be supportive of further intervention. It is clear, however, that
the support eventually given by HQ management was extremely important to the success
of the Programme, particularly in the early stages of its development when it had limited
funding and a lower profile.
Another important factor, briefly mentioned above, was the way in which IPEC works
not only within the ILO tripartite framework but also with NGOs:
What is our strength? I don't really know. For the ILO at least, we expanded the
partnership to NGOs, this was a big issue. Flexibility and pragmatic in funding,
trying out different projects. The ILO's strength- workers, employers and
governments- in practice was very important (ILO-IPEC official, pers. comm.).
The role played by NGOs in IPEC's success cannot be underestimated. NGO partners
have been invaluable in developing alternative, innovative and flexible action
programmes in a way which IPEC's traditional partners were unable to do. NGOs are
often based in local areas and are therefore more aware of the issues which may lead to
programme success or failure as well as to the particular needs of individual
'communities'. They may also be less politically implicated than the traditional ILO
partners, although it can be argued that the recent growth in NGOs119 has made them a
major player on the international and national political arena. The issue of flexibility will
be discussed further below.
Appropriate staffing is also identified by one IPEC staff member as an important factor
contributing to the success of IPEC:
119 Stirrat and Henkel (1997), cited in Crewe and Harrison (1998), estimate that there are now around 30,
000 international NGOs as well as countless local, community and grassroots organisations. For a further
discussion on NGOs, see Crewe and Harrison (1998).
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It is a young programme. There were a lot of people who wanted to prove they
could do it. It is difficult to get a job with the ILO, young people get employed in
IPEC with a high level of responsibility. It was felt that anyone could deal with it
as it only needs a very general background, if you were prepared to work hard, it
is not difficult to be committed to this cause. Young people, that is a strength
(ILO-IPEC official, pers. comm.).
While I would disagree on the basis ofmy evidence that working with IPEC only needs
a general background (4.4.7 below) young people have been a key strength of IPEC.
IPEC is fortunate in having an extremely young, experienced and committed staff who
are prepared to put in long hours and hard work (see 4.4.6).
The issue of appropriate staffing brings us to another factor behind the success of IPEC:
the visionary style of its early leadership. According to informants who had worked with
IPEC from the early days, IPEC greatly benefited from the ideological vision of one
man, Assefa Bequele. Leadership is not the same as management and this distinction
becomes important below (see 4.4.7; 7.3.3). I would argue that without the vision of this
one man, IPEC may not have been where it is today. According to Peters and Austin in
their book A passion for excellence (1986), cited in Albrow (1997: 103), success
requires vision and values. Vision starts with the single individual and: 'It must come
from the market and the soul simultaneously. It must be felt passionately before it is
published'. IPEC provides a strong example of this equation: the passion and the vision
were there, embodied primarily in Bequele but also in the colleagues who supported
him, whilst at the same time the changing market and developing societal values were
ready to hear the message.
Finally, it is important to discuss the issue of flexibility raised in the quote above. IPEC
stands out in ILO programming, largely due to its flexibility within a more rigid,
bureaucratic structure. IPEC developed as it gained empirical experience. Partner
organisations were encouraged, particularly in the early years of the Programme, to
develop and implement innovative activities. Successful components were then brought
into larger projects (ILO 2000a). Research has always been an important element of the
Programme although funding was scarce until recently:
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Research in the ILO has been constrained by many factors. We are at a new
beginning, for the first time we will have appropriate resources for research. In
previous years lip service was paid to research but there was no money. Donors
didn't want to pay. Projects give more visibility for taxpayers' money spent.
(IPEC research co-ordinator, pers. comm.; gloss added).
Furthermore, the emphasis on particular types of action has changed through time: from
an early focus on withdrawal, to one of 'providing alternatives' and now to the 'worst
forms'. While the pattern was clearly not so linear and different country programmes
implement their programmes in different ways, the fact that IPEC has been open to
different approaches has been important in allowing it to develop in a pragmatic way.
4.2.2 Marketing and the commoditisation of 'the child labourer'
The attractiveness of'child labour' to the donors must also not be discounted:
Child labour as a concept has been a very powerful tool to get visibility to the
issue of children, to put pressure on government, human rights groups and others
(Bequele, pers. comm. gloss added).
'Child labour' has therefore been a powerful tool, acceptable to many different groups
and an issue which many donors want to buy into. In the words of one informant:
The ILO produces 'conscience'. The donors buy this, it makes them feel that they
are doing something good (ILO official, pers. comm.).
Child labour has been a particularly strong 'brand' of 'conscience' and IPEC has been
particularly successful in capitalising on this in order to market and sell its 'product'. In
fact IPEC itself uses marketing language, referring to its various actions as 'product
lines': for example, the 'Education and Social Dialogue Product Line'. This vocabulary
shows the importance given to 'marketing' the 'brand'. The glossy brochures and heart-
tugging videos produced by IPEC have been extremely well produced to sell its product:
'conscience'. Helping children is one issue which has always been a fundraiser, no matter
what the context. The interesting issue with child labour, however, is that it is not just a
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social issue but is one firmly implicated in current drives towards economic
liberalisation. This makes it easy to sell to the business and worker groups as well as
humanitarian groups. According to Czarniawska (1997:34) :
It is its (organisation) tendency to dramatize certain chosen problems in order to
gain the attention of the public. The number of issues the spectators are able to
identify and attend to seriously is limited, regardless of the degree of their
sincere interest. The issues that become the topics of discovery and discussion
are those presented in a dramatically appealing fashion (italics author's own;
gloss added).
IPEC leadership was aware of this, and the package has been sold in a suitably dramatic
'appealing fashion', making it one of the key 'conscience packages' sold by the ILO. It
would appear, however, that the 'packaging' of the 'product' needed further development,
as revealed by the recent introduction of 'marketing speak' within the day-to-day
functioning of the Programme, i.e. the re-naming of the different activities as 'product
120 •lines' . The implications of adopting this particular language is worth considering
briefly. The use of new language can facilitate the 'selling' of the 'package' to the donors
- not only by giving the impression of a more 'exciting' and 'innovative' approach but
also by giving an appearance of 'efficiency' in that the Programme is aware of the latest
developments in business and management thought. I would argue, however, that it is
important to be aware of the more negative impacts of such an approach. By turning
child labourers into 'product lines' they are being de-humanised121. Such de-
humanisation may serve to give the impression that it is possible to advocate a set of
rational 'solutions' to child labour, in much the same way as a factory uses one fixed
120 I attempted to find out where the language came from but it appears that the language had entered so
gradually into the IPEC consciousness that no-one could inform me as to its origins.
121 Klein (2000) refers to the way in which companies no longer market a product, i.e., trainers but the
brand, i.e., Nike. Could branding become the next step in international development management? Instead
of taking child labour in Tanzania, for example, as the starting point, donors 'buy-in' to the IPEC brand? In
a way, this has happened already, with DFID developing an understanding with the ILO that child labour
support should be provided through IPEC (DFID: 1999b). Is branding, therefore, a natural consequence of
'partnership'? It would be too early to decide on this, as IPEC branding is a very new phenomenon, but it
will need addressing in the future.
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'recipe' to produce a conveyor belt of identical and perfect items. Children are not
products but individuals, each with their own experiences, needs and desires, and cannot
be targeted by one single 'recipe'. Child specialists are well aware of this, as shown by
the development of a 'new sociology/anthropology of childhood' which takes a social
constructionist perspective to argue that there is no one childhood but multiple
childhoods', each located within a specific socio-cultural context (Chapter 3.1; James and
Prout 1997 [1990]; James, Jenks and Prout 1998) and which, in turn, has led to the
development of a more participatory approach to working with children (for example
Johnson et al. 1998). It is in fact disturbing that IPEC has not taken this particular
language of'participation' more seriously, as discussed in 3.1. I would therefore argue
that while the use ofmarketing 'speak' is important in the short term to attract donors, it
is detrimental to the development of appropriate and sustainable action to working with
child labourers in the long term. Such action must be based on extensive and sensitive
participatory research work, which takes a social constructionist approach. In the rush to
satisfy donors (4.4.5 below) this is often not done which leads to a situation where, at
best, children ignore the project, and, at worst, children are banned from an industry
only to be forced into one which is much worse, more underground and harder to tackle,
as the Bangladeshi case taught us122.
4.2.3 Conclusion
The success of IPEC can thus be attributed to the way in which it was packaged and
sold, in a post-CRC climate where increasing attention was being placed on the rights of
children, as well as to factors internal to the ILO such as leadership, support from the
DG and others, its particular integrated and holistic approach to child labour, its
flexibility, timing and participatory approach.
122 The threat of a US Bill to ban imports of goods made by children led to the sacking of all children
under 14 by Bangladeshi clothing manufacturers. Deprived of a much needed income, children were
obliged to find alternative employment in industries which were often more hazardous such as
prostitution. See O'Malley (1997).
118
It is important to note, however, that none of the ILO HQ informants attributed success
to the work of IPEC outside ofHQ i.e. field offices, National Programme Managers and
other national staff, despite the fact that they are the primary focus of action in the field,
as explored in Chapters 6 and 7. This is an important omission and reflects the
centralised nature of the Organisation.
4.3 IPEC Now: Formal Discourse and Practice
This section will explore the formal discourses and practices employed in the
implementation of the policy determined by the policy makers (Chapter 3). While policy
provides the overall framework for action, formal discourses and practices are the
specific ways in which the Programme is structured in order to facilitate the translation
ofpolicy into practice.
This section focuses mainly on written sources. These illustrate the formal discourses of
the Programme but it is important to remember that each source is written by one person
or group of people on behalf of the Programme, and field work revealed the distinctive
experiences, talents, styles and ideologies of different staff members. Therefore although
it might appear that Programme literature is a homogeneous body of 'formal discourse'
this could never be possible. Written documents are the outcome of complex processes
which aim to provide a cohesive and collective statement. They may be developed to
fulfil a particular bureaucratic function (for example, mid-term reviews written in
technocratic language), for promotional purposes (glossy brochures written in
simplified, generalised form), for political purposes (to gain support) or for financial
purposes (to obtain money).
4.3.1 Programme Goals and Philosophy
According to Albrow (1997: 113) 'statements about organizational objectives are
notoriously slippery as focal points for organizational analysis and yet traditionally have
had a privileged place'. He bases his argument on the fact that rational models of ends or
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goal-oriented behaviour require behaviourally defined targets 'to permit mutual
orientation to a common goal by a multiplicity of actors' (ibid.: 114). I would argue that
organisational analysis must explore organisational objectives for exactly that reason.
Programme or organisation goals or objectives are revealing in that they do 'permit
mutual orientation to a common goal by a multiplicity of actors'. This is a considerable
achievement considering the diversity of actors within an organisation. One key factor
behind IPEC's success has been its ability to unite diverse groups under the one
objective of abolition of child labour. An exploration of the goals of the Programme is
also illustrative of the underlying philosophy of the Programme to which staff are
expected to buy in. It is also important to note the purpose for which goals are set, such
as clarity, to gain financial, political or public support or to promote a particular
ideology. Furthermore, goals are not fixed. In the ILO, the overall goal of abolition of
child labour has remained the same through time but the goals required to achieve the
overall goal and the language used to convey the goal have developed as new
experiences have been taken on board (2.3; 3.2).
The aim of the Programme is well defined in the literature and consists of ensuring the:
progressive elimination of child labour by strengthening national capacities to
address the child labour problem and by creating a world wide movement to
combat it. Recognising that the child labour problem cannot be solved overnight,
IPEC gives priority to action which will bring an end to extreme forms of child
labour (ILO undated: 18).
Breaking this statement down is revealing of the philosophy of the Programme. First is
the assumption that countries are capable of effectively formulating policy and
implementing programmes for the progressive implementation of child labour, with
particular emphasis on the worst forms. To do so, however, national capacities need
strengthening and the Programme aims to help in this. A world wide movement is also
needed to combat child labour and IPEC can assist in developing this through the
introduction of legislation, policy and programme development, information
dissemination to increase public awareness and to change social attitudes and finally
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through calls for action. The Programme encourages countries to ratify both Convention
138 and 182 (see 2.3) and assists them in developing measures to ensure that they are in
a position to do so. The Programme recognises that child labour can not be stopped
overnight and that elimination is a progressive process. It therefore prioritises the
elimination of the worst forms of child labour. These need to be detected and prevented
and then children need to be withdrawn from these forms of work as a matter of
urgency.
The focus on the worst forms of child labour is not a new one although many
commentators have the impression that it is an emphasis which came about with the
recent adoption of Convention 182:
We have always been focusing on the worst forms. Before it was called
'hazardous and exploitative work' but since 1996, 97, we have been focusing on
'worst forms'. There has been an increase in action programmes, not just from
the field but also there was a push from HQ (ILO official, European male with
long term experience of working with IPEC, pers. comm.; see also International
Labour Office 1998e: 12).
In order to understand the philosophy further it is important to briefly highlight why it is
that the Programme is campaigning against child labour:
In the long run, child labour results in scores of under-skilled, unqualified
workers and jeopardizes future improvements in the overall level of skills within
the workforce. The worst child labour abuses take place, basically, among the
most vulnerable socio-economic groups in society. Their children do not attend
school because of social stigma or simply because they cannot afford to forego
the children's contribution to the family income (ILO 2000a: 4).
Long term societal development and the need to protect child labourers from abuse are
therefore, according to the quote, the two primary motives for intervention. The choice
of order is interesting although it would not be appropriate to read too much into that as
for the majority of ILO informants the primary motivation for action was the need to
protect children from abuse. The long term impact of child labour for societal
development is, however, an important one as child labour can perpetuate child labour
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with future generations of children of child labourers also being caught in the vicious
cycle of poverty and labour.
4.3.2 Programme Structure
The structure of IPEC has been constantly changing and evolving and any documents
written on this theme soon become out of date. It is therefore important to note that this
analysis is valid up to November 2001123. The Programme chart (Box 4.3.2) is useful in
summarising a highly complex structure124:
123 For an earlier review of IPEC see Lansky (1997).
124 The Programme is based on three operational pillars: Knowledge, Service and Advocacy (ILO 2000a:
5). The Knowledge pillar focuses on legal standards, research on policy issues and statistical development
for policy and programming. The Advocacy pillar aims at leading 'the global campaign aimed at urgent
and widespread ratification and proper implementation of 182 and other relevant conventions'. The
Service pillar works to 'assist constituents and other implementing partners in translating into action their
political will to abolish child labour, giving priority to its worst forms' (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/ipec/publ/pub99/index. htm.). The Director of Operations is responsible for the Service pillar
which means that he oversees desk officers, evaluation unit and newly appointed Sub Regional Co¬
ordinators and the National Programme Managers who must be nationals of the implementing country (6).
The Director of Policy and Advocacy is directly responsible for research, advocacy and statistics activities
at HQ level. Fieldwork revealed, however, that in practice there is often an overlap with staff in
Operations also developing policy research documents to feed into programming.
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The current InFocus Programme: IPEC management framework involves three
Directors: one overall Programme Director who reports directly to the International
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Steering Committee, one Director of Operations and one Director of Policy
Development and Advocacy. Many informants believe that it is useful to have more than
one Director, as different Directors have different skills, i.e. one is seen as politically
sensitive and able to impress donors and another is seen as a good manager. The
Directors have very different backgrounds and it could be argued that the selection
process was very 'politically correct'. One Director is a near end of career white
European male, another is a middle-aged Asian male and the other is a mid-career black,
female Francophone African. Although this is a 'representative' selection, informants
have argued that there are often internal conflicts and discord as a result of the
management structure:
We are working in parallel lines. There is internal conflict with (one) doing his
own thing, unaware of what the others are doing, and another feeling
marginalised (ILO official, pers. comm.).
We will return to the issue ofmanagement in 4.4 on informal discourse and practice.
At the HQ level, the Programme Director is responsible to the International Steering
Committee (ISC), a representative group of ILO constituents responsible for monitoring
the work of the Programme. This was an innovative feature of the Programme and aimed
at making it more directly responsible to the constituents than other conventional ILO
programmes. At a national level there is also a national steering committee to which the
national programme is accountable for decision making and which is explored further in
Chapter 6. The ISC meets once a year for approximately half a day to consider the
biennial budget as well as policies and strategies. I attended an ISC meeting and it
became very clear that there was not enough time for the meeting and moreover it was
more of a 'rubber stamp' to predetermined proposals than a forum for active debate. This
concern was also raised in the external audit (see below): 'the ISC is not in a position to
exert strong control over IPEC activities nor does it receive sufficient information to
hold IPEC management fully accountable for implementing the approved programme'
(External Auditor 1999: 3). This concern had not been resolved by the November 2000
ISC during which one constituent expressed frustration with the process, arguing that
future meetings should discuss future directions rather than just review what was put to
124
them by the Office: 'a steering committee should steer and give guidance, not just
review' (pers. comm.). These frustrations have in a way been an inevitable result of the
rapid expansion of the Programme: what was once a small committee of participating
countries has now turned into a major event with at least one hundred participants. For
this reason the external audit has suggested that the function may best be performed
through the usual ILO channels, i.e. the GB and the Technical Co-operation Committee
(which meets during the GB meetings).
Field work revealed a number of problems with the day to day functioning of the
Programme, many of which were picked up on by the external audit conducted in 1999.
The DG commissioned the audit in view of the rapid growth of IPEC, the aim being to
examine the extent to which the Programme had met its objectives and to make
recommendations for future action. The report was presented in May 1999, and the DG
decided that all 24 recommendations should be implemented and an action plan was
prepared with target dates. These recommendations are clearly laid out in Annex 2 of the
IPEC Highlights 2000 (ILO 2000a), although a number of issues are brought up in the
next section. It is important to note, however, that the Programme has taken serious
measures to address the recommendations, committing itself to deadlines as well as to
reporting on progress to the International Steering Committee.
One of the main conclusions of the Report was that the Programme's operational
structure had remained broadly the same since its 1992 inception, although the work of
the organisational units had evolved through time. This had led to confusion with regard
to the roles and responsibilities of staff, the result being overlapping duties and
duplication of work. The first recommendation was therefore that the roles and
responsibilities of staff and organisational units be clearly defined. A new Programme
chart was drawn up and a review of job descriptions, both in HQ and in field offices, has
begun (ILO 2000a: Annex 2).
This section has thus shown us the official structures and philosophy behind IPEC, the
ILO programme which was designed to implement the Organisation's child labour
agenda in the 1990s and then beyond. Organisations do not, however, function merely
through having appropriate structures and philosophies. In daily practice there are a
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number of bureaucratic procedures and individual personality traits and experiences
which allow the Organisation to function either in a constructive or a less constructive
manner. The next section therefore considers the day-to-day voices of those responsible
for implementing the formal discourse of IPEC.
4.4 IPEC Now: InFormal Discourse and Practice
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is 'dehumanized', the more
completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all
purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation
(Weber 1978: 975, cited in Albrow 1997: 93125).
Weber's account of rational bureaucracy has dominated organisational theorising but
recent commentators, notably Albrow (1997), have taken Weber's other work on motive
and meaning to argue for the inclusion of emotion into social theorising of the
organisation. Albrow (1997: 113) argues that 'organizations, viewed as webs of action
and interaction, are emotional entities as much as they are rational units'. This is
supported by my fieldwork which revealed that it is impossible to separate affectivity,
i.e. feelings and emotions, from the day to day functioning of the ILO and for this reason
it is important to consider the informal discourses and practices of staff working in HQ.
While the formal discourse explored in the previous section revealed the overlying
structures and 'philosophy' of the Programme, i.e. the 'dehumanized' business to be
accomplished, this section provides evidence for the argument that no-one can work in a
void, free from emotional needs and desires.
It is important to recognise that emotions are fundamental to both the success and the
failures of bureaucracy, and particularly to the functioning of the Programme within the
ILO, a value-driven Programme within a value-driven Organisation.
125 For a fuller exploration ofWeber and bureaucracy see Albrow (1970) and Albrow (1997).
126
In this and following chapters (6 and 7), I therefore consider the human actors within the
Organisation in an attempt to counter the image of human beings as rational decision
makers and to explore ways in which a recognition of human organisational life can be
used to improve practice.
4.4.1 The De-humanisation effect
It was seen above that according to Weber "Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly,
the more it is 'dehumanized'" (1978: 975). It is useful to explore this idea further, using
the ILO as a pertinent example of a 'dehumanised' bureaucracy. In Chapter 3, it was
noted that official reports tend to hide the passion and emotion of the discussions upon
which they are based. It is therefore important to read between the lines but for those not
present at the meetings in question it is all too easy to view the decision making process
as harmonious and emotion free. This de-humanisation serves to perpetuate the belief in
'The Organisation' as a homogeneous, non-human entity, which in turn hides the fact
that it is composed of people and therefore subject to the emotional and ideological
conflict experienced by any group. Those within the Organisation will be fully aware of
and part of this conflict, which is expressed in meetings, over coffee or in scribbles on
official documents circulated around the office. These scribbles are then filed and the
document is once more 'de-humanised'. What are the reasons behind this de-
humanisation? I would argue that de-humanisation is a necessary part of sustaining the
myth of the rational Organisation, above human error. As long as this myth is sustained,
however, organisational flaws can only continue. Once the human input is recognised
and 'managed' in a more realistic way then large bureaucratic organisations, such as the
ILO, can restructure themselves more progressively (7.3.3). Of course, admitting that
human emotions determine the success or failure of your organisation is not the perfect
way to get a donor to fund your multi-million pound programme as donors are looking
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for the rational, scientific model approach126 but I would argue that these donors in turn
must admit the non-rationality of their own decision making processes. The power of the
individual in blocking or sanctioning a particular action or idea is only too strong (7.3.3).
Conflict of personality is something which anyone working in an organisation has
experienced, despite the best attempts of bureaucratic structures to prevent such
occurrences. The contrary effect is that where the personality of a staff member is
particularly appreciated by a manager, the former may be given greater opportunities
than would otherwise be the case.
Czamiawska (1997: 40) argues that de-humanisation is important in maintaining the
illusion of control in a situation where no one is or could be in charge. She also provides
an alternative way of viewing the organisation- as a superperson:
Despite the claim that machines and organisms are the most popular images of
organization (Morgan 1986), there is another metaphor that is as popular but
whose metaphorical character has been almost forgotten, so taken for granted has
it become. This is the organization as super-person, as a single powerful
decision-maker, personified in a leader or leadership group or expressed in the
notion of the organization as a collective. The assumption ofHomo collectivus or
Organization Man, can be seen lurking behind this conceptualization. (1997: 41).
The ILO is a perfect example of this. The DG represents the Organisation and all official
documents are seen to be written by him, although a large number of people are
responsible for writing his documents and oral presentations. Somavia is seen as the
frame of reference for much staff decision making and his name comes up regularly in
both formal and informal meetings. The result of this 'homo collectivus1 is that the
Organisation is seen as consensus-based. While this is a useful image to bear in mind, I
would argue that this vision is more commonly found within the Organisation and by
those working closely with it. From an external frame of reference, the 'de-humanised'
model appears to be a more relevant and common approach to portray and perceive the
126 While some donors, such as DFID, are paying lip service to being favourable to a more participatory,
process approach, in reality this is extremely rare and is more dependent on the particular programme
officer fighting on a personal level for this approach than one coming from policy and management.
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'Organisation'. I therefore propose to continue to use the de-humanised model as my
theoretical frame of reference.
4.4.2 A Cacophony of Voices
In addition to the de-humanisation effect, an exploration of the formal discourse and
practice of the Programme or of the Organisation, as undertaken in 4.2, may also lead
the reader to believe that there is a polyphony of voices within the Organisation, all
working harmoniously in a rational and mechanised fashion towards the same goal.
Fieldwork revealed, however, that this polyphony is more of a cacophony (see also
Chapter 6). It is important to note that within IPEC there are a number of different
informal discourses and practices and so any conclusions are bound to be affected by my
informants. There is no one informal discourse, just as it was shown above that there is
no one formal discourse. As Czarniawska argues:
Every organisation hosts a multitude of small narratives, multiple interpretations,
plural realities. These stem from ideological differences, professional variations,
or generation and gender differences. Actors are forced to choose one version of
the world to act upon, but this does not make any particular version permanent or
valid for the future (Czarniawska 1997: 161-2).
This important statement reminds us of the fluid nature of organisations and the
difficulties faced by those conducting any form of organisational analysis. The picture is
one of continual flux, with people's narratives being constructed and reconstructed
through time. Bourdieu (1977) and De Certeau (1984) argue that social agents do not
simply enact culture but reinterpret it and reappropriate it in their own ways. I saw this
time and time again, with informants giving me quite different data depending on their
mood at the time of our conversation. On particularly stressful days the more negative
aspects of life in IPEC would be revealed, whereas more positive aspects would be
discussed on days when there had been an inspiring meeting, for example, and staff felt
valued. Informants occupying different positions in the bureaucratic ladder also gave me
access to different types of data. In IPEC there are a very large number of actors:
administrative support staff, different professional grades within the formal ILO
structure, JPOs who work in the UN system for an average of two years, National
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Project Managers, National and International Steering Committee members, consultants,
donors and of course the 'beneficiaries'. These numerous stakeholders clearly have
different interests and agendas and there is therefore a continual negotiation and re¬
negotiation of ideas and proposed actions.
In order to gain a clear picture of informal discourses and practices in IPEC HQ, it was
important to use a range of sources, both oral and written. In 4.2 it was seen that sources
have their own background and are expressed in particular ways, for particular purposes.
Different sources are therefore revealing in different ways. Written memos, for example,
have a range of stylistic cues which convey feelings, such as hostility, esteem,
approbation and insecurity, and for this reason require meticulous care in preparation
and interpretation (Albrow 1997: 121). Meetings involve much more than data exchange
and are complex occasions: forums for expression of emotion (Albrow 1997: 121). As
one informant told me after a meeting, which I had found frustrating as no-one appeared
to 'say' anything ofparticular value:
You need to decipher the code behind what people are saying. There are many
things going on under the surface (Young, male ILO official, pers. comm.).
In this section it was thus seen that it is important to recognise the multitude of
narratives within IPEC and to attempt to understand what lies behind these.
4.4.3 Bureaucracy, Personality and Bureaucratisation
Having argued for the existence of multiple narratives, it is important to return to the
issue of individual personality and affectivity (see also 7.3.3). According to Merton,
bureaucracy requires, and tends to produce, a certain type of 'bureaucratic personality'.
The bureaucratic emphasis on precision and reliability can be self defeating, with the
following of rules, designed to facilitate the achievement of organisational goals,
becoming an end in itself. The graded career structure may encourage staff to 'keep a
low profile' and not speak out when mistakes are made or when innovative ideas are
proposed (Merton's 1940, cited in Albrow 1970: 55). Bureaucracy can therefore produce
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rigid thinking which is unsuitable for periods of rapid change. Albrow (1970: 55) points
out, however, that: 'The official has characteristics as a social being beyond those which
the administrative code specifies. Like other men he has interests, prejudices and fears.
He forms friendships and cliques'. Despite the gender insensitivity typical of the time at
which Albrow was writing, his words remain pertinent. While bureaucracy may
encourage a bureaucratic personality it is also important to remember that each staff
member has his or her own biography and is embedded in particular social relations.
Behaviour is therefore not so easy to regulate. It is useful to remember the informant in
4.1.2 who told us that the second Director of IPEC struggled as he was an 'outsider' and
'didn't know how to do things'. This meant that not only did he not know the
bureaucratic procedures but he did not have his 'friendships and cliques' within the
Organisation to help him side-step certain bureaucratic constraints.
Many IPEC informants were not 'bureaucratic personalities' and one of their main
complaints was the highly bureaucratised nature of the ILO, which they try to resist in
particular ways (4.3.8). Although it was seen above that IPEC was developed to allow
for flexibility and innovation, staff are still working within the rigid bureaucratic
structure of the ILO which, many claim, slows down action and leads to frustration and
the feeling of being continuously blocked:
People who come in from the private sector only stay one or two years because
everything is so slow here. People do try but there are blockages at every level
and then we become bureaucratised ourselves, then we become slower (male,
ILO official, pers. comm.).
This last statement is an interesting reflection of the bureaucratisation process. Even
people who enter the Organisation full of energy and commitment find themselves
having to leave or slow down in order to survive. The structures of the Organisation may
therefore have a demotivating effect with staff feeling stifled, uninspired, unchallenged
but at the same time overworked. Interviews revealed that when people arrive from in
IPEC from the field they feel their 'field identity' very strongly, as did I when I first
arrived. In a relatively short time, however, the 'field identity' (where the primary focus
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is on intervention) is transformed into a 'bureaucratic identity' (where the primary focus
is on fulfilling bureaucratic procedures). I will return to this in 7.3.3 but at this stage it is
important to note how routine and structural elements of bureaucracy, such as set
procedures and working patterns and the need to sustain a particular life style, can lead
so easily to the 'bureaucratisation' of staff.
Linda Nelson and Frank Burns (cited in Management for Development Foundation
2000: 5) identify four types of organisational management styles: reactive organisations
(focused on the past and struggling to survive), responsive organisations (focused on the
present), pro-active organisations (focused on the future) and high performing
organisations (focused on flows, from past via present to future). I would argue that the
ILO is a responsive organisation and its management style is therefore one of short term
planning. This is partly to do with the fact that the Organisation works by biennia and
funding is never guaranteed. This has the impact, however, of attracting traditional
management techniques in terms of planning, authority and a structured approach. The
result is the current focus on input rather than output and on process rather than on goals.
In a rapidly developing policy climate, however, these management skills need to be
modified to take into account the needs of an environment which requires flexibility,
speed, inspiration and results.
It is interesting to note how 'bureaucracy' is used by many informants and commentators.
The term has obtained a popular understanding as a 'dirty word' rather than as a valid
and valuable form of public sector organising. Bureaucracy is commonly associated with
red tape and delays but it is important to remember the valuable role played by
bureaucracy in preventing unsavoury practices such as corruption and nepotism (Du
Gay: 2000; 7.3.2). As seen in 7.3.2, bureaucracy can often be used as an excuse for
inaction of to hide incompetence. Perhaps it is useful at this stage to take the words of
Assefa Bequele, one of the innovators behind the alternative approach taken by IPEC
(4.1):
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I don't believe that bureaucracies don't work, they are subject to defamation too.
There is no link between bureaucracy and inefficiency. What creates the
dilemma is something else, it does not mean that public bureaucracies are
inevitably condemned to being inefficient (pers. comm.)
It is to this 'something else' that we shall return in Chapter 7 in order to understand what
it is in bureaucracies that can lead to inefficiency.
4.4.5 Spatial distribution
According to Crewe and Harrison (1998) spatial separation and segmentation is a key
factor leading to the impracticability of the Weberian ideal:
Segmented bureaucracies (...) do not function as Weberian integrated wholes.
Rather policies are reinterpreted according to the rationales, predelictions and
positions of the individuals concerned. Equally, those creating the policies, even
if they have had 'field experience' at some point in their careers, are physically,
as well as conceptually, separated from those charged with carrying out their
policies (1998: 190).
The issue of spatial distribution and segmentation was an important one during field
work: the spatial divide between the field, the field office and HQ, the mental and
philosophical divide between staff in the field and at HQ and the physical divide within
the Office.
At HQ, one of the most frequently cited complaints was the structuring of the different
departments:
This building is too big. It is not humanly organised. You don't know what other
people in different parts of the building are doing (male ILO official, pers.
comm.).
The physical geography of the building is important and as Baldry (1997: 367) argues
sends out important signals to non-occupants as well as to occupants. The building is an
enormous arc-shaped, grey cement structure. Visitors enter through electric glass doors,
and are then overwhelmed and humbled by the grandiose but sparse stone reception hall.
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Most staff do not use this entrance but enter instead via the functional concrete
underground car parks or from the bus stop entrance, through one of the three canteen
entrances. They then enter one of the eight sets of lifts at either end of the building and
then go up to one of the 14 floors. There are a further four sets of internal staff lifts (not
including those for messengers). Each floor is identically laid out with offices on either
side of the building separated by an inner ridge of storage rooms and meeting rooms.
Photocopy machines and water fountains are spaced out at regular intervals along the
224 metre corridor. Newcomers are often found coming out of the lift the wrong way as
all corridors look identical and it is difficult to get one's bearing for the first few weeks.
The office was therefore not designed in a particularly human friendly way but in a
'rational, bureaucratic' way: everything ordered to look similar to promote an impression
of efficiency and, I suggest, to ensure that human emotions such as jealousy would not
come through. This clearly has not worked, however, as the views from both sides are
different: from one side there are the magnificent Alps and Lake Geneva and from the
other a field and some hills. Competition for one particular side of the building is
therefore important. More 'emotions' are also created by the fact that different grades are
allocated different numbers of windows: administrative staff have one or one and a half
windows, medium level professional staff have two windows, high level staff three and
Directors four. Window space allocation is therefore deliberately ordered to illustrate the
hierarchy and power relations within the Organisation.
Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 36) argue that 'notions of locality or community refer both to
a demarcated physical space and to clusters of interaction'. It is therefore important to
see that the notion of belonging to the ILO or to IPEC is not just referred to by a
demarcated space but also by clusters of interaction. This is important when one
considers the extent to which the Organisation is compartmentalised, not just by physical
space but by a lack of interaction between different departments, for example.
Departments are also spatially compartmentalised on different floors or ends of the
building. This can hardly be avoided but has led to a situation where individual
departments do not know what is going on in others. More seriously they often find
themselves in competition with each other. This is due not only to spatial distribution
which leads to a feeling of 'otherness' but is also to the scarcity of funding and the way
in which different departments are responsible for finding extra-budgetary funding. With
a limited number of donors, each department is responsible for packaging its own
product in the most attractive way to ensure funding. Furthermore, the promotion
structure means that individual managers need to prove how successful they are at
running their department, which leads to further competitiveness.
According to one informant one of the greatest weaknesses of the ILO is the
departmental compartmentalisation:
One of the weakest aspects of the organisation is that there is no proper co¬
ordination between departments and units. I think it's becoming too
compartmentalised and in some cases competitive and there are no appropriate
policies to help overcome this situation (female ILO official, pers. comm.).
Senior management must therefore take greater responsibility for ensuring greater co¬
ordination between departments and it would appear that the Director General's policy of
reducing the number of departments was aimed at facilitating such co-ordination. In
reality, however, the number of activities has not been reduced:
I do understand Somavia's approach, we need to work on visibility and not
spreading ourselves too thin. The rationale is for a single concept- decent work,
with four sub concepts but they haven't reduced it from 39 to 4. They are not
doing away with all the other activities (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).
Within IPEC itself there is also a compartmentalised approach with Operations
responsible for certain actions and Policy development and Advocacy for others. It was
seen in 4.2.2 that this leads to staff feeling that they are working in 'parallel lines' and
that there is conflict between the different directors. While it is important for activities to
be allocated in a clear manner, it is also important that each member of staff feels that he
or she is fitting a piece into the larger puzzle and that the final picture is clear.
There is also a spatial separation from child labourers:
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I saw from the administrative side, child labour was just a subject. You're not in
contact with the child labourer, that's how people see it, there is no real contact
with the subject. When people come they think they will but then get bogged
down in the administrative things rather than the research work. I think when
people come to IPEC they do have the kids in mind but this is washed away
when they realise it is just administrative work (female, ILO secretary, pers.
comm.).
This is supported by a professional grade informant who was disturbed at how little
involvement he had with people working at field level:
I thought that my job would be supporting people on the ground. When I got here
I realised that everyone always looks upwards and not downwards. Do this as a
service to the DG or to the Cabinet. It's not necessary to wonder that some of the
old crocodiles are a bit cynical (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).
This quote again reflects the political nature of the Organisation: looking 'up' to those in
power instead of'down' to those in need of empowering.
This is further supported by the spatial distribution of the Organisation. The ILO has
been decentralised since the late 1940s when field offices were opened up (2.3; 6). The
Organisation does remain, however, extremely centralised:
Whichever way we turn we are an extremely centralised organisation (...) MDTs
(multi-disciplinary teams based in the field), half the posts are vacant. Everyone
wants to be at HQ, so they send the junk out (ILO HQ official, pers. comm.,
gloss added).
My experience of the ILO Area Office (AO) in Tanzania did not support the argument
that only the 'junk' was sent out as the AO Director was extremely competent (Chapter
6). It is true, however, that the most 'prestigious' and solicited posts are in HQ and that
the competition to gain promotion in HQ is strong. This furthers the impression that the
HQ is the central point for policy making and means that many innovative and
successful approaches taken in the field are not taken on board in HQ.
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The built environment and spatial distributions are thus extremely important elements of
organisational analysis although these are elements which commentators do not seem to
have taken on board. It is high time that this is done as the links between space and
performance are important.
4.4.5 Political framework
Having discussed the importance of individual personality and emotions within the
Organisation as well as problems of spatial segmentation, it is as important to note that
the Organisation does not function in a void but is located within a global capitalist
system geared to profit, value for money and quick results, with less and less money
being invested in 'social' organisations such as the ILO. Managers must function within
this wider political framework and are often faced with the dilemma ofwhether or not to
abandon one good but controversial idea for 'the greater good' of the Organisation. This
issue came up often with regard to the use of participatory methodology. During
fieldwork my participant persona pushed frequently for the importance of adopting a
long term process approach based on a participatory methodology. The official response
from both DFID and the ILO was that this was not suitable. From the ILO the
justification was that 'the donors would not approve, they want immediate results' and
from DFID it was 'our new policy framework has moved away from that' or 'that is what
we are doing' although I would disagree strongly that this was being done. It is not my
purpose to enter into details here but rather to show that there are wider motives behind
individuals rejecting particular approaches.
Crewe and Harrison's (1998) study of the aid industry reveals a similar reluctance on the
part of donors to conduct pre-project work:
Donor agencies tend to shy away from giving funds for pre-project work, for
example carrying out research to discover what local needs are. They need a
mechanism for decision-making and aim to give the impression of rationality and
coherence in their choices (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 191).
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IPEC informants add the donors' need for quick results to Crewe and Harrison's need for
'rationality and coherence'. They argued that pre-project work, in the form of the use of
participatory methodologies, was rejected as the donors wanted quick results:
Try asking donors for money for participatory methodologies, the Americans just
want things done quick, quick, quick (ILO official, pers. comm.).
This opinion is supported by the pressure placed by the Americans on 'delivery rates'
(4.1). They have made it clear that they want quantifiable results, mainly verified by the
spending of all money allocated, as opposed to a long-term process based on extensive
participatory research.
The reason for the ILO's acceptance of US dictate is related to its financial contribution.
In a time of declining funding, money means power :
Power is where the money is. Poor countries pay small membership fees but then
have very little say. The Americans are putting money in two places- into IPEC
and the Declaration (ILO official, pers. comm.).
The impact of donors on programme activities was briefly discussed in 4.2 (see also
Chapter 7). I would also argue, however, that the power of donors can be
overemphasised and used as an excuse for inaction and lack of innovation. The ILO is in
a position to negotiate with the donors, who need the ILO as much as the ILO needs
them. Donors have budgets which need to be spent: there is therefore room for debate
and if the ILO can provide a well justified argument for its approach then donors will be
open, as they have been in the past, to IPEC's innovative approaches. The fear of the
donor was reflected in an informal conversation with a senior official responsible for
ILO-donor relations regarding the rapid influx of money to IPEC. I was arguing that
there did not seem to be a logic to the fact that IPEC was receiving so much more money
than other programmes in countries where non-child labour issues may in fact be more
important and yet be receiving very little money:
ILO official: If IPEC receives more money than other InFocus programmes even
if it is not necessarily the most important one in-country then that is a failing of
the ILO. The country Director has failed.
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Interviewer: But who can say no to funding?
ILO official: We can say no.
Interviewer: Really?
ILO official: But there would be political implications of rejecting US money if
they specifically wanted it spent on a particular issue.
The conclusion of the conversation was that the ILO would not say no to money and
therefore to US dictate, due to the wider political implications.
Often, however, the wider political framework can be brought in as an excuse: many
people in Organisations feel that they do not have the answers. They are not allowed to
express this, however, and so hide behind 'the framework', the 'donors', the 'managers'.
There must be wider recognition of the fact that answers are not always easily found and
innovative approaches must be considered. Other times people are overworked and don't
have time to think strategically, they therefore feel the need to hide their 'failures'. I
would argue that this is not a personal failing but an organisational failing. In IPEC
people are overworked and this is no secret to management:
There are lots of options but little spare capacity to play around with. If you see
the workload people in IPEC have. I am amazed they still have time to think of
IPEC product lines despite their incredible workloads (Programme Director
IPEC during a donor meeting, pers. comm.)
4.4.6 Overwork
While the political framework is of key importance to the wider functioning of the
Organisation, overwork was an internal factor which came up repeatedly during field
work, although interestingly enough it was usually a matter of pride rather than
complaint. The organisational culture promotes the ideal of working long hours as
illustrative of a 'hard worker', despite the fact that the ILO is meant to be promoting the
right of workers to 'decent work'. During my first week in IPEC Tanzania, the National
Programme Manager asked me if I would be working Saturdays as 'we all do'. I soon
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found out that not only did the National Programme Manager and others work Saturdays
as a matter of course but often Sundays and holidays too. The words of IPEC staff
informants reveal the extent to which they are overworked:
We all work 11, 12 hour days and often weekends. It is a value driven
organisation so people are committed and stay late. Only two are regular budget
staff, all the others are just on annual contracts. (This refers to 'Operations',
Female IPEC staffmember, pers. comm.).
The level of overwork was substantiated by participant observation in HQ. If I were to
walk through the corridors of the ILO late in the evening, any night of the week, the only
department where all the offices would still be lit up would be those of IPEC. Many
other departments are in fact under-worked, as illustrated by the high numbers of people
'at coffee', no matter what the time of day. According to one informant it is the fact that
IPEC staff are in such precarious positions that leads to overwork:
The safer the job, the less people seem to do. In IPEC most people have insecure
jobs so they have to work very hard. If people have to work weekends though
there is something wrong (IPEC official, pers. comm.).
For those who do not see overwork as 'normal', the pressures of the heavy workload
contribute to the high turnover within IPEC:
There is a very high turnover of staff because of the heavy workload. People
can't cope. The funding isn't stable and it is difficult to keep people on (Male,
IPEC informant, pers. comm.).
127The vast majority of IPEC staff are not funded under the regular budget but under
project funds. This means that they are not permanent ILO staff but occupy posts created
for the project alone. Although they may have worked for IPEC for years they have no
job security or associated perks:
127 The problems facing European staff in accessing regular budget ILO jobs were discussed above (3.3.3)
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There is a high turnover in IPEC because there is no security of employment,
they can't enter competitions, only external ones but if they come from a
country, like Belgium, they have little chance (Male, IPEC informant, pers.
comm.).
Morale is therefore low for many who feel that their overwork is not compensated for in
any way other than their love for the job and their belief in the work that they do. The
issue of overwork is illustrative of the informal ways in which the Organisational culture
can exert pressure on staff in order to gain maximum utility from them. It is also another
example of the paradox which sees the International Labour Organisation advocating the
rights of workers throughout the world and yet not ensuring the basic work rights of its
own staff128.
One of the primary reasons for overwork has been the limited numbers of staff. These
have been growing rapidly, however, with the recent influx of US funds. The exact
staffing numbers remain secret, however. At the November 2000 National Steering
Committee meeting, the question of exact staffing numbers was raised on three separate
occasions. The response on each occasion was evasive and no conclusive number was
given. When I asked IPEC informants after the meeting why the numbers should be
secret I was told it was because other departments would be jealous and create problems.
This shows that resentment (4.1) continues.
The problem of overwork is compounded by the lack of adequate management:
The management of IPEC has always been shambolic. It is easy to criticise but if
you do not give the necessary resources... Most people are looking for a way out.
Overwork is one thing but non-management is another (IPEC official, pers.
comm.).
128 It is important to remember that we are discussing the International Labour Organisation, the body
responsible for international labour standards and currently emphasising 'Decent work' as a priority.
Overwork and short term contracts extended over long term periods are contrary to any decent work
principle. The strange hypocrisy of the Organisation is further revealed by the fact that until recently ILO
staff were not allowed to be unionised, this from the Organisation promoting the worldwide right of
workers to join unions!
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I would also suggest that overwork is more common than in other departments as IPEC
staff are particularly value-driven. Many were highly committed child rights activists
working in poor countries before joining IPEC. In other departments, it is more common
to find staff who are career international civil servants129 and who are perhaps therefore
motivated to work in different ways. It is important to recognise that there are different
groupings within the ILO itself, each with its own collective identity. This is also
highlighted by the way in which ex- trade union representatives, for example, were
introduced to me with the prefix: 'He was a trade unionist' or in which trade unionist
identify themselves with the same prefix, may be to affirm that they are not career civil
servants.
4.4.7 Leadership and management130
We saw that the vision and values of IPEC leadership in the early days were key to its
'success' (4.1). Albrow (1997) cites Peters and Austin (1986) who argue that values and
vision are followed by love and empathy and love is equated with loyalty, teamwork and
respect for the individual. While 'love' is perhaps too strong a word, fieldwork did reveal
that a strong liking for a leader and empathy lead to commitment, passion, enthusiasm
and job satisfaction, which in turn leads to improved output. IPEC management has
often been less than satisfactory and was one of the biggest complaints of informants,
and I would argue that this is primarily because it has not always been successful in
inspiring 'love and empathy' from staff. This is supported by current management
thinking which rates 'Emotional Intelligence' (EI)- the ability to understand and control
your emotions and to recognise and respond to those of others- as the single most
effective business skill of the new century (Goleman 1996, 1999).
129 For a text on international civil servants see Lemoine (1995).
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Leadership skills require the ability to inspire and motivate staff to follow your lead whereas
management skills require the ability to direct staff as to how best to do this. A person responsible for a
department or Programme should have both leadership and management skills.
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It would appear that all too often the 'value-driven' nature of IPEC staff has allowed
management to ignore the importance of providing inspiring leadership. This has led to
the departure of extremely talented and committed staff, causing high turnover,
institutional memory loss, wasted time in training up new staff, and confusion for social
partners who find it difficult to place the face to the action and spend valuable time re-
explaining things to the new face. All this affects the atmosphere of the working
environment which in turn affects the product or output (Albrow 1997: 119).
Visionary leadership is therefore extremely important in maintaining staff morale and
dynamism, although it would appear that there is currently little such leadership in IPEC.
In addition to visionary leadership I would add the importance of charismatic,
authoritative and dynamic leadership. As IPEC currently stands, low level IPEC staff
such as JPOs often have a higher level of child labour experience than their managers,
be it in or outside the field. While experience may not always be the most important
requirement of a manager, in a context where specific management skills are weak,
experience is essential. According to ILO informants, two of the three current directors
have no previous experience of child labour work. Child labour is a highly technical
field, which I (unlike the informant cited in 4.1 above) would argue, on the basis ofmy
evidence, requires a specific form of expertise and experience of what does and does not
work with working children. The ILO's bureaucratic structures mean that managers
should be generalists who are advised by the specialists but where there are multiple
managers working in a hierarchical system this becomes complicated and does not
necessarily work in the 'rational' way that it should.
Management issues do not just affect IPEC but the ILO as a whole. Many informants
complained about the management structures and the lack of importance given to the
training of good managers:
There aren't good managers. Management is not looked at as a profession, a
post. There is no training on the art of management, people are selected for their
political and technical competencies, not their management (male, ILO official,
pers. comm.).
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Not only is management not seen as a profession but even more concerning is the use of
promotion as a way of disposing of people who are not performing as they should:
Here if you don't perform you probably get promoted because people want to get
rid of you, send you to the field and give you a P5 (male, ILO official, pers.
comm.).
I came across this same issue in discussions with other UN staff, indicating that it is not
just an ILO problem. The issue of people being given jobs because of their nationality
was also discussed in Chapter 3.3.
4.4.8 Informal Resistance Strategies
As much as people are subject to Organisational processes, they are also responsible for
constructing and reconstructing them. As Foucault informs us, power permeates all
levels and resistance necessarily accompanies the exercise of power. The instruments
and techniques of disciplinary power are therefore "always liable to forms of re-
appropriation, reversibility and re-utilisation not only in tactical re-alignments from
'above' but in counter-offensives from 'below'" (Gordon cited in Foucault 1980: 256).
IPEC HQ staff are not therefore mere subjects to the bureaucratic procedures but are
active participants in resisting and re-appropriating them.
During a discussion about the critical literature on IPEC one informant informed me that
many IPEC staff are in fact 'resisting' the bureaucratic structures and trying to change
how the Organisation works:
There are many of us who fight from the inside, unlike those (pointing to the list
of critics) who just criticise from the outside (pers. comm., gloss added).
While there are those who try to change the functioning of the Organisation, the majority
is simply trying to 'survive' in a highly regulated environment which makes the
achieving of results a slow and tedious process.
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With regard to the spatial compartmentalisation seen in 4.4.4 above, staff develop their
own informal networks for getting things done:
Here everything is done through informal networks, who your friends are, who
you trust, that is how it works. You exchange information with those you trust
(male, ILO official, pers. comm.).
Staff also resist the impersonal structuring of the office space (4.4.4). People personalise
their own space with plants, photos and other items designed to 'tell observers a little bit
about us as people: I am a name and not a number' (Baldry 1997: 367).
Another common resistance strategy is avoidance:
Avoidance, I avoid everyone. I try to help those in the field. I avoid the managers
in particular (male, ILO official, pers. comm.).
Often avoidance would simply consist of going for coffee, especially in HQ. Other times
people would put their answering machine on even when they were in the office. I
would also argue that meetings are often used as an avoidance strategy. Meetings are
extremely frequent which means that responsibility can be diverted to the group as a
'group decision' or time can simply be wasted on endless discussion.
A section from my field notes written after a discussion with ILO colleagues over
canteen lunch reveals the impact of the bureaucratisation process on myself as
'participant' and the various survival strategies I was contemplating at the time:
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In big organisations, you lose freedom, you get lost in the big system, stepping
stones up, always fighting till you end up resigning to it as a survival strategy or
resigning full stop. In a system you are part of it and yet you are also fighting
against it, i.e. fighting against a part of yourself, there is a constant re-evaluation
of self, more obstacles in front of you. People in your system who are supposed
to be helping you are actually making things harder for you. It is a comfort zone,
you sit in your department saying, this is not my problem, not my responsibility,
go and ask over there.
A classic example of this was the two month contract I had at HQ to build a
bibliographic database. I needed a particular software package and I put in the order as
soon as I arrived. Ordering equipment is a lengthy process and it has to go through the
various levels of bureaucratic procedure. Had I ordered the package privately it would
have taken 24 hours. Instead, however, the package arrived at the end ofmy sixth week.
This left me with just over two weeks to complete the activity for which I had been
recruited for two months. Not only was six weeks of taxpayers' money wasted but a
considerable amount of time was spent chasing people up that should have been spent in
a more 'rational' way, i.e. doing my job. This is an extremely small example but a
common one, illustrative of why multi-million dollar development programmes take so
long to come off the ground (see 7). The process also illustrates how responsibility is
passed around in a bureaucracy and how the system facilitates this, i.e. the administrator
shops around for the package and applies to the IT department who processes the request
and then forwards it to Procurement who insists on using a particular stockist, eventually
ordering a more expensive package from a store which did not have it in stock, the order
then goes back to IT for processing and eventually the software is delivered). In such a
system, each person blames the other for 'not going through the proper procedure' or for
'sitting on the demand order' or for 'being on holiday' or for a number of other excuses
which I heard almost daily during the six week period.
4.4.9 A point on gender
Throughout the fourteen months of fieldwork, the issue of gender within the
Organisation was almost invisible in conversations with informants. In fact, it only came
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up with regard to the frustrations expressed by one male member of staff that a particular
woman had only been promoted because she was female. Whether or not this is correct,
it is clear that the level of gender stereotyping in work allocation remains pervasive
within the Organisation. Despite promoting equal rights at work, the ILO has been
unable to put gender equality into practice. Management positions are clearly male
biased, and gender stereotyping is obvious, with secretarial jobs still held by women and
messengers being men. There is, however, a growing group of young, ambitious and
professional females and it will be interesting to see whether they manage to burst the
glass ceiling131.
Such gender stereotyping continues to influence the issue of sexuality at work.
According to Hearn and Parkin (1987) cited in Savage and Witz (1992: 48-49):
Enter most organizations and you enter a world of sexuality.. This can include a
mass of sexual displays, feelings and fantasies, and innuendoes, as part of
everyday organizational life, right through to sexual relationships, open or secret,
occasional sexual acts, and sexual violations, including rape.
The authors express their surprise at the 'booming silence' about sexuality in the
literature on organisations, which give the impression that they are 'inhabited by a breed
of strange, asexual eunuch figures'132.1 would argue, however, that the 'booming silence'
may not be so surprising after all. Reference to gender and sexuality is still taboo within
Organisations and therefore obtaining data is not so straightforward. During fieldwork,
the issue was only talked about on two occasions: once when sexual harassment was
gossiped about but not substantiated, and once when a male official implied that another
official had only been promoted as she is female, discussed above. The issue of sexual
harassment is one which management still tend to 'brush under the carpet' although the
131 Helle Poulsen at the University of Copenhagen is currently undertaking a PhD in gender
mainstreaming within the ILO.
Ij2 Moss Kanter's (1977) landmark text was one of the first books to break the 'booming silence' and to
explore the impact of corporate power on women. Witz and Savage (1992) provide a useful overview of
the literature on sexuality and gender in organisations.
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issue of female promotion is one which the Organisation is taking seriously, at least in
rhetoric133.
The way the Organisation relates to its staff in terms of gender and sexuality is important
in terms of day to day practice. Gender discrimination will affect policy development,
for example, as policy makers will mainly be men. To date, all but two IPEC programme
directors have been male, which I would argue has led to a more 'masculine' style of
organising. Hofstede (1994) lays down four factors which impact on Organisational
culture, one of which is the extent to which masculinity, as opposed to femininity, is
pervasive134. Gender roles are of course socially and culturally determined and Hofstede
makes clear that he uses the terms 'masculine' and 'feminine' in a relative as opposed to
absolute sense. According to Hofstede (1994: 81-82), masculine positioning tends to
emphasise certain indicators of success- earnings, recognition, advancement and
challenge- whereas feminine positioning tends to emphasise the importance of
relationships, co-operation, living area (living near home) and employment security.
While men can have feminine characteristics and women can have masculine
characteristics, Hofstede's framework provides a useful perspective to explore how male
dominance of power within the ILO and IPEC affects practice and programming. Ifmale
managers emphasise advancement, challenge, recognition and high earnings then it can
be argued that they will focus more on developing programmes which are high status
and innovative and lead to rapid and identifiable results, which if successful will lead to
promotion, pay increases and recognition. A female manager may be more likely to
focus on programming which is more centred on building relationships, i.e. conducting
participatory action research. Hofstede goes on to argue that certain cultures are more
masculine or feminine than others. On his masculinity-femininity index, Germany rates
133 A Report entitled 'Breaking through the Glass Ceiling: Women in management' has just been
completed. See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pkits/pdf/glassceiling.pdf. Writing reports in
one thing but gender equality remains elusive within the ILO, despite being one of the ILO's primary
goals.
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Hofstede's other categories will be explored in Chapter 6.
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as a strongly 'masculine' country, as opposed to Denmark, for example, which is more
'feminine'. It has been seen that in IPEC there has been a number of high status and
innovative initiatives and a reluctance to engage in more long-term processual and
participatory research and programming. There has also been little emphasis on building
relationships with staff, e.g. by fighting for more equitable contractual terms. It could be
argued that this is due to the 'masculinity' of IPEC management systems, caused by
sexual discrimination and stereotyping as well as by the domination of German
managers.
4.5 Chapter Conclusions
This chapter has explored the various discourses and practices behind the 'vision' laid
down in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it has introduced a number of important theoretical
issues to which we will return in later chapters.
It has been shown that although the ILO portrays itself as a 'de-humanised' entity which
functions in a rational, non-emotional and mechanical way it does in fact constitute a
multi-dimensional body of thought and practice which functions according to the various
interactions and power relations between staff and the outside world as well as among
staff within the Organisation. Albrow's theory on the importance of including emotion in
social theorising of the organisation was used to build on arguments by Weber and
Czarniowska and to reveal that 'de-humanisation' is an important tool used by
management and others to portray the organisation as a rational, homogeneous machine,
free from human error and the ideological and emotional conflict necessarily found in
any group of people. These issues are considered further in Chapter 7 where I argue that
'people' related issues such as emotion and personality are central to the failure of
matching development rhetoric with effective practice.
It is therefore useful to take a Foucauldian perspective to view the Organisation as a site
of contestation or web of power relations rather than as a rigid and 'de-humanised'
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structure. If practice is to be improved the organisational culture must reflect the value
of each individual staff member. This is supported by Ramsay and Parker (1992) who
propose the 'neo-bureaucracy' model and argue that an Organisation must 'capture the
hearts and minds of members in order to ensure its functioning', exercising control
through consent and common purpose. The ILO is already at an advantage in moving
towards such a model. As a value-based organisation, it can be argued that the ILO,
especially IPEC, often has the hearts and minds of staff before they even join the
Organisation. Bureaucratic procedures (explored further in Chapters 6, 7 and 9),
however, lead to the unfortunate situation where the hearts and minds are often lost and
people leave to work for NGOs, the private sector or work as freelance consultants for
the Organisation which means that they can buy in to its heart and mind without being
constrained by the bureaucratic nightmare.
The private sector is already taking the issue of managing relationships on board and is
placing increasing emphasis on Emotional Intelligence (4.4.7), as a key management and
leadership skill. The public sector has traditionally been slow to pick up on innovative
developments from the private sector. In this rapidly developing world, however, where
competition for resources is strong and where scepticism vis-a-vis social change is
growing, organisations such as the ILO can no longer afford to rest on their laurels and
must adopt efficient management techniques. The tragedy appears to be, however, that
instead of learning from the success of the innovative approach taken by IPEC it is
attempting to bring it back into the folds of the Organisation which will inevitably lead
to bureaucratisation and the stifling of further innovation and change.
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5. Child Labour in Tanzania: A
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In previous chapters, the term 'child labour' has been used in a more or less abstract
manner, with little explanation of what actually leads to children labouring in particular
countries or how children and others feel about child labour in a national context. This
thesis could clearly not be complete without an exploration of such issues, which were in
fact the starting point of my research. My primary concern while preparing for field
work was the importance of using a participatory approach to gain an understanding of
the situation from the perspectives of children and other stakeholders. It soon became
clear, however, that it was impossible to explore the issue of children labouring in a
purely local and contemporary context. IPEC is only the most recent development in a
long story of historical changes in child work practices. The historical context behind
child labour in Tanzania must therefore be explored as well as the national framework
which was developed to tackle the issue before IPEC was set up. What was the situation
prior to the entrance of IPEC and what was it that led the Government of Tanzania to ask
the ILO for assistance in tackling child labour? In this section, I will be attempting to
place current child labour practice in Tanzania within its historical context as well as
outlining the development of national policy to tackle child labour before the
introduction of IPEC in 1994. I will then introduce the historical development of
Mirerani, the mining township which is the subject of Chapters 6 and 7 on IPEC
Tanzania intervention, attempting to place this local history within the wider historical
context explored in the first section of this chapter. Finally, I will attempt to outline the
human and economic geography of Mirerani in order to provide the backdrop to the
child labour situation which is explored in Chapter 8 through the use of participatory
research with the children themselves135.
135 The placing of the chapter on children's voices at the end of this thesis is not accidental but is a
reflection of the positioning of the realities of children's lives within organisational practice. In the
following chapters I argue that child labourers as embodied subjects with voice are almost invisible in the
wider machinations of the ILO, replaced instead with 'the child labourer' as an abstract and disembodied
construct.
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5.1 Child Labour in Tanzania136: A Historical Overview
This section originates from a desire to understand the role of children's work in
Tanzanian society through time in order to contextualise contemporary arguments for
'eliminating child labour' (Ministry of Labour and Youth Development 1997) and
therefore for the introduction of IPEC. My data reveals that the roots of today's attitudes
to child work are firmly based in historical developments. This supports Hendrick's
argument (2.2) that:
the numerous perceptions of childhood, which have been produced over the last
two hundred years or so, can only be fully comprehended within the context of
how different generations and social classes have responded to the social,
economic, religious and political challenges of their respective eras (Hendrick
1997 : 35)137.
Wallman teaches us that the concept of 'work' can be introduced into a culture or
transformed through time (Wallman 1979). I thus propose to consider the ways in which
cultural, political and economic developments have shaped people's lives and their
1 ^R
perceptions of the role to be played by child work .
5.1.1 Pre-Colonial History: Child work as a form of socialisation and learning
Writing on the pre-colonial history of Tanzania generally and of Tanzanian childhood
specifically is difficult due to the dearth of available literature (Mpangala 1992). Goran
136This section will consider only mainland Tanzania, called Tanganyika during the colonial era. This is
because the islands of Zanzibar, which united with Tanganyika in 1964, have a distinctive history which it
would not be possible to analyse within the scope of this proposal.
137Hendrick was writing on British childhood and his task was greatly facilitated by the extensive literature
available (Aries 1986 [I960]; DeMause 1976; Cunningham 1995b). Unfortunately, very little has been
written on childhood in Tanzania (Sumra et al. 1999: 42) and almost nothing on the developments in child
work through time. Therefore, in view of the limited resources, I in no way claim to be constructing a
definitive historical overview of child work.
Ij8 For a differentiation between child 'work' and child 'labour' see Chapter 1. I use the ILO definition
whereby labour is work which is exploitative or dangerous to the child. Although this is clearly a
subjective definition, as discussed earlier, it is the most useful working definition for my purposes. Child
work can lead to child labour and it is therefore important to explore both of these.
153
Hyden informs us that, in Tanzania, 'History began with the white man's arrival on the
black continent' (Hyden 1980: 38). According to Mpangala (1992), the earliest form of
economy in Tanzania was hunting and gathering although the transition to crop
cultivation and pastoral economy started as early as 500 B.C. (1992: 3). The first
available reference to children is that made by Mpangala in his discussion of nineteenth
century societies. He informs us that the communally based, nomadic Masai pastoralists
of central and north-central Tanzania divided labour activities by age and sex, with
'children between the age of eight and eighteen specialised in grazing cattle' (1992: 5).
This would suggest that children formed a labour group in themselves and that there was
no gender division of labour for children, unlike today where, as seen below, child work
is clearly gender divided (see also Chapter 8).
Kayongo-Male and Onyango's (1984) study of the family division of labour in pre-
colonial society supports Mpangala's comments regarding the division of labour by age
group 'children' as opposed to by gender, although they suggest that work does become
gendered from the age of eight to ten:
Children began helping at very early ages. They were not overworked but were
expected to contribute through performance of tasks geared to their age and sex.
Before the age of eight to ten years, there was little sexual differentiation in the
duties given to children, tasks being sexually differentiated after that period.
Children learned persistence, co-operation and many other values in addition to
the skill in performing a task. By the age of seven most children were capable of
caring for younger siblings while the mother did other work like farming or
trading (1984: 24).
Age was therefore an important component in the division of labour and children had
clearly defined roles within the group. According to Koponen:
there was no society which did not at least informally recognise age grades such
as 'childhood', 'adolescence', etc., and few societies which did not formalise some
of the grades and generate more or less elaborate rituals to mark the transition
from one grade to another. This was necessary because age was a major factor in
the allocation of roles within the groups of production and consumption (1988:
288).
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Age also played an important role in the social and ideological organisation of pre-
colonial society (Mpangala 1992: 8-9; Koponen 1988: 288). Age-set seniority systems
were developed within kinship institutions, with the youngest at the lowest level in the
hierarchy. Furthermore, a number of groups also used a system of age-sets, with those of
the same age passing through age grades in the company of their set mates (Koponen
1988: 289; Mpangala 1992: 6).
It would therefore appear from the literature that in pre-colonial history children had
clear work roles and functions within their kinship group. They were expected to
perform light tasks, which would develop as the child matured, as would the division of
tasks according to gender. The child thus contributed to the survival of the community at
the same time as developing vital life skills139.
5.1.2. The German Invasion and the introduction of 'child labour'
It has been argued that the German colonisation of Tanganyika put an end to the
prosperity of the pre-colonial economies (Hyden 1980 : 41)140. The fragile relationship
between people and environment, which had been carefully balanced by the indigenous
peoples was rapidly disrupted by ill thought out colonial policies which sought to
maximise profit. The arrival of the colonisers141 was disastrous with loss of life through
fighting and out-breaks in epidemics such as smallpox and rinderpest, which wiped out
90% of the cattle in most parts of the country (Coulson 1982: 28). It is clear that the
consequences of famine, disease, forced migration and fighting must have been
damaging for children's welfare in that their survival and development were under
139 It is important to qualify the literature review, however, with the observation that it is difficult to
generalise about the division of labour by gender or age on the basis of the study of a small number of
social groups as there may have been huge variations depending on the local political economy. It is also
important to note that pre-colonial times experienced slave trading and various inter-ethnic wars (see
Koponen 1988) as well as slave trading, which clearly impacted on the lives of children.
140By the end of the nineteenth century, important iron, textile and salt manufacturing industries had
already been developed in Tanzania, an aspect often ignored in the colonialists' attempts to justify their
presence as bringing 'Africa out of backwardness' (Hyden 1980: 38).
141
Although the term 'colonisers' is used it is important to note that these were not a homogenous group of
people but a mixed group which included missionaries, settlers, misfits and undesirables from Europe,
progressive officials as well as bureaucratic technical officers.
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continual threat. Furthermore, the introduction of a cash-economy disrupted the
traditional subsistence economy. The Germans imposed a cash taxation system, which
meant that many had to seek paid employment on colonial plantations in order to meet
tax demands; failure to make cash payments led to forced labour (Coulson 1982, Hyden
1980). Forced labour was particularly disruptive to family farming, with members of the
household, generally men but also children, being withdrawn from the farms for long
periods, leaving women and children to take on the work of the absent men (Kayongo-
Male and Onyango 1984: 25).
According to the commentators, it was during colonial rule that children were first
drawn into exploitative non-family labour, working on plantations, in mines and as farm
and house workers142 (Kayongo-Male and Onyango 1984: 25; Rwegoshora, Mbeo and
Amma 1997: 32). This is particularly distressing in that whilst colonialists were
engaging Tanzanian children in such exploitative and hazardous work, legislators were
passing laws outlawing such practices in Europe (Fyfe 1989; 2.2). According to Nyerere,
this was also the time that the term 'worker', in the capitalist sense of 'employee', was
first introduced to Tanzania (1968a: 6). This supports Wallman's claim that work is a
concept negotiated and transformed through time (1979).
It is often argued in favour of colonial policies that the colonisers provided an important
contribution through the development of basic infrastructure. In Tanganyika, German
rule led to the introduction of formal education systems and by 1914, there were 60
primary schools and 9 post-primary schools (Coulson 1982: 41) in addition to the
mission schools which had established themselves since the 1840s. Furthermore, a
network of hospitals and roads was developed in areas of German settlement. I would
argue, however, that while better than nothing, such developments were marginal and
due to the limited numbers I would doubt whether they had any impact for the majority
of children working in Tanzania143.
142The paradox is that plantation, mining and domestic work are currently the three targets of international
attention in Tanzania as these are seen to be the most hazardous and exploitative forms ofwork.
143 For those African children who did access schooling it is useful to consider Serpell's (1993) argument
that many young Africans emerge from Western style primary schooling with a sense of frustration and
lowered self esteem.
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The German invasion was thus responsible for dramatically transforming pre-colonial
work patterns and it is during this period that children became engaged in waged and
forced labour. The consequences of famine and disease were detrimental to children's
welfare and although there were developments in basic infrastructure, these were
minimal and had little impact on the welfare ofmost Tanzanians.
5.1.3 The British 'Invasion' 144:
Growing poverty and the entrenchment of child labour
Although child labour first developed under German rule, the situation became more
acute under British rule. The war between the Germans and British left the already weak
colonial economy in a desperate state. Between 1920 and 1946, Britain administered
Tanganyika under a League of Nations Mandate which stated that the colony was to be
administered in the interests of 'the material and moral well-being and the social
progress of its inhabitants' (League of Nations Mandate quoted in Coulson 1982: 45). It
would appear from the literature, however, that during this period there was little social
progress and that the material and moral well being of the inhabitants came second to the
profit of Western plantation owners. Children were often used in plantation labour and
no effort was made to legislate for their protection (Rwegoshora, Mbeo and Amma
1997: 32). The world depression of the 1930s hit Tanzania's primary product export
industry hard and wages for plantation workers collapsed, with many unskilled labourers
earning half of the 1927 rate in 1940 (Coulson 1982: 46). Tax rates were not reduced,
however, and many people found themselves having to produce double the amount of
crops to pay their taxes, with the threat of forced conscription for those who could not
pay145. While there is no information available as to how peasants succeeded in
increasing production so successfully, I would suggest that it was essential for all family
members, including children, to work extremely long and exhausting hours. The colonial
focus on the production of cash crops also led to a decrease in subsistence farming and
l44I use the term invasion as the result of the British administration was at least as destructive and invasive
as the German invasion had been.
145During the war years, labour conscription increased over 27-fold, from 960 in 1941 to 26,200 in 1945
(Orde-Browne 1946 quoted in Coulson 1982: 49).
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consequently to a series of famines. The result of colonial policy was thus clearly not
one of encouraging the well-being of inhabitants but of increasing the dependency of
small-scale producers, not only on world markets for cash crops but on the British
government for famine relief, a situation which unfortunately has hardly changed since.
After the Second World War, the country become a 'trusteeship territory' of the United
Nations, whilst remaining under British governance. Instead of facilitating a transition to
independence, the British now adopted an open policy of forcing small farmers to
change their agricultural techniques; local know-how was ignored and foreign 'experts'
told peasants how they should work their land. According to Coulson (1982), new crops
were introduced, ineffective 'conservation' policies were imposed and peasants were told
when and how to work. Farmers who refused to accept 'modern' methods were seen as
conservative and lazy and the possible reasons for their refusal were ignored. Time,
however, proved them to be right with many policies leading to severe environmental
degradation (Ibid.).
It would thus appear that colonial policies not only stimulated the current 'child labour'
phenomenon through employing children in exploitative and hazardous conditions but
placed many peasant farmers in an economically and environmentally precarious
situation in which family survival depended on the contribution of all family members,
including children. Employers could therefore justify employing children on the basis
that it was helping family survival : 'Thus the very 'evils' of the system created by the
colonialists had become in turn the justification for perpetuating the 'evil' of child labour'
(Shivji 1985: 224)146.
146 Just before the end of British rule the Employment Ordinance Cap. 366, 1955, was passed, prohibiting
the employment of children under the apparent age of 12 (section 77). This Ordinance remains one of the
key pieces of national child work employment to this date. Under the Ordinance children between the ages
of 12 and 15 are allowed to engage in light agricultural, horticultural or plantation work as long as this
work is not hazardous or dangerous. No person under the age of 18 can engage in hazardous or dangerous
work (s. 2). The penalty for breach is a fine not exceeding T.shs 3,000 (£3) and/or three months
imprisonment. Unfortunately, enforcement mechanisms are weak and many children fall outside the ambit
of the Ordinance which refers to 'employed' children i.e. those with an employment contract. Most
working children in Tanzania are, however, self-employed or do not have a work contract. It would thus
appear that the Ordinance is of more symbolic than practical value in that it does not really provide
effective protection for working children.
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Furthermore, the education of Tanzanian children was extremely low on the British
colonial agenda. The total allocation to education was below 1% of total recurrent
expenditures between 1919-1925 and around 5% between 1930-1945 (Buchert 1994:
23). Furthermore, the few educational institutions were concentrated in areas of cash-
crop production, trade and administration and white settler areas. Consequently, these
schools were primarily accessible to European and Indian children, who lived in closest
proximity to these areas147. The British introduced a triple system of education, with
different schools for White, Indian and African children. According to Buchert, the
British 'Education for Adaptation' policy:
applied only to the African population and was provided for males rather than
females. It aimed at the provision of basic reading, writing and accounting skills
in support of the indirect rule system, the transfer of vocational agricultural skills
to develop peasant agriculture and the transmission ofWestern civic values and
Christianity to 'civilise' and mute certain traditional values and customs (1994:
30).
It would therefore appear that British educational policy was more geared towards
supporting the colonial system than to promoting the educational rights of Tanzanian
148children , particularly those of girls. Furthermore, according to Kayongo-Male and
Onyango, the introduction of European schools and churches was particularly
detrimental to traditional family life, offering both new sets of values and new sources of
authority (1984: 26; see also Varkevisser 1973). Hendrick also argues that the British
schooling system created and imposed an altogether new construction of childhood:
It threw aside the child's 'knowledge' derived from parents, community, peer
group, and personal experience. Instead it demanded a state of ignorance.
Secondly, it required upon pain of punishment, usually physical, a form of
behaviour, accompanied by a set of related attitudes which reinforced the child's
dependence and vulnerability (1997: 46).
147Fortunately, some unassisted village schools also developed in more remote areas and continued to
operate outside formal government control (Buchert 1994: 30).
148 This argument is further supported by the fact that education for Africans was primarily elementary
with only 3% of African students continuing with schooling past the elementary level between 1931 and
1946, for example (Buchert 1994: 26).
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The contrast between the British and local education systems is illustrated in Raum's
classic 1940 ethnography, Chaga Childhood: A Description ofIndigenous Education in
an East African TribeU9 which provides an extremely useful and detailed description of
the cultural and educational development of Chaga children, from conception to
adolescence. Raum details the importance of work as part of an informal process of
teaching:
Agricultural work thus not only enforces a uniformity of synchronised behaviour
throughout the tribe and a close co-operative union of family members but it also
activates the ties of kinship (1940: 210).
Children were sent to assist kin in times of sickness or need, without reward or wage,
and were so taught the importance of social interdependence and economic co-operation.
The education received by Chaga children was thus a general one in contrast to the one¬
sided scholastic education favoured by European style schools. Raum also details the
role of children's work within the Chaga division of labour:
girls and boys during the first five or six years are occupied in similar work.
Younger boys take part in the domestic work of girls (..) This disregard for the
traditional division of labour is strongly marked when the eldest child is a son
who has to do duty as a nurse, or a girl is the only child and therefore has to
pasture the cattle (..) The older a boy grows, the greater the temptation to play
the truant at work that he never sees performed by his own sex. (..) Gradually the
boy is introduced to the kind of work which traditional division of labour has
assigned to men, viz. gathering banana leaves and plants suitable as fodder, and
cutting them up, collecting grass for the goats, pasturing cattle, the difficult tasks
of constructing a hut, the butchering of animals, the brewing of beer, and the
preliminary clearing and tilling of a hitherto uncultivated plot (1940: 179-180).
Raum's text displays similarities to pre-colonial accounts of divisions of labour, although
children in his account started working at an earlier age. This is interesting in that it
reveals that although colonial policies introduced exploitative, non-family 'labour', the
age and gender divisions of household labour remained much the same.
l49Raum was a British anthropologist whose father had been a missionary among the Chaga in Northern
Tanzania for forty years.
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It would thus appear that colonial governments were more interested in promoting their
own economic interests than in promoting the welfare of Tanzania's children. In fact, the
evidence suggests that children's welfare deteriorated under colonial rule, with the
introduction of forced labour, exploitative work, insensitive education policies and
environmental and agricultural policies which created famine and increased household
poverty.
By the 1950s, unrest was spreading and in 1954, the Tanganyika African National Union
(TANU) was founded. Four years later, TANU had won a general election and there was
little left for the British to do but leave. Tanganyika mainland finally gained
independence from Britain in December 1961 and united with the islands of Zanzibar in
1964 to create the United Republic of Tanzania.
5.1.4 Independence:
The rise in 'child labour'
The twin legacy of under-development and dependency150 on Britain became one of the
key challenges for Tanzania's first President, Julius Nyerere. To ensure equitable and
rapid development, the new government adopted a policy of African socialism or
Ujamaa, which involved large-scale nationalisation programmes and forced resettlement
of peasants in communal villages. The policy appeared successful with record progress
in education and health. Compulsory primary education was introduced and resulted in a
noted gender balancing: women and youth were guaranteed access to land in their own
right, communal labour-sharing and child-care facilities were provided in Ujamaa
villages and human rights were strongly advocated at policy level (Mukangara and Koda
1997: 20). Furthermore, the controversial colonialist poll tax was abolished (Hyden
1980: 124). With regard to child work, Nyerere made his position clear, as outlined in
3.1, arguing that everyone who was physically able to work must do so with the
exception of small children (Nyerere 1968a: 15). All workers must, however, receive a
just return for their labour and that no one has the right to exploit others (Nyerere 1968:
150The economic crisis facing Tanzania has meant that it has been unable to reduce its dependence on
foreign assistance despite Nyerere's vision of'self-reliance' (1968a: 25).
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15). Unfortunately, the retreat away from subsistence farming, so actively encouraged
by the colonialists, continued despite the government's efforts to increase food
production through villagisation, market organisation, forced production of certain crops
and price policies (Havnevik 1993). While there is no specific data on the impact of
these policies on children, food shortages must have been particularly damaging to
children's development and survival and presumably the use of children in extra-
household work continued. The 1970s was also a time of rapid urban growth, with the
majority of those moving to urban areas remaining unemployed or joining the informal
sector and a few joining the swelling ranks of the civil service or the new Tanzanian
entrepreneurial class (Coulson 1982: 196, 203). In contrast to colonial urban migration
patterns the majority of new migrants were 'youngsters and youth' (Ishumi 1984: 94),
which goes some way to explaining the rising numbers of 'street children' in urban areas
(Mdoe 1997).
Throughout the 1970s the standard of living ofmany Tanzanians fell and factors such as
falls in commodity prices, severe droughts and a costly war with Uganda meant that by
the mid- 1980s the country found itself on the verge of bankruptcy (Tanzania High
Commission 1998: 11). Since 1986, Tanzania has undergone a process of rapid
economic and social transformation, moving towards a more liberal development
environment which has involved political pluralism, free markets and the greater
participation of stakeholders151. The introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies
(SAPs) has had negative consequences, however, with many basic social indicators
declining. Primary school enrolments, for example, stood at 93% of the relevant age
group in 1980, declined to 72% in 1985 and to 63% in 1991 (Gibbon 1995: 15).
According to recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) figures one third
of Tanzanian children do not attend primary school, 95% do not attend secondary school
and only 1% of the cohort attend one of the three Tanzanian universities (UNDP 2000:
1). Social sector under-funding is a gross problem and Tanzania remains, in economic
"'The transition to multi-party democracy in mainland Tanzania has been smooth despite the fact that
Tanzania is multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious. The first multi-party elections were held in
1995 when the former ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) was returned to power and formed the
current national government. They also won the 2000 election. In Zanzibar, the process has been less
smooth, with allegations of corruption and regular political violence.
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terms, one of the poorest countries in the world with a GNP per capita income of only
$210 in 1997, which is far lower than the dollar a day poverty line (UNICEF 2000: 86).
Furthermore, Tanzania's relative position on the Human Development Index (HDI) has
been declining, from 126th in 1992 to 150th by 1998 (UNDP 2000: 30) and to 156th out
of 175 countries in 1999 (UNDP 2000: 1).
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One of the most glaring consequences of Structural Adjustment Policies has been the
marginalisation of women153 and children (Mukangara and Koda 1997), a symptom of
which could be the increasing numbers of children said to be engaging in hazardous and
exploitative work. The issue of child work in Tanzania has been of concern to both the
national government and the international community, as revealed by the introduction of
the ILO-IPEC and the signing in March 1994 of a Memorandum of Understanding
between the Tanzanian Government and the ILO to implement a child labour
programme. Accurate statistics of child labour are difficult to obtain but according to the
ILO-IPEC, 'the worst forms of child labour appear to be in the plantation industry, where
children are exposed to chemicals, machinery, hard physical work and long working
hours, and, to some extent, in mines and manufacturing industries' (ILO 1996b: l)154.
Furthermore, about 30% of 10-14 year olds are out of school and children under the age
of 15 constitute about half of the urban informal workforce (ILO 1996b).
It is important to consider these concerns in the context of children's daily lives. Has
hazardous and exploitative child work really increased? If so, why? Has there been a
transformation in the work patterns that we explored in pre-colonial and colonial times
and which were an important part of children's socialisation and learning?
152 The obvious failures of SAPs have led to a new World Bank approach: PRSPs or Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers. Tanzania is one of the 'pioneering' or 'experiment' countries for the PRSP, which is
developed through extensive consultation with Tanzanian people, be they in villages or in organisations.
The Paper is thus meant to be a poverty reduction strategy based on the needs of 'local people'. It is
currently a new process and yet already it has been controversial. See Chapter 7.3.1
153A useful study of the impact ofmodernisation on traditional life-styles and women is Aud Talle's 1988
study of Masai pastoralists. Talle argues that the move from subsistence to market oriented production has
placed a larger control of family resources in the hands of the Masai men which has led to declining
autonomy for women (Talle 1988: 5).
154The Tanzanian economy is heavily dependent on agriculture which accounts for 57% of GDP although
mining is a growing sector, increasingly attracting foreign investment (CIA publications 1998: 5).
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To answer this last question it is useful to compare a recent 1995 UNICEF report with
the findings of the pre-colonial and colonial literature which we have examined. In fact,
it would appear from the UNICEF report that little has changed with regard to division
of labour by age. The study of Tarime in Tanzania reveals that boys as young as three or
four are given a small club and encouraged to participate in herding the animals whereas
girls are given a small pot and accompany their elders in the search for water and
firewood (1995: 25). As they get older, girls are expected to do all the work inside and
around the house, such as preparing food and caring for siblings, as well as working in
the shamba or farm. Boys sometimes help with shamba work but are more concerned
with work outside the house such as building, herding and hunting (1995: 32). It would
therefore appear that within the domestic sphere the divisions of labour by age and
gender have remained relatively stable through time, except that there are now clear
gender divisions for very young children. The report also reveals, however, that the girls'
workloads have greatly augmented with increasing household poverty, as has the
problem of child domestic workers. Raum's 1940 ethnography revealed that children
were often sent to work for their grandparents, free of charge. This practice has since
been extended, with children, mainly girls, now being sent to distant kin, living in
predominantly urban areas, in the hope that they will receive an education and an escape
route from the poverty of their home areas. The reality for many has been quite different,
however, with children working in very difficult conditions, often vulnerable to physical
and emotional abuse and often unpaid (TAMWA 1996; Sumra et al. 1999). The
difficulty here is that these employer-employee relationships are hidden as kinship
relationships and there is therefore little protection for these child workers who are
described as family members rather than as employees.
The decrease in subsistence farming and the new expectations brought about by
modernisation and a cash-economy have meant that many households have been unable
to satisfy their needs. Children have thus been facing increasing pressure to work in
excess of what was traditionally expected (see also 8.1.1). A number of other factors,
such as family breakdown, cost sharing, the HIV/AIDS phenomenon and consumer
pressures have further compounded the problem.
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The introduction of cost-sharing has meant that many families are unable to send their
children to school which has resulted in children engaging in waged employment to pay
for their education or dropping-out of school altogether. A recent survey revealed that
73% of child workers interviewed worked out of economic necessity, 35% of these to
finance their schooling (Rwegoshora et a!. 1997: 22). These figures are higher than my
own (8.1.1) which found that 47% left home to work because there was 'no money at
home', with a further 18% leaving because there was 'no money for school'. The income
contribution of children has become an essential survival strategy for many families who
see little value in an expensive, low quality education which does not appear to provide
their children with necessary survival skills. Price liberalisation and the removal of
subsidies has also reduced families' purchasing power and has meant that more and more
children are required to contribute to the family income (Mukangara and Koda 1997:
21).
The breakdown of the extended family has also led to an increase in child work
practices. Traditionally, the extended family was an important support network which
could provide child-care for working parents or assistance in moments of poverty. Its
breakdown has meant that elder siblings, usually girls, have taken over child-care and
other domestic responsibilities or have been forced into employment to provide financial
support in desperate times. Furthermore, the increase in female-headed households has
had important consequences for child work patterns. Research has shown that children
from female-headed households are more likely to be absent from school, which was
linked to the fact that these households have hardly any access to land and will
consequently 'supply as wage labour any able-bodied member, including school-aged
children' (Sender and Smith 1990: 62). My fieldwork revealed that even where families
had access to land, the effects of the drought as well as the undesirability of a life on the
shamba led many children to choose to enter in wage labour (Chapter 8).
AIDS is another important factor which has affected traditional divisions of labour in
Tanzania. No figures are available specifically on the number of children living in
families affected by the virus but in view of the recent estimate that 10% of the
population may be HIV+ (Tanzania High Commission 1998: 8), children must be very
directly affected. Children may find themselves responsible for caring for sick family
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members, working to pay for expensive medication or even running and supporting the
household. There are an estimated 730 000 'AIDS' orphans in Tanzania (UNICEF 1999),
most under 18 and either living with a single parent or relatives. The number of child-
headed households is also increasing and there have even been cases of extended family
members claiming the inheritance rights of the children and then abandoning them
(Groves and Warioba 1999). Many orphans have thus found themselves obliged to
abandon their education and to engage in income-generation (Kaijage and Tibaijuka
1998).
A final factor affecting contemporary child work patterns is one which many forget to
mention: the global consumer culture. This was explored in Chapter 3.1 and I therefore
propose to do no more than to remind the reader of the powerful influence of consumer
pressure as a result of mass advertising (from which there is little respite in Tanzania)
which has led to some children and young people feeling that it is as important for them
to obtain the necessary kinds of clothes and other possessions as it is to attend school, for
example. They therefore opt for gaining a cash income as opposed to spending valuable
family resources on a low-quality education, especially in a country with high youth
unemployment among school leavers (8.1.1). The most recent UNDP report on Tanzania
paints a bleak picture of youth unemployment:
In 1999, 53% of the population was below the age of 18, an estimated 600- 650
000 job seekers entered the labour market in 1998 while only 33 000 wage sector
jobs were created. Even with a sustained growth rate well-above current
projections, Tanzania will be able to create wage sector jobs for only a tiny
fraction of the labour force. Just to maintain the current high unemployment rate,
it is estimated that Tanzania's economy must grow by 7% per annum (UNDP
2000:1)
The opportunity to gain a cash income is therefore not easy to reject, as discussed in
Chapter 8.
This historical analysis has shown that child work as a concept has been transformed
through time and that the response of different generations to 'the social, economic,
religious and political challenges of their respective eras' can assist us in understanding
today's attitudes to children and child work. In pre-colonial times, child work was an
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essential part of community survival strategies as well as an important part of the
informal learning and socialisation process. The colonial era introduced the cash-
economy and the employment of children in hazardous and exploitative non-family
work, a trend which has continued to this day. Within the domestic sphere, the gendered
division of labour has remained much the same, with a particularly negative impact on
girls who are kept within the home and prevented from attending or succeeding at
school, thus sustaining the status quo of female subordination. Age and gender have
therefore remained the basis for the social division of labour although it would appear
that children's workloads have increased as part of family survival strategies. In
contemporary Tanzania, children make important contributions to both national and
household economies through their work155, engaging in domestic work, unpaid
subsistence farm work, waged labour and informal employment (see also ethnographic
evidence in 8.1.2.1). The value of children's work is seldom acknowledged, however,
and the lack of data has meant that their contributions have remained invisible and that
children are in fact seen as a net cost to national education, health and welfare budgets
(Sumra et al. 1999: 71). Ignoring the value of children's contributions leaves children
more vulnerable to exploitation and places them in a weaker bargaining position.
5.2 The historical development of child labour in Mirerani,
a mining township in Northern Tanzania.
Having explored the overall development of child labour in Tanzania, this section will
consider the development of child labour in Mirerani, a mining township which became
the target site ofDFID supported IPEC intervention (Chapters 6 and 7).
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A survey of the divisions of labour in agricultural production in Rukwa region reveals that the labour
inputs of children were 33%, ofwomen 35% and ofmen 24% revealing that work traditionally assigned to
men being passed on to children (UNICEF 1995).). This situation is similar to that in industrial revolution
Britain (see Chapter 2.2).
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Mirerani is located in Northern Tanzania in the Purana hills156. It is in the Simanjiro
district ofArusha Region and is famous for being rich in Tanzanite gemstones and more
infamously for being 'wild west country'; reputed to be one of the most dangerous places
in Tanzania and rife with criminal activity15'. Only 35 years ago the site, which now
houses a rapidly expanding township based on a single industry, that of gemstone
mining, was bush, frequented only by Masai pastoralists passing through on their way to
more productive grazing land for their cattle158. This makeshift settlement sprang up out
of'Tanzanite fever' and retains a marginalised status to this day. National, regional and
local maps fail to place the site and even the spelling of its name is under dispute.
Tanzanian pioneers to the area claim that the site was named by the Masai after the
Olmelela trees which grew there. Masai elders claim, however, that 'Olmelela' is
Kiswahili and not Kimasai159 and that they named it Esere due to the grasses which grew
there. Foreign mining companies and gemstone texts (Keller 1992; Kimambo 1984)
refer to the site as Merelani whereas locals use the names Mererani or Mirerani
interchangeably. Whilst the most common pronunciation of the site is Mererani, for the
purposes of this written text I will be referring to the site as Mz'rerani as this is the
spelling used by the village government officials I was dealing with.
Gaining an accurate history of the area is even more difficult than gaining an accurate
spelling of the name of the township, with different parties claiming the accuracy of
their version over that of others. To gain a thorough understanding of the history of the
area a literature review was conducted and oral histories were collected during
interviews and focus group discussions. The literature review and discussions with
relevant people revealed that there has been no extensive documentation of the history of
the area. As will be seen the texts I did find presented short and conflicting accounts
156 Whilst many claim that Mirerani is to be found in the Leletema hills Masai informants told me that this
was inaccurate, the mining area is in fact located in the next range of hills, the Purana hills.
157 The issue of the reputed criminality of the area is returned to below.
158There is debate as to the spelling of Masai but Masai I interviewed living in and around Mirerani claim
that this is the correct spelling. The issue of terminology is a complex one and my use of certain terms and
spellings is based on the terms and spellings used by my informants. I am therefore not claiming that these
are in any way definitive as Masai in other regions, for example, may very well use different spellings.
159 Kiswahili is the official language of Tanzania and Kimasai is the language used by the Masai.
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which were not clearly referenced (Keller 1992; Kimambo 1984). This history is thus
primarily based on oral histories. My dependence on oral history meant that it was
important to gain histories from as many different sources as possible, particularly in
view of the often conflicting evidence presented by interviewees. Interviews were thus
conducted with elders160 from two different Masai groups in neighbouring villages; with
the first inhabitants of the township, who have gained notoriety and respect for their role
in the creation of the township; with other early inhabitants who have played a less
political role in the area and with a number of other relevant parties from government,
mining companies, religious groups and Mirerani township.
The first known name of the area was Agata-ongishu, a Masai name which means cattle
passage and which reflects the main activity of the area at the time; Masai pastoralism.
According to the Masai history of the area, as provided by focus group discussions with
two elders of the Masai village located within the Mirerani township, the first non-Masai
to come to the area was an mchagga (from the wachagga tribe, based on Mount
Kilimanjaro) named Salimu, a politician who arrived in 1952 to do farming by the river.
He was soon followed by wameru (people from Mount Meru) who recognised the fertile
potential of the area. The farmers diverted water from the river for irrigation purposes,
preventing the flow of water to the Masai settlements, and closed off the farming land,
preventing the Masai cattle from grazing in their traditional pastures. This land-use
conflict between Masai pastoralism and the economic activities of the settlers persists to
this day, despite the adaptability of many Masai to the new gemstone trade, a large
number of whom engage in the profitable activity of brokering (middle men who sell
stones on to the dealers). Other than Masai pastoralism and small-scale shamba farming,
there were two plantations producing sugar cane and sisal a few miles from the current
site of Mirerani which were owned by wazungus (a term used to refer to all non-blacks
except Asians) and which were closed down in 1967, as discussed below.
Before continuing it is fundamental to introduce the gemstone whose discovery led to
the development of the area from bushland to a modern, thriving township:
160 One 'elder' interviewed was born in 1903 and the other two were in their 60s.
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Tanzanite is the ultimate prize of a gem safari. Its rich purples and blues often
have the depth comparable to the finest sapphire. Paler Tanzanite has a delicate
periwinkle colour like the eyes of Elizabeth Taylor. It is supremely rare, coming
from only one place in the world, the Merelani hills of Tanzania, in the shadow
ofMount Kilimanjaro (Gemsdirect 1999).
This short excerpt vividly illustrates not only the beauty of the stone but its marketability
as a popular, sought after gemstone. It also helps us to understand the lengths that
individuals generally and children and youths specifically are prepared to go to mine and
sell the stone.
Tanzanite is a variety of zoisite and was named by Henry Piatt of Tiffany & Company
after the country in which it was found161. The gem is slightly soft and is unusual in that
it is trichoic, which means that it has a different colour down its three axes; sapphire
blue, yellow-brown, and purple-red. When heated, the stone becomes a more uniform
blue-violet. The darker the stone, the more valuable. One gramme of dark violet
Tanzanite, for example can fetch between TSH 250-300, 000 in Mirerani, increasing to
between TSH 350-400, 000 by the time it reaches the main towns having changed hands
a large number of times and then being sold onto tourists at further inflated prices. In the
United States, one carat of Tanzanite sells for around $300 per carat (they do not buy in
grammes but one gramme can equal two or three carats). It is important to note that
prices fluctuate on an almost daily basis.
The details of the discovery of Tanzanite are disputed (see Appendix) but what is clear is
that the discovery of Tanzanite meant that the number of prospectors in the area
increased rapidly and by 1969 over 60 mining claims had been pegged (Kimambo 1984:
200). Claim holders hired employees and alluvial stones were found with relative ease
so there was no need for deep mining. Other miners soon started to apply for claims but
161 The Tanzanite deposit that has been claimed thus far is a rectangular area approximately 4 kilometres
long and 1 kilometre wide. There are officially one hundred claims of 900 square feet, since subdivided,
which makes a total area of 90, 000 square feet. While Tanzanite has been found in other parts of East
Africa it has not been of gem quality. It is believed that the Tanzanite deposits originated approximately
550 million years ago when heated ground waters dissolved minerals from surrounding rocks and re-
deposited them in open spaces (Keller 1992: 62, 66).
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the government limited the numbers of claims sold. Consequently, smuggling became
rampant with employees stealing mauwe or stones and selling them on. D'Souza
estimated that up to 80% of his production was being stolen by the miners before he had
a chance to see it (Keller 1992: 69). This was confirmed by a broker who at the time
made his living through buying stones smuggled from employees and then selling them
back to the mine owners (pers. comm.). Tanzanite was also smuggled to neighbouring
Kenya which had a well developed gemstone cutting and polishing industry and which
offered high prices (Kimambo 1984: 106)162. The vast sums of money to be made
attracted large numbers of people to the area, all hoping to make their fortunes (at the
time 5 grammes of Tanzanite would fetch TSH 6000, equivalent in today's terms to
around £5, considered to be a lot ofmoney at the time.)
When one of my informants, Samuel, built his house in 1968 in what has now become
the Mirerani township, there were only four other houses and a small Catholic church
built by the first residents. The first known resident of the township was Alphonse, a
doctor working with the local Masai. He is now dead but his family still resides in
Mirerani, working as brokers. Samuel opened the 'Zaire bar' for the miners and dealers
who were working in the area although living in neighbouring villages or at the mining
site itself. The township has since been known as Zaire by locals, which another
informant told me was the common name used when discussing the area in public to
deflect unwanted government attention from the illicit activities going on and to prevent
1• • •
them from discovering the location of the site . According to a Masai informant, the
name 'Zaire' in fact came from the mispronunciation of Esere, the Masai name for the
site (see earlier) but this version is denied by Samuel, again revealing the conflicts
between different land users. Mirerani was seen as a good site for settlement at the time
as there was a good water supply and plenty of animals (a situation radically
transformed since with severe water shortages and the absence of wildlife, due to
162
Kenya remains the world's primary exporter of Tanzanite, although it has no reserves. In 1998,
Tanzanite sold at a total retail value of $500 million worldwide and yet only $6.8 million worth of
Tanzanite was officially exported from the country. This is a dramatic indication of the extent of
smuggling (Mirelani Mining Ltd., pers. comm.).
163 This may also help to explain its non-appearance on any maps.
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drought and environmental degradation). The scramble for Tanzanite also meant that the
township grew rapidly and in 1970 the first school was set up; a nursery school for 4-6
year old children who were being abandoned during the day as their parents mined for
stones. The discovery of Tanzanite also had an impact on the Tanzanian mining industry
and when its legal export commenced in 1969 it accounted for 15% of the total value of
gemstone exports (Kimambo 1984: 202). Illegal trafficking of gemstones led the
Government to introduce the Gemstone Industry (Development and Protection) Act
1969 and the Mining Ordinance was revised giving the President full control of all
minerals in Tanzania. To prevent further pegging of claims in Mirerani164, the
Government closed the area to all further prospecting whilst it carried out its own
geological examinations (Ibid.: 202-203).
In 1971, the Government again took radical action in the area as part of its
nationalisation programme165, cancelling all claims and establishing the National
Development Corporation, which in turn formed the State Mining Corporation
(STAMICO) in 1972 as the only licensed mining body. Mine owners were consequently
evicted without compensation and STAMICO declared the mines (all 10km2) to be a
'closed area' and no-one was permitted to settle near the mining area. In 1974, the
Government set up the Tanzania Gemstone Industries Ltd. (TGI), to act as the sole
licensed gemstone dealer166. Nyerere's villagisation programme reached the region
around 1973 and although Mirerani was never formally villagised, people were
encouraged to group together as this would entitle them to seek government assistance to
build schools, hospitals and other facilities. A non-government informant revealed that
this 'encouragement' was slightly more forceful, with the government bringing
truckloads of people to Mirerani who settled in the township, returning to their farms to
work the land during the day. At this time, the government also used to search residents'
houses to ensure that no-one was accumulating wealth, i.e., gemstones (Mirerani
resident, pers. comm.). Green's (2000) study on the Tabora region revealed that at this
164 Between 1968 and early 1979, 78 claims were pegged (Zonal Mining Officer, pers. comm.).
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Having closed the plantations down in 1966.
166TGI went into liquidation in 1998.
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time there was also a decline in the price of crops, which led to a number of people
moving out of family based agriculture. This, combined with the forced resettlement of
people could explain why there was a sudden increase in the numbers of people coming
to Mirerani to engage in mining related activities. With a decrease in family based
agriculture, out-of-school children were also left without a means of contributing to
family survival and may have felt increasingly obliged to start working in the mining
sector. Ironically, however, the villagisation programme was seen by STAMICO as a
key weapon in the fight to combat illegal mining and in the 'Daily News' of 2nd May
1977 it recommended that people should be organised into Ujamaa villages, that the
groups should be licensed to engage in mining and that stringent security measures
should be enforced to prevent illegal residents and transactions (cited in Kimambo 1984:
112).
STAMICO was an ill-thought out operation and was unsuccessful in extracting
Tanzanite. It lacked resources and trained personnel, facing operational problems from
its inception. National production declined dramatically; from TSH 2, 966, 000 in 1970
to TSH 799, 600 in 1971 (Kimambo 1984: 104). By 1975, STAMICO was only active in
Mirerani and Umba and in 1983 it accepted failure in Mirerani, withdrawing from the
area with TGI taking responsibility for maintaining government interests and security in
the area. The Ministry of Mines then allowed a private American company 'Bermuda',
run by a mzungu called Ferguson, to prospect the area167. Throughout this time, the
informal mining sector was booming. As TGI owned all the surveyed land, people were
stealing and smuggling stones from the TGI mines at night, which was risky but
profitable work. The employees were generally low paid and were active participants in
the smuggling of gemstones, which included 28 gemstones other than Tanzanite. These
smugglers were known as Wana Apollo, or the people of Apollo, after the famous
167
Discussions with informants revealed that Ferguson was widely disliked by the people of Mirerani as
he shot dead a trespasser and threatened to kill any others. It is also claimed that instead of prospecting the
area he was in fact looting it and was smuggling stones out of the country. The miners put pressure on the
government to get rid of him but it was not until it was discovered that he held a South African passport
(in addition to his American one) that the government immediately expelled him from the country
(Interview with ex-govemment official, pers. comm.). He had claimed to be American but in fact was
South African (South Africans were not tolerated in Tanzania during the Apartheid period).
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American space mission. This name referred to the fact that the sand smuggled out in
big bags looked like moon-dust and that if asked where they were coming from the
smugglers would answer 'From the moon'. The miners still refer to each other using this
name.
The town continued to grow fast with people from all over Tanzania arriving to smuggle
gemstones and to set up supporting businesses (catering, hotels etc.). It was at this time
that Mirerani gained its sinister reputation as a town which attracted murderers and other
criminals and in fact the rate of criminal activity was high, with large numbers of
reported thefts, rapes and even murders. This reputation still prevails with many
Tanzanians, including those with whom I worked in Dar Es Salaam, too afraid to
venture near the site, despite the drastic reduction in crime and the creation of a police
station and an active militia. It could be argued that this vision of Mirerani actually
works in residents' favour as it discourages many would-be miners and competitors from
venturing into the area. What is interesting is that other mining sites in Tanzania do not
suffer from such a negative reputation. Informants claim that this is because Mirerani
grew very rapidly before services such as the police station and the court-house were
established to maintain law and order. Furthermore, Tanzanite was worth more than gold
and other gemstones so it attracted a large number of people from all parts of Tanzania
and neighbouring countries, all looking to make money quickly. When it proved less
simple to mine than was expected frustrations often led to conflicts. Another reason for
the apparent influx of criminals on the run was its proximity to the large towns of
Arusha, Moshi and Nairobi. It was simple for criminals to come to Mirerani and
'disappear' into the mines and surrounding bush.
Between 1982 and 1990, TGI virtually stopped activity in Mirerani, leaving watchmen
in the most profitable locations. People moved into the other areas and began to mine
informally, eventually taking over the whole site. In 1984, a Ministry employee, Angelo
Mpangala, surveyed the area, dividing it into 100 claims of 900ft2. The Ministry then
divided this into 4 blocks which they floated for tender in 1985. Four Tanzanian
companies were provisionally accepted but no land was allocated to the small-scale
miners, who had been mining the area for over 25 years. The miners took action and the
community leaders and the new miners' association, the Arusha Regional Miners'
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Association (AREMA) went to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in protest. The tenders
were consequently rejected and the miners continued to mine illegally until 1989 when
the government once again expelled all the miners and floated another tender
(Government of Tanzania 1989). The land was again divided into four blocks but Block
D (the least profitable site with hard clay which made mining extremely difficult) was
granted to 55 small-scale miners under one licence, held by AREMA. Block B was
granted to an Israeli company, Building Utilities, and Block A was granted to
Kilimanjaro Mines, a joint venture between a Tanzanian and an Australian company.
Block C was granted to TGI who then formed a joint venture with a Tanzanian mining
company, based in Britain, African Gems and a British company, SAMAX. This joint
venture took the name of Graphtan Mining and was subsidised by the African
Development Bank. One of the conditions of the granting of the licence to Graphtan was
that the company would contribute to community development through providing
facilities such as roads, electricity and water. The project provides a clear example of
commercial pseudo-development, whereby a foreign private sector company lays claim
to a poor country's resources on the pretext that it will be better able than a local
company to bring development to the area. 'Pseudo' was definitely the key word in this
case as the only development that did occur was for the primary benefit of the plant
owners, i.e., electricity was brought as far as the plant, bore holes were built next to the
plant and a temporary road was built from the main road to the plant. The road was built
for the primary benefit of the mine managers who were commuting from Moshi, a
nearby town, and is now practically impassable. Mirerani is approximately two
kilometres from the plant and yet no attempt was made to bring the water, the electricity
or the road to the township. This understandably led to resentment against the foreign
owned mine, which had received development money on the pretence that it would bring
development to the township. This resentment is one which persists to this day, as
explored further below.
The allocation of land to the small scale miners was, however, seen as a small victory as
their right to the land had finally been recognised. In October 1994, the small scale
miners made an official complaint against the owners of Block B, Building Utilities,
who were not meeting their licence obligations, which included using modem
machinery. Tensions in the area led to violent clashes with a reported 21 miners shot
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during the ensuing violence, apparently by Building Utilities (Maunya 1994: page
unknown). In an attempt to resolve the conflict, the government expelled Building
Utilities and gave the land to the small scale miners, citing violation of its contractual
agreement with the government (Maunya 1995: 5). In January 1995, the government
revised its previous position granting Simanjiro District Council exclusive rights over
Block B, which they were to manage on behalf of the local community (Maunya 1995:
5). This was supposed to resolve the bitter conflicts over ownership of the mines but in
fact served only to fuel the fire. The plans were eventually dropped, however, as legally
district councils are not allowed to have their own business ventures. The small-scale
miners were thus allowed to lay claim to Block B.
During the same period, there was also conflict over ownership of Block B (see Plate
5.2b below) and in November 1994 the Minister for Water, Energy and Minerals barred
AREMA from direct involvement in mining activities and gave Block D to individual
licensed miners (Maunya 1995: 5). Under the new system, the biggest claim would be
50m2 and there was a fee of TSH 50, 000 for a claim application and a fee of TSH 20,
000 to renew claims on an annual basis. The Regional Mining Office in Arusha was to
be responsible for granting claims which meant that there were no local people involved
to ensure that local interests were safeguarded. The reasons behind the expulsion of
AREMA are disputed. Members of AREMA argue that this is because they became too
powerful and were attempting to block moves by international companies to take over
the land. Central government, they maintain, had too many interests tied to the
international companies and thus refused to renew the AREMA licence. Others claim
that AREMA was a corrupt organisation, with leaders pocketing a large proportion of
the fees they requested from members (10% of profits), a proportion of which were
1 68
supposed to be used for community development . According to ex-AREMA
informants, it was after the expulsion of AREMA that children started to be found
working in the mines, either with their families or independently. During AREMA time
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During the three years AREMA held the licence, the only tangible contributions to the community were
the provision of school desks to local schools. AREMA members claim that they had few resources as
only four mines were producing in the three years AREMA had power. Critics of AREMA attempted to
take the task force to court but the case was thrown out due to insufficient evidence.
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there were strict rules against employing children. AREMA would interview the
children, give them food, try to help them and send them home. Members would donate
money and office funds were used to assist the children and to give them bus fares
home. Others say that children were working in the mines during the few years that
AREMA was responsible for the area. It is claimed that children were used as
informants by mine owners to check that minerals were not being stolen and as
messengers to go in and out of the mines on errands.
Plate 5.2b A view of 'Block B'
During this time the township continued to grow rapidly and the community set up a
road toll to raise money to build a secondary school, power supply and police station.
Each house was also required to contribute a fixed sum. In 1998, electricity was installed
and a police station was built. The school remains half built, waiting for more funds. In
April 1998, severe flooding in the area left 100 miners dead (Business Times April 24
1998). International and national media attention meant that the government could no
longer ignore Mirerani and consequently there was a government crackdown and a by-
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law was passed imposing stringent conditions on mine claim holders. Use of children
under 16 was banned, with the consequence that the number of children in the mines
was drastically reduced for a short period, with children returning once the heat was off.
Children and owners remain wary and no-one will admit to having children employed
while children mostly claim to be 16 or over. With the value of Tanzanite increasing
daily, making it the second most popular coloured stone in America in dollar terms
(Business Times 1999), it would appear that the township can only expand.
The controversy over Block allocation continues to this day. In 1997, SAMAX's $22
million outfit was declared bankrupt. In July 1998, after floods hit the mines, the
President of Tanzania visited the area and when asked by the small-scale miners if they
would be allowed to lay claims to Block C, he promised to look into the situation. He
failed to report back to the community and in 1999 the claim to Block C was given to a
joint venture between a South African mining company, AlFGEM, who bought the assets
for $5 million, and a Tanzanian company. The joint venture is known as Merelani
Mining Limited (MML) and the conditions of their being granted the licence was that
they would contribute to community development. 30% of production and 3% of profits
are paid to the government in tax. MML claims to be committed to community
development and is currently setting up a 'community development trust', although
whether anything will come of it remains to be seen. Granting the claim to a foreign
company gave rise to further tensions in the area, with miners occupying and mining
part of the land in February 2000. Production in the occupied area was high, leading to
more miners attempting to occupy the land. Police were brought in by MML and the
miners were evicted once again169. Kilimanjaro Mines still occupy Block A but are
waiting to be granted a mining licence by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The
• 170small-scale miners are currently attempting to lay claims to this land .
169
Arrests of trespassers mining on MML land are still made on a regular basis.
170 It seems unlikely that they will be granted any such rights, the argument made by the Ministry of
Minerals being that some claims in Block D and B are still not being exploited (pers. comm.) although the
small scale miners would argue that that is because those claims are not considered to be productive
whereas Block A is.
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Tensions in the area are not solely between the mzungu mine and the small scale miners.
It is important to note that there is no one homogeneous group of miners. Instead there
are a few large mine owners with important and powerful interests, small-scale mine
owners attempting to mine with limited resources and finally the miners (see 8.1.1).
Within all these groups, there are different sub-groups, with different affiliations and
different interests. This was revealed on the 15th and 16th February 2000, when violent
clashes erupted between members of the Luo tribe and Masai.
What is clear from the above discussion is that both the colonial government and the
Tanzanian governments have directly and indirectly contributed to the development of a
socio-economic framework in which the growth of child labour in the mines was
inevitable. The main economic activities in the area prior to government intervention in
the 1960s were Masai pastoralism, sisal plantation labour and game-hunting for the
colonial occupiers. Nationalisation led to the closing of the plantations and the departure
of the British led to the end of employment for the game-hunters. Families were thus
forced to look for alternative employment and this was found through the discovery of
Tanzanite. The Government then pegged off the mining land, forcing the miners into the
position of'criminals', i.e. illegal miners. This was the beginning of Mirerani gaining its
reputation as a dangerous site, rife with criminal activity, when to start with it was
occupied by people legitimately trying to make a living, their other sources of income
having been removed by political processes. Nyerere's villagisation programme also
contributed to the rapid growth of the area and children found themselves taken from
family based agricultural activity or from plantation work, into which they had been
forced under colonial rule (5.1), into an environment which had not yet developed
enough schools to provide an alternative activity. Many were therefore drawn to the
mines, as a natural means of contributing to family survival in an uncertain economic
climate. The Government policies ofwar with Uganda, of villagisation, of SAPS, and of
the introduction of school fees, amongst others (5.1) all led to a worsening economic
position for many Tanzanians. At the same time, the lures of the 'globalised' consumer
world led to new aspirations which demanded large sums of cash in order to be fulfilled.
Many children thus found themselves in a situation whereby both they as individuals and
as members of a family needed money. When this could not be found locally, many
chose to migrate in search of their fortune, leading to the current situation in Mirerani
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(see Chapter 8 for voices of children which confirm these findings). The actions of
politicians, British or Tanzanian, therefore played a significant role in the growth of
child labour in Mirerani.
5.3 Mirerani: Human and Economic Geography
An exploration of the historical background to Mirerani has revealed how the area has
developed from a deserted bushland to a dynamic township enshrouded in myth and
drama. It is now appropriate to provide a brief background of the human and economic
geography of the area in order to contextualise child labour. Mirerani grew out of a
single economic activity: gemstone mining. All inhabitants, except of course the
indigenous Masai, migrated to the area and there is consequently a diverse ethnic and
economic mix of people. Transect walks revealed that the settlement is organised in a
somewhat random fashion. The oldest residents built their houses in the west of the
settlement and the township grew from there. The 'town centre' consists of two parallel
roads, containing most of the main shops and services as well as the 'Tanzanite market'.
In his paper on gold mining, Chachage (1993: 101) argues that:
Many mining camps are highly organised (..) Once a camp is established, within
weeks there follows a chain of entrepreneurs. The organisation of the camp
embodies considerable social differentiation. Even the nature of means of
transportation reflects the same segmentation, from bicycle taxis to landrover
buses to four wheel drive vehicles in varying conditions, from decaying to top of
the range with air conditioning.
I agree with Chachage as to the level of social differentiation in Mirerani but I did not
observe that Mirerani is highly organised in terms of the physical development of the
settlement. Transect walks revealed on a number of occasions that next to a mud hut
with a thatched roof there could be a two storey mansion with a large garden and three
cars parked in front of it. Most residences are rented accommodation in locally
manufactured concrete terraced housing. Informants accompanying me on the transect
walks claimed that there is no division of area by ethnic group, wealth status or
occupation. This was confirmed by further participant observation. Mine owners live
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next to commercial sex workers who live next to gemstone dealers who live next to
miners. The ethnic makeup ofMirerani is diverse:
Here is where all the Tanzanians and all the tribes of the Great Lakes are,
Kenyans, Ugandans, Zambians are here and all the 127 tribes of Tanzania are
resident here. You can't say there is a dominant group in Mirerani, it is an
international place (Mirerani resident, pers. comm.).
It is interesting to note, however, that there are no Indians or wazungus residing in
Mirerani171. It is also not quite accurate that there are no dominant groups in Mirerani.
The Masai are clearly the largest group, although the majority of these do not actually
reside in Mirerani village, just work there, returning to their neighbouring villages in the
evening. The Luo claim to be the second largest tribe in Mirerani, numbering around
3,500 followed by the Chagga (Mirerani residents, pers. comm.).
Social differentiation in Mirerani in terms of wealth levels is considerable. Tanzanite
mining is an economically risky activity, with some people making extreme fortunes,
able to buy new cars, houses, businesses and other luxuries, and others living in
desperate poverty after years of mining for no income. It is useful to briefly outline the
various economic activities in Mirerani in order to understand who benefits from mining
activities.
According to Chachage (1993: 101), who is referring to gold mining:
The fortune makers in this process are firstly the claimholders. These basically
comprise the rural bourgeoisie and village leaders (who are in a position to
register claims at local offices and Ministry), some syndicates of small scale
miners, some Asian and Greek businessmen, employees of the official mining
sector and urban party and state bureaucrats. Secondly come the dealers and
merchants, it is these who smuggle out gold and recycle the foreign exchange
earned from it through importation of consumer goods, these groups are the main
beneficiaries of the liberalisation measures, which have partly formalised these
activities.
171 I apparently was the first and only mzungu to live in Mirerani. Other researchers would come in from
the near by towns of Arusha or Moshi, not staying in Mirerani itself or spending more than a few days on
their study.
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A similar process can be observed in Mirerani where claimholders and sponsors are the
primary beneficiaries if a mine produces. If it does not produce the losses are substantial
as running costs (which include purchase of water, firewood, food, compressors,
explosives etc.) start at around TSH 70, 000 per day (around £60). Pits can be
operational for years without production. Most mines have sponsors who are usually
Indian Tanzanians, although there are a few wazungu sponsors. Participant observation
revealed that there is in fact a two tier system of sponsorship with Indians sponsoring
Tanzanian middle men, resident in Mirerani, to act as official sponsors. This is because
of the high rate of theft from mines which Indian sponsors could not monitor due to
being out of Mirerani. There is also significant resentment between the African and
Indian Tanzanians for various historical and economic reasons172 and consequently
relations are probably better between African Tanzanian sponsors and the miners. Whilst
the claim holders in the mines described by Chachage are the village leaders and the
rural bourgeoisie, in Mirerani this is not the case, as described by one informant:
In Mirerani, anyone can have a claim, there is no tribalism here, if you want a
claim you can get one, whether you are a farmer, a politician or a businessman
(Mirerani resident, pers. comm.).
Another expanded on this explaining that:
Before there were claims people were mining illegally, all types of people from
everywhere, they had their own pits and knew each other. Then the government
decided to give the land to the indigenous people and asked the miners to register
the pits where they were working and pay for their claims. Neighbouring pits
would confirm that this was your land, where you had been mining. Then the
non-pegged land became available and business people with capital, from Arusha
and other cities started pegging their claims (Mirerani resident, pers. comm.).
Claim holders in Mirerani thus come from a variety of economic and social
backgrounds. More and more newcomers, however, are wealthy business people with
172
During the nationalisation programme, Indian businesses and lands were confiscated. The Indian
community remains, however, one of the wealthiest in Tanzania and many African Tanzanians feel that
they are taking all their profits back to India instead of investing them in the Tanzanian economy.
money to invest in their mines. Mining is an expensive business and those with most
capital are able to run their mines daily and have greater chances of producing whereas
less well-off claim holders can only afford to run their mines infrequently when they
have the money. A number of claim holders therefore also work as dealers or brokers,
1 7^
their profits subsidising the running costs of the pits . Plate 5.3 below shows brokers
and dealers bargaining in the Tanzanite market in the mining site.
173 Brokers are the middle-men in buying and selling Tanzanite, negotiating between miners and dealers.
The government issues brokering licences but the vast majority of brokers (and dealers) work illegally.
Brokering is also a risky enterprise as although substantial profits can be made, it is not uncommon for
brokers to overestimate the value of stones they buy and then be left covering the difference. Dealers may
buy stones from brokers or from the miners. Their licence is more expensive than the broker licence but
they have an export licence, which is where large sums ofmoney can be made. Furthermore, dealers tend
to have greater experience in gemstone identification and more capital to buy bigger stones which are
going to generate higher profits. Most brokers in Mirerani are Masai but a large proportion of Mirerani
residents try their hand at brokering. The Masai also engage in dealing but the majority of dealers in
Mirerani are middle class Tanzaniaris and in the main towns most of the dealers are Indian Tanzanians.
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Plate 5.3 The Mirerani Tanzanite Market where Tanzanite is bought and sold
In the mine itself, there are number of jobs in which people engage. Any profits are then
divided up according to activity. The claim holder and sponsors clearly get the majority
share to cover costs and their profit share (around 80-90%, with the remaining share
divided between the workers). Next comes the foreman, who is known as the steling by
the miners (the term comes from the English, 'steering' and refers to the one who leads).
Next come the skilled machine operator and the blasters, known as nobels after the
brand name of the original blasting product used. Nobels will usually have an assistant
who is often a nyoka or 'snakeboy'. Next on the 'pay scale' are the drillers or
wachorongaji which means 'those who drill'. There are usually between four and six
drillers to a small mine. Last on the scale are the sand carriers or wasomoaji who are not
permanent employees but who move around from pit to pit, withdrawing the earth from
the pit to the surface after blasting. This is a particularly exhausting task but the carriers
are then allowed to sort the sand where they may find small gemstones. Also on the
lowest scale are the errand boys who take things up and down the pits, 'Father Ration'
(the cook who is always male and is responsible for producing two meals per day for the
miners) and the 'communication' operators. By law, pits must be equipped with a radio
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communication system and two radio operators but many do not have such a system and
continue to use nyokas for this work (see Chapter 8).
Each mine has its own way of distributing profits, which of course depend on the levels
of supervision as sponsors may not even know that their mine has produced if they do
not remain well informed. Miners do not receive a salary, just food and medical costs174.
Often, however, they have an agreement with the brokers and dealers that if they find
any stones they will give them to the broker or dealer in return for small sums ofmoney
to pay for transport, showers, beer and sex. Occasionally it is possible for men to get
casual labour for one or two days cleaning the sand out of a pit after blasting. The total
payment for this intensive labour is TSH 5000 and nyokas are not employed in this form
of work 'as we are too weak and our health is too bad' (nyoka, pers. comm.). There is a
more sinister form of labour, that of press-ganged labour which I thought was no more
than a rumour until an incident in July 2000 when a mine was attacked by a group of
men and set fire to. In this mine there were a number of men who had been forced to
work in the night under the threat of being macheted. Usually the men are released the
next day but on this occasion they were kept for a few days with no food or water. Their
friends were concerned at this disappearance and set up the rescue operation. The day
after the rescue the mine was still working and no-one reported the incident to the
police175.
In addition to Chachage's list of beneficiaries, it is important to note that while mining is
the primary means of livelihood in the area, there are considerable economic
opportunities for entrepreneurship in the associated service industries. It was seen from
the transect walk that bars, or 'groceries' as they are called to obtain cheaper business
licences, are the predominant buildings after residences. The bars provide pombe or
local brew, other forms of alcohol, food, commercial sex workers, a radio and
sometimes a television for viewing. The bars are usually busy at any time of day and
174 There are no fixed work times but usually Sunday is a rest day, which means that there is no blasting
but the miners may still continue working. Sometimes funds for blasting run out or machines are broken
and then the pit may remain inactive for weeks.
175 It must be noted, however, that authorities are conspicuously absent in the area and it is common
knowledge that in order to obtain services payments must be made.
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until the early hours of morning. There are also mama ntilies or food sellers, water
sellers and petrol and diesel sellers, pharmacists and clinics, hairdressers and barbers.
Income is also provided for neighbouring farmers, who come to Mirerani market to sell
their produce176. Other forms of employment are provided in the government jobs;
teachers, local government and police. There is also an active militia in Mirerani. With
more and more miners bringing their families to settle in the township, the service
industry can only grow. Mining, however, continues to be perceived as the most
profitable activity, illustrated by the fact that most government workers and other service
providers are often to be found at the mines, both in and outside of their official working
hours.
A substantial income is also generated for local government from granting service
licences and for central government through income tax, royalties which consist of 3%
of exports, claim fees and renewal fees (TSH 20, 000 per year), broker and dealer
licences and miner mining licences (claim holders must pay around TSH 5000 per year
per miner employed). The issue of local government income inevitably brings us to the
issue of corruption, a phenomenon so insidious to daily life in Mirerani that people never
use the word, saying instead mradiwao or 'it is their project'. The situation has even got
to the point that:
If you do not steal, they do not take you seriously here, if you do not put money
in your pocket, they do not listen to you (miner, pers. comm.).
Despite numerous interviews, I was unable to gain information about the actual revenue
earned by the local government, as informants claimed that there was no data available.
Observation reveals, however, that not all of the income it is used as it should be: there
are no public services in that the streets are never cleaned, there is no public health
service, no secondary school. The services that do exist were built through other
contributions by the community177. When asking a member of the village government
176 In Mirerani itself nearly all the fanning land has been sold off for property development.
177
Again revealing the inadequacy of the authorities in providing services for the area.
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about what happens to all the money collected in taxes, the answer was clear and speaks
for itself:
It is swallowed, it goes to Tumboni St178 (miner and government official, pers.
comm.).
The economic benefits to be had from the small-scale mining industry are clearly
substantial. The way it is carried out does, however, have a number of negative
implications for residents. The mining site itself is something of an environmental
disaster, with massive land erosion and deforestation. Empty pits are not filled in and
there is shallow mining on all available pieces of land, even the roads. The physical
health of people living in Mirerani is extremely poor (see Chapter 8 for health status of
nyokas). The number of diseases arising from unhealthy sanitary conditions is high, as
are pulmonary diseases caused by continuous inhalation of graphite dust. The high levels
of alcohol consumption, the high rates of unprotected sex with commercial sex workers
and other partners179 and the relatively high number of mining accidents combine to
ensure that miners have a low life expectancy. The main hospital in Moshi screens all
Mirerani residents who go there for treatment and have termed Mirerani as a High
Transmission Area, with over 40% of patients diagnosed as HIV+. Funerals of young
men take place regularly, as confirmed through participant observation. When I asked
the District Health Officer why the government was not providing health facilities to the
area his answer was:
I don't know, they know we have no services, they don't care. They think people
in Mirerani have money so they can pay for their own health. This should not be
the point as people are suffering a lot. They are dying but even statistically you
can't classify because people here in Mirerani are not staying, they are here to
earn and when they are infected or sick they leave (pers. comm.).
178 This translates as In the Stomach Street, which speaks for itself. Although I collected a substantial
amount of data, corruption is not an issue I want to enter into except to ensure that its impact is borne in
mind when analysing the data.
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Polygamy is common in the sense that many men have more than one 'wife' although they may not be
legally married to any of them.
187
This leads us to the issue of statistics. Obtaining accurate statistics as to the human
geography of Mirerani has proved a highly complex, if not impossible, task. Each
government department has different figures, which often do not remotely reflect reality.
According to the 1988 official census (the 1998 one has been postponed to 2002), the
population of Mirerani was only 3, 159 (1, 827 men and 1, 332 women), one third of
whom were under 15 (Takwimu 1988: 412). An unofficial census by the Divisional
Commissioner in 1998 revealed that the adult population was 15, 422 with 2, 972
children under the age of 18. This five-fold increase in population over a ten year period
would appear to confirm informants' statements that the town grew dramatically during
the past decade. This figure, however, has been seen by my informants as a clear
underestimation and they would suggest that the figure was much higher and more like
100, 000. Another report claims that in 1997 the total population of Mirerani township
was between 78, 000 and 80, 000 (Kijo-Bisimba 1997: 6). Yet another report places the
population at 60, 000 with 10, 000 permanent residents (Alii 1997: 1). The difficulty of
obtaining accurate figures is enhanced by the highly mobile nature of the mining
community, who follow mining booms across the country and even across borders (see
8.1.1 for the migrant nature of child labourers in Mirerani). Furthermore, a large number
do not live in houses, sleeping instead at the mining site and are therefore difficult to
capture in an official census.
The same problems occur when trying to enumerate the numbers engaging in mining
activities. According to the 1988 census, there are only 300 miners, a gross
underestimate to anyone who visits the site. The Zonal Mining Office statistics are
equally questionable as they only note registered claims, highly problematic in an
industry where most miners are working illegally or informally. Thus only 2 dealers are
registered with the Zonal Mining Office (Zonal Mining Office, pers. comm.) and a local
Masai informed me that there were at least 2, 000 Masai dealers and brokers, and this
does not include all the other dealers and brokers, although Masai are the predominant
group. Even more difficult is trying to estimate the numbers of children engaged in
mining activities. According to Kijo-Bisimba (1997: 6) between 2, 800 and 3, 200
children are directly involved in mining activities, all of whom are male. The total
number of children involved in activities related to mining activities (selling food, drinks
and other items, carrying water, self-employed brokers and commercial sex workers) is
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19, 515; 15, 606 ofwhom are female. This contrasts with the Divisional Commissioner's
census which revealed that there were only 2, 972 children in the town. Alli's report
claims that there were over 150 boys working full-time in the mining site (1997: 5). The
findings of both these reports are questionable in that they are so different and in that the
researchers were not from the area and only remained in town for a few days. What is
interesting is that they both visited in the same year and their findings should therefore
be more consistent. My findings would indicate that the numbers of children working in
the mines falls somewhere between the two extreme figures provided by Alii and Kijo-
Bisimba. I conducted semi-structured interviews with one hundred children in Block B
using a snowballing method as well as having informal conversations with many, many
others (Chapter 8). It was relatively easy to find children to interview which would
indicate that there are many more children than I could interview, especially as a number
of children would have been down the pits when I was interviewing. Furthermore, a
large number of children reported to me that their friends would not be interviewed out
of fear that I would report them to the authorities or try to remove them from the
180mines . The boys are highly mobile and often inaccessible as so many are underground
at any one time. Any attempts at enumeration can therefore only provide inaccurate data.
When I asked the nyokas themselves how many of them they thought there were the
response was always one of laughter and mingi sana or 'very many'. Their estimates
were over 500 in Block B and around 1000 in Block D. It is clear that that the number of
nyokas has increased substantially over the years and is still increasing.
5.4 Chapter Conclusions
The historical analysis has shown that child work as a concept has been transformed
through time although age and gender remain the basis for the social division of labour.
It has been shown that Tanzanian children make important contributions to both national
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Rumours were circulating that I was going to force them into school, that I was going to arrest them
and even worse that I was going to kill them with one boy reporting that 'I do not want to be killed just for
clothes'. This comment was brought about by the fact that I was providing interviewees with an item of
clothing each in compensation for their time as each interview took around 45 minutes.
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and household economies through their work. The value of this work is seldom
acknowledged, however, which leaves children more vulnerable to exploitation and
places them in a weaker bargaining position.
The juxtaposition of the generalised historical analysis with ethnographic evidence from
Mirerani has revealed that both the colonial government and the Tanzanian governments
have directly and indirectly contributed to the development of a socio-economic
framework in which the growth of child labour in Tanzania was inevitable. Government
policies of war with Uganda, villagisation, SAPS and the introduction of school fees,
amongst other factors such as the AIDS pandemic, environmental climate change,
growing poverty and the breakdown in family support structures all led to a worsening
economic position for many Tanzanians. At the same time, the development of the cash
economy and the consequent pressures of the global consumer market led to new
aspirations which demanded large sums of cash in order to be fulfilled. Many children
thus found themselves in a situation whereby both they as individuals and as members of
a family needed money. When this could not be found locally, many chose to migrate in
search of their fortune, leading to the current situation in Mirerani, which will be
explored in greater depth from the perspectives of the children themselves in Chapter 8.
In view of the increasing numbers of children engaging in labour the Government of
Tanzania approached the ILO for assistance, which eventually led to the adoption of
IPEC, as seen in Chapter 6 below.
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6. IPEC Tanzania
In Chapter 3, it was shown that the development of child labour policy involves a
complex process of negotiation and re-negotiation between government, employer and
worker representatives. Other organisations, such as NGOs, are also involved. The ILO
Constitution has a number of safeguards to ensure that no one country or group is
dominant in dictating policy direction and therefore the over-simplified argument used
by a number of 'Northern' anthropologists that organisations, such as the ILO, impose a
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'Northern' construction of childhood' was refuted . In Chapter 4, an historical approach
was taken to explore the development and application of the ILO's child labour
programme- the InFocus Programme on the elimination of child labour: IPEC.
Participant observation was used to explore the different formal and informal discourses
and practices within the Organisation and it was shown that there needs to be a greater
recognition of the role of affectivity within organisational analysis as well as a greater
emphasis by management as to the role of the individual person in making an action
succeed or fail. While Chapter 4 focused specifically on the application of policy at
Geneva headquarters level, this chapter will consider how the various discourses, rules
and regulations of IPEC are applied, modified and employed in the national context of
Tanzania.182.
18'Although Chapter 7 will explore the way in which a particular country can use its power to influence
the development of particular projects.
182 No comprehensive study of an international Organisation in a country such as Tanzania should ignore
the fact that any action taken is embedded in the development of a complex, multi-billion pound industry:
the 'Aid Industry'. I do not propose to enter into a detailed exploration of the Aid Industry in Tanzania as
there are many texts which do so- most valuable is Rugumamu's 1997 'Lethal Aid'.
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In the first part of this chapter, I use oral history and secondary sources to introduce the
history of IPEC intervention in Tanzania. The second part explores the formal discourses
and practices of the Tanzania Programme, on the basis of participant observation
conducted. The final section examines informal discourses and practice.
6.1 History of IPEC Tanzania
This section is based on oral histories, from Tanzania as well as HQ, and relevant
documentary sources. According to the IPEC National Programme Manager (NPM) it is
important to see the arrival of IPEC in Tanzania as a lengthy and complex process:
It's a whole process; I came on board somewhere along the process. It starts with
consultations between the government and the ILO, I think discussions started
around 89, 90. At that time the government expressed the wish to collaborate
with and seek support from the ILO to address child labour problems. At that
time IPEC was just being created in Geneva and also at that time the German
government expressed interest in supporting child labour initiatives in various
countries. Consultations between the government and the ILO led to a national
workshop in 1992 and before that a number of NGOs had already begun to
address child labour problems through small pilot studies, seminars. The
workshop must be seen as part of the whole child rights' concern, the CRC was
coming in, the launching of IPEC should be seen in this context. I did two small
consultancies for the ILO on child labour. When the national workshop came up
in 1992 I was asked to prepare the draft country programme document. At the
end of the workshop the Ministry of Labour formed an inter-ministerial task
force on child labour and I was a member, although it was called inter-
ministerial. It invited NGOs, UNICEF and others as well (NPM, pers. comm.).
It can be seen from above that the process leading up to the eventual signing in 1994 of a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of Tanzania and the
ILO, to adopt IPEC was a lengthy one, dating back to the late 1980s. Moreover, the ILO
has been active in the country since 1962. This reveals the extent to which the process
was not simply 'imposed' into the Tanzanian context, as some commentators have
argued (3.1), but was instigated and driven by the Government of Tanzania, with the
support of the ILO.
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In fact, discussions between the Tanzanian Government and the ILO regarding child
labour first took place in 1989 at an Organisation for African Unity (OAU) meeting in
Ethiopia. Child labour was one of a number of issues discussed and during the meeting
the Government of Tanzania acknowledged the existence of child labour in the country
and requested that the ILO send a mission to Tanzania to examine the situation. In 1991,
the ILO sent a mission to the country and through discussions with tripartite partners and
others it was established that child labour was prevalent in a number of sectors. The
National Programme Manager tells us in the above quote that in 1992 a workshop took
place in Tanzania to strategize on the child labour issue. The 'National Seminar on Child
Labour in Tanzania: Policy and Programme Options' was a five day event organised by
the ILO, under its Interdepartmental Project on the Elimination of Child Labour (4.1), in
collaboration with the Ministry for Labour and Youth Development. There were 23
participants from different Ministries and representatives from 5 NGOs, the University
of Dar Es Salaam, the National Social Welfare Training Institute, the National Planning
Commission and UNICEF.
The objectives of the seminar were to:
Identify policy options, strategies and practical measures to reduce the incidence
of child labour and improve the conditions of working children and to heighten
public awareness and promote action against child labour (Interdepartmental
Project on the Elimination of Child Labour 1992: 37)
The objectives were clearly very broad, targeting not only child labour but also
'improving the conditions of working children'. The focus since has been primarily on
reducing the incidence of child labour and heightening public awareness and promotion
of action. The issue of improving the conditions of working children has, however, been
relatively ignored in the development and adoption of different action programmes, as
seen below.
During the workshop, strategies and a National Programme of Action were developed.
The National Programme of Action focused on three particular areas of intervention:
legislation and enforcement; education; and community mobilisation and information
campaigns. Within the specified actions, however, there were no measures aimed at
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protecting working children, although the Summary states that 'legal protection be
extended to other sectors of known child employment' (op. cit.: 6). The primary focus is
on keeping children in schools and withdrawing them from labour. As a priority the
report proposes that 'urgent attention be given to the prohibition of work by the
youngest and most vulnerable and the removal of children from hazardous occupation
and industries.' (op.cit.: 6). Again it becomes clear that despite the stated objectives,
'protection ofworking children' is not a priority (2.3).
Although the workshop was held in 1992, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
between the government and the ILO was not signed until 1994 and programme
activities did not officially start until 1995. During the intervening years the ILO and the
government were basing, trying to get donor approval and funding as well as the full
commitment of the social partners. The MoU itself is a standard ILO document but it
was scrutinised by the government who, according to the National Programme Manager
(NPM), had no problems with its format and signed the first draft. The current NPM was
appointed in 1994 after the signing of the MoU and the inter-ministerial task force
became the 'National Steering Committee' (NSC).
The process leading up to the adoption of IPEC Tanzania was thus a lengthy one and the
development of a strategy, focusing primarily on education and withdrawal of children
from labour, involved many different partners.
6.1.1 A 'top-down' imposition?
This exploration of the introduction of IPEC to Tanzania raises a number of pertinent
issues concerning the extent to which the process was 'top-down', imposed as it were by
an international organisation exporting a 'Northern construction of childhood' (see 3.1).
It does not appear that IPEC imposed its presence on the Tanzanian Government. On the
contrary, IPEC's presence was the result of a lengthy process, instigated by the
Tanzanian Government. The process was therefore dialogical rather than simply
imposed by the ILO.
This is confirmed by the NPM, who was involved in discussions from an early stage:
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The government initiated the process, they were involved fully and were actually
leading the process. It is not possible to bring IPEC into any country if the
government does not accept the problem and the need to address it. The
understanding of the government was that something needs to be done, whatever
it is (NPM, pers. comm.)
as well as by another informant from the Tanzanian government:
The Government did instigate the process. During the OAU meeting they
requested ILO to come and verify the situation. It was not an ILO meeting but an
OAU meeting. ILO had been invited to attend and presentations were made.
When the MoU was drafted and brought to the Government of Tanzania the
government had to understand it and study it. No changes were made, it suited us
and we could work perfectly to meet the objectives of the programme. There was
a technical meeting with lawyers present to discuss whether the vision was
suitable, it was agreed that it was and the MoU was signed by the government
(Ministry of Labour official working on child labour issues, pers. comm.).
My question as to the extent to which there had been an 'imposition' of western values,
as argued by some Northern academics (Chapter 3) with regard to child labour was
clearly one which had already been given considerable thought by Tanzanian
practitioners:
There have been a lot of discussions if we swallow wholly western cultural
values of what is child labour; we have different cultures and socialisations. It
has been very selective and not imposed. We knew the MoU was drafted by the
ILO but caution was made to implement the concerns of Tanzania, not the
concerns and interests of others. There was a suiting to our interests. Child labour
is a problem, some in the community may not understand that hazardous child
labour is wrong. We try to make people understand this and to address causative
factors. We can't say there was imposition of the programme (Ministry of
Labour official working on child labour issues, pers. comm.).
While I would maybe dispute the above assumption that 'some in the community may
not understand that hazardous child labour is wrong' (see quotes in 3.1 and discussion in
Chapter 8) this Tanzanian Government official is clearly expressing his personal, as
opposed to 'imposed', viewpoint. The assumption that poor people do not understand
certain issues is often attributed to Northern donors or experts and it is therefore
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interesting to hear the same view expounded by a Tanzanian official, illustrating the
difficulty in attributing certain ways of being to 'Northerners', for example. Fieldwork
revealed that it was not that people 'in the community' did not understand that hazardous
child labour is wrong. On the contrary, every one that I spoke with expressed concern at
the fact that there were so many nyokas; the problem was that they did not know what
could be done to stop children engaging in mining, particularly in view of the worsening
poverty situation in Tanzania (see Chapters 5 and 8).
The IPEC Programme Officer for Anglophone Africa was also present at the original
workshop and was vehement in her disagreement with the argument of an imposition of
western values:
I completely disagree. The process itself makes it impossible to just impose a
programme (..) the ILO has such a tight tripartite structure that there is no way
that anyone can make that argument (...) How can anyone argue that child labour
is OK? What is the damage of IPEC coming in? (...) It has such unanimous
support with the new Convention, so no-one can say that it is bad. Part of these
statements come out of ignorance, from people who come from a 'western'
background and don't know the difference between child work and child labour.
They haven't been to the field to see the impact (IPEC official, pers. comm.).
While the process was therefore not simply 'imposed' upon the government and other
national institutions involved in the process, to what extent was it imposed upon the so-
called target group, those children engaging in child labour? To what extent was the
need identified by those affected by the issue? According to the NPM there was no
consultation by IPEC with children or their families specifically:
When it comes down to international cooperation, I don't think that any
government consults with the villages, it isn't practical. At this national
workshop all the data and information available was brought together and
discussed till an understanding was reached (NPM, pers. comm.).
Clearly, it would be inappropriate to take participation too far before introducing a
programme to a country but it is important to remember the hesitancy expressed by ILO
conference delegates with regard to the extent to which there should be participation by
children and other stakeholders in developing appropriate policies and programmes with
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regard to Convention 182 (3.4). As seen in Chapter 8, the children I spoke with were
very favourable to receiving assistance in the form of IPEC intervention (although they
did not know what this would entail in reality as the programme had not started). At the
end of the day, if children do not want to take part in direct intervention programmes
they do not have to (See Crewe and Harrison 1998 on project participation).
The issue of imposition becomes more complicated, however, when one considers the
indirect impact of IPEC action or the national legal framework which IPEC has helped
develop and which is applied in a generalised fashion not taking into account individual
situations. For example, after IPEC sensitisation workshops in the Arusha region, a large
number of policemen were sent to Mirerani to round up any children found working in
the mines. The children were then taken home in buses or dropped off in the nearest
town. Mine owners were threatened with imprisonment if they were found to have
children in their pits (see Chapter 8). The result of this 'imposition' (as the children had
no choice) was that the children returned a few days later and continued to work, either
secretly or on a freelance basis. Freelance work is often more hazardous than employed
pit work (8.1.1), so the indirect impact of IPEC action was detrimental to the immediate
well-being of the nyokas.
IPEC has been a highly dynamic programme, with action changing through time
(Chapter 4). This was also reflected in the development of the Tanzania programme:
There have been changes at different levels. When IPEC started the strategy was
evolving and changing as new experiences came in, way back in 92, 94 we didn't
have all the answers. Methodologies and strategies are changing in the light of
emerging experiences. It is very clear that IPEC has provided for country grown
innovations. All along they have been very keen to have overall strategies
adapted to country specific situations, they are very keen on that (...) In the case
of Tanzania we felt we needed to start with awareness raising and sensitisation to
bring an understanding across society that putting children to work at the
expense of their education is a problem and is not acceptable. There is no strict
structure. Geneva gives a broad framework of interventions and the individual
countries decide where they want the emphasis (NPM, pers. comm.).
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This makes it clear that the actions developed by Geneva were adapted to the local
context in Tanzania, at least from the viewpoint of the NPM. In fact one of EPEC's key
strengths is the extent to which it is nationally owned:
I think that they have developed a foundation, there is no one way to apply
across the board. In the Tanzanian case, they have worked to establish an
incredibly strong foundation. I have no doubt that after IPEC leaves the work
will continue here. It depends on the country. I think that everyone involved in
the workshop worked very hard to create a sense of ownership, there was a lot of
open discussion and dialogue so that when IPEC came they knew where to focus
(ILO official, pers. comm.).
National ownership can therefore lead to greater chances of sustainability: not only will
the chances of the project continuing after the donors leave be strengthened but project
design and management will be more 'in tune' with national realities, as opposed to
'Northern' theories (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Chapters 7 and 9). If one looks closer at
the situation, however, it becomes clear that this 'home grown' characteristic applies
principally to action programmes, responsibility for which lies with the country
programme itself.
There are also, however, a number of interventions instigated by Geneva. Out of the
total budget for Tanzania of S6 million over the next 5 years, the core budget for action
programmes in the 2000- 2001 biennium is only $806, 000183. The rest of the money is
spent on extra-budgetary activities, for example, the Time-Bound Programme (TBP)184,
DFID activities, SIMPOC (statistical programme), the Sub-regional commercial
agriculture project, the Education project and the Promoting Linkages between
Women's employment and the reduction of Child Labour project. These areas of
intervention are usually identified by donors. For example the Norwegian government
initiated the Education project and DFID heavily influenced the Mirerani mining project
(7.1). IPEC in country then set up a national project task force which is responsible for
183 The core budget for 1998-1999 was $800, 000.
184 TBPs are the next step in IPEC's approach and are aimed at accelerating the process of eradicating the
worst forms of child labour within a given time period, see ILO (2000a: 5). Tanzania is one of the three
pilot TBPs, along with El Salvador and Nepal.
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identifying activities, which must then be approved by the National Steering Committee.
It thus becomes clear that 'ownership' is a complex issue. While the donor identifies the
area of intervention, it is IPEC that recruits the project co-ordinator and it is then the
project co-ordinator along with the task force who selects which activities to conduct.
Finally, the National Steering Committee has responsibility for approving the choice of
activities.
IPEC Tanzania thus developed through lengthy negotiations with different partners and
was based on a consultative process as opposed to a 'top-down' imposition. Consultation
was, however, with those in the upper echelons of power: government officials, trade
unions, employer groups, academics, some NGO representatives based in Dar Es
Salaam. There was no consultation with poor families or child labourers themselves.
This is very much to do with the organisational, as well as national, culture. Both
operate in a hierarchical fashion on the assumption that those in power have the
knowledge and right to speak for those without such power. In this case the idea of
'Northern' domination and imposition over the weak and subordinate 'South' has been
shown to be over-simplified. More relevant would be the notion of the domination of
'uppers', in this case educated government, trade union, employer organisation, NGO
and ILO bureaucrats, be they Tanzanian or 'Northern', over the 'lowers', in this case child
1 RS
labourers and their families (Chambers 1997)
6.2 IPEC Tanzania:
Formal Discourses and Practice
It is important to emphasise that while IPEC's discourse is undoubtedly based on the
European and North American experience of development, it cannot be assumed it is
185
Although many 'lowers' would agree with the 'uppers' that child labour in mines is not acceptable (see 5
and 8), the former would argue that such labour is a necessary survival strategy. Furthermore, consultation
with 'lowers' also revealed different strategies for tackling the situation than those identified by lowers.
For example, children argued that IPEC should provide them with cash so that they could set themselves
up in business. Something that 'uppers', such as IPEC informants interviewed, are unlikely to do.
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wholly generated in these countries (see Chapters 3 and 6). As shown in 6.1, countries
interested in combating child labour must first approach the ILO, expressing their
interest in joining the Programme. If this is approved by the ILO a Memorandum of
1 Q/T
Understanding between the national government and the Programme is signed . A
National Programme Manager, who must be a national of the implementing country, is
then selected and the Ministry of Labour selects the National Steering Committee
(NSC), which consists of representatives from the trade unions, employers' associations
and government and other interested parties and is responsible for strategic input to the
Programme. The Ministry of Labour then sets up a Child Labour Unit, which is the
Secretariat of the NSC and is responsible for co-ordinating the roles of the various
implementing agencies. The NPM is IPEC staff and is responsible for providing
technical support to the NSC. In this way the Programme is said to be locally owned and
therefore free to generate its own national child labour discourse. It could be argued,
however, that while the NSC members and the NPM are Tanzanian nationals a
significant, ifminority, proportion of them have been educated in Western universities
and therefore exposed to the Western 'child labour' discourse. To leave it at this would,
however, be to simplify the role of agency. People within organisations do not simply
follow the dominant discourse blindly but interpret it, resist it and apply it in different
ways (4.4.8; 6.3). This section will explore the formal structures, discourses and
practices of IPEC Tanzania. 6.3 will then examine informal discourses and practices.
6.2.1 In the Office
IPEC Tanzania is based in the ILO Area Office for Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia and
Kenya in Dar Es Salaam. From the outside, the Area Office is a particularly grand and
somewhat intimidating building (Figure 6.2.1), located on one of the main roads leading
out of the city, with many other UN agencies and embassy buildings.
186 The MoU was drawn up by the ILO and was approved without amendment by the Tanzanian
government.
Figure 6.2.1 Photo of ILO Dar building, surrounded by lush gardens
The location of IPEC within the ILO building is unusual in that ILO projects are usually
located outside the Area Office. IPEC was, however, a highly visible Programme,
supported by powerful donors, from the outset (see 4.1) and it could therefore be argued
that it was important for it to be located within the Area Office. According to one
informant:
IPEC should be in the Area Office, wherever the Area Office is. It should never
be separate. The Area Office should focus more and more on IPEC, now that it is
an InFocus programme. I think that the IPEC budget is well over 50 % of the
ILO budget. I think that IPEC has created more visibility for the ILO because it
is getting support from powerful donors. Consumer interest and media has made
it a shining issue (IPEC staff, pers. comm.).
This is also confirmed by the Area Office Director who argues that:
A lot of people think that IPEC is outside the ILO but no, it has been projected in
the past as if IPEC is a programme of its own, independent of the ILO. Mostly
from within. When it took off it was one of the ILO's major programmes and
people considered, and rightly so, that it shouldn't be stifled by internal rules, to
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have an independent face. But this doesn't mean that IPEC's work should be
divorced from the overall ILO objectives. If it stands alone then it can lose so
much but if it complements ILO actions then it can make a great impact. The
wrong message was given when trying to make the administration independent.
In many Area Offices it started separately without integrating. When I came, I
changed that. The role of the Area Office is to support IPEC, to give it the ILO
stamp and the necessary political and administrative support. It is an ILO
Programme although it was launched and conceived as stand-alone (pers.
comm.).
The fact that IPEC is located within the Area Office gives rise to a number of issues.
IPEC was originally set up to be semi-autonomous (4.1). This means that for some
purposes IPEC functions independently within the Area Office. For example, it orders
its own supplies and has its own budget. On the other hand, it is firmly planted within
the formal organisational functioning, i.e. all letters sent out must be signed by the
Director. In the words of one informant:
The problem with IPEC is its relation to the rest of the ILO, as it is still perceived
by some ILO people as being different, not part of the ILO. In the Area Office,
we have our own computers and things. When IPEC was launched, the only way
to have efficiency in a structure like the ILO was to have a high level of
independence but then it was perceived as something different. There was a high
risk that IPEC was becoming an independent structure inside the ILO, like
UNDP, UNEPA187 were programmes originally. In the last two years there has
been a big effort to have it back in the family (IPEC official, pers. comm.).
This sheds light on the discussion in 4.1, revealing further the current drives to bring
IPEC back within the fold.
The above quotes reveal an interesting conflict in ILO support. IPEC is responsible, for
example, for all its equipment, down to the last paper clip, yet staff cannot send out
official correspondence, however minor, in their own name. All letters must be signed
by the Area Office Director188. This means that if he is absent, all correspondence is on
187 UNDP is the United Nations Development Programme, UNFPA is the United Nations Population
Fund.
188
This practice is in fact common to most UN agencies.
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hold until he or his stand-in can sign so it can take days for a letter to be sent out,
causing unnecessary delays. The situation can also be demoralising for staff who were
used in previous jobs to being trusted to write and sign their own correspondence. The
argument is that the Director must be aware of all activities as he is ultimately
responsible but other agencies, such as DFID, do not employ this practice and yet
function suitably. In the ILO Area Office, all incoming mail must also be addressed to
the Director, who will read it and then assign it with follow-up action to the relevant
staff member. To the outsider, this appears an amazing waste of valuable time. Surely
the Director must have more important functions to conduct than reading mail and
assigning individual tasks as a result? Most interesting, or should I say disturbing, is the
origin of this practice. In his memoirs, Archibald Evans, who had worked in the private
office of the ILO's first Director, Albert Thomas (Chapter 2), reveals the extent to which
the ILO's current organisational structures date back to the system put in place by Albert
Thomas- in other words, back to 1919:
Thomas (..) followed the French system of government, in which instructions
flowed from the top ministerial level, trickling downwards to the officials
responsible for carrying them out. (..) The end result of the "French" approach
was that, Thomas, arriving early at the Office, saw all the mail of importance
(other than routine matters) and by 9:30 a.m. or thereabouts had issued massive
flutters of "papillons" (literally butterflies) containing instructions as to the
relevant sections of the Office on the action to be taken arising out of the daily
mail (Evans 1995: 9).
Thomas' 1919 practices are therefore still followed in 2001. The Organisation was
clearly much smaller in those days and it may have been a useful method but with the
current mandate of the Organisation it appears to be a diversion from more important
issues which a Director should be tackling as well as an inefficient use of his or her time.
It also does not provide staff189 with the opportunity to take responsibility and therefore
ownership of the decision making process. A Foucauldian perspective might suggest that
the Director is exercising his panoptical reproductive power over his staff through the
189 Staff have developed their own resistance strategies to this through using e-mail, which, for practical
reasons, does not have to go through the Director (6.3.5). E-mail is, however, mainly used for internal
organisational correspondence. External correspondence is still primarily through conventional mail.
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tight regulation of all mail (Foucault 1979). I prefer to take Hofstede's (1994)
perspective on uncertainty avoidance which provides a useful framework for exploring
organisational culture (see also 4.4.9 and 6.3.3). One of his analytical dimensions is
'uncertainty avoidance', which he defines as 'the extent to which the members of a
culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations' (op. cit: 113). He suggests
that this feeling is expressed in various ways, such as nervous stress and a need for
predictability, actualised through the need for rules. I would argue that the organisational
culture of the ILO promotes a high level of uncertainty avoidance. As in any
bureaucracy, there is a strong need for written and unwritten rules. By examining every
letter personally, the Office Director is avoiding uncertainty, as required by the
Organisational culture. As Hofstede argues, however, such an emotional need for laws
and rules often leads to the establishing of rules or rule-oriented behaviours which are
'nonsensical, inconsistent, or dysfunctional' (op. cit: 121), such as, I would suggest, the
ILO Director's need to examine all correspondence.
In terms of funding, the primary IPEC Tanzania donor is Germany but this situation is
currently changing, with the US government increasing its contributions and it is
expected that these will exceed the German contribution for the next biennium.
Although exact figures remain confidential it is expected that the US contribution for the
Time Bound Programme will be in the billions. Norway and Britain have also made
contributions to IPEC Tanzania. To date, the bulk of funds have been allocated from HQ
but the Tanzania office is currently trying to attract funds directly from donors in
country. The DFID Tanzania office, for example, is one donor with whom the Tanzania
office is attempting to build a direct rapport (DFID HQ is already allocating funds
directly to ILO HQ for IPEC). This fits the moves towards greater decentralisation,
currently found in both agencies.
Since it started in 1994, IPEC Tanzania has been expanding in terms of resources and,
more recently, in terms of staffing, from an allocation of $600, 000 in the 1994-1995
biennium to $806, 000 for the current 2000- 2001 biennium. The advent of the Time
Bound Programme (TBP) has meant a renewed interest in Tanzania and consequently in
funding. There has also been an expansion with regard to staffing. Until January 2000,
the NPM, the secretary and a part time accountant were the only members of staff, with
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extra technical support from ILO HQ in Geneva, mainly from Operations (Box 4.2.2),
and from the Regional Office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In January, a new JPO, funded
by the Italian Government, arrived to replace the previous JPO who had left eight
months previously in May 1999 and in May 2000 a new Programme Officer for
Anglophone Africa, funded by the US Department of Labour, arrived. From being
staffed by Tanzanian nationals, IPEC now has two expatriate staff, funded by their
respective governments. When I asked the NPM if he felt that there was a role for
international staff within IPEC Tanzania his answer was suitably diplomatic:
In terms of capacity, I wouldn't say that we are self-sufficient yet, yes there is
still a role (NPM, pers. comm.).
It is expected that by the end of 2001 there will be 11 staff in total, most ofwhom should
be Tanzanian. The Director attributes this expansion to the success of the Tanzania
programme:
Expansion is to do with, they feel that generally what they call success stories,
like Tanzania, have chances for increased impact if the programme expands.
Interventions on child labour through IPEC are expanding at global and field
level, more donors are coming in, countries are demonstrating increased support
and political commitment (ILO Director, pers. comm.).
The Director attributes another reason for the influx of staff- decentralisation:
I have been asked to take on all the financial and administrative responsibilities. I
said no in May unless it was accompanied by a transfer of human resources. We
are negotiating how many people we need for the Programme. We are expecting
to grow to twenty people. There is no wisdom in IPEC expanding when it is not
structurally prepared. That will make or unmake IPEC. They need to respond
positively, it is their biggest challenge (pers. comm.).
This is a particularly interesting example of resistance to HQ. The Director was aware
that his staff was overworked already and it would be unsustainable to agree to take
further responsibilities. His refusal paid off as the donors have agreed to pay for more
staff. It is worth returning briefly to the point made in 4.4.5 that the ILO must not be
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afraid to stand up to the donors. The ILO Director in Tanzania, however, seems to be
one of the few prepared to do so and yet his proposal made sense to the Americans. At
the end of the day, donors want to fund successful projects and implementing agencies
must be prepared to argue the case for the necessary inputs instead of selling themselves
short, which, I would argue, can only lead to failure in the long run. In the words of the
Director:
You must not be scared of the donors. You can't implement miraculously without
a budget for support staff. You will fail if you do that. There must be competent
people who can push the issues. (...) They want money but they don't want to ask
the donors. They are timid. I told them, if you don't put up a good fight you won't
get it (...) I talked to the American woman leading the discussion and she agreed.
Some of the bureaucrats had a shock when I said no but I had to (pers. comm.).
The internal structures of IPEC are thus relatively dependent on the ILO Area Office,
despite its semi-autonomous nature. IPEC Tanzania is currently in a state of transition,
due to a rapid influx of funding and consequently of staff. This growth is set to continue
in the near future and will no doubt have an important impact on the formal structuring
and practice of the Programme.
6.2.2 IPEC outside the office
IPEC Tanzania acts as a 'middle-man' between the National Steering Committee (NSC)
and other social partners and the donors and beneficiaries. A 13% agency or
'management' fee is charged to the donors by the ILO. This fee covers administration
costs and other overheads. IPEC staff in the Office are responsible for providing
administrative support to the Child Labour Unit190.
The Child Labour Unit (CLU) of the Ministry of Labour is the secretariat to the NSC.
There is one permanent project manager, one secretary, one driver, all funded by IPEC,
and one assistant project manager paid for by the Ministry of Labour. The Government
pays for meetings in terms of venue, stationary, and food as well as for service and
190
Support is also provided to other social partners although these are not official members of the NSC.
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maintenance costs, such as photocopying, typewriter, computer and the car. There is
currently a proposal that the Tanzanian Government should contribute a proportion of
the project manager's salary.
One IPEC social partner describes the relationship between the NPC (old term for NPM)
and the secretariat:
ILO-IPEC is having an NPC who is the watchdog of the process, to advise the
government and to intervene if the objectives set by the government are not
being followed. All project proposals should come to the secretariat who presents
them to the steering committee. ILO provides technical support (pers. comm.).
This would appear to be the 'idealised' version as the Ministry of Labour Project
Manager describes his role in more realistic terms:
I am the government eye on implementation, so they (social partners) should
bring proposals and projects to me to refer to (the IPEC National Programme
Manager) but because they know the ILO has funds they go directly to the ILO
Director. (The NPM) then refers them back to the Child Labour Unit, pending for
discussion. Most members are supposed to discuss with me first but many go to
the NPM first and then he comes back to me (pers. comm., gloss added).
It would thus appear that, in reality, social partners try to circumvent bureaucratic
structures, approaching those with the money, and therefore the power, directly.
Fortunately, the NPM is aware of the structures and does not seek to abuse his power,
referring all requests back to the Secretariat. This is a case where bureaucratic rules and
procedures are a positive thing (7.3.2). In a country as corrupt as Tanzania (Tanzania
was cited by Transparency International191 (1999) as one of the most corrupt countries in
the world) it would be easy for procedures to be circumvented in a negative fashion. The
ILO's strict rules prevent this from happening, as much as is possible.
191
Although it is not appropriate to detail the report it is important to note that it was drawn up by an
international body and the methodology used is questionable as is the definition of 'corruption' used.
The CLU is responsible for organising NSC quarterly meetings, where issues relating to
programme implementation are discussed. During fieldwork, however, it became clear
that meetings were not held on a strictly quarterly basis, but as the need arose:
The last meeting was in March, now we are in July and we haven't had another
one. Most programmes haven't started for 2000-2001 so there are no urgent cases
to address (CLU Director, pers. comm.).
The selection of programmes to be supported is made by the National Steering
Committee which consists of representatives from Government (5), NGOs (2) and
employers' (1) and workers' (1) organisations as well as one ex-officio member from
IPEC and one from UNICEF. The NSC is thus composed of a relatively wider range of
national 'partner' organisations.
6.3 IPEC Tanzania:
Informal Discourses and Practice792
Britan and Cohen (1980) use the term informal systems to refer to practices which
influence how individuals and groups within an organisation relate to each other and
influence the formal system:
People are not roles or offices. Personal interests, emotions, affinities and
situations bring them into closer contact than formal duties demand, leading to
consultation, friendships, and intimacy, as well as to factionalism, competition
and hostility. Formal organisation forces people into sets of rule-regulated
relationships. Within those relationships, 'natural' factors of interest, association
and history produce alignments of co-operation and competition that may
parallel formal structure, but are not necessarily congruent with it (1980: 16)
192 In this section, informants will generally be referred to with minimum detail in order to preserve their
anonymity. All staff cited, except two, are male, reflecting the gender bias of the organisation (4.4.9).
Where necessary the distinction will be made between expatriate and local staff.
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During fieldwork, I collected a wealth of data regarding informal discourses and
practices of Tanzania staff. In fact, I often felt that my office was a 'consulting' room
with a regular flow of people coming to talk to me about their frustrations with the
Organisation193. The data is therefore used in a way which informs my debate while
respecting the confidentiality of individuals. Throughout this section it is also important
to bear in mind that it is impossible to explore IPEC without considering the wider ILO
Area Office structures within which it functions.
6.3.1 The ILO: A Learning based Organisation?
Recent thinking in organisational development theory has introduced the idea of the
'Learning Organisation' (see Garratt 1994). Rondinelli (1993:166-169) argues that it is of
central importance for an organisation to have a learning-based process of planning and
administration which allows for errors, innovation and change as most Weberian style
bureaucratic structures are in fact designed to suppress mistakes, to standardise, routinise
and limit individual discretion. The bureaucratic structures of the ILO were discussed in
Chapter 4 but specific interviews were conducted with IPEC Tanzania staff to explore
the extent to which they felt that the ILO was a learning-based organisation.
According to the NPM, the ILO is a learning organisation:
It is impossible to cover up mistakes. When it comes to the quality of output my
own experience is that the ILO is obsessed with quality outputs. If you cover up
it would come back to you. There is a very strong, rigid, learning culture, even to
the extent of having to delay delivery, therefore they are very keen on quality. As
a donor agency we deliver maximum quality (pers. comm.)
While the above informant is referring to internal admission of mistakes, a contrasting
viewpoint is given by another informant with regard to external recognition of mistakes:
193 This is revealing of how free staff felt with revealing data to me. This is partly due to the fact that the
Director was so open to my research and had told staff to assist me in any way possible. People therefore
did not feel as threatened by my presence as they may otherwise have felt.
We always admit our mistakes but not on paper, that is the ILO approach. When
you work you know all your weaknesses, for example, administration problems,
EPAs (budget forms), but we can't admit that on paper. If you are working with
donors it is stupid to put your mistakes on a report so you must always say that
your project is a success (IPEC official, pers. comm., gloss added).
This quote confirms the point made in 4.4.5 that it is not good 'business' sense to admit
to mistakes ifmore funds are needed from donors. What about the IPEC audit discussed
in 4.3? No-one in Tanzania, not even the Director, had seen this report:
After the auditing of IPEC, I have seen a lot of messages referring to it. I have
never seen the report. It was made for HQ. (IPEC official, pers. comm.)
Internal audits are usually conducted to help with organisational learning and it is
therefore counter-productive not to ensure that all field staff are fully briefed as to its
findings. The fact that they were not reveals the top-down nature of the Organisation
(6.3.8). Another explanation could also be that one key audit recommendation was to
improve the abysmal contractual position of field staff (6.3.3.) The findings were
considered serious enough, however, to have led to the re-structuring of IPEC that is
currently underway (4.2.2).
Another ILO informant reveals the extent to which the 'risk-adversity' of the
Organisation prevents organisational learning:
People are so risk adverse that they will at any cost avoid mistakes which is why
they spend so much time on monitoring. They always want to protect their own
position. So making a mistake is really a mistake. If you take a risk to improve
things and then make a mistake you really are in trouble. The people who don't
really want to stay in the Organisation take risks. They are the ones who criticise
openly the way things are. The bureaucrats get very uncomfortable. If you don't
ask questions and just perform, then fine, but if you do, you must avoid to think
about what the ILO is doing, then you get frustrated or fired (ILO expatriate
staff, pers. comm.).
This final point illustrates one of the many survival strategies employed by ILO staff, as
discussed in 4.4.8 and 6.3.5.
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Fieldwork revealed that a key constraint to learning and strategising was the overwork
and time pressures faced by IPEC staff (4.4.6). In the Area Office, following of
bureaucratic procedures and responding to continual demands from HQ has led to a
situation where actual 'thinking' and 'learning' from experiences is always pushed back
to 'later':
If you have to deliver you simply do the urgent things, not the most important
(IPEC expatriate staff, pers. comm.).
One of the main factors which prevents the Organisation's learning is its relatively high
turnover. The Area Office, for example, is disproportionately staffed with JPOs. In fact,
all but one of the technical staff are JPOs. JPOs stay for a two to three year period and
then leave. There is usually no handover to the next JPO as the period until the arrival of
the next one can be years. For example, it took 19 months from the date of departure for
the gender JPO to be replaced, despite the Director requesting a replacement one year
before the contract of the previous JPO expired:
There is no institutional memory. If I go, who will take over my work? Maybe
the Area Office can help but that is a big weakness (ILO expatriate staff, pers.
comm.).
This issue is difficult to resolve as there is limited funding for staffing so the ILO is
dependent on governments sending JPOs. JPOs can also choose their field and country
from a list of vacancies so there is no guarantee that posts will be filled as necessary.
ILO permanent professional staff often do not want to work in the field but stay in HQ
which means that JPOs who are in theory trainees find themselves in high positions of
responsibility:
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I am a trainee. The grey hairs all want to stay in Geneva. They are talking about
decentralisation but it is not really being done. Anthony is the only professional
staff in the Organisation plus the two bosses and then the Associate Experts194
(ILO JPO, pers. comm.).
It would therefore appear that internally the Organisation regards learning as important,
although staff shortages and time constraints mean that learning is often left on the 'to do
later1 tray. The Organisation is not, however, open about sharing its mistakes and
learning with the outside world, mainly due to the wider culture within the aid industry
of covering up mistakes and for donors to only fund 'successful' projects without
allowing for learning and consequently for improving practice (see also 4.4.5).
6.3.2 The ILO: A Responsive Organisation?
To what extent is the Organisation responsive to the diverse problems and conditions
within Tanzania? Is there scope for IPEC Tanzania to modify policy in the light of the
culturally acceptable practices and behaviour of different groups of people or is Geneva
dictated policy written in stone?
IPEC is very responsive. IPEC is designed in such a way. There is a lot of
latitude in the programming for adapting to local practices. I don't see any
rigidity when it comes to responding to local realities, it is very accommodating.
In many instances we are advised to see and to indicate the ways in which certain
principles can be adapted (NPM, pers. comm.).
Another informant, however, argues that IPEC is not as responsive as it could be, mainly
due to lack of time allocated to 'thinking' strategically:
There is a very low possibility, occasion, interest in thinking about theory, what
we are doing and why. There is no occasion to think about what is really good
for child labourers, there is more interest in good action programmes, good
indicators. (IPEC expatriate official, pers. comm.)
194 Associate Expert is another term for JPO (see 3.3.3). IPEC now has one extra professional staff
member- the Sub-regional Co-ordinator but she is on a two year contract, funded by the US Department of
Labour.
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The ILO functions according to the Weberian bureaucratic model (Chapter 4).
Tanzanian society, however, functions in ways which are often quite distinct. This can
make it difficult to follow such a rational, de-humanised model. To what extent,
therefore, are Tanzanian forms of organising incorporated into the formal ILO-IPEC
structure in Tanzania?
I don't think that we have Tanzanian forms of organising but the level of
Tanzanian adherence to organisation principles is probably lower, organisational
principles overall are the same globally (...) Standards have to be there. Different
societies have to strive to meet these. For example, if you take the element of
time, if a meeting starts at ten then it should. This has a lot to do with Cultural
traditions (NPM, pers. comm.).
While the informant did not want to expand on the particular cultural traditions to which
he was referring, he does highlight the need to recognise the impact of culture on the
way in which an organisation functions.
The NPM raises the issue of time which is one particular cultural phenomenon worth
considering. Expatriate staff soon realise that their North European time-keeping rigidity
is quite out of place in the Tanzanian context where meetings never start 'on time'. There
are unspoken rules, however, as to timing and, for the culturally aware practitioner, these
do follow their own logical path:
You also learn how late meetings are going to be. For example if you have a
meeting with donors you know that the meeting will be 15 minutes late, if you
have a mixed meeting with government and donors then maybe it will be 30
minutes late and if you have a national meeting or workshop then it will be one
hour because people don't arrive on time, only 20% of people will be there on
time and the more important the meeting the more important the guest of honour
and the higher the chance that person will also be late (ILO expatriate staff, pers.
comm.).
It is therefore possible for meetings to start 'on time' in the Tanzanian cultural sense.
Once the initial frustrations of dealing with a new cultural form of organising are
overcome, expatriate staff can come to find this method of holding meetings quite
useful:
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As long as you know, it can work in your advantage because if you are doing
something you know that you can be late, if you are early then you can talk to
people there which is sometimes more useful than the meeting itself and if you
are preparing the meeting you have more time to prepare a little (ILO expatriate
staff, pers. comm.).
The Organisation can therefore be seen as responsive to local conditions, although
mainly this is because it does not have a choice. Where there is a choice, informants
argue that HQ will choose to continue along the rigid, bureaucratic path, rather than
taking local conditions into consideration:
Geneva tends to lose touch with what is happening on the ground, not by chance
but by choice. They deliberately refuse to comprehend what is going on the
ground so they don't deliver on the requirements of constituents. It is business as
usual. It is a bureaucracy and they don't want to change now (ILO Local staff,
pers. comm.).
6.3.3 Staffing
It was seen in Chapter 4.4, that the precariousness of staffing arrangements in IPEC HQ
is quite particular within the wider ILO system where more people are on permanent
arrangements, although there are still a large number of people on two year renewable
contracts. In Tanzania, the staffing situation is similar.
The contractual position of the NPM is as precarious as that ofmany staff in IPEC HQ.
The Tanzania NPM is on a one year renewable contract, which offers little job security.
Again the paradox of this in the Organisation responsible for ensuring workers' rights
internationally is worth flagging up. Even more concerning than having been on a one
year renewable contract for seven years is the fact that contracts often aren't renewed
until the last minute. I was shocked, for example, when leaving for my Christmas break
in mid- December, at the response I received upon saying 'See you next year' to the
NPM:
I may see you in January but I may not, my contract still has to be renewed
(NPM, pers. comm.).
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The Office closes down over Christmas and it was clear that the NPM would not find
out if his contract had been renewed until starting work in the New Year, although his
contract expires on the 7th January of each year.
Research reveals that one key problem is that the Organisation in general and IPEC in
particular does not invest in its staff:
IPEC does not invest in human resources. US Department of Labour has given
over $100, 000, 000, 13% of that is yp5$ 13, 000, 000 but no-one knows where
that has gone. It is not being spent on human resource development (ILO official,
pers. comm.).
This could be because IPEC is a Programme and therefore has a limited life.
Management may therefore feel it is not worth investing resources into staff
development, if those staff are not going to remain within the Organisation in the long
term. It could also be related to the fact that there is a wider trend within the public
sector not to invest in people196. Human resource departments are usually marginalised
within Organisations and are generally not invited to attend organisational strategisation
meetings, despite the fact that effective investment in, and management of, staff is key to
the success of any organisational strategy (Brown 1995: 130-141).
What about the difference between local staff and expatriate staff in the ILO Tanzania
office? The distinction is quite dramatic, but this is by no means confined to the ILO but
to all international agencies working in Tanzania197. Expatriate staff live a life of luxury
which they would be unable to do at home: UN staff have tax free allowances, housing
allowances, transport allowances, health care and private education provision for their
195 The term 'human resource' is problematic in itself in that it detracts from the fact that it is dealing with
'people'- another example of the potential de-humanising effects of bureaucracies (4.4.1). By de¬
humanising the 'resource', we are in fact negating the importance of affectivity within the wider
functioning in the organisation (Chapter 4).
196
Although DFID, for example, currently holds the British 'Investors in People' award.
197 DFID staff, for example, get free housing, travel allowances, servants salaries, cost of living allowance,
'hardship' allowance and other perks which as ordinary civil servants working in the UK, they would
clearly not be entitled to. The extent to which the level of these perks is justifiable is a question in itself
and is one which many are questioning, especially in view of the fact that they sustain power imbalances
and cause resentment.
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children. Local staff are on far lower salaries than their expatriate colleagues who may
very well be doing the same work and are not entitled to the various perks of expatriate
staff. The material distinction between expatriate staff and local staff is therefore blatant.
To what extent, however, is this due to racism or merely to the fact that expatriate staff
are living away from home and that local staff would receive the same perks were they
to be seconded? Crewe and Harrison (1998: 22) argue that:
Racist stereotyping, although different according to who is constructing and
being constructed, underpins much development policy and practice.
The authors consider how racist stereotyping dictates the way in which 'white'
developers interact with poor 'black' aid recipients and why few black staff are to be
found in positions of power in international aid agencies. Commenting on the former
would be a thesis in itself but it is important to point out the extent to which my
experience with the ILO differs from the findings of Crewe and Harrison. The Director
of the ILO Tanzania is a 'black' expatriate, the Deputy Director is a 'black' expatriate and
the NPM of IPEC is also 'black' but a Tanzanian. Furthermore, only one of the three
IPEC HQ directors is white and the Director General is from Chile. Crewe and
Harrison's own stereotype does not therefore match my experiences of the ILO. Having
'black' people in positions of power has, however, led to its own controversies such as
claims that promotion was too dependent on being non-'white' (3.3.2.4; 4.4.9).
Those in positions of power are therefore not only 'white'. But let us return to local
administrative staff. According to a 'white' expatriate staff member, local staff are
treated differently to expatriate staff:
I think that there is a big difference in how different staff are treated. I know that
people are afraid of our management (..) Local staff are treated most differently.
Let's face it we have different cultural, educational backgrounds. When people
are on mission. It is not so much racism but cultural background. The
management tells local people what to do, not so much asking for their opinions.
It's a common habit in African countries. Africans are used to that kind of
management style whereas Europeans are not (ILO expatriate staff, pers.
comm.).
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In view ofwhat we saw above, the main issue may be the distinction between expatriate
and local staff as opposed to being 'black' or 'white'. The informant brings up the
interesting issue of culturally different management styles, arguing that the African
Director employs a 'top-down' approach to management, telling local staffwhat to do as
opposed to asking for their opinions. I would dispute the extent to which this is a
specifically 'African style of management' as many European managers use the same
approach, particularly in a bureaucratic system198. It is worth highlighting the fact that
this particular informant used to work for the private sector in Northern Europe and was
therefore accustomed to a far less bureaucratic system.
Another expatriate informant also referred to the 'African management style':
I find this is a very, very African management style. The Director is driving
around in a saloon car with flags on. There is a lot of attribution and weight put
on the position of someone. The title you use, the car. It is very important that
letters go from one Director to another, not between the responsible persons. It is
all very formal (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).
Again my findings would dispute whether this is an African, as opposed to a
bureaucratic, management style. The head of DFID and many other international
agencies, as well as government officials, also drive around in big cars with flags and
place importance on position, title and car199.
On the one hand, therefore, the formally bureaucratic management style is a form of
access to Tanzanian government officials who are used to, and expect, such a style but
on the other hand it can serve to perpetuate a system where power distance is extremely
large. Hofstede provides a particularly useful framework for understanding power
distance within national and organisational cultures200. He defines power distance as 'the
198 One informant who had also worked for the previous female, European ILO Director claimed that her
management style was more formal than that of the current 'African' Director.
199
Although, internal management practices may be different. For example, DFID staff can sign their own
correspondence.
200
Hofstede's (1994) five dimensions of national and organisational cultures are: power distance (extent to
which less powerful members of institutions and organisations expect that power is unequally distributed),
femininity versus masculinity (4.4.9), collectivism versus individualism, long-term versus short-term
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extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a
country expect power to be distributed unequally' (1994: 28). In a large power distance
culture, people expect that power is distributed unequally and those in power therefore
expect to have access to all the trappings that come with power, such as the big car and
the top-down management style.
The issue of lack of staff rights was one which came up frequently, particularly with
regard to short term contracting and the hypocrisy of the Organisation. It is perhaps
useful to quote the Director-General, Mr Juan Somavia:
A global economy in which people do not have the right to organize will lack
social legitimacy. People organizing themselves to make their voice heard
exercise a fundamental human right and the most important development right
(ILO 2000: 1).
In view of the fact that the first collective bargaining agreement within the Organisation
was only signed in 2000, it can be argued that the ILO lacked 'social legitimacy' and that
staff were, until recently, denied their 'fundamental human right and most important
development right':
For the first time since 1919 the workers managed to sign a collective bargaining
agreement with the managers of the ILO and here we are lecturing others on the
advantages of collective bargaining agreements. Isn't that funny? (ILO local
staff, pers. comm.)
Local staff still do not have the right to bargain with their employers:
I honestly believe that for local staff there should be scope for negotiating with
the employer. It has never been brought up in the office, only in the staff union
but we never got feedback (ILO local staff, pers. comm.).
orientation and uncertainty avoidance (6.2.1). The extent to which a culture has these dimensions will
affect the form of organising well as the way in which nationals tackle problems.
When I asked the informant why he did not chase up the issue, the answer exposed the
power dynamics used by the Organisation to ensure that local staff do not fight for their
own rights as workers:
When I look where I was before joining here I am much better off so I wouldn't
now. It wouldn't be worth ringing the bell (ILO local staff, pers. comm.).
The fact is that conditions for local staff are far better in the ILO than in the Tanzanian
government or any other local institution. This is controversial in itself as it means that
some of the best Tanzanian capacity has been poached from national institutions to work
for international organisations. Local ILO staff salaries, while considerably lower than
those of expatriate staff, are far higher than those of other locally employed Tanzanians.
They also receive numerous perks such as staff family allowances and medical
allowances (deducted from salary). Furthermore, their salary is exempt from tax. One of
the biggest differences between local staff and expatriate staff salaries is that local staff
salaries are not pegged to the dollar, which they claim means that they lose out on
exchange rates.
One particular incident over the salaries of cleaning staff, was particularly revealing of
the hypocrisy of the Organisation:
The ILO is not practising what they are advocating with regard to local staff.
They use the labour market as it is to have employment policies they like, which
is exactly what they are trying to prevent. If you are the Director, you can make
- sure that people have decent wages and contracts. The cleaners get paid TSH 30,
000, there are four, but every month we pay TSH 320, 000 to the contractor and
they hardly ever have any soap to clean with. (Some others) raised this issue in a
weekly meeting and said couldn't we contract these girls individually or ensure
that the contractor pays them more and (the Director) said it is none of our
concern and it was left. The ILO wants to have an impact on relations between
employers and workers and then it says that it's none of our concern! (ILO
expatriate staff, pers. comm., gloss added.).
The lack of promotion and staffmobility opportunities were also important frustrations
for local staff:
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There is a kind of non-equality of treating between professional staff and local
staff. To be professional staff your grade should be at least PI. (..) They say it
has to do with the UN common system but this is not fair. The ILO should be at
the forefront of fighting this anomaly as it works for workers' rights. What is sad
is that other UN agencies can be ahead in terms of workers' rights. People at HQ
are very conservative, maybe they have been there too long. They are reluctant at
implementing change (...) There should be local staff mobility, transfer to other
offices, this should pave the way for career development. It is difficult to develop
a career from our level to P level. In other agencies, such as UNICEF, they can
do this. I am on a two-year renewable contract. There are some local contracts
without a limited time but after you have worked more than 10 years (..). We are
lucky that our director used to be a trade unionist for many years. He shares our
concerns (Local staffmember, pers. comm., gloss added.).
The Director did in fact bring with him a new approach to local staff: inviting local
financial and administrative staff to weekly meetings (previously the domain of
technical, and therefore mostly expatriate staff) and, more recently, sending local staff
on missions. He has also been trying to raise money for local staff training. In the words
of one informant: 'he is investing in us'. The Director also organised a 'Retreat' for all
staff to get together to discuss issues related to the Office. All staff felt that this was an
important 'bonding' exercise and that their complaints were taken on board201.
Overall local staffwere extremely favourable to the management of the Area Office and
considered themselves to be fortunate to have such a good and open manager:
It is good that there is a lot of transparency. If staff have complaints you can go
- to higher authorities. I am referring to the system in the field office (ILO local
staffmember, pers. comm.).
It is interesting to note that expatriate staff felt that the Director was hard on local staff.
By contrast, local staff themselves were extremely positive about him. This could be
because they feared giving me the information but informants did make a number of
complaints and I do feel that the issue could have been brought up, even informally over
lunch but it never was. This could be because their experience of past employers was
201
A report was produced by external consultants. The extent to which report recommendations will be
implemented remains, of course, to be seen.
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more negative. It could also be related to the guilt felt by most expatriate staff regarding
the low pay of local staff, which made them particularly sensitive as to how local staff
were treated.
Hofstede's (1994) power-distance matrix, discussed above, provides us with a useful
framework for understanding this apparent contradiction. For example, expatriate staff
see the Director as too 'top-down' i.e. as having a too much of a power distance, whereas
local staff see him as very approachable i.e. as having a small power distance. This
perception is clearly based on people's cultural values and norms. Just as important,
however, is the wider organisational culture which does not value human resource
management, be it for expatriate or local staffmembers.
6.3.4 Procedures:
Inefficiencies, delays and constraints202
One of the primary procedural problems brought up by social partners and IPEC staff
alike is the issue of delays within the ILO system (4.4.8):
At the level of the office in Geneva, a 15 month project you expect to do in 20.
Most of us have problems with delivering at the planned time, the process of
scooting through IPEC and the ILO Geneva is not predetermined, you can wait
four months without any information (TACOSODE203, pers. comm.)
Another social partner explained the detrimental consequences of such bureaucratic
delays:
We sent a proposal to IPEC in 1997. In 1998 it was agreed. The money was not
coming to IPEC so there was a period of waiting which caused anxiety to the
children and to the social workers. There was a six month delay halfway through
the project. There was no dialogue that there would be a delay, if there was a
dialogue (we) would have done something, talked to teachers. IPEC did not tell
202 We return to Procedures in greater depth later when the impact of procedures on a specific case study
will be explored in depth (7.3.2). For the purposes of this Chapter, however, it is important to discuss
procedures more generally as this was one of the primary issues brought up by informants, both within and
outside of the Office.
203
TACOSODE is a social partner: the social development NGO umbrella organisation.
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us how long the delay would be, and the social workers just waited (Social
partner social worker, pers. comm., gloss added).
Delays can therefore lead to the dangerous situation where the support given to children
is put on hold, leading to frustration and bad feeling as well as the risk that children will
need to return to work while waiting for the support to arrive. The result may be that
children lose faith in local staff and do not return to the project even when the funding
eventually arrives. The 'bush telephone' is also very powerful and rumours may fly that
the money has been stolen by staff or that it is a waste of time to take part in the project.
Such rumours are remembered in the long term, which can lead to a loss of support for
and faith in the project.
The ILO's centralised nature, which leads to a lack of 'synergy' at a national level, was
also considered problematic:
The NPC's office is not empowered enough in terms of setting the pace in the
national programme. There is a lot of bureaucracy, reporting systems to Geneva,
it creates gaps in terms of responses. The NPC should have more scope for
approval and getting things done. Geneva must say OK. In terms of national co¬
ordination, co-ordination is not very effective. There is no synergy. There is
duplication, omissions, some of the partners are condemning the employers, they
are misinformed, using emotive and subjective assessments and there are no
intervention strategies which would entice employers. Condemning departs from
the main principles. It is a question of synergy between all actors (ATE204, pers.
comm.).
Another issue which became a concern to me during fieldwork was the lack of
(effective) evaluation of projects. Evaluation is an important administrative function
within the wider project cycle but evaluations were difficult to find and often quite
weak. This is confirmed by an ILO staff member who, when asked as to whether
evaluations were conducted, answered:
204 ATE is a social partner: the Employers' Organisation.
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Yes there are but they are a joke. There is an evaluation, different levels. Projects
need to self-evaluate on a yearly basis. This often doesn't happen. Also there
should be a baseline before evaluation. On the four projects that I am working on
only one has a baseline and an evaluation. If the project is higher than a certain
level there needs to be an external evaluation. The question is that often these are
regular ILO consultants. The ones I have seen are all extremely positive, maybe
too positive. It is a business- if you write a positive evaluation you will get asked
to do a job again. Evaluation reports are written under time pressures, there is no
time for details (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).
The lack of evaluation is not just simply due to a lack of rigour on the part of the ILO
but also to a lack of importance placed on it by donors:
Little evaluation has been done in the past because the donors wouldn't pay for
it. For example, Tanzania. The German government wouldn't pay and said it
would have to come from regular budget funds but there weren't any (ILO HQ
official, pers. comm.).
Related to the issue of over-centralisation is the problem of field dependence on the desk
officer sitting in Geneva. Before action can be taken, there must be approval not only at
national level but also from the desk officer. As seen in 4.4.6, HQ staff are incredibly
overworked which can only lead to delays in responding to field staff. Furthermore, the
political nature of the Organisation is also frustrating to many field staff:
The objective is not efficiency, the level of technical capacity is not the first
priority, the ILO is a political organisation (ILO expatriate staff, pers. comm.).
For staff who came from 'outside', be it from private or non-governmental sectors, where
efficiency and technical capacity are generally of primary importance, this can be a
shock. This shock is counter balanced, however, through the adoption of a number of
daily forms of resistance and appropriate coping strategies, as shown below.
6.3.5 Motivation, coping strategies and resistance
One central concern which came up during field work was how staff coped with the
heavy workload and never-ending flow of administrative tasks:
223
One way I try to use is to set priorities for the day, for the week but these
priorities keep shifting because new things keep coming in. In my experience I
set two or three things to deal with in a day and allow for unexpected things. If
visitors come you must see them, phone calls you have to talk, things come in
from Geneva, again you have to prioritise these, within the framework of my
own work-plan. In the morning I write my priorities for the day, I don't usually
end up finishing my list of priorities (...) IPEC in Tanzania has generated a lot of
curiosity both from within and outside the organisation, it is on the increase
(NPM, pers. comm.).
The NPM thus identifies one of the reasons behind the phenomenal work load: IPEC
Tanzania's success. The Programme has come to be seen as a 'success story' (6.2.1).
There is therefore a continual flow of consultants from HQ assessing particular aspects
of the work and Tanzania has now been chosen as one of three pilot countries for the
Time Bound Programme (TBP) on child labour (6.2.1). It was seen above that IPEC
Tanzania was based on a careful and well-thought strategy, involving different
stakeholders. The rush to move the TBP forward has led, however, to a situation where
there is no time to strategise carefully and significant time is spent on administering
success, i.e. through report writing and entertaining guests. Success can therefore be
self-defeating. The IPEC Tanzania experience thus confirms Chambers' (1983) argument
about the self-defeating nature of project success and how project fame can push
managers into public relations as well as turning particular projects into self-sustaining
myths.
Another important motivating factor used to overcome day-to-day frustrations with
procedural issues is the overall philosophy of IPEC:
I don't agree with all operational procedures, I can't say which ones but I have
my own reservations and dislikes. In every organisation members don't agree
with all the procedures. I agree with the broad priorities. IPEC priorities are
shifting in terms of lessons, priorities, new innovations. Some may not seem
appealing, some are questioning. (NPM, pers. comm.).
Belief in the importance of the wider objective is therefore essential to sustaining
adherence to frustrating bureaucratic procedures.
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Another issue which arose was resistance. It was seen in 4.4.8 that HQ staff used various
resistance strategies in their day to day work practices. It is therefore useful to explore
the forms of resistance occurring both within and outside of IPEC Tanzania. How do
these problematise or overturn dominant discourses? In IPEC Tanzania, for example, the
arrival of a new JPO inspired a new approach and discourse, at least as far as the
individual himself and those with whom he worked directly were concerned. The JPO
was an 'outsider' in that his main experience was with a Latin American NGO and he
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therefore had quite alternative views to those usually heard in the office . The arrival
of the new Programme Officer for Anglophone Africa, seconded from the US Ministry
of Labour, also heralded a different approach. The Programme Officer was very much
an 'insider' in that her mother used to be the ILO Tanzania Director and she herself had
worked on the initial workshop which led to the adoption of IPEC Tanzania. Her
discourse was very supportive of the IPEC approach whereas the JPO was more
sceptical. This meant that their approaches were distinct although the tasks which each
had were also distinct and it is therefore difficult to compare how their individual
discourses affected their work. I would also argue that no matter what the individual's
particular ideologies, the administrative overload means that in reality 'ideas' are not as
important as how forms, for example, are filled in. Overwork due to administrative
overload could therefore be seen to be a particularly strong bureaucratisation, as well as
de-humanisation, technique (see also 4.4.1; 4.4.3). Individual personalities and opinions
could be covered over by standardisation of procedures and jumping through
bureaucratic hoops. In this sense, ideological resistance is difficult. Procedural resistance
is also difficult in view of the short term contract problem (4.4.6). Those who do not
follow the correct procedures do not have their contracts renewed. This, however, seems
to be a fear rather than a tested theory as informants had all followed the procedures and
therefore had their contracts renewed. The fear is particularly strong among local staff
205 The Latin American movement of working children for working children has been extremely
influential in advocating the need to recognise the voice of the children themselves and the importance of
seeing child labourers as labourers and therefore entitled to labour rights, such as trade union protection.
This viewpoint is controversial within the ILO as the trade unions are vehemently against the inclusion of
children in trade unions, because they believe that children should not be working in the first place and
therefore have no place in Unions. While based on an ideologically sound argument, the practical situation
is that children do work and do need protection.
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for whom the ILO is a 'dream job', being much better paid than other administrative jobs
(6.3.2). UN 'local' staff in fact gain higher salaries than those working for individual
donors, although these are still far, far below those of expatriate staff.
One of the key motivations of staff was the value-driven nature of the subject area.
Many felt a strong moral belief in removing children from labour:
I am a social worker and within the social work profession my interest is
focussed on social work with children and this brought me to the issue of street
children and UNICEF and then to working children and the ILO and then
eventually to IPEC. I feel some kind of obligation and commitment to contribute
to the cause of children and I find IPEC as offering prospects for advocating the
rights of children, working children. That's my personal professional work point
of view. Secondly I like challenging work, I am not scared, I'm not saying it is
extremely pleasant but I enjoy the challenge (NPM, pers. comm.).
This comment reveals another aspect leading to motivation: personal satisfaction with
the challenging nature of the work. It is also interesting in view of Hofstede's
'masculinity-femininity' model, which placed 'challenge' as one of the key criteria for job
satisfaction on the masculine axis (4.4.9).
Although staff are clearly motivated by the cause of child labour, they do not necessarily
support all ILO procedures. Practitioners in the field often 'resist' top down approaches,
developing their own methods and informal practices or what Scott would term metis
(Scott 1998). The current approach towards child labour is being challenged, with
practitioners arguing for a better understanding of child labour and for more attention to
be paid to the opinions of the children themselves (Johnson et al. 1998). Experience has
shown, however, that metis is often re-appropriated by development discourse and
codified into, to use Scott's term once again, techne (a legible set of technical and
generalised rules). This is clearly shown with the so-called 'participatory approach' to
children in development. This started as an alternative methodology but has since been
appropriated by international development organisations with the usual consequences of
using rigid and generalised sets of'rules' cross-culturally and cross-sectorally.
Scott's (1990) 'hidden transcripts' and Ackroyd and Thompson's (1999) 'Organizational
Misbehaviour' also provide us with a useful framework for exploring staff resistance to
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the power structures within which they must work. Staff use 'hidden transcripts' or
'/misbehaviour' to resist the power structures on a daily basis through practices such as
doing work they are interested in, leaving less agreeable work to the bottom of the in-
tray or through use of gossip. Lunch conversations, for example, often centre on
frustrations about particular procedures, especially financial procedures, which were
often subject to lengthy delays. The young ILO and IPEC expatriate staff formed a
'community' which would lunch and socialise together. During these times, they would
gossip about other staff and criticise the system and its procedures in a bid to illustrate
their autonomy from it and to vent their frustrations. Another form of resistance relates
to the anachronistic letter signing mechanism (6.2.1). This mechanism is circumvented
by the advent of e-mail: in a world where organisations need to act quickly, letters are
often a thing of the past and people in different organisations or within the same
organisation often need immediate responses. E-mail is therefore a primary form of
communication and this cannot be monitored to the same extent by the Director. Some
form of autonomy can therefore be sustained, although within the ILO e-mail is
primarily used internally. External communication is still predominantly conducted
through conventional letter, and therefore signed by the Director. Telephone is also used
as a way of contacting people informally and directly.
Resistance is often limited, however, by the need to maintain and sustain the high
quality expatriate life-style. This need becomes a self disciplining mechanism (Foucault
1977). While staff may criticise the system and express acute frustration, many admit
that the life-style in an important motivating factor.
6.3.6 Power relations:
Inside v. Outside the IPEC Office206
Power relations are clearly important (see also 7.3.1). Although IPEC has been set up to
ensure national ownership, with the Ministry of Labour, through the Child Labour Unit,
206 As with procedures, we will return to Power relations later (7.3.1) when one case of the impact of
power will be explored in depth. This should not detract, however, from the importance of considering
power relations inside and outside of the office, in terms ofmore general, day-to-day practice.
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officially responsible for the Programme, who really has the final say where there is a
conflict of opinion, for example, as to whether or not a project proposal should be
approved? Is the rhetoric of 'partnership' simply a mechanism for ILO-IPEC to
legitimise the imposition of a particular discourse? Or do government opinions
supersede those of other social partners? Who ultimately has the power to dictate action?
The National Steering Committee is officially the supreme decision making body and it
is therefore useful to consider and contrast the views of the different groups within it:
There has never been any conflict in the NSC, usually there are debates and
arguments and so on so I wouldn't know what would happen if there was a
conflict. If there is I suppose the matter would have to be referred to the Ministry
and the ILO (NPM, pers. comm.).
This is confirmed by another informant:
There is no bulldozing in the NSC, they have equal powers (..) You can't
imagine, we expect NGOs and the employers to be so vocal and demanding but
there is always common thinking, setting the same vision. There is no
confrontation. The argument is technical, no-one dominates the other in terms of
discussion, you can't rule out those that talk more, that is the right to speak
(Ministry of Labour spokesperson, pers. comm.)
and yet refuted by many others:
It depends on the agencies and who is heading them. Some will say yes, yes to
get the money, other won't. If the co-ordinator is strong and has drive and
commitment they won't. ATE (Employers' Organisation), CHODAW (Domestic
Workers' Union), TAMWA (Women's Media Association), certainly are not
doing this. Information services, labour inspectors are (Social partner informant,
pers. comm., gloss added.).
And another:
The government tends to think that it knows better than everyone else, it takes
the driving seat and we are the passengers. Sometimes the driver falls asleep and
doesn't wake up till we crash. This is contributing to the lack of synergy (see
below) (..) all partners are trying to wake up the driver. Government wants
control. (..) My problem with the trade unions is that there is low technical
capacity. They are very enthusiastic but down on the ground there is a lot of trial
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and error (..) They have over enthusiasm to show off although there is no
preparation, they want to impose themselves and lack a systematic approach
(ATE, pers. comm., gloss added).
The background of the informant is clearly important. While the Ministry of Labour
argues that all works harmoniously, as they must in view of the fact that they are the
Secretariat, there are clearly conflicts among the other groups. The government is
criticised for being too slow, whereas the trade unions are criticised for 'showing off.
These are all of course personal opinions and the meetings I attended were always
resolved harmoniously in practice.
According to the NPM:
The NSC meets quarterly, it depends on the agenda, can be reporting, reviewing,
discussion. The Secretariat sets the agenda, the secretariat is the manager of the
child labour unit, in collaboration with the chairperson who is the permanent
secretary and the partner agencies. All project proposals get presented to the
NSC, if they are not in line with the country programme objectives then they are
rejected (NPM, pers. comm.).
When asked whether a project proposal, which is clearly not in line with the country
programme objectives, would be presented by the NPM the answer was:
I will still present it so there is consensus in rejecting it so that people know it
was not just my decision. This is for transparency (NPM, pers. comm.).
The quote below reveals the discrepancy between the NPM's idealised version of events
and the reality:
The Child Labour Unit is there but all in all we do not know what they are doing,
I even ask myself the NPC207 is for Tanzanians and the child labour unit is for
Tanzanians how do they work? But all in all it is a place for getting information
from other organisations and to share ideas, to see who is doing what, where and
how. The Child Labour Unit needs to have its capacity built, he is just alone, we
rarely meet, he also has to go around. We are supposed to meet every quarter,
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NPC or National Programme Co-ordinator is the old term for NPM.
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when we started we used to meet but since last year we haven't. Maybe he is
overloaded, maybe he needs an assistant (Domestic workers' union, pers.
comm.).
According to the informant, the situation is less clear cut than the NPM would have us
believe. The activities of the Child Labour Unit are unclear to some of the social
partners, and meetings are less frequent than quarterly, called more on the basis of need
than regular timing (6.2.2). For example, there was a NSC meeting in March 2000 but
by July there still had not been another one.
6.3.7 Successes
Interviews with informants revealed not only the weaknesses of IPEC (see above) but
also its strengths. An informant from the Ministry of Labour provides a useful insight
into the successes and limitations of IPEC:
There have been positive results. Before people didn't know about child labour,
now society is all informed that child labour is a violation of children's rights,
there has been an integration of child rights activities through UNICEF and ILO.
Of course now it is possible for the government to develop guidelines to define
what child labour is and what strategies are appropriate, this has come about
through IPEC. With time things would have happened but IPEC has been
catalytic in fastening the process of change. Without the Programme we wouldn't
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have had 138 (Convention 138) . Along with awareness this is a great success.
Employers are aware, trade unions are playing a pressure role, workers and
parents themselves feel bad for child labour, NGOs and government from
- grassroots to national level are playing a part. The review of existing legislation
has been a success although adoption is slow. The problem remains, having
instruments in place does not mean that the problem is solved. Society is very
poor and parents send children out to work, not out of choice but poorness. This
makes the problem persist despite guidelines, radio programmes, all
programmes. If people are not economically empowered, that has not been a
success although that is not the concern of IPEC but of the Government (pers.
comm., gloss added).
208 The Government ratified Convention 138 (see 3.2) in 1999. With IPEC assistance, the Tanzanian
government is also currently making moves to ratify Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child
Labour.
This reveals the valuable role that IPEC has played regarding awareness raising and
acting as a catalyst to change. However, it also reveals the limitations of the Programme.
As is pointed out, IPEC alone cannot remove poverty and must therefore be integrated
within wider government programmes. This is the approach currently advocated by the
TBP (6.2.1).
IPEC's financial contribution is also important :
If you count the money given by IPEC, it is not money that Tanzanians could
have had but it works with many NGOs so IPEC has assisted Tanzania on a
budget that Tanzania could never have. IPEC has made Tanzania get involved in
issues it had never thought of (TASWA, Social Workers' Association, social
worker, pers. comm.).
Awareness raising is also brought up by an NGO informant who also points to the need
to incorporate IPEC into wider poverty reduction strategies, as well as the important role
played by IPEC in terms of capacity building, involving the communities themselves
and expanding the ILO partnership to NGOs:
First they helped in awareness raising, before there was awareness but it was
mainly the concern of the labour department. Now all others are involved,
especially NGOs are involved. Mainly after IPEC. IPEC helped build capacity
especially at the Ministry level. The Ministry of Labour developed capacity and
helped spearhead the ratification of Conventions. It has also helped communities
themselves to get involved. Also it has expanded ILO partners beyond trade
unions, employers and government. It has also started reducing the magnitude of
the problem with the withdrawal of children. Maybe if there was not this
initiative the numbers would be larger. The elimination of child labour also
depends on poverty reduction. The level of income of the majority has gone
down, in consideration of the value of the Tshilling that is why poverty is
increasing. IPEC can only work within its mandate. Alone it cannot address the
child labour problem so multi-sectoral linkages are important, it is good that
IPEC is taking this way (TACOSODE, social development NGO umbrella
organisation, informant, pers. comm.).
The direct one-to-one support provided by the ILO is also important:
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I have been meeting many people from ILO-IPEC, they are wondering how is
IPEC doing but we are the implementers, we are selected as ILO-Tanzania,
invited to Malawi, Washington (..) The thing is I like about the ILO here is that
they are not very bureaucratic, you can just go in and they will support us.
Maybe individual people I can call them and ask for help, this is what I mean.
They are bureaucratic in terms of finance but when it comes to technical
assistance you can ask for help. We are very free in their office, that is good, they
are working closely with the partners (Domestic workers' union, pers. comm.).
IPEC has also contributed through the provision of literature and other promotional
tools:
Materials such as leaflets, booklets, we have been able to produce these and to
use these through IPEC. We can use these when talking to unions, government,
to persuade them to be involved in these activities. It has been valuable. Also we
attend seminars to discuss child labour issues, to set strategies, exchange
experiences and are involved in the development of policy (Mining and
construction workers' union, pers. comm.).
The way IPEC has been developed to be 'nationally owned' and therefore accountable to
the social partners and others is also seen as important:
It is nice to work with international organisations because they report to you, you
give them an implementation report, they see the success and failures. With
government it is all lies, you can't see the truth (Social partner, pers. comm.).
6.3.8 A 'Top-down' Process?
We saw that the introduction of IPEC was not a 'top-down' imposition by the ILO on to
Tanzania (6.1.1). What of the day-to-day practices within the Organisation, however? To
what extent are these top-down?
According to one informant, the Organisation itself works in a top-down way and
therefore policy comes down from Geneva rather than up from field experiences:
The agenda is set by Geneva but is then filtered in the IPEC office but IPEC by
nature is not very participatory. It is top-down which is to do with the fact that
the ILO is top-down. We were screaming and shouting HIV-AIDS and child
labour for years. The partners were telling us that this was a key issue, we were
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telling Geneva that we wanted to act but they just said that they had the answers
already, it was too tricky for them. IPEC Geneva has a satellite way of working,
in the field we are dependent on the desk officer (ex IPEC expatriate Tanzania
official, pers. comm.)
This appears to contrast with the views expounded by informants (6.1.1) who argued
that the process is very participatory and not top-down (see also 3.4 and 7 on
participation). I put this to the informant quoted immediately above and she answered:
From a Tanzanian perspective it is very participatory but to me Tanzania is a top-
down system. When people talk of participation in Tanzania they are talking
about being 'participative'. If you sensitise people by gathering all the people in
a village that is participation. (The DFID consultant) has a European concept of
participation which can be dangerous in Tanzania where participation means
different things. You need to find somewhere in between. IPEC is moving
towards this, it is not just about lecturing in villages but also about how to make
people talk, I am not sure that mapping and focus group discussions are always
right if people are just being 'participated'. You need to recognise that this is
tricky but some partner agencies are succeeding in making people talk, how then
to get the partner agencies to take people seriously? That is where IPEC can play
a role. You have cases where findings are taken back. When CHODAW started
in Iringa they wanted to do sensitisation, people said we know all this we want
income generation. They did this on a small scale and it worked (pers. comm.).
While it has been shown that there is in reality a consultative process it is perhaps useful
to briefly consider the representativeness of those on the National Steering Committee.
One important issue in Tanzania is that most NGOs and other 'representative' bodies are
based in Dar Es Salaam and are mainly constituted by middle class Tanzanians, some of
whom have received education outside of the country, often in Britain or the United
States. To what extent can they truly represent the opinions of those in poor
communities? This issue faces most representative organisations, whatever their nature,
as pointed by the NPM:
Membership of the NSC comprises of all the tripartite partners, when you say a
certain trade union is represented you don't expect a representative from
Mwanza to attend, you expect them to represent their members. Personally I




The above discussion has revealed the dangers of using terms such as 'top-down' and
'imposed', in the context ofNorth-South relations, which only over-simplify a complex
situation. The 'top' itself is varied and context dependent. IPEC may be the 'top' vis-a-
vis government officials in Tanzania, but the government and other elites in turn
represent the top to their own citizens209. In the context of child labour in Tanzania it is
perhaps more relevant to refer to Chamber's (1997) concept of 'Uppers' and 'Lowers'
(6.1.1), when referring to power relations. It is also useful to return to Hofstede (1994:
140) who argues that:
Organizing always demands the answering of two questions: (1) who has the
power to decide what? and (2) what rules or procedures will be followed to attain
the desired ends? The answer to the first question is influenced by cultural norms
of power distance; the answer to the second question, by cultural norms about
uncertainty avoidance.
This section has used the work of theorists such as Hofstede (1994), Chambers (1997)
and Scott (1990) to show that the power to decide what happens in IPEC lies on two
levels: the rhetoric and the practice. In rhetoric, power to decide lies within the National
Steering Committee but in reality power lies where the money is, as National Steering
Committee members revealed through their practice of going to the National Programme
Manager before going to the government's Child Labour Unit. At the next level along,
the current decentralisation rhetoric would appear to suggest that power lies in the field
office but in practice the power remains at HQ. This is revealed by the large power-
distance between HQ, Area Office directors and staff, exemplified by the need for HQ
approval at all stages, the need for the Area Office Director to examine all
correspondence, and the large discrepancies between expatriate and local staff. While
individual personalities can play an important role in bridging this gap, as shown by the
Director's efforts to involve local staff in decision-making and to provide them with
209 Development institutions have already absorbed this point in that they use alternative way of saying
the same thing: stakeholder analysis.
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training opportunities, the Organisational culture of minimising uncertainty has led to
the development of a set of wider bureaucratic procedures, such as checking letters and
financial procedures which require HQ authorisation, which ensures that the power-
distance framework remains firmly in place, despite the development of certain informal
resistance strategies.
The next chapter will take a specific case study of the development of a child labour
intervention process in the mining sector to explore the issues raised in this Chapter
further. A power-procedures-people framework will be used to consider what it is in
particular that contributes to the success or failure of development intervention.
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7. The Intervention Process:
The Mirerani Child Miners' Case
It is a mixture of top-secret story, real assessment, bad jokes and self esteem that
leads to the birth of a new project! (ILO official, pers. comm.).
This is not a normal IPEC project. This is being written for DFID (ILO official,
pers. comm.).
We will not get very far as long as we focus on personal intentions, especially if
the ritual aspect of bureaucracy is recognized. Nor (...) is there any point in
perpetuating the stereotype of the autonomous 'system', for that does nothing
more than provide an ethical alibi for those who are indeed indifferent to the
pleas of the different. (Herzfeld 1992: 183).
Having examined the general functioning of the office in Chapter 6, it is useful to
explore how a particular intervention strategy is developed. The case study is of a
process initiated by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997
and which has yet to be resolved, over four years later210. The donor agency has retained
a strong influence throughout the process; sending in its own consultants and staff to
provide 'technical support' as well as dictating procedures. This illustrates how the need
to attract funds can lead to the donor's ideas and policies being adopted, sometimes over
and above those of IPEC Geneva. It also illustrates how the supposed beneficiaries of
the project can be practically ignored in the process, despite the strong rhetoric,
210 The ethnography is based on fieldwork in Tanzania to September 2000. Contact with DFID, the ILO
and local community members in Mirerani revealed that as of November 2001 no substantive progress in
terms of resource allocation or project approval had been made since September 2000.
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particularly in DFID, of 'participation'211 (3.4; 6.3.8), a theme considered further in
Chapter 8.
In this chapter I use ethnographic evidence to consider the intervention process itself
(7.1; 7.2) and draw out key factors responsible for hindering or facilitating the
development of the intervention programme (7.3). I group these under three sub¬
headings: Power, Procedures and People. Through focusing on these three categories, I
am taking Hertzfeld's (1992: 182) 'dialectical middle ground', avoiding the reification of
either the person or culture, but attending 'to the play of ideas about both'. I thus attempt
to step between institutionalised procedures and power relations, and individual
personalities in order to attend to 'the play of ideas' in the development of the ILO-DFID
intervention programme.
7.1 The Process Itself
Firstly, it is useful to outline the process from inception to the present. This is
summarised in Box 7.1 below. The data were obtained by examining DFID and IPEC
Tanzania files and conducting interviews with staff involved in the process as well as
with key stakeholders in the partner organisations and in Mirerani, the target site for
intervention.
211 See Cornwall (2000), Rahnema (1992) for further discussion of'participation'.
Sox 7.1: Timeline outlining the process of developing a DFID/IPEC intervention strategy
— 1997
ILO-IPEC conduct situation analysis in Mirerani
DFID express interest in IPEC Tanzania
IPEC approaches DFID with proposal for sectoral programme on child
labour
— 1998
Feb DFID say will support proposal but want to send consultant to work on
collaboration programme
Mar DFID consultant visits and recommends working with IPEC and
conducting baseline survey on child labour in Tanzania
Aug Consultative meeting with social partners re baseline survey proposal
Sept Draft proposal submitted informally to Geneva and DFID for comments
Geneva return few comments, DFID many
Oct DFID SDA recommends funding for baseline survey
Nov Submission approved- start date 25/01/99, for three and a halfmonths.
DFID agree to pay £58, 000 for baseline with possibilities of funding
larger programme identified through baseline.
_ 1999
Jan MoU signed by DFID - budget in DFID version higher than in ILO
version due to confusion as to payment in US$ or £. DFID APO visit to
IPEC to discuss internship
Feb Start date delayed due to IPEC failure to sign MoU due to budget
confusion
Mar Original MoU signed by IPEC with covering letter indicating extra
money to cover design phase and new start date.
May Contract for baseline consultants drawn up- to be completed 30/09/99
First instalment paid by DFID
June First baseline progress report submitted
Sept DFID APO arrives, brief to assist in development of Project
Memorandum for potential DFID support.
" Oct Baseline study progress report submitted, still far from complete.
- 2000
Jan Final baseline study submitted, almost 10 months overdue
Consultant recruited for design of Mirerani Project Memorandum (PM).
Participatory research carried out.
Feb Consultative meeting held in Mirerani. Participatory research
continued.
Mar-Jun Budget confusion- IPEC Tanz. trying to get hold of funds to pay
consultants. Delays ILO HQ and DFID.




While the box above provides a simplified illustration of the timeframe, it is important to
see the process as multi-layered and complex with a number of factors both within and
outside the organisation impacting on the development process.
212In early 1997 , IPEC Tanzania conducted an assessment of child labour in the
Tanzanite mines in Mirerani, a mining township in Northern Tanzania213. The report
concluded that the situation facing children was particularly problematic and IPEC
consequently became interested in developing some form of action in the site. In August
1997, a workshop in Nairobi led to an informal discussion between a social development
advisor (SDA) in DFID and a new IPEC associate expert (AE) or JPO in which the
DFID SDA revealed that DFID was interested in supporting IPEC and would consider
any project proposals. This coincided with IPEC's desire, based on the 1997 assessment,
to develop interventions in the mining sector. IPEC Tanzania consequently drew up a
project idea for intervention in the mining sector, which was presented to DFID in
Nairobi.
DFID consequently sent a consultant to assess IPEC Tanzania:
(The consultant) came to talk to IPEC Tanzania and partners to find out what to
do. She was very serious and did a huge report. We didn't agree with all her
conclusions, it would need a very theoretical perspective to draw those
conclusions but nevertheless her report was discussed (...) and it was agreed that
the first activity would be a baseline survey on child labour in Tanzania as there
wasn't enough research. In line with (the consultant's) conclusions the survey
would be very participatory, all mapping and focus group interviews, very
ambitious. We identified local consultants through UNICEF. Then the problems
212 Prior to DFID involvement, IPEC had conducted awareness raising and sensitisation workshops on
child labour for parents, teachers, workers' organisations and community leaders in the Arusha region. A
video on child labour was produced and footage was televised nationally and screened at a special meeting
for Dar Es Salaam based social partners. There was no special screening for Mirerani residents, which
considering that most residents do not have a TV guide informing them of forthcoming programmes, let
alone a television, is indicative of the common attitude amongst donor agencies of coming into an area,
extracting information and the leaving, often with no follow-up. This was also indicated by the fact that
IPEC and another NGO had conducted surveys of child labour in Mirerani yet never sent copies of these
back to the village government.
~13 The research process was not particularly participatory as consultations were limited to government,
trade union leaders and other community leaders. There was little if any consultation with other
community members, miners or children. Annex 2 does provide three case studies of child labourers but
the information given is limited to a few lines per child (see Alii 1997).
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started. Everyone could see it would take forever. Then (the new DFID SDA)
came along and wanted something short and concise. She didn't want this huge
piece of research. We tried to cut back the research plan in a more action
oriented way. It took a long time just to get the paperwork done as so many
people were involved and we didn't have a clue how to handle this, it went
backwards and forwards between Geneva, London, Tanzania. It was dreadful and
then the agreement was signed and I left (ex ILO expatriate official214, pers.
comm.; gloss added).
This quote reveals the problem of consultants from Headquarters, whose
recommendations are often seen as 'too theoretical' and impractical. Despite the ILO's
disagreements and the fact that 'it would take forever', the consultant's recommendations
were acted upon and the baseline survey was designed. This comment also reveals the
impact of the arrival of new staff, who bring with them different requirements, as
explored further below, and the fact that often people really do not know what they are
doing, and function on a hit or miss basis; 'we didn't have a clue how to handle this' (see
also 7.3.3).
The signing of the agreement was itself a complex and lengthy procedure. Box 7.1
above reveals that the process from initial discussions in August 1997 to the signing of
an agreement between DFID and IPEC Tanzania took one year and seven months; a
chaotic start which was to mark the entire process.
The baseline survey contract was drawn up in May 1999, with a starting date of 01 June
1999, to be completed by 30 September 1999. The baseline survey was not completed,
however, until January 2000, four months after the second deadline (and ten months
after the first deadline, which had had to be put back due to failures to sign the
Memorandum of Understanding). The delays were caused by several factors which
included delays with payments by DFID but were mainly due to the failure of the
consultants to produce adequate data. This meant that they were asked to return to the
214 Most quotes in the following section are from this informant- this is due to the fact that the person no
longer works for the organisation and was very keen to reveal information, in the hope that it would lead
to positive change. She was also the key ILO link to the initial process.
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field to collect more comprehensive data. The ILO's choice of consultants had been
based on a recommendation by DFID, so even in this regard DFID was dominant.
While the baseline study was underway, there were important staffing changes in both
organisations which caused further confusion and delays. The IPEC Associate Expert
responsible for the project left and was not replaced for seven months which meant that
the workload was on the shoulders of one member of staff. A new DFID SDA came on
board with different ideas to her predecessor and more importantly, a sceptical view as
to the added value of working through IPEC. Furthermore, I started working with IPEC
as a DFID Associate Professional Officer, under the ILO title of 'DFID intern'. The
changeover in staff also coincided with a dramatic shift in the DFID-Tanzania agenda,
away from projects and towards policy 'influencing', although the Social Development
Department in London was still pushing for DFID East Africa to work on child labour
issues, through the ILO and IPEC.
In October 1999, the draft findings of the baseline survey were presented. Four areas of
intervention were identified, including mining. This confirmed what IPEC already knew
in early 1997 when discussions first took place with DFID:
We were in no doubt that mining was the area. Mining is a political issue and it
would need a courageous donor as the government and multinationals are so
involved. It was our priority (ex ILO expatriate official, pers. comm.).
The baseline survey took nineteen months and $63, 092 to complete and served to
confirm what was already known i.e. that mining was one of the most hazardous sectors
for child labour. It had little other value in that both DFID and IPEC agreed that the
findings were weak and did not really offer much. IPEC had, however, overcome
DFID's third hurdle: the consultancy, taking me on and completing the baseline survey.
The mixed motives behind each stage of the process led to a situation of utter confusion,
in terms of procedures, support and ownership:
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We did not know how to proceed and we got no backup from our superiors.
Everyone wanted their fingerprint on this, DFID wanted an assessment of IPEC,
the consultant wanted participation, I wanted mining. Geneva's agenda was to
get DFID funding on board whatever. They wanted us to do anything. It was a
very confused process from the beginning (ex ILO expatriate official, pers.
comm.).
This confusion is symptomatic of the rigidly applied bureaucratic model: there are tight
rules for those who follow the norm but when someone tries to do something outside the
rules there is little back-up and no-one knows what to do, leading to confusion as
opposed to productive creativity. The situation was rendered even more confused by the
desire of each Organisation to retain ownership, and therefore power, over the process.
When I arrived in Tanzania, I was not aware ofmany details of the history between the
organisations, such as the predetermination of the intervention sector as being mining. In
fact, I had been clear in my research proposal that I would not consider mining sites as
potential field sites due to the dangers involved of being a lone mzungu or white female
in a clearly male dominated and dangerous mining site215. Upon arrival, it became clear
that the SDA was interested in the mining sector although IPEC seemed less interested
in this sector, as illustrated by the number of times the NPM asked me why I was not
focussing on commercial agriculture. The issue of staff changes is once again relevant:
while the ex-IPEC staffmember was personally committed to intervention in the mining
sector and the ex-DFID SDA was personally committed to the need for in-depth
research, when they left their replacements were less committed to these issues and had
very different agendas.
From this point on, the development of the intervention process became intrinsically
linked with my choice of field site. DFID gave me a free reign to select the intervention
area, although mining was to be the chosen sector216, and IPEC only played a
consultative role. The Project Memorandum would be developed for wherever I chose to
go. Mirerani became my choice as IPEC had carried out a situation analysis and I had
215 Mirerani has a reputation for being the most dangerous place in Tanzania (5.2).
"1S This was justified by the preliminary findings of the baseline study, which saw mining to be one of the
worst sectors for child labour.
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been told that an active child labour committee was in place, demonstrating community
commitment to the issue and that there was an active partner agency working there, the
mine workers' union, TAMICO217. I was then to conduct research in the mining site,
which would feed into the design of an intervention strategy. I presented this research to
DFID and IPEC in January 2000 and DFID advised IPEC to recruit a consultant to
design the Project Memorandum. Once again conditionalities were made in the form of
'good advice': the Project Memorandum should be developed according to DFID
guidelines, participatory community based planning should be used, the Project
Memorandum must fall under DFID's Strategic Area 4 'Sustainable Livelihoods' and the
Project Memorandum must be replicable elsewhere. Of course, the advice could have
been ignored but then it would have been more difficult to ensure funding and, as shown
in 4.4.5, the ILO rarely says 'no' to donors.
The consultant was recruited under short time constraints in January 2000. ILO and
IPEC decided that it should be a local consultant, although DFID suggested an
international consultant. No available consultants were felt to be completely suitable but
due to the time constraints, a Tanzanian woman with experience of working with IPEC
although no experience of drafting Project Memorandums for DFID, was chosen. In this
case, ILO's choice was accepted but this could be because the one suggested by DFID
was unavailable. This illustrates the realities of setting up projects: frequently the ideal
choice of resources, human and other, are simply unavailable, leading to a less than
optimal choice.
IPEC called for a consultative meeting involving key stakeholders in Mirerani, the
results of which would form the basis of the Project Memorandum. The meeting was
'convened' by the Child Labour Unit of the Ministry of Labour although it was actually
organised by myself as I was living locally whereas the Child Labour Unit is based in
Dar Es Salaam. Unfortunately, the date chosen coincided with three other local
government meetings, even though there had been advance notice of the date. The week
217 I found out six months into field work that IPEC partners had actually conducted a mining project in
the ruby mines of Southern Tanzania. Distressed that this had not been pointed out to me before I
questioned why. The answer was: 'You didn't ask'.
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before the meeting there was serious rioting in the mines so the local government was
preoccupied by this. Needless to say the District Officer was there and he summoned
local government officials from their other meetings to attend ours, illustrating the
power exerted by foreign development experts (see also 7.3.1). Our meeting was seen to
be more important than tackling immediate and serious local problems. Also present was
the DFID SDA and the ILO JPO. A group of officials from different child-centred
NGOs and different government departments from Arusha (the regional capital) also
attended. The meeting concluded that there was a need for some intervention and that
local government would fully support any action taken.
In March, the IPEC Consultant, later to become IPEC staff, designed the Project
Memorandum, using community based planning. Some community members were
clearly committed to the issue. Development of the Memorandum created conflict within
the village, however, with a lot of jealousy expressed towards the woman with whom I
lived, who was also Chairwoman of TAWOMA, the women miners' union identified as
a potential implementing agency by the Project Memorandum. Many villagers were
convinced that she was benefiting financially from her involvement and would become
rich through her contact with me. Clearly this was not the case as I only paid her
nominal rent, which she refused to accept for the first few months. With regard to her
involvement in the Project Memorandum, she was one of the only people to submit a
proposal, despite the fact that many people were invited to.
In May, the draft Memorandum was submitted informally to DFID and IPEC. DFID
expressed serious doubts about the content, an over-ambitious community development
project. At the same time, DFID was heavily involved with the World Bank's PRSP
process (7.3.1) and was making concrete moves to cut down on projects. Many old
projects were axed and it was made clear that it would be unlikely that new projects
would get funding. The consultant resubmitted the report after a briefing with IPEC staff
during which a new, more realistic logffame218 was developed. IPEC was still not fully
218 The logframe or logical framework is a tool used by many development agencies for project planning
and evaluation. At its best, it is used in a participatory manner with stakeholders which not only empowers
them but gives them a sense of ownership. At its worst, as illustrated in this case, the tool is merely a
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satisfied but submitted the report to the ILO Director and to DFID anyway, with the
intention of modifying the draft at a later stage once funds were released. Formal
submission was necessary so that DFID could release the funds to pay the consultant.
The consultant had in fact been given a new job with the ILO Area Office but before she
could start work she needed to be 'signed off from her previous activities. Had this not
been the case, she would probably have been expected to spend more time perfecting the
Project Memorandum, which shows how rules can be bent when necessary. Once funds
were released, the Project Memorandum was put on the back burner. This was mainly
due to the arrival of the new Sub-regional Officer for IPEC, who needed full briefing,
and pressure from HQ to work on the new Time-Bound Programme (6.2.1).
My direct involvement ended at this point, in September 2000219. By November 2001,
four years after the start of the process, the Project Memorandum had still not been
approved by DFID and discussions were underway to include the Project Memorandum
in the TBP, which DFID are saying they may (or may not) support.
7.2 The voices of local 'partners'
It is useful in this section to invert our frame of reference. The above section explored
the intervention process through the lens of the ILO-IPEC experience. What of people in
Mirerani ? What were their experiences and opinions regarding the development of an
IPEC intervention strategy? This section will illustrate the interpretation of events by a
number ofMirerani residents.
One ofmy primary concerns throughout the process laid down above was whether or not
the villagers felt that there was a role for IPEC intervention. Most respondents felt that
IPEC did have a valuable role to play, for several reasons:
compulsory hurdle which must be jumped over to have any change of obtaining DFID funding. For a
fuller critique see Gasper (2000) and 7.3.2.
219 I retained email contact with many informants while writing up the thesis.
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The need is there for IPEC, to help the children. If they will be there to help it is
to facilitate the education of children, school fees, uniforms and if they can
afford even to provide family support. The world is one, it is just a matter of
boundaries, they should be involved. We want others to share responsibility
(Mirerani village government official, pers. comm.).
This informant clearly believes that IPEC should help the children and that they also
need to share responsibility for child labour as the 'world is one'220, a point with which I
fully agree.
Another informant reveals that IPEC has an important facilitatory role to play, not just to
place additional pressure on government but also in providing advice on ways forward:
When I first heard of your organisation, I did not know what it was but I was
happy because we knew we needed support. We knew we didn't want children to
work in the mines, the government used to come and say 'we don't want the
children there', they would chase them but the children would just come to the
town, begging in the streets, they wouldn't give any support. It was not a solution
to chase the children away, it is better to have a centre where you can do
everything well and teach the children. If you had not come, nothing would have
been done. It is very good that you came. Because you can need something but
you have no idea where to start, you don't know the way. You helped me to
know what can be done and how to do it and how it is important to do it. IPEC
should continue to try to help these children (Chairwoman of TAWOMA,
women miners' association, pers. comm.).
Another of my concerns, primarily caused by my naive belief in the 'imposition of a
Northern construction of childhood' argument (Chapter 3), was whether people felt that
an outside agenda was being imposed by IPEC and DFID. When I asked this question, I
was nearly always greeted with laughter:
(laughter) maybe we agree with your position, it doesn't contravene human
rights or our law, if you hadn't come it would be difficult to do it, we wouldn't
have done it (Mirerani resident, pers. comm.).
220 An interesting slant to the common vision of 'globalisation' which sees the 'world as one' from a strictly
economic as opposed to social point of view.
My academic naivety was further proven, when I presented the argument that aid is a
form of neo-colonialism and was greeted with more laughter:
(laughter) No it is not true that you are colonising us, you are teaching us (village
official, pers. comm.).
This response of laughter was a powerful one, and was the turning point for my belief
that the discourse imposition argument was not only naive but patronising. Local people
are capable of resistance to 'discourses' imposed from outside: be it in the form of
ignoring what the outsider is saying or of arguing clearly against it. Of course, power
does come into the equation, especially when the outsider is offering money but in this
case the issue did not come up as all informants agreed that action needed to be taken to
reduce child labour and offer the children alternatives.
Regarding the process itself, many informants felt that the IPEC consultant responsible
for developing the Project Memorandum (7.1) should have stayed longer, if she wanted
to have any realistic opinion as to the reality of life in Mirerani:
It is very good that you came for a long time. If someone like (Tanzanian IPEC
consultant) had just come in for one week, we would not have understood her.
You need someone for a long time to explain things properly (Village resident,
pers. comm.; gloss added).
This confirms the long standing anthropological argument for the importance of in
depth, qualitative research carried out over long periods of time (Malinowski 1961).
The issue of people coming in, extracting information and then leaving does not apply
only to expatriate IPEC staff or IPEC consultants but also to Tanzanian NGOs and
unions:
Here people do nothing, they come here like TAMICO (miners' union), take
money, do seminars, collect their money and then do nothing (...) What do
people who come from Dar Es Salaam for few days know? They see only official
people. The first meeting was very good but the process has been very slow and
this is bad because if you start something you have to go quick, quick while it is
hot (Village resident, pers. comm., gloss added).
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This last point is an important one. As seen above, the process leading to the
development of an intervention programme has been going on for years. By November
2001, DFID had still not approved intervention and my concern is that this will create
frustration and disillusionment. Already, many people are saying that nothing will
happen, just more promises which lead to nothing. The capacity building and
empowerment conducted in 1999-2000 led to the creation of a local NGO, but this
fledgling organisation needs support to maintain itself (see Fowler 1997): support not
yet received from IPEC or DFID.
Another interesting point raised was the benefit of having wazungu support:
It is our problem so we should be taking responsibility. People are happy when a
mzungu comes because it means money will come. People take you more
seriously if you are a mzungu, they trust you, they know a mzungu can't steal,
can't lie (Village resident, pers. comm.).
False expectations are thus placed on donor staff before they even arrive in the village:
the equation that mzungu- money and honesty, is obviously not always correct and such
expectations can only lead to frustration and bitterness on the part of recipients and guilt
and frustration or an unfounded superiority complex on the part of the donors. There
therefore needs to be some recognition of the limitations of the power of the 'whitey'-
this can only be done by donors and their consultants admitting their limited power
instead of driving into villages with expensive cars, clothes, laptops and mobile
221 • •
phones , meeting mainly the most prestigious people, making lots of promises and then
leaving the same day. The message given by such action is clearly one of unfounded
superiority and of power to make change, which more often than not is illusory in
reality.
221 Actor Network Theory (Callon 1999; Czamiowska 1997; Dugdale 1999; Latour 1999) teaches us that
the Organisation is composed of both human and non-human actors, both tangible and intangible, all
enmeshed in a web of relations. The use of expensive cars etc. thus creates the Organisation as much as do
the human actors working within it. In this case, the power of the donor is established not simply through
the perceived authority of the mzungu but also through the use of non-human symbols such as laptops and
mobile phones.
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Considerable frustration was also expressed with the corrupt practices of some
Tanzanian village government officials, who have hindered the process even further:
It is their responsibility but they are doing nothing. They know there is money
coming here through your organisation, they thought it would be simple that the
money would just come to fill their pockets, they didn't know we would do it
like this, to build the centre. They just wanted the money, they are now delaying
the process because they think the money is going to her (TAWOMA
chairwoman), they just want it in their hands (Village informant, pers. comm.;
gloss added).
Instead of sowing the seeds to make a good harvest, they consume the seeds. One
kilo of maize seed can make 25 bags of maize but if he takes the kilo to make
stiff porridge he will never have 25 bags again. They squander the money before
the project takes off. They eat the seed, they don't plant it (Village government
informant, pers. comm.).
While corruption is clearly a fundamental aspect of life in Tanzania (it is almost
impossible to go from Mirerani to Arusha without being stopped by traffic police asking
for 'tea money': 'nipe chai'; see also 5.3) There are other reasons for the failure of
government officials to act, however, as illustrated by a regional government official:
With financial resources we are not able (...) We enrolled 25 children at Mirerani
primary school and sponsored 8 with school fees. What we lack is resources, you
can't withdraw children unless you have money to supplement what was missing
with the children. There has been no follow up, we have left the matter to the
village government and to the Headteacher. The Ministry does not provide travel
expenses for staff unless they give a written request to send you somewhere. A
social worker earns an average of TSH 100 000. We can't afford travel from our
" salary. (Dept of Social Welfare informant, pers. comm.; gloss added)
This reveals failure by village officials to follow up action instigated by the Department
as well as the desperate lack of resources. The salary of less than £100 per month is
extremely low and if social workers or other public officials want to travel to
communities, they must pay for this themselves, which makes follow-up difficult.
This section has shown that although Mirerani people felt that there was an important
role for IPEC and although they shared the same value system with regard to child
labour, the process itself clearly left a lot to be desired.
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7.3 Finding the 'Middle Ground'222
The above sections have revealed a multitude of factors hindering the smooth
development of the intervention programme: from wider contextual issues, such as the
changing aid framework, to donor mis-communication and failure, to local corruption:
You can't put the blame in one place. It is very difficult, there are always a
million factors which can make things go wrong (ex ILO official, pers. comm.).
I have tried to group these 'million factors' under three sub-headings which summarise
the key issues: power, procedures and people (Box 7.3). Through focusing on these three
categories, I am taking Hertzfeld's (1992: 182) 'dialectical middle ground', avoiding the
reification of either person or culture, but attending 'to the play of ideas about both'. In
the next section, I will thus step between institutionalised procedures and power
relations, and individual personalities in order to attend to 'the play of ideas' in the
development of the ILO-DFID intervention programme.
222 This chapter was influenced by discussions and debates surrounding a workshop, which I helped to
facilitate, held in May 2001 at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex
Box 7.3 Flow diagram to illustrate the way in which direct relations between the









In this section, power is not just defined in Weberian terms (1948), i.e., as being
obtainable through political structures, the securing of economic interests, style of life,
caste or ethnic group membership, specialised knowledge and so forth but in the wider
sense defined by Bourdieu (1977). While those holding the power in this case study
obtained it through the political structures to which they belong, the economic wealth
which they control, their prestigious life styles, their ethnic group membership and their
specialised knowledge, Bourdieu (1977) extends our understanding of power through his
idea of 'symbolic capital'. Symbolic capital, such as the prestige and renown attached to
a family name (ibid.: 179), or the gaining of prestige, loyalty, obligation through the
giving of gifts or loans (ibid.: 195) is socially recognisable as wealth, although its power
lies in it being a 'disguised' form of economic wealth. Power is therefore not only
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embedded in structural relations but is also constituted through language and everyday
practice (Bourdieu 1991, Kingsolver 1996).
The use and abuse of power is present at all levels of the case study: DFID used its
power to dictate to the ILO; HQ staff used their power over field staff; management over
front-line staff; particular government ministries over other ministries; village politicians
over other residents and so forth. One of the most striking elements of the case study is
the power of the 'donor'223 agency, DFID, to dictate ILO-IPEC practice regarding the
development of intervention in the mining sector. As seen in 4.4.5, the ILO does not
often say 'no' to donors, which can lead to a situation where qualified and experienced
IPEC staff find themselves jumping through donor hoops unnecessarily. This display of
power by DFID is reflected in its current move towards an 'influencing agenda', whereby
DFID staff are 'sent forth' to influence other development agencies and national
governments and encourage them to 'see the light'. The claim to be able to influence
development policy is clearly based on DFID's perception of its own symbolic capital.
As a donor, DFID has built up substantial symbolic capital in the form of prestige,
loyalty and obligation. It must, however, conceal the fact that this originates from
'material' forms of capital and therefore portrays itself as a 'gift-giver', 'influencer' and
'adviser' (see also argument relating to the PRSP below).
On the other hand, a Foucauldian perspective informs us that power is not just a one way
imposition, but a network of relations, a constructive force which produces reality (1977
194).. The ILO must therefore also take responsibility for allowing itself to be taken
through the hoops. In this case, the need for funds led to compromise and acceptance of
all DFID's 'suggestions'. In the words of the NPM: 'This is not a normal IPEC project.
This is being written for DFID'.
Frustration with DFID's exercising of power was also expressed by an ex-IPEC staff
member, with particular reference to the imposition of the baseline survey (7.1):
22j The ILO is itself a powerful donor in Tanzania but in this context is a recipient of DFID funds.
It is difficult to preach participatory research in a country where 'participation'
has a different meaning to London. It is the thing to do, it has been for the past
ten years but it may not be the appropriate way of doing things in Tanzania (...) It
is good to assess properly, I agree, but if someone who knows what they are
doing who has been working in the field for years says there are problems in
mining, why do you need to do a survey for Tanzania? (pers. comm.)
This question brings us straight back to Foucault's power-knowledge paradigm (1977,
1980) which sees power as both creating and created by knowledge. Why did DFID
want a survey for Tanzania before it would accept the opinion of the ILO partners that
mining was a priority sector? It could be argued that through requesting the baseline
survey, DFID was holding onto its power through certain 'concerted strategies of control'
(Foucault 1977), i.e., the ILO must do a, b, and c, as we tell it to; as well as through
holding onto the decision as to whose knowledge is acceptable, i.e. the knowledge of the
Tanzanian partners is insufficient, there needs to be further knowledge generation
funded by ourselves. However, it is important to remember that the Organisation is
value-based and the staff member who commissioned the survey was not simply an
'instrument' of power but an individual with her own agency who is committed to
poverty reduction and who used her best judgement to decide that a baseline survey was
needed. Furthermore, the issue of 'fashion' must be brought up. It is currently en vogue
to conduct baseline surveys and this obviously had an influential role to play. As one of
my informants told me: 'You have to admit this is a fashion-oriented business' (see also
Czamiowska 1997).
The irony is that the ILO staff member cited above, who was so critical of the baseline
survey, was the staffmember responsible for administering the baseline survey. It would
appear that the ILO recognised the power imbalance and agreed with the DFID proposal
in order to guarantee much needed funding in the long-run. With regard to the validity of
a national survey, I would agree with the informant. As mentioned above, I believe in
the intrinsic value of baseline surveys and extensive research as a basis for effective
action. In this case, however, it was not necessary to conduct a baseline survey to
determine whether or not the sector should be mining, as detailed research had already
been conducted in the sector by the ILO (Alii 1997) and both DFID and the ILO were
committed to the mining sector. The baseline survey, however, had it been better carried
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out, would have been an important documentation of the wider child labour situation in
Tanzania and therefore valuable in itself, but I argue, as a separate exercise, not a hurdle
to project funding.
Power was not just exercised by DFID over the ILO, but also by DFID management
over front-line staff and by the World Bank (the most important donor in the aid
hierarchy, along with the IMF) over DFID. It is important to remember that during the
time of negotiations between DFID and IPEC, DFID was undergoing dramatic
transformations, from a sub-office in Kenya to a large independent office in Tanzania.
Furthermore, the wider aid framework also changed: from projects to supporting
government development policy. Unfortunately, DFID staffwere not adequately briefed
on the implications of change and the period of transition was one of confusion. The
World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)224 process apparently came up
overnight and left many advisers in turmoil. Added to this was the fact that the new head
of DFID East Africa was determined to place the region at the 'cutting edge' which
meant that, along with Uganda, Tanzania was one of the first DFID offices to
wholeheartedly embrace the PRSP process. There should have been a clear statement
from DFID that support would no longer be given to projects; instead there was a series
of 'perhaps, if you do this and this'. This change is, however, a reality of the
development industry as a whole: a new 'trend' or 'success story' comes onto the scene
and suddenly everyone is in a rush to jump on the bandwagon. This case study is just
one ofmany abandoned orphans, nurtured by the donor parent only to be dropped, just
as it is about to walk, when a new, more beautiful baby arrives.
Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital, discussed above in relation to DFID's
'influencing' agenda, is also useful here. Through advocating the PRSP approach, the
World Bank and other donors place themselves as government 'advisers' as opposed to
mere providers of funds, retaining even more power, although at the end of the day the
primary reason that the Government of Tanzania accords them any power is that the
224 The PRSP is a policy paper developed by the national government, with donor support, through a
consultative process. Policy laid down in the paper will be supported by donors, the aim being that donors
will all be engaging in co-ordinated action, led by the national government, as opposed to working
piecemeal style on different projects.
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donors can provide the debt relief and "economic" capital needed to carry out the
country's development policy. While this perspective is clearly useful it is based on the
assumption that agents such as DFID are driven by a simple desire to gain power, by
whatever means. This assumption needs to be challenged in this context, where agents
clearly seek to maintain the prestige of their Organisation but many are also morally and
politically committed to the reduction of poverty and child labour, as well as wanting to
gain personally from their work (see 7.3.3).
The development of the intervention programme was aimed at reducing the conventional
power imbalance between community and donor through 'community empowerment',
'ownership' and 'capacity building'225. The philosophy was that the best project designers
are often community members themselves as they are aware of the realities in which
they live (Chambers 1983). Such an approach was being strongly promoted by the likes
ofDFID. Unfortunately, by the time the Project Memorandum was presented, DFID had
already moved on, leaving the 'capacity built' and 'empowered community', just as it was
about to walk, with no resources or further support. I firmly believe that such a move
makes a mockery of community participation as in the final analysis the donor had
retained the power i.e. the money and was as free as ever before to walk out, leaving
nothing but broken promises behind. In such a case, donors must be careful about
employing such grand vocabulary. NGOs have shown the value of 'participation',
'empowerment' and 'ownership' as effective development tools but this case study has
shown the extent to which these strong words can be watered down and eventually
abandoned without a second thought once they become institutionalised. During a
training programme for DFID Associate Professional Officers (APOs), a 'hypocrisy' test
was conducted on certain words currently 'en vogue' in development parlance. Those
which ranked highest were: Partnership, Ownership, Participation and Transparency226.
The hypocrisy behind the use of these words is perfectly illustrated by our case study -
there was no real partnership (either between DFID and ILO or between the donors and
225 For a useful discussion of'ownership' and 'empowerment' see Cornwall (2000).
226 The extent to which donor commitment to participation/ownership etc. remains rhetorical is shown by
the fact that these issues are never included as indicators for monitoring and evaluation. Only once this has
become regular practice can the rhetorical use of these words become a real commitment.
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the Mirerani residents) and no true ownership, there was participation but it was
irrelevant in the wider scheme of things and there was very little transparency by DFID
as to its changing agenda.
The ILO uses the language of'participation' much less than DFID but the organisation's
rhetoric would indicate that a high emphasis is placed on adapting child labour
intervention activities to local conditions:
The struggle against child labour must be rooted in each society's own culture,
institutions and aspirations. Children and their families are the first line of
defence against child labour. That is why efforts are directed at identifying and
implementing concrete measures to empower them through awareness,
participation and organisation (ILO-IPEC literature undated; emphasis in
original)
IPEC is naturally in a much better position to put this into practice than DFID as it
works through national institutions- government, unions, employers and NGOs. The
media campaign has been particularly successful in reaching children and their families
in order to raise awareness (6.3.7). In practice, however, there has been little progress in
terms of empowerment and participation beyond the awareness raising stage. The
'empowerment through participation and organisation' has received less attention. For
example, it was shown above that sensitisation workshops were held for government
officials in the Arusha region and a meeting was then held in Mirerani to form a
committee. Most people invited to this meeting, however, were high level residents not
'children and their families'. The latter are usually far too busy to come to the township
on a work day to attend meetings. One way of encouraging their participation would
have been to show the video made or to share the research reports with them (7.1).
Unfortunately, this was not done (as seen above) and the nice words expressed in the
promotional literature cited above remain mostly rhetorical. Furthermore, it can be
argued that the views of'children and their families' are considered important as long as
they do not conflict with the legislative norms laid down by the ILO. Where children
indicate that they do not agree with these universal and generalised norms (see 8.1.1), it
is argued that the legislators know best, and their views are therefore discarded in the
interests of standardisation.
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It has been seen that the powerful position of the donors (World Bank and DFID) means
that they can dictate policy change. This also puts the donor management in an
extremely powerful position over front-line staff. In DFID Tanzania, there was a lot of
reluctance by many field staff to adopt the PRSP process so rapidly. Those that
expressed this attitude were seen, however, by management as 'not with it' or 'foolish'.
This meant that many felt unable to express their opinions, based on long-term
development experience, during office meetings. They were made clear, however,
amongst friends over dinner. The pressures of the Organisation were therefore such that
dissent was penalised, at the expense of gaining the opinions of experienced, qualified
staffwho may have had very valid points to make.
ILO staff also found the continually changing policy agenda of donors extremely
stressful:
The changing policies of donors is also a headache, it is difficult to formulate
interventions when donors are formulating their policies. You need to give
priorities time to work not to keep reviewing and changing them (ex ILO official,
pers. comm.).
It is front-line staff, as opposed to donor management, who have built relationships with
people on the ground and therefore feel personally committed to the area. The managers,
on the other hand, have no direct responsibility to the 'clients' and therefore have fewer
ethical qualms about 'moving on'.
The way policies change illustrates the ranking of power within the industry- the World
Bank changed its approach, DFID followed, leaving the ILO and IPEC, never mind
'poor people' and child labourers, behind in the race to get to the front. While learning
from mistakes is clearly important, continual change which does not give sufficient time
for mistakes to be learnt from and incorporated into better practice, can only be
detrimental in the long term. Tanzania provides a clear example of the disastrous impact
of rushing new policies through: the Child Labour Unit (6.2.2) was not even invited to
the PRSP meetings, and so was not given the opportunity to put its issues on to the
agenda. Donors see the PRSP as reflecting the Government's priorities and will therefore
be less inclined to support activities not included in it. By not being included in the
PRSP the reduction of child labour would not therefore be considered a government
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priority by donors. As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, however, child labour is a government
priority but the Prime Minister's Office, responsible for sending out invitations to the
PRSP discussions, did not invite the Ministry of Labour and the Child Labour Unit. This
reflects further the issue of power within the process: some government departments are
more influential than others for a number of reasons, such as personality and resources,
and their ideas are therefore prioritised. Child labour was eventually put into the final
draft of the PRSP, only to be removed when another 'internal final draft' was put out by
the Prime Minister's office.
It was shown above that 'Power' is also key to the relationship between headquarters and
the field, both in the ILO and in DFID. For example, my internship was set up by DFID
HQ as part of its 'partnership' with the ILO, laid down in its 1999 paper 'The elimination
of poverty: working collaboratively to tackle child labour', and I had signed my contract
before DFID East Africa had even agreed to have me. When I arrived in Tanzania, there
was no budget for my work, clearly an impediment to effective action, not only in
financial terms but also because if you do not have a budget your work is sidelined and
not considered an office priority. This was clearly illustrated by my absence from the
Tanzania office organogram. Therefore, although HQ asserted its power by sending me
to the field, the field office had its own forms of resistance, primarily through sidelining
my work.
Another example of HQ asserting its authority concerns the 51% delivery rate (see 4.1).
Field offices have been put under pressure to spend more and to spend on time. This did
not address the fundamental problems, which were caused by HQ:
This is not because of the fault of field staff but because of bureaucratic delays
because someone is blocking your money. Instead of resolving this they are just
telling us to make sure we spend the money in time (ex ILO official, pers.
comm.).
In an attempt to redress this power imbalance, the ILO has been following a policy of
decentralisation but:
They have decentralised responsibility but not resources, so this causes trouble in
the field (ILO staffmember, pers. comm.).
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The ultimate test of relinquishing power is clearly financial decentralisation but this is
something many agencies are not prepared to do, which means that decentralisation
227 ...remains primarily rhetorical . In the meantime, IPEC Tanzania is still subject to
228
extensive delays due to waiting for financial approval from Geneva .
Use and abuse of power at all levels, be it financial, symbolic or other, is therefore key
to understanding how the intervention process has developed in such an ad hoc and
questionable way. The exercising of power is not the whole story, however.
Understandings of how particular procedures are used and of the individual people who
implement them are also crucial.
7.3.2 Procedures
The nature of the rules is crucial here. The "rules" in the excellent companies
have a positive cast. They deal with quality, service, innovation and
experimentation. Their focus is on building, expanding, the opposite of
restraining; whereas most companies concentrate on controlling, limiting,
constraint. We don't seem to understand that rules can reinforce positive traits as
well as discourage negative ones, and that the former kind are far more effective.
(Peters and Waterman 1982: 322)
By procedures, I am referring to formal bureaucratic practices, rules or 'rituals' employed
by organisations in order to function as effectively as possible. Although procedures are
the back bone of any form of organising, a review of organisational and management
text books reveals that they are the almost 'invisible' element of organisational
. 229
theorising . Following Du Gay (2000), I argue that bureaucratic procedures are a valid
and valuable form of public sector organising (also 4.4.3), despite current drives to
reduce them and follow more flexible, private sector forms of ad hoc entrepreneurship.
"7 This also applies to 'partnerships' with other organisations and the emphasis on community
'ownership'. Until the financial processes are also 'owned' or at least shared there will be no true
ownership or partnership
228 Power and domination are also fundamental to the functioning of the intervention process at a local
level. For example, during the participatory planning exercise in Mirerani, the majority of participants
were CCM (the dominant political party) officials with their own particular interests and agendas.
229 tIt is interesting to note that the only time I was restricted access to ILO documents was when I asked to
see the procedures handbook.
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Both the ILO and DFID have lengthy handbooks on procedures to be followed in the
day-to-day functioning of the Organisation. When in doubt as to how to proceed, a staff
member will refer to the handbook and will be able to justify action taken on the basis
that they are 'following the procedures'. In this way, procedures form a safety net in
moments of uncertainty, as well as setting a uniform pattern of action. At their best,
bureaucratic procedures prevent corruption, nepotism and other unsavoury behaviours as
well as laying down clear, acceptable modes of practice. At their worst, however,
procedures can be abused and blamed for unacceptable behaviour. They can cause
delays, frustration and inaction, with staff mechanistically using procedures as the ends
of organisational action rather than as the means for effective action. This is often
because procedures, as we shall see below, become institutionalised or ritualised
(Hertzfeld 1992) and do not develop with the times, unlike policy which as shown above
can be extremely fickle and flighty.
It was seen in Chapter 6 that the ILO has stringent communication procedures- incoming
and outgoing mail must be monitored by the Directors of the relevant departments. The
expressed purpose of this procedure is to ensure effective communication across and
within departments. Many staff feel, however, that this procedure is more of a
supervisory, 'panoptical' (Foucault 1977) mechanism. It thus causes resentment and the
belief in staff that they are not trusted to 'do their job properly'. In DFID, communication
procedures are more ad hoc and individuals are trusted to and expected to use their
common sense in deciding what needs copying to management. Unfortunately, this case
study„ reveals that neither procedural mechanism was particularly useful in ensuring
effective communication and the lack of communication between different departments
and agencies was shocking, leading to needless delays and misunderstandings.
Another procedural example was the use of participatory planning. DFID requested that
IPEC conduct participatory planning, which it did. Once this was complete, however,
DFID pulled out of the process for entirely unrelated reasons, which answers Robert
Chambers' question as to the extent to which participatory planning is then acted on:
Empowering poor people to conduct their own appraisal and analysis, and to
present their realities, is one thing. Whether their voices are heard, understood
and acted on is another (Chambers 1998: 197).
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'Participatory planning' is an important project development tool, but as seen, can
become yet another procedural hoop for practitioners to jump through, as opposed to a
truly emancipatory tool. Green (2000: 68) provides a valuable critique of the
development of participatory planning exercises, arguing that:
despite the claims of participatory development ideologies to foster the
empowerment of the poor, the interventions it promotes are premised on a denial
of poor people's capacity to bring about change for themselves. Such approaches
prioritise participation in terms of knowledge production rather than programme
management and in so doing construct the target communities as passive agents
waiting the emancipatory intervention of development organisations.
In favour of the IPEC case study, it is important to point out that participation was to be
prioritised in project management and not just for the purposes of knowledge
production. The fact that DFID changed its policy does not take away from the good
intentions of the participatory planning exercise. The key all along was that poor people
did have the capacity to bring about change for themselves, as illustrated by the way
people were invited to put forward their proposals, which were then taken on board.
This, however, was more due to the person responsible for developing the process,
myself in this case, than to a specific IPEC procedural requirement of participation. As
seen in Chapters 3 and 4, 'participation' is not a term commonly employed by IPEC. I
would argue, however, that while ILO has perhaps been slower on the ball than DFID at
employing 'sexy' language, it is a more 'participatory' organisation in that trade unions,
employers groups, governments and NGOs are, in theory at least, representative ofmany
people in their country and are therefore participating more in the development of ILO
policy and practice. The vast majority of poor people, however, are not involved in any
of these groups for obvious reasons and Green's argument is therefore relevant at this
level. In the case study, poor people's participation was mainly seen in terms of
knowledge generation: poor people and children were asked for information and advice
but it was not expected that they themselves would manage the project. This would be
left to more powerful elements of the community - in the end the consultant decided that
the project would be managed by an Arusha-based NGO. The role of the NGO,
however, would be to eventually hand over project responsibility to the 'community',
once sufficient capacity had been build. The argument, with which I concur, was that,
however much one might want poor people to manage their own projects, a DFID
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funded project requires particular skills, which the vast majority of poor people do not
possess, such as computer typed quarterly reports, stringent financial and other
procedures. The fact is that DFID and other donors are accountable to the British tax
payer and must therefore provide documented support for the legitimate nature of their
expenditure. The ideal whereby money is given to poor people to manage by themselves
is therefore not realistic for a public government body, particularly in the current context
where written documentation is essential at every step of the process. This leads public
donor organisations, seeking to reduce the exclusive nature of their work, to one of two
divergent paths: firstly, they can invest more resources in 'capacity building', during
which time poor people are trained in the 'right way' to fill in the forms; secondly, they
can accept less regimented procedures and adopt the approach of the Swedish
development agency, SIDA (see below), for example, whereby local partners are
allowed to use their own procedures to administer projects. This saves a lot of'capacity
building' time and serves to break down the power-knowledge (Foucault 1977) hierarchy
between donor and recipient in that it recognises the administrative procedures and
capabilities of the recipient as opposed to trying to impose alien and often inappropriate
procedural requirements230. On the basis of my data I would clearly recommend the
second path.
With regard to the target community being constructed as 'passive agents waiting the
emancipatory intervention of development organisations', it is important to note that the
'target community' in Mirerani was far from passive before and after the 'emancipatory'
intervention of IPEC. They already knew there was a problem and people were helping
children out on an individual basis (Chapter 8). What was missing was a concerted
strategy and it was through facilitating the development of such a strategy that IPEC had
a valuable role to play. What must be noted, however, was that the opportunity for a
development organisation to have one staff member working with a community for 12
months is extremely rare and therefore the participatory planning exercise often becomes
230 Action Aid UK is currently trying to adopt such an approach through its ALPS or Accountability,
Planning and Learning System, which aims to 'liberate staff and partners from the tyranny of endless
forms and writing lengthy plans and reports which mostly adorn some shelf or archive' (ActionAid 2001:
7). ALPS puts more emphasis on downward accountability to the poor as well as opening up space for
greater participation during planning, monitoring and evaluation of programmes.
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a one week hurdle to jump over as fast as possible, without the time to gain a real
understanding of the issues in order to facilitate the process of community planning.
Most often, a stranger walks in, demands participatory planning to be conducted in a few
days, usually conducting relevant activities with local 'elites' (Crewe and Harrison 1998:
175), and then has to write this up into project memorandum (7.1). The problem
therefore is not simply the potentially rhetorical nature of 'participatory planning' but the
lack of resources allocated to it by the Organisation (also 3.1; 4.2.2). Furthermore,
resources for particular projects have been predetermined in the annual budgets ofmost
donors, so the 'participatory' aspect of planning is often constrained to fit within
predetermined limits.
The Mirerani case is a clear example of the need to spend a long time in understanding
the context before undertaking any form of planning. The site is visually distressing and
most visitors are extremely disturbed when first seeing it. It is a challenge to all the
senses: the sore, red eyes shining out of the filthy, dried up face of a small child, the
smell of excrement and urine everywhere, the sounds of the explosives, the taste of the
dust and explosives in your mouth, the smell in your nose, the feel on your skin. For
many people the immediate response is the desire to take all the children into your arms
and to 'remove them from child labour'. A deeper understanding of the situation leads
you to see the child behind the shocking exterior and to see the wider context. Although
mining is clearly a difficult and risky occupation, for many children it is a chosen
alternative to life at home, on the shamba, where successive droughts mean food and
cash is scarce (8.1.1). This revelation illustrates the need for a deeper analysis. When I
presented my findings to the National Steering Committee, I was criticised for painting
'too nice a picture' of life in the mines. This reminded me of my own first impressions,
where I had to find a private space to cry at the misery of these children. The
impressions I took with me to the meeting, however, were of laughing children, proud to
be earning an income and with a real 'joie de vivre.' What many of the children wanted
was not charity but financial assistance to set themselves up in business, to pay for
schooling or to buy mining equipment (8.1.1). Others, however, did just want 'out' of the
mining life, but felt that they had no choice, illustrating the complexity of developing an
intervention programme for 'child labourers'. There is no such thing as 'the child
labourer', instead there are thousands of children, each with different experiences, needs
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and desires. This is described fully in Chapter 8 but at this stage, I merely want to flag
up the importance of long term community planning as opposed to short term
consultancies, where consultants are forced to meet a checklist of procedures, e.g.
logframes, participatory planning, SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats) analyses etc.
The logframe, for example, is meant to facilitate management and planning and to be
effective it should be developed with stakeholders. In this case-study, the logframe was
developed by the consultant, and revised by ILO staff and myself in Dar Es Salaam. The
logframe was very much developed for DFID. It was clear that DFID would not even
consider a Project Memorandum without a logframe attached. This is a very good
example of how a valuable and empowering tool becomes a rigid and non-participatory
procedure. The ILO do not use the logframe approach, yet for them to have any chance
of gaining DFID funding they were obliged to develop a logframe. The assertive attitude
of DFID is once again brought to the fore; the ILO had to develop a logframe, even
though it is a complex tool which requires substantial training to be used properly. The
logframe therefore ceased in this case to be a participatory tool but instead became a
procedure forced upon the ILO231. As such, much of its value was lost and, once more, a
mockery was made of the term 'participation'. Neither Mirerani residents not the ILO
were in positions of sufficient power to negotiate whether or not it would be appropriate
to use the tool, and instead were forced to accept a DFID imposed procedure. As we saw
at the beginning of this section, procedures are meant to facilitate the effectiveness of an
Organisation. Instead, in this case the logframe and other procedures became yet more
hurdles on the path to potential DFID funding, which as we know was eventually
withdrawn anyway due to unrelated policy changes in the wider aid framework (7.1;
7.3.1).
Procedures are therefore subject to abuse, particularly when they become bureaucratic
ends in themselves, as opposed to the means by which to operate effectively and
legitimately. Organisations should therefore be attempting to ensure that procedures are
231 The Swedish donor agency, SIDA, is fully aware of the non-participatory nature of imposing the
logframe and partners submit project memorandums according to the format that they feel is most useful.
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employed as part of a wider process and that the goal, be it the elimination of child
labour or the elimination of poverty, remains in sight at all times. In this way,
procedures can become positive and dynamic tools for effective practice, as envisaged
by Peters and Waterman (1982) in the introductory quote to this section.
7.3.3 'People' Issues
Emotions are within the texture of organizing. They are intrinsic to social order
and disorder, working structures, conflict, influence, posturing, gender, sexuality
and politics. They are products of socialization and manipulation. They work
mistily within the human psyche, as well as obviously in the daily ephemera of
organizational life. Although we might know this, it seems to be uncomfortable
knowledge. Writers on organizations have successfully 'written out' emotions, to
the extent that it is often impossible to detect their existence (Fineman 1993: 1)
The above quote is the introduction to Fineman's ground-breaking work on emotions
within organisations (see also 4.4). I propose in this section to 'write in' the emotions
which imbued the case study used in this chapter. Such an attempt also helped me
understand why emotions have been successfully 'written out' of the literature. Emotions
are 'too close to home'; they require commentary on people that the commentator has
worked with and got to know. Writing about these people in such a personal way as to
comment on their emotions seems in some way a betrayal of the relationship (1.2).
Furthermore, the interpretation of emotion can only be subjective and therefore counters
the perception of the rational and objective researcher, it takes us into the domain of
gossip and far too close to our own emotions and how they impact on our perceptions of
the informant. Unlike the informant in a remote village, who does not read English, the
informant from a particular organisation is quite likely to read the commentary and
challenge the researcher's interpretation of their emotions. When the organisation you
study is also one for which you work the task becomes even more controversial. The
sense of'belonging' to the organisation brings up my own emotions: guilt at referring to
colleagues and friends; fears as to the consequences doing so may have for any future
relationships with the Organisation; sense of loyalty to the Organisation and so forth.
For these very reasons, my own emotions mean that I must omit a number of field
experiences, for which I apologise in advance. I therefore take a deep breath and dive
into the task of attempting to explore the impact of 'emotion' within the case study. I
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have chosen to call this section 'People' rather than emotion in order to maintain the link
with the people involved, as opposed to exploring emotion in a detached way, for
detached is one thing that discussing emotion can never be, and 'people' are the units
through which emotion lives and breeds. Furthermore, the term 'people' also embodies
the issues of agency, motivation and unpredictability which are so central to the
translation of vision into effective practice, as revealed throughout this thesis.
It was shown in 4.4, that affectivity or emotion is central to the success or failure of any
organisational practice. Both the ILO and DFID are portrayed as and portray themselves
as homogeneous monoliths or 'communities' of like minded people, all fighting for the
same goal, be it poverty elimination or the elimination of child labour. The reality,
however, is clearly different. Within each Organisation there is a multitude of discourses
and practices, of motivations and aspirations and of forms of conflict and resistance.
Fineman (1993) uses two conceptual lenses to explore emotion in organisations: social
constructionism and psychodynamic theory. The former teaches us how 'emotions shape,
and are shaped, by the social arrangements, rules and languages used' (ibid.: 2) and the
latter how 'a largely invisible world of personal anxieties, fears and yearnings can be
seen to underpin some of the routines and rituals of work organization and behaviour'
(ibid.: 2-3). One ethnographic example of this would be the introductory quote to this
chapter in which an ILO informant refers to the important role played by 'self esteem' in
the birth of a new project. Fineman's framework is therefore particularly useful in
allowing the student of organisations to explore both the visible and invisible ways in
which emotions determine the thinking and doing that establish organisational practice.
Both the Organisations in this case study are target based: the ILO's target is the
elimination of child labour and DFID's target is the elimination of poverty. Within these
organisations, however, individual staff members have their own targets, framed within
country strategy papers. Performance targets are often framed in a relatively rigid way
which does not reflect the highly dynamic realities of organisational life. For example,
my DFID Annual Performance Development Plan (APDP) was developed on my arrival
in Tanzania and revised half way through the year. The context within which I was
working shifted dramatically between the first set of targets, the revised targets and the
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final evaluation. Despite the recognition of my ability to adapt and of the tasks I
undertook which were not in the APDP, one central conclusion to my APDP was that I
did not meet my original targets. The impact of such performance targets is that staff
tend to avoid innovative behaviour, to stick to simple, achievable targets and do not
expect recognition for actions taken outwith the APDP framework. Performance thus
becomes geared, not to achieving the overall aim of poverty elimination or whatever but
to attaining one's personal targets in order to achieve a good end-of-year review and
therefore eventual promotion. Emotion thus plays a central role in the practice of annual
performance plans. Using Fineman's two conceptual lenses it can therefore be argued
from a social constructionist view that annual performance plans shape the way in which
staff behave and their emotional responses to their evaluations determine the way in
which they perform according to their targets. From the psychodynamic perspective, it
can be seen that the personal fears and anxieties of staff regarding meeting targets and
therefore the gaining of a good review and future promotion opportunities underpin how
the organisation functions.
In 7.1, it was shown that one of the primary problems in the development of the
intervention programme was linked to staff changes:
The process has been wrong from day one (...) One of the problems is that there
are so many people in on it, people leave, there is no continuity and they don't
talk, that is the point of the Mirerani thing, the (SDA) left (another) came in, then
she came to Dar (from Nairobi as part of DFID decentralisation) then I left, then
you came in and weren't informed of what had been going on (ex- ILO official,
pers. comm.).
The lack of continuity and communication is largely related to the fact that little
emphasis is placed, particularly in the ILO, on staff management (6.3.3). If there had
been, there would have been better hand-overs as well as better briefing. The new policy
framework also came into place over an extremely short time period with little staff
consultation or briefing (7.1). In terms of emotion, continual staff changes meant that
personal links formed between staff members were broken, which in turn meant that
important links between the organisations were also broken, having to be re-built with
each change, a time- consuming process, which in part helps to explain why what should
have taken only a few months has taken over four years.
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Staff changes also brought different personal priorities onto the agenda (7.1). For
example, the ex-IPEC staff member was personally committed to intervention in the
mining sector and the ex-DFID SDA was personally committed to the importance of in-
depth research. Their replacements, however, were not so committed to either issue and
had very different agendas (7.1). Personal preferences lead to prioritisation ofwork load:
people are more inclined to focus on work that they are personally committed too. In an
environment where staff have extremely heavy workloads, work which is not personally
prioritised will sit at the bottom of the 'in-tray', which can go some way to explaining
the delays. Recognition of different personal priorities is important in order to view the
Organisation not as a homogeneous body but as a contested terrain in which different
'stakeholders' have different agendas, each stakeholder trying to influence outcomes in
their own way (Phillips and Edwards 2000: 49).
Furthermore, overwork and insufficient staff has led to the logjam situation, particularly
in the ILO (Chapters 4 and 6), as well as to conflict between HQ and the field office,
with field staff often feeling misunderstood and over-stretched:
Part of the problem is the non-realisation on the part of the donors and IPEC
Geneva as to how orchestrated field staff feel, they are under funded, you can
work 18 hours a day, seven days a week and not shift the work. IPEC Tanzania is
seen as a success, everything is dumped here. (...) You end up working in an ad
hoc manner and you don't have five minutes to think strategically, to do a
comprehensive piece of work. The field office needs more staff. This is not
realised by IPEC Geneva or they know but don't know what to do, the donors
don't want to fund staff or equipment, they want the money to go direct to the
children, this is a good approach but it isn't working, it isn't reaching the
children (ILO staffmember, pers. comm.).
In the rush to develop new policies, the organisational 'manpower', in terms of capacity
and emotion, is often forgotten. Policies are developed mainly at a theoretical level, in
HQ, with little consideration of available staff capacity resources, as in the case of
Tanzania and the TBP (6.2.1). The feelings expressed by the informant in the quote
above reflect Fineman's psychodynamic invisible world of personal anxieties, fears and
yearnings. Staff felt overworked, under valued and frustrated by the way their work was
hindered by factors like those mentioned. The section of the quote referring to IPEC's
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success also takes us back to Chambers' (1983) argument as to the potentially self-
defeating nature of success (6.3.5).
Field staff are also marginalised within the career structure and this came up on a
number of occasions:
There is an ingrained organisational culture that it is better to stay in Geneva if
you want promotion than to go to the field where you may be forgotten. This is a
huge problem (ILO staffmember, pers. comm.).
High level staff are thus encouraged to stay in Geneva which acts a form of 'brain
drain', where the most qualified and experienced staff feel little incentive to work in the
field, although this is where most direct impact occurs (see 6.3.1).. The quest for status
and power is, I would argue, an important characteristic for many people working within
the ILO and DFID and is therefore central to understanding social relationships within
the organisation (Fineman 1993: 22).
Another aspect of the quest for status and power is reflected in the issue of leadership
(4.4.7); people's careers can be built on bringing in ambitious, new policies. This was
particularly illustrated by the new Head of DFIDEA's desire to be at the 'cutting edge'
and the pushing forward of the PRSP process. He revolutionised the office almost
immediately upon his arrival, causing concern among staff members, particularly those
with long term community experience and commitment who knew that fast is not always
best. Within a few months of his appointment and his revolutionising of the offices, he
had already applied for promotion and was given one within two years of his arrival.
The management literature refers to these people as 'change agents' - brought into
departments for short periods of time, during which they revolutionise the structures,
and are then moved to other departments almost as rapidly as they were brought in
(Buchanan and Boddy 1992; Cooper and Hingley 1985).
Du Gay writes of his concern with recent trends in the public sector to whole-heartedly
embrace innovative management techniques. He warns of the implications of 'too
enthusiastically harnessing individual enterprise to the achievement of public goals and
the pursuit of public interests' (2000: 12). His argument is based on the fundamentally
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different raisons d'etre of the private and the public sectors. Public bureaucracies are
meant to be custodians of a country's Constitution and of the interests of its nationals:
Because a system of representative government requires officials to act as the
custodians of the constitutional values it embodies, it cannot frame the role of
bureaucrats as solely in terms of efficient management, performance,
responsiveness and securing results (2000: 12).
I would argue that it is not the role of DFID to be at the 'cutting edge' of International
Development. On the contrary, the Organisation has a responsibility to ensure that DFID
policy is conducted according to the interests of the British electorate. These interests
have been set down under the overall goal of'poverty elimination'. It is therefore the role
ofDFID to provide the necessary administrative and advisory support to ensure that this
takes place. The Tanzania case illustrates how processes were 'managed' in order to be at
the 'cutting edge' despite the hesitancy expressed by many staff members. Rather than
considering the World Bank strategy in depth and providing advice to ensure its ultimate
effectiveness, management was pro-active in a way which even surprised the World
Bank itself. As one World Bank informant told me, they had been expecting a bit more
resistance and comment to the proposed Strategy Paper. One individual, however, had
the power, personality and drive to push things through. It only remains to be seen
whether or not this particular policy will successfully 'eliminate poverty', even though
many valuable projects were dumped unceremoniously in the process.
Fieldwork also revealed the different personality cultures valued within the two
Organisations. DFID appears to place an important emphasis on vocal and dynamic
personalities, necessary if anyone is to take notice of its 'influencing agenda', whereas
ILO staff tend to be far less dynamic, emphasising the following of procedures as
opposed to the voicing of opinions. This is also reflected in the different organisational
management styles and promotion structures: in the ILO, the primary function of the
Area Office Director was to 'administer' the office, through reading mail and allocating
roles, whereas in DFID the primary function of the 'Regional Head' was to shake up the
office and place it at the 'cutting edge'.
People and their emotions therefore play a vital role in organisational life: be it in the
form of social constructionism through the development of specific personality and
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leadership cultures, or in the form of personnel management which can cause
understaffmg and consequent delays or lack of continuity through frequent staff changes
and lack of handovers; or in the form of psychodynamic factors such as ambition,
frustration, anxiety, fear or yearning. What does this signify for the practice of
organisations such as the ILO? According to Putnam and Mumby (1993: 55), emotions
can be managed as the means to instrumental ends, such as the desire to perform well
and therefore to set conservative targets in your APDP, but also as positive ways to
enhance 'community interrelatedness'. They argue that using the emotion frame exposes
'the myth of rationality', and produces 'information grounded in personal experience,
mutual understanding, and community'. A challenge which, I would argue organisations
such as the ILO and DFID should begin to take on board. Finally, recognising the
importance of 'people' issues is an important step in that it places people firmly at the
centre of organisational practice and change. This in turn places responsibility for the
way in which power and procedures are employed with individuals themselves and takes
us away from abstract and de-humanised critique, a theme to which I return in Chapter
9.
7.4 Chapter Conclusions
The development of an intervention process therefore involves a complex web of
factors. At each level of the intervention process a combination of power relations,
procedures and people mean that there is continual negotiation and re-negotiation
between different agents. This illustrates the difficulties of referring to the
'Organisation' or the 'Donor' as a de-humanised, inorganic entity: instead there is
simply a multitude of people trying to perform in a bureaucratic structure, employing
often inadequate and antiquated procedures, and trying to find ways to simplify their
tasks and to meet their personal ambitions and needs, within a complex network of
global, national and local power relations. When I arrived in Tanzania, IPEC was very
much riding the last wave of the project based agenda. By the end of my involvement,
IPEC Tanzania was clearly no longer in the right place, right time or right agenda, at
least as far as DFID was concerned. There are also conflicts within organisations as to
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how to do things and in this case, the donor with the money and the strong personality
culture was the dominant power. IPEC lacked the time, manpower and confidence to
stand by its own ideas and practices and to challenge DFID on points of contention.
Green (2001) argues that the kinds of practices used to plan and to implement
development are employed in order to transform policy vision into manageable realities
through the social constitution of 'projects'. In this case study, the policy vision of
'reducing child labour in the Tanzanian mining sector' is transformed into manageable
realities through an array of 'projects', such as conducting a baseline study, capacity
building and empowerment, developing a project memorandum according to DFID
defined guidelines. All these 'projects' are developed according to particular procedures,
as seen above. The fulfilling of the procedures in order to ensure that the project is
managed in a quantifiable and financially justifiable way becomes the end in itself. The
'projects' thus become separated from wider social realities, from the nitty-gritty,
complex and emotional aspects of 'real life'. This explains how the child labourers
themselves became almost invisible within the intervention development process.
The above leads to one simple question: Why do public organisations, such as the ILO
and DFID, continue to function as they do, despite the repeated evidence that their
approach is not only time consuming but resource consuming with minimum impact for
so-called 'beneficiaries'? Organisations like DFID have tried to transform the
bureaucratic model, by adopting private-sector management techniques, such as change
agents. Such an approach is also problematic, however, as the public sector has very
different responsibilities and needs to play more of a monitoring role rather than
jumping onto whatever the next fashionable bandwagon may be, without adequate time
for reflection and questioning. While the ILO could not say 'no' to DFID, DFID could
not say 'no' to the World Bank. Both Organisations should have taken more time to
reflect on the implications of following the more powerful organisation almost blindly.
Both could have put forward valuable arguments and points for reflection. Instead they
just acted: the ILO for money, and DFID for the prestige of being at the 'cutting edge'. In
both cases, the last consideration was the best interests of the child. Short term
Organisational interests came first.
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Recent management thinking has shown that project implementation problems appear to
'lie with "people issues'", organization structure, and project leadership, not with
traditional project management and control, or issues related to technical developments'
(Buchanan and Boddy 1992: 4). Such a statement is supported by this study of the ILO
and DFID in Tanzania, which shows that issues related to technical developments (such
as the implementation of a 'participatory' or 'empowerment' approach to development)
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and to traditional project management and control (such as the project cycle ) were not
the factors leading to failure to develop a project which would impact on the lives of
child labourers. Instead it was 'people issues', in the form of staffing and personalities;
'organization structures', in terms of unnecessary bureaucratic delays and
miscommunications; and 'project leadership' determined by power relations. 'Leadership'
was never clear in the process: IPEC should have been leading the process and yet DFID
used its power to lead the process in subtle ways. The result of these factors, which I
have centred around the themes of power, procedures and people, was the unnecessary
expenditure of energy, money and time at the cost of the development of appropriate and
effective child labour intervention. It has been seen that the children themselves were the
last consideration in the bureaucratic process, rarely mentioned by any of my
informants. Furthermore, as revealed by this study, by the time practice reaches the
children themselves the wider context may have changed leading to the abandonment of
the intervention itself. The result in this case was the self-sustenance of two
9-1-5
bureaucracies and the expenditure of almost four years, of over $140, 000 and of staff
time and energy. The direct impact on child labourers, however, was nil.
232 The project cycle is a project management tool used by DFID and other donors, which involves
problem identification, planning, implementation and monitoring in a continuous cycle.
233 This figure includes the $91, 000 in the DFID-ILO Memorandum of Understanding for the baseline
study and other activities which should arise, and the cost of my placement (in terms of salary,
accommodation and other expenses). Added to this should also be the staffing and other relevant costs to
both Organisations. I could not quantify these, however.
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8. The 'Missing Link':
Mirerani Child Labourers
Contextualised
It was seen in the last chapter that the child subjects of international intervention, the
child labourers themselves, become almost invisible within the wider machinations of
the ILO and DFID bureaucracies. This chapter uses participant observation to focus on
the voices of the children themselves and the circumstances in which they work or
labour. This chapter, which could have been the first, thus becomes the last, and serves
as a reminder of who it was that the ILO and DFID were in fact claiming to be trying to
assist: not 'the child labourer' as an abstract and disembodied construct but 'child
labourers' as embodied subjects, living within a particular reality.
This chapter will therefore use ethnographic evidence in an attempt to bring the 'child
labourer' in Mirerani to life, exploring the realities of child labour in the Tanzanite mines
and the cultural constructions of child work to which the children are subject. The first
section will consider the voices of the nyokas themselves and their reasons for working
in the mines as well as their opinions of their work. The following sections will explore
the cultural constructions of'child' and 'work' in Mirerani. We will consider the extent to
which the constructed child labourer described in previous chapters matches the profile
of the children working in the mines ofMirerani.
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8.1 Child Labour/work in Mirerani
Until relatively recently, Mirerani was predominantly populated by male adults. There
were few women in the township and those who were there were mainly traders such as
female commercial sex workers and mama ntilies (mobile food sellers). Most miners
were either single or had left their families behind in their home villages or towns. There
were therefore very few children in the township. As Mirerani developed into a larger
settlement in the mid to late 1990s with medical facilities, a school, electricity and a
police station, more and more families with children started to settle there (5.2). The
arrival ofwomen and children clearly led to transformations in the daily work activities
in the area. Different tribal and socio-economic groups were living together in one
settlement, influencing each other's cultures and traditions. It is important to bear this in
mind and understand that it is not possible to provide generalised statements about
children and child labour and child work in Mirerani. This ethnographic study of
children reflects their specific patterns of socialisation, which have been influenced by
living in such a diverse and unique community.
8.1.1 'The child labourers'234
When you watch them carefully you realise they are not real children... some
have red eyes apparently because of the bhang (marijuana) they smoke ... they
seem ostensibly guilty of an offence they will never admit to have
committed..there is nothing like a sense of discipline or decency in the way they
respond to questions asked by an adult. (Rioba 1995; gloss added)
In Chapter 3, 'the child labourer' as defined by international discourse was introduced.
Having examined the local context in which children are engaged in Mirerani, it is
appropriate to attempt to understand the reality of embodied child labourers. Who is the
'child labourer' in the context of Mirerani? What is the experience of the 'child
labourer'? To what extent does the constructed child labourer, the 'victim' of adult
234 The term is used in inverted commas to refer to the fact that this section is a critique of how IPEC uses
the term in a way which homogenises what is in reality a diverse group, encompassing a range of ages,
ethnic groups, personal histories and experiences.
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exploitation, the passive labourer who suffers in silence, match the profile of the
children working in the mines ofMirerani? Or is the profile given above by a Tanzanian
journalist as 'not real children' more relevant? This section attempts to answer these
questions and thus draw a picture of the 'child labour' experience m the Tanzanite
mines, using the voices of children and other township members themselves236.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with one hundred boys237 in the mines using
the snowball method (interviewees act as informants and links to other interviewees) and
I had informal conversations with countless others2j8. I spent most of my days in the
mining site itself conducting participant observation. Some boys also came to visit me at
my home where I was living with a mining family, some would come just to chat and
others would come for English lessons. Children from both Blocks B and D (see 5.2)
were interviewed. The results challenged a number of assumptions upon which the
international discourse construction of 'the child labourer' is based. It is important to
note that I do not claim to be providing a definitive profile of children working in the
mines. One thing which became clear during participant observation is that there is no
such thing as 'the child labourer'. Each child has his own personality, history and reasons
for working in Mirerani. Having said this a number of generalisations can be drawn on
the basis of the interviews but these must be considered in the context of the wider
findings ofmy research.
It is useful to highlight key findings in order to provide a baseline. Most of the children
(75%) were under the Tanzanian legal age for mining, that is 16, and all interviewees
were under the CRC and Convention 182 on the Worst Forms ofChild Labour minimum
235 In Mirerani, there a number of different categories of child labour which include domestic workers,
informal sector workers and child commercial sex workers. I will be focusing on the mining children as
this is the primary focus of IPEC intervention.
236 Issues ofmethodology and reflexivity are discussed in Chapter 1.
2^7 There are no girls to be found at the site, which does not mean that girl children are not involved in the
mining industry- many are in processing and in the service sectors- but the focus of these particular
interviews was children directly involved in mining.
~38 In view of the fact that 100 children were interviewed data will be presented as a percentage for the
sake of clarity. It is important to remember, however, that these percentages are only based on 100
interviews.
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age of 18. The majority were 14 and 15 years of age (61%) with only 15% aged 13 and
under. The 'child labourer' is thus less a child than a young adult but falls under the ILO
Convention 182 definition of'child' labourer (2.3; 3.4).
With regard to schooling, 35% of interviewees claimed to have reached standard 7 level
(terminated primary school). Only 11% had never attended school, which whilst high
was lower than expected. This means, however, that most children had dropped out of
school before reaching standard 7. Most claimed that their parents had no money for
fees for them to continue, which is linked to the introduction of cost sharing, brought
about through the adoption of structural adjustment policies in Tanzania (5.1.4). While
fees should only be TSH 2000 (around £2), a number of schools charge much more and
for a large family these fees added to the cost of uniforms and materials are just too
much m view of the poor quality education that many informants felt that they
received. Some children were sent to school for a few years and then removed to allow
younger siblings to attend. During informal conversations many boys claimed that they
chose to leave school as they found themselves working for their teachers for no salary,
being beaten without good reason or waiting for teachers who often did not attend.
Others saw that children who had completed school often stayed in the villages without
work while others saw people with secondary level education and even degrees working
in the mines and argued that there was no point obtaining an education only to find
yourself in a job you could have started earlier and been earning money for instead of
'losing time\nyoka, pers. comm.).
It is interesting to note that only 3 out of the 100 interviewees came from Mirerani; the
others had travelled to Mirerani in search of work from neighbouring districts of
Arumeru, rural Arusha and rural Kilimanjaro (see 5.3 for the migrant nature of the
mining community generally). One boy informed us that Mirerani had attained almost
mythological proportions in the stories told by and to children as a 'get-rich quick' area,
the lights of the township being visible from the slopes of Mount Meru and Mount
Kilimanjaro. Only one boy was Masai (see below for comment on Masai children and
239 For an excellent analysis of the education system and the impact of structural adjustment in Tanzania,
please refer to Kuleana (1999).
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mining) and 11% came from far distances such as Shinyanga and Tanga240, hundreds of
kilometres away. The words of an adult miner shed some light on the reasons why
children are migrating from home:
Things have changed very much, before you would not have found me here, I
would have had to stay with my wife and parents. Stay home. Now people are
lost, even children they can go away from home and stay away. This staying at
home is going to finish I think as everyone moves around now because of the
lack of land. (...) Before children were not allowed to leave home for a job before
18 years, (pers. comm.)
Changes in cultural expectations and socio-economic opportunities are therefore
important explanations for the growing numbers of children migrating to Mirerani.
These factors will be explored further below (8.1.2.1).
To continue on the theme of push factors, 47% of children cited 'hakuna pesa nyumbani'
or 'no money at home' as the primary factor, with a further 18% claiming 'hakuna pesa
kwa ajili ya shule' or 'no money for school' (see also 5.1.4). This was also reflected in
the pull factors with 61% claiming to need money for food, clothes and to build a house,
with a further 8 out of 100 wanting money for schooling. The need to obtain money for
basics contradicts the often cited opinion that 'all they want is quick money to buy nice
things', often heard in the township when discussing why the children are working, and
reveals that motives are far more complex. Another interesting result was that all except
four decided to come on their own accord, refuting the image of the 'child labourer'
forced to work by exploitative adults. It would have been particularly useful, however,
to have conducted a tracer study of all the children, to explore their home lives and gain
the perspectives of people who knew them in order to confirm the extent to which their
migration was their own choice, or suggested, encouraged or even forced by parents,
other family members or peers. Socio-cultural norms such as family loyalty and
obedience to elders may lead to children seeing themselves as voluntarily doing what
people used to other norms may see as forced or coerced activity. For example, the
school children discussed below (8.1.2.1) who did not see themselves as being coerced
240 This finding that most of the children were migrants was one which the ILO took on board as it had
important implications for programming.
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into working for their teachers. Whereas I would have termed this an abuse of the
teacher's power, the children saw themselves as being privileged. In this sense, the idea
of the free, autonomous agent must be questioned although my evidence suggests that
the children were not forced in the violent sense in which the 'exploited' child is often
portrayed.
There is no space here to enter into the detail of kinship and domestic structures of the
various groups involved in order to explore the impact of these on child labour but when
I raised the issue of family loyalty and obedience to elders, a Chagga (one of the
majority ethnic groups in Mirerani) informed me that:
When the first born comes, then often the other brothers follow. The brother may
go home and tell the others to come with him. Obedience to elders is not
important, they just come because they can get something. Family loyalty is very
low as a reason for the nyokas coming. The families know the situation is
dangerous for the children, they know the children smoke cigarettes and have
bad lives which is why families only send the child if an older brother is there to
look after him (pers. comm.)
This implies contradictory messages in terms of who takes the decision: is it the brother
who encourages younger brothers to follow, or the family who send the child or the
child himself who takes the decision? I suggest that the situation differs for different
children. Many children interviewed did not have brothers in the mines so this was not a
consideration, other children did have brothers and claim that they decided to go and
find them of their own accord, others claim that their brothers brought them.
Most of the children interviewed had only been in Mirerani for a short time, under one
month, and only 15 had spent more than one year in the mines. There are several
possible reasons for this. Firstly, the interviews were conducted in January and
February. The end of the school year in Tanzania is December so those who had
completed or dropped out of school would have been looking for work at that time. New
arrivals may also have been more willing to be interviewed as they may have been less
aware of the risk that outsiders pose in terms of expelling them from the mines. Others
were suffering from the shock of arriving and experiencing the difficulties of the work
and saw my research assistant and myself as assistance for going home, judging by the
high numbers who asked for bus fares to go home. Those who had been working in the
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mines for a long time may have been more hesitant about being interviewed, having
gone through the process before with interviewers who made promises and never
returned (Kijo-Bisimba from LAMP, a Swedish NGO; Alii from the ILO; the mining
union TAMICO241) or they were established workers and therefore had little free time to
spend on being interviewed.
Boys working in the mines are referred to as nyokas or snakeboys as they are said to be
able to move rapidly down the narrow pit tunnels. In reality, however, many children
never go down the pits (37%). They remain on the surface, sieving sand to extract small
pieces of gemstone (Plates 8.1.1a-c). This process is known as kuchekecha. A common
complaint of many of these boys was that mine owners would not employ them in the
pits and so they had to work in what they perceived to be less profitable surface work.
This refutes the idea that mine owners exploit children by forcing them to go down the
mines. Instead, it would appear that many are refusing to employ the children which led
to the scenario that I witnessed on many occasions of children making repeated and
emotional pleas to owners to give them jobs. 63% of those interviewed do go down the
pits, however. The most common job that they do is 'communications', which involves
taking messages from the surface to the miners in the pits (Plates 8.1.Id and e). Other
jobs consist of taking water down, running errands and bringing sand up from the pit to
be sieved. Only 5 boys were involved in setting explosives, a particularly dangerous
task, as one boy reveals:
I don't like doing it. I get scared. I set the fires for the explosives. Many don't get
out but it is an easier job for getting stones as you are near the blast' (15 year old
- nyoka, pers. comm.)
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I, as a DFID/ILO representative, may also be added to the list, if Mirerani does not become part of the
Time Bound Programme (6.2.1). Although I never made any promises, my mere presence was enough to
raise expectations.
Plates 8.1.1a, b and c Surface mining: These three photos illustrate the way in
which boys work on the surface, exposed to the sun, sieving through the sand either





Plate 8.1.1 d and e Pit mining nyokas: The two photos illustrate the makeshift




It is often said that the children are exploited because they do not receive salaries. Alii
informs us that 'The child labourers in the Mirerani mines are exploited because they are
not paid any salary' (1997: 7) and that one of the 'workplace stresses' for children is
'Inequitable pay; the children, despite the arduous task they perform, are not paid' (1997:
18). Kijo-Bisimba also suggests a solution to the problem could be that 'there should be
a just and fair salary which is directly proportional to the nature and amount of work
which they normally do' (1997:25). Such statements contribute to the construction of the
'exploited child labourer'. It is remember that in Mirerani, no-one is paid for working in
the mines (5.3)242. According to my observations, children are sometimes less exploited
than adult miners, as they get certain privileges by virtue of their age, such as extra food
and other assistance which adult miners may not obtain. The tasks they perfonn are also
lighter and less strenuous than those of adult miners. Most boys also reported that they
had a strong support network, either helping each other out or being looked after by an
adult miner in times of need. Only 3 boys reported having been abused by adult miners
242
Except for the occasional casual labourer. Miners, including nyokas, receive two meals a day
consisting of ugali (stiff porridge) and beans. They also get medical assistance and a percentage share in
any find once expenses are taken into account.
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in the form of beatings or having torches stolen, another 2 claimed that their pockets had
been slashed open whilst they were sleeping and the contents stolen. Whilst this does not
mean that abuse does not happen regularly it does place a question mark upon the
common view that children are regularly raped and beaten (England 1999)243.
The situation is thus not as clear cut as some maintain. In terms of 'exploitation', my data
reveals that child labour should be seen more as a 'class' or 'group' labour issue than as
an 'age' specific issue (also 2.2). Having said that, the boys' work is hard and they are
often expected to go up and down the pits on a continual basis, an exhausting task: 'It is
very hard work and tiring but I must work. I have my problems' (14 year old nyoka,
pers. comm.). To the observer, the working conditions are disturbing to all the senses.
The pits go down to 200 metres and consist of very narrow, pitch black tunnels. There
are places where there is just a rope to descend vertical shafts and in other places miners
must crawl through the tunnels on their bellies. Miners have only a torch for light and
wear no protective clothing (see plates 8.1.1 d and e). There are no sanitation facilities in
the mining site, indicated by the all pervasive stench of human excrement, and physical
hazards include noise, vibration, excessive heat, lack of shade, poor hygiene leading to
bacterial infections, inhalation of graphite dust, gases, fumes and smoke. Alii (1997: 18)
also claims that the psychosocial hazards for the children include 'occupational stress
caused by over work and overburdening leading to lowered self-esteem, low work
motivation and 'escapist' alcohol and drug consumption'. My research has not, however,
revealed 'alcohol and drug consumption' as a key issue. Although one or two boys can
be seen smoking bhang, local marijuana, Most children interviewed were vehemently
against the use of alcohol or drugs. Water, however, is an important issue for many
children. There is no adequate water supply and water used at the mines is brought by
vans in tanks and sold to miners at exorbitant prices. The miners generally do not wash,
coming into town occasionally for a shower. Lack of adequate nutrition also appeared to
be a key problem with many children complaining of hunger and showing signs of
malnutrition (lethargy, rotten teeth, underweight, thin arms and legs, small in relation to
243 Adult informants also rejected this view. In the words of one miner: 'The children are forced to work
hard by the leader of the mine but I have not seen any children get beaten or sodomised. It is not true, it is
just stories.'
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age, lack of desire to laugh or play, see Pryer, 1988). The general health of the children
is very weak. In the words of the district health officer:
The health status of the nyokas is very, very, very bad, they have no relatives
here so they just die, they can't have water (...) Nyokas here do not have a
balanced diet to maintain their immunity and because they are exposed to soot
from explosions and graphite dust they are very vulnerable, (pers. comm.).
Another risk the boys face is that of becoming 'married'. I experienced this first hand
when an acquaintance used my research to attempt to 'marry' one of my informants.
Women, often desperately poor themselves, promise nyokas sex and other assistance,
such as payment of school fees, if they bring them any Tanzanite found in the mines
where they work. HIV infection is a very real risk, especially as most 'wives' also
engage in prostitution and condom use is extremely rare in Mirerani. Generally sex is a
one-off and the boys never gain any of the other promised benefits.
The children who do surface sieving are mostly self employed and are therefore not
entitled to anything, but usually make a little money everyday to buy food, although
some claimed they sometimes went up to three days without eating. Finding out about
children's incomes was difficult as there are several reasons why they might under¬
estimate, over-estimate or even conceal their income. When asked about the total
amount of money made during their time in Mirerani, 44% claimed that they had got
nothing; 'hamna'. When pushed they admitted that in fact nothing meant around TSH
500-1000 (5Op - £1) per day which they made from selling small stones or which people
gave them to buy food. This original under-estimation reveals that children are not in
Mirerani to earn an income to meet their basic survival needs, indeed they do not even
classify small sums which are enough to buy food as 'income'. 36% had got over TSH
10 000, 10% over TSH 50, 000 and only 3% got over TSH 100 000. Whilst the income
was confirmed for one boy who had earned over TSH 100 000 by a fellow miner, it is
possible that they would overestimate the amount earned to persuade me of the
importance of their work in case I was linked to the government and trying to evict them
(see 5.. Despite any doubts about the validity of their statements, when placed into the
context that nyokas often work twelve hour days in the glaring heat or in suffocating
darkness and under very difficult conditions, the rewards of mining are in reality low.
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The expectations, however, are high and everyone knows someone who has made their
fortune which serves only to fuel the dream. Two informants had made TSH 1 000 000
and TSH 500 000 respectively, setting up their parents in business and inspiring many
others boys to follow their lead. It has been claimed that owners attract one boy by
giving him a stone to sell in the hope that he will then bring more boys. This was
strongly denied, however, by miners, owners and boys.
Interviews with mine owners were also revealing. A number of mine owners became
friends throughout my stay and were surprisingly frank and open about employing
children although they knew that I was working for the ILO which seeks to enforce the
law banning the employment of children in the mines. Having said this, however, there
is clearly no guarantee that I was not being told simply what informants thought that I
wanted to hear.
Mine owners claim that there is hamna faida or no added value to using children as
opposed to adult workers. Many argue that it is difficult to refuse to employ boys who
come begging for work claiming that they have not eaten for many days and that they
need money for school fees. I personally witnessed this on many occasions and, as
discussed earlier, children often complain that mine owners will not employ them so
they are obliged to engage in less profitable surface work. It is often argued by people
who do not live in Mirerani that children are used by mine owners because they are
small, nimble and rapid. One informant laughed when asked this, replying 'silazima
kuenda haraka', 'there is no need for speed'. Under new legislation, mines must have
walkie talkie communications from outside to inside. There is therefore no need for
'quick children' to run around taking messages anymore. The only pits which don't have
such technology are those which have not produced and those pits have no need of
speed: 'hamna haraka, hamna production'. This same mine owner argued that there
fewer children work in pits now than before and most work on the surface. This
contradicts research findings of my own which revealed that out of 100 children
interviewed 63% go down the pits regularly with only 37% engaged in surface work
alone. Those engaged in surface work are generally new arrivals who eventually find
their way to the pits.
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Interviews with another mine owner contradict the argument that mine owners employ
children out of sympathy:
I do not employ nyokas because it is against the law. It is not true that some mine
owners employ children to help them because the children do useful errands for
the owners, getting water, sodas and other things (mine owner, pers. comm.).
Again the findings refute a number of assumptions about mine owners who actively
exploit child labourers because they are children. The situation is highly complex with
owners having various motives for employing or not employing nyokas. Some mine
owners refuse to employ children because there is no added value to employing them or
because of the law whereas others employ children to help them out or because they will
do work, such as running errands, that adult miners do not want to do. Conversations
with nyokas, however, clearly revealed that in recent years it has been more and more
difficult to get work in the pits. This could be because of the large numbers of adult
miners fighting to get work, prepared to do any work necessary and providing better
value for money because of their strength and endurance, or because many mine owners
are not prepared to take the risk of employing nyokas. Time and time again boys
expressed frustration with this:
If you go down the mines you can one day make a lot of money and be rich, if
you do sieving then you are just working for your food, nothing else. You cannot
make good money (nyoka, pers. comm.).
As a rule Masai children do not engage in pit mining (only one child interviewed was
Masaj). Discussions with Masai elders revealed that this was because parents are strict
with their children, refusing to allow them to go down the mines due to the dangers.
Masai boys are also occupied with cattle rearing or school and therefore have no time to
go to the mines. Elders did express concern that more children were wanting to go to the
mines as it was seen as the only way of making money. This may be linked to the
growing trend of Masai becoming mine owners as opposed to solely engaging in
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brokering as they did previously. Masai children were also seen illegally sieving endings
from Merelani Mining Ltd. (5.2) with their mothers244.
Regarding income, all the children who have made money claim to have sent the money
home, once they have bought themselves clothes245. It is then used to build houses for
their parents or to start small businesses. This shows that children sustain kinship ties
despite being far from their families:
We believe that when you send something home to your parents you will be
blessed. So everyone tries to help their parents. Or the child may have done a
mistake, like staying away from home for a long time is a bad thing, so they may
send money home so their parents don't think bad of them and so they don't get
bad luck. You can buy a kanga (piece of fabric) for women or a blanket or coat
and send food, sugar, meat, rice, (village resident, pers. comm.; gloss added).
This also refutes the common impression that children 'waste their money on motorbikes
and fancy things'. This was not the case for any of the children I interviewed, although
others may have done so. When asked what they thought of their work it was interesting
to note that 62% said their work was 'nzuri' or 'good', 5% said 'nzuri sana' or 'very
good' and only 24% said 'mbaya' or 'bad'. This clearly conflicts with the paternalistic
view ofmany international organisations who argue that mining work is clearly 'mbaya'
or 'hazardous and exploitative' for children. It must be noted, however, that when asked
why the work was 'nzuri' the majority said 'because of the money', though it has been
seen that most do not make money. The hopes of getting rich are therefore the primary
reason why the work is 'nzurf as well as that it provides a better alternative to life in
their Lome village. It was interesting to note that it was not just those who had made
money who said the work was 'nzuri', as might have been expected. Even some of those
who claimed to have found nothing liked the work. Of course, it could be argued that the
children were telling me that the work was good in case I tried to expel them but those
'44 Merelani Mining Ltd. has plans to formalise the procedures and give these women and children the
endings to sieve and any stones found are to be sold back to the mine 'at a fair price'. To date, however,
these plans remain rhetorical.
245
Again, it would have been useful to conduct a tracer study to explore the extent to which money was
sent home as well as it what it was used for.
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that were interviewed did appear confident and not in the least afraid of me or of
expressing themselves.
The answer to the next question: 'Do you think that children should be allowed to work
in the mines?' appeared to contradict the previous finding that most interviewees said
their work was 'nzuri'. 71% said that children should not work in the mines despite
having said that the work was 'nzuri'. When questioned about this apparent
contradiction, nyokas answered that the work was good for them because they had their
own 'problems', which they primarily defined as the need for money, but that other
children should not be allowed to work in the mines. The boys are therefore clearly
aware of the gulf between the ideal childhood and their own experiences of it. A
significant 29%, however, argued that children should be allowed to work in the mines if
they want to. When asked at what ages children should be allowed to work there, most
of the children divided their answers between surface mining and pit mining. An
important 36% said that children under 18 should be allowed to work in the pits, in
direct disagreement with international law. This is interesting as in the previous question
only 29% said children should be allowed to work in the pits, which could relate to the
fact that the previous question used the term 'children' as opposed to specifically
referring to age. However, most said 18 should be the age limit for pit work with 14%
saying it should be 20. Most also agreed that 18 should be the limit for surface work but
43% said the limit should be 16 for surface work. When asked why these ages were
chosen common answers were that younger children should be at home helping their
parents or at school (for further discussion on kin and domestic backgrounds, see
8.1.2.2). The choice of 18 is also interesting in that the majority of children did not know
that international law specifies 18 as the minimum age for engaging in underground
mining activities.
When then asked what they thought of the international law stating that children under
18 should not engage in labour such as underground mining (see ILO Convention 182,
Chapters 2 and 3.4), 63% said that it was 'nzuri with 27% saying 'mbaya' and that the
limit should be lower and that children need to work as they have their 'own problems'
and need money. When it came to aspirations for the future, expectations were very low
compared to school going children interviewed. The most popular preferred occupation
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was mining, with building a house and setting up a business next whereas school going
children aspired to become teachers and civil servants, amongst other professions.
The interviews with nyokas thus appear to challenge several widely held views about
child labour in the mining sector. Participatory research is thus an important tool for
organisations such as the ILO if they are to base their work on the reality of children's
lives rather than on assumptions. It was seen in the last chapter that one of the central
issues for failure to translate vision into effective practice is the machinations of
international bureaucracy in terms of the power-procedures-people dynamic. This
chapter reveals that there is one more challenge: listening to children's voices and
translating these voices into policy and practice. The findings of the Mirerani
ethnography reveal a number of important questions that would need to be addressed if
the ILO is to truly act in the best interests of the children. For example, the 'children'
interviewed are more youths than 'children' with most between the ages of 14-16. Policy
needs to accept this reality. Does the ILO really want to focus on this age group and if so
should it not develop a strategy for tackling 'young people' specifically? Also what are
the psychological implications for nyokas of the title 'children' when they repeatedly
expressed their sense of pride in being a part of the mining community, of being 'men'
as often expressed by the cry 'I am not a child, I am a man'?
Furthermore, over one third of nyokas had completed primary school and the work does
not therefore interfere with their educational development, in terms of Universal Primary
Education. For these children, work is the sensible option and they find it strange that
they "should be prevented from working when they have completed compulsory
schooling. What can IPEC offer these young people in terms of alternatives, for example
niche markets, such as lapidary training? Thirdly, 97% of children were not from
Mirerani as originally assumed and there is a high mobility of boys with peaks around
holidays, weekends, end of school year and droughts. This has important consequences
for programming, implying a wider focus on prevention and cross-district/ region
collaboration. Fourthly, one of the boys' primary complaints was that employers do not
allow them to work down the pits as this is where the most profitable work is conducted.
They are also guaranteed food, health provisions and a safer living environment than
freelance surface miners. Does there therefore need to be a reassessment of the
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definition of worst forms within each sector? Another issue is that the children do not
suffer from 'inequitable' pay. None of the miners in Mirerani receive salaries. There is
therefore a need to reconsider the issue of exploitation of children by virtue of the fact
that they are children. This is a question of exploitation of all labourers in a context of
poverty.
It is also important to recognise the children's support network, with peers and adult
miners looking after those in need. How can these networks be built on instead of
demonising those adult miners who may indeed be helping the children? Another
consideration is the children's belief that they can make their fortune. Although the
chance of this happening is slight the children believe that it is worth putting up with the
difficult working environment. They believe it provides a better opportunity for 'making
their own lives' than working in the shamba at home. The children send money back
home which contributes to the local economy there and they seem to have an astute
sense of investment, investing the money in worthwhile projects, contrary to popular
belief. The question this raises for programming relates to the finding of attractive
alternatives as well as the need to recognise the children's skills and contributions.
When this is removed what are the alternatives for families? How else will children feel
valuable?
In terms of information and awareness raising, over one third of interviewees said
children under 18 should be allowed to work in the mines if they choose. Whilst this is
not possible in a context of 182, more attention needs to be spent on informing children
as to the rationale behind such policies as opposed to simple eviction. The priority needs
identified by the children are: continuing with their education, either through the
conventional education system or through vocational training, obtaining capital to set
themselves up in business and money to buy food, shoes and clothes. This illustrates that
they are well aware of the importance of investing in their future as well as of meeting
their immediate needs. The need for capital for investment is one which needs to be
considered further by programmers as is one that is rarely considered in programming.
This section has thus shown the importance of considering children's voices if
programming is to be designed from their realities. In this way, children are more likely
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to participate in programme implementation and their best interests are also more likely
to be met.
8.1.2 The cultural construction of child work
Having examined the target group of IPEC intervention, 'child labourers in the Mirerani
Tanzanite mines', it is appropriate to consider the work activities in which other children
in Mirerani engage and how 'work' in general and 'child work' in particular are
culturally constructed. While most children in the Tanzanite mines are migrants, not
from Mirerani, I examine the constructions of work in Mirerani itself as it was not
feasible to conduct ethnographic studies in the various parts of Tanzania from which
they come. The wide range of informants from different ethnic backgrounds should,
however, provide some form of representative sample. I also conducted participant
observation with the children attending Mirerani primary school, as in theory these
children are not engaging in one of the 'worst forms of child labour' and should
therefore provide a useful comparison with the work activities of the nyokas.
8.1.2.1 'Work': Definition and Role
In contrast to the English language which distinguishes work from labour, in Kiswahili
both work and labour are referred to as kazi and child labour is referred to as kazi ya
watoto. In contrast to the expatriates with whom I worked in Dar Es Salaam, who
defined work primarily in terms of self-fulfilment and the gaining of different
experiences as well as in terms of financial reward, most informants245 in Mirerani
defined work in terms of survival and progress, as illustrated by some of the quotes
below:
Kazi is anything you do, cook chapatis and go to sell, carry water to sell,
anything you do for money is kazi. What you do for nothing can also be kazi, for
example, children who help in the home, they work hard for their family for
nothing (female adult informant, pers. comm.).
246 The responses from both men and women were similar. The majority of quotes are from women,
however, as most of my time in the township, as opposed to the mines, was spent talking with women,
who felt more comfortable approaching me.
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Kazi is to get money to eat, to live everyday, (male child informant pers. comm.)
Kazi ni biashara. It is to bring up my children and to give them a good life,
(female adult informant, pers. comm.)
Kazi is the work which makes me live, to give me a future and that I can get all
my needs so that later I can get food, house, anything that can make me live,
(male child informant, pers. comm.)
In Mirerani, work is therefore what people do, be they children or adults, in order to
survive and to have a future247. Work is not defined in terms of pleasure or
psychological self-fulfilment but as a responsibility. This contrasts to children
interviewed in Britain by Mizen and Pole (2000) who were motivated to work by three
themes: the ability of work to extend children's social networks, the need to gain
independence and the desire for money to spend as desired.
Having provided some cultural definitions of work, it is important to consider the work
of non-mining children. This may also help to shed light on why children migrate to the
mines in search of work. Participant observation was therefore also conducted at
Mirerani primary school. I sat in on classes, played with the children in breaks and often
had conversations with children outside school. Interviews were conducted with pupils
from standard three to seven, using participatory research tools248. Their purpose was to
draw up a picture of the work they are involved in on a daily basis. Groups of six pupils
were selected from each class with an even distribution of sexes. The Head-teacher was
asked to make a random selection and he did this spontaneously by pointing to children
sitting in the north, south, east, west and centre of the room.
After ice-breaking games and introductions, the children were asked to describe types of
work done by school children at home and in school. They were also requested to
describe types ofwork done by other children in Mirerani. During the pilot interview, it
247 Kazi is opposed to kupumzika, meaning 'to rest': 'Kupumzika is doing what you are interested with
which is not work, it can be watching television, playing football, going to the bar, visiting people. It is
what you are not responsible for, what you do for pleasure1 (male adult informant, pers. comm.)
248 The headmaster felt that it was inappropriate to take standard 1 and 2 out of class as they were already
under considerable time pressures with completing the syllabus.
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became clear that children were uncomfortable using drawing to represent the work
activities. I therefore gave each group the choice as to whether they preferred to
represent the work through pictorial, oral or written methods. Standard 7 and 6 chose to
write essays about their work activities whereas Standards 5, 4 and 3 chose to have a
group discussion. The group were then asked to write each activity on a piece of card
and to place these into piles according to whether or not they thought the work was
lzinazofaa' 'suitable' or 'zisizofaa' 'unsuitable' for children. They were then asked to
place the cards according to suitable ages for each activity and were given time to
discuss the placing of the cards and come to a consensus. At the end of the interview
there was a groups discussion on how children who do unsuitable work could be
assisted249.
The main types of work conducted by these school children were: general cleaning of
both home and school, fetching water, shopping, cooking, ironing, working on the farm,
looking after cattle, planting trees, burning rubbish, collecting firewood and running
errands for their parents and teachers. With regard to listing of activities they had seen
other children in Mirerani conducting or which their friends conducted, the children
were primarily referring to out of school children. The activities listed were: sieving
sand for left over minerals, mining, begging, digging roads, fetching water for pay,
selling small items, domestic work, collecting rubbish, washing vehicles and bicycles,
selling stones, prostitution, loitering and stealing.
The school children identified work suitable for children (the suitable ages are indicated
in brackets) as cleaning the compound at home and in school (age 10-12), cooking (14),
washing clothes and utensils (10-14), fetching water (19-14), playing football (14-18)250,
errands for parents and teachers (12), ironing (12-14), studying (10), farm help (10-18),
collecting firewood (10), planting flowers and arranging stones at school (8-12). Cards
placed in the 'unsuitable work for children' pile included selling vegetables (14-16),
mining (14-18), sieving sand (14-18), begging (10-12), stealing (12-18), loitering
249
A wealth of data was collected, which would be worthy of at least a separate paper. Due to the
constraints of this thesis I am only able to summarise the key findings here.
250 This was interesting in that it was mentioned in three groups as a 'work' activity.
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(12014), prostitution (18), working in hotel or bar (18), collecting rubbish for pay (10-
14), washing cars/motorbikes/bicycles (14-18), working in a shop (18), digging roads
(16), carrying water and farming for pay (14-18).
'Work' according to these definitions appears to include both paid and unpaid activities,
within and outside the home. It is particularly interesting to note that the children did not
mention activities conducted for teachers as work. When asked why this was so one
informant told me; 'We must help the teachers because they help us to learn' (pers.
comm.). Activities conducted for teachers include cleaning their houses in the evenings,
fetching water and performing numerous other errands. Observation also revealed that
children in school uniform were often to be seen during school hours shopping at the
market, carrying very heavy containers of water and out on errands. When asked why
they were not in school the children would answer that they were helping the teachers.
Some children expressed pride in this activity and saw it as a privilege to be asked by
the teacher to help. These were generally the older ones. Others, especially younger
children, complained that it was very tiring to carry water and it made them late for
school. The Minister of Education declared a ban on school based labour in 1996 and a
circular letter was issued to all primary school authorities. The Government of Tanzania
therefore considers school based labour to be detrimental to children even though most
child informants seemed in favour of 'helping' their teachers during school hours.
Age plays a key role in determining work patterns in Mirerani. As the interviews with
school going children indicate, the ages at which children engage in various forms of
work'are clearly set. They also differ from the ages children in Britain, for example,
would be expected to engage in similar activities. For example, children in Mirerani are
expected to engage in shopping and washing dishes from the age of 10. I suspect that
most adults in Britain would not trust or want their children to engage in such activities
at this age. As children get older, their work roles change. Those that attend school often
find their work roles reduced with parents expecting them to focus on their schooling.
Younger siblings therefore take over their tasks. Those who do not attend school are
expected to contribute to the family income by working on the family farm, herding
cattle or entering wage labour:
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Small children sweep the floor, wash pots and cups, fetch water in groups,
between the ages of 5,6,7,8. After 10 they wash and iron their own clothes, they
fetch firewood, go shopping, they can prepare tea and other foods. When they are
big, 12 to 15, they can do everything, go to the farm, do gardening, everything.
They can only start working for money when they are 18, 19 (female, adult
informant, pers. comm.).
This informant is clearly expressing an ideal situation where children only start working
for money at 18 or 19. All the children working for money in Mirerani, however, were
far younger than 18 or 19.
Gender plays a clear role in determining work patterns with girls responsible for
assisting their mothers in household duties or replacing their mothers when the latter are
working outside the home, activities which are reproduced through the different
generations, although the majority of homes in Mirerani employ house-girls who
conduct most of the household chores :
All children are the same they can all work at home but girls work more than
boys at home because girls will be mamas so they need to learn.(Female, adult
informant, pers. comm.).
Girls like to be with their mothers so they stay with the mothers to do mothers
work, the boys can play making cars and sometimes following their fathers.
(Female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
The one job boys and girls share is clothes' washing. All children are expected to wash
their own clothes. Girls are also responsible for water and firewood collection; a labour
intensive task in Mirerani where both are scarce. Boys' work consists ofwatering plants,
looking after cattle and washing cars.
One woman who spent considerable time living with an Australian man, has different
ideas, however, believing that her children should be brought up equally:
I bring all my children up to do the same work whether they are girls or boys
(female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
251
Housegirls are often overworked and underpaid, if paid at all. Child domestic labour is another
example of a hazardous and exploitative labour activity for children but is not one that I am able to focus
on here. See TAMWA (1996).
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Regarding the role of kinship in determining work patterns, some informants felt that
kinship was not relevant in Mirerani where most children are not living with their
families (8.1.1):
In Mirerani people do not live with their families, we have no kinship we are all
survivors. The first born can command the younger children to work, they must
do more work then. That is Africa, (male, adult informant, pers. comm.)
The last two sentences seem to refer to 'traditional' situations outside Mirerani and reveal
that where children are within kin structures, kinship is an important determining factor.
This is confirmed by other informants:
Younger ones must do as they are told, they must fear grownups. Young sisters
must do what older sisters tell them, (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
Other informants argue that there are no set patterns ofwork within families:
It depends on the family. Kind people do not make the difference, all the children
do the same work. Sometimes one child refuses and other will do it. The
personality of the child decides what work they do. My last bom used to refuse
to do any work so my second bom would do everything. In others families, poor
relatives are used as servants, treated badly, because they are poor, because they
are giving them clothes and food they treat them as they like, (female, adult
informant, pers. comm.).
The issue of ethnic group is also relevant:
Kinship depends on tribal differences. With the Chagga, the first bom normally
takes care of the family. He is the head of the family, it can be a boy or a girl.
_ The younger children must consult the first bom if they want to do something. If
the first bom does not do well then the rest of the children will think they cannot
do well. They follow their brothers and sisters. The last bom male is responsible
to take care of the family house and to look after the parents. He is not supposed
to live away from there. Nowadays, sometimes they neglect this because maybe
at the home there is nothing so they must go away to find money. Now most
people go. Kinship is less important now than it used to be. (Male, adult
informant, pers. comm.).
The changing socio-economic climate is therefore also important as it has led to a
decline in traditional kinship patterns. Mirerani is a highly polygamous society, which I
would argue also contributes to an increase in child labour:
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It is particular to Mirerani, in other towns people marry. When they come here
men learn from men and go with many women. Men here they have a woman
here, in Moshi, in Mombasa, everywhere. They do not know how to love, how to
look after a woman. They just make children everywhere and then give no
support. The wife works so hard but it is not enough, he must get more women.
(Female, adult informant, pers. comm.)
Women are therefore left looking after the children but the father's income is not enough
to support his many families. Often women are forced into prostitution, as one informant
told me:
Look around, nearly every woman in Mirerani has had to be a prostitute. It is our
life. (Female, adult informant, pers. comm.)
Lack of income also means that children go to the mines to find money to support their
mother and siblings. The fault cannot be entirely ascribed to the men, however. Many
male informants argued that women only came to them for their money:
Even the women themselves have many problems, they are after money, there is
no real love here. If a man gets stones, many women come after him. She says
build me a house, you do then when the money is finished the woman doesn't
need me any more and she keeps the house and sends you away. (Adult, male
informant, pers. comm.)
Having explored constructions of and motivations for work, it is useful to briefly explore
the role ofwork in defining person-hood in Mirerani. According to Setel in his article on
young men in Northern Tanzania (2000: 58):
The labour activity with the highest social value is farming and the lowest is
business (..) When I asked one woman what her brother did, she responded 'Oh,
he doesn't work; he just does business'
The argument that farming has a higher social value than business is directly opposed to
the views of Professor Murray (cited in Ndejembi 04.02.2000) who argues that in Africa
farming is not considered to be a job, 'the most needed type of work has the lowest
status in the social consciousness'. My experiences in Mirerani would also dispute
Setel's argument. On a number of occasions, boys informed me that their mothers did
not work, they just stayed in the shamba or farm, 'analima tu' which means 'she only
farms', reflecting the low value assigned to farming. Regarding aspirations, many
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children wanted to set up their own businesses and when they did send money home it
was for their parents to set up businesses. Many came to Mirerani to escape from the
farming life where 'you have to work very hard for nothing' (nyoka, pers. comm.). It
would thus appear that business is seen as a culturally superior form ofwork to farming.
Most adult informants in Mirerani were mining to make money to set up their own
businesses:
Here you are much more respected if you are a business man or woman, dealing
with gemstones. They respect the mining business more than any other business
as all business here starts from the gemstone business. Farmers are not respected
because they only have small farms selling maize and bean crops, they do not
have big farms, (village resident, pers. comm.).
According to one informant the type of work you do does not define your personhood,
the amount ofmoney you make does:
Here even if you work hard as hard as you can, if you are poor no-one will
respect you. Even if a small boy makes a lot ofmoney he is respected. If you are
rich people will do anything for you, even wash your feet. Here people work
hard and die but they don't care, they work hard to be rich, to be respected, to get
the name, to buy cars, gold chains (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
This was confirmed by several other informants:
Here in Mirerani, people respect your work only if you have money, whether you
are a teacher or a miner, even if you work so hard (female, adult informant, pers.
comm.).
And only disputed by one:
There is respect for teachers, they respect that work, people respect me much
because I am a teacher. They respect me for teaching their children. I would
disagree with her (above) because the respect I have got in this village is from
teaching children, (female, adult informant, pers. comm.; gloss added)
In Mirerani, many people seem to work in order to get 'fast' money with which to buy
into the Western life style (see 3.1), which has come to be seen as a mark of progress
and social prestige, although many children do not spend their income on items such as
motorbikes but send money home to their families (8.1.1). According to Khamsini
(1978: 113):
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African miners spent their surpluses in the purchase of commodities such as
bicycles, motor-cycles, lorries and cars. Ownership of these commodities was a
significant symbol of their new economic power and of their new social status.
This observation is confirmed by one of my informants, referring to the situation in
Mirerani:
People here are not rich, they buy big things when they get money, like luxury
cars to show off. Why buy these cars for here, for these roads you need a pickup
to carry water or a tractor, not these cars, they just want to show off. (female,
adult informant, pers. comm.)
Personhood in Mirerani is therefore defined by having money, as opposed to working
hard. This money, however, must be used to help people:
In Mirerani, if you have money and you have assets, a business, let's say a bus
taking people to Arusha or a big shop, if people can see that you have a lot of
money, or if you help people when they need money, then you will be known to
everyone and everyone will say that is a good man. But if you have those things
and you don't help people they do not respect you (miner, pers. comm.)
Money itself does not grant power and status, but the symbolic capital which it can be
used to obtain does (Bourdieu 1977; 7.3.1). This cultural phenomenon is widespread in
Tanzania and has led to resentment amongst the middle classes who feel that they should
not have to support their most remote kin members and has even led to the situation
where many informants in Dar Es Salaam said they did not want to return to the villages
at Christmas because they would be approached by strangers asking for money and
claiming to have kin ties with them. In terms of child labour, therefore, it becomes clear
that it is important in Mirerani to have money as this is an important factor in defining
personhood.
This section on work raises important issues for ILO programming. First of all work is
defined in terms of survival and progress and any alternatives to labour must be able to
address these concerns. Secondly, gender and age (see also Chapter 5) continue to play a
central role in defining work allocation. Thirdly, it was revealed that the changing socio¬
economic climate has led to a decline in traditional kinship patterns which has not only
affected the allocation of work according to kinship patterns but has also meant that
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more children have sought work outside of kinship structures. Finally, personhood was
also seen as being defined less by work activity than by the amount ofmoney possessed
which explains the desire of the children to earn cash as opposed to working on family
farms with no financial reward.
8.1.2.2 'Child': Definition and Role
Having explored the cultural construction of 'work' in Mirerani, it is also useful to
briefly explore the cultural construction of'child'. We should first to remind ourselves of
the introductory quote in 8.1.1, in which a journalist defines child miners as 'not real
children'. Interviews were conducted with different groups of people in Mirerani in order
to find out how they defined 'real children':
In Mirerani, there is no age for a child, when a kid has strength to drive a
motorbike or whatever they can work, (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
For us, a kid is one who goes to Kindergarten but here it is below 8, 10 after that
you must work (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
A child is before the age of 9 or 12, after that they are adults working for their
living (male informant, pers. comm.).
A child is before the age of 15 (nyoka, pers. comm.).
In all but one case, therefore, 'child' is defined according to chronological age, a method
of classification often attributed to 'Northern' constructions of childhood. One of the
primary anthropological critiques of universal legislation based on 'Northern'
constructions of childhood (3.1) is that such ideals of childhood accord ultimate
importance to chronological age. Nieuwenhuys (1994), for example argues that
anthropologists have long pointed to the many-sided aspects of age-classification
systems and that age has a social and cultural rather than a biological meaning. It is
argued that in non- 'Northern' societies such as Tanzania, cultural definitions ofmaturity
may depend on passing through a series of initiation rites or attaining of stages of
biological maturity rather than on chronological age (See Raum 1940; Omari & Mbilinyi
1997: 2). These quotes reveal, however, that Mirerani informants also define childhood
according to chronological age. Such a vision cannot therefore be simply a 'Northern'
construction but, as argued in Chapter 3, a 'dominant' vision of childhood.
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One informant attempted to define childhood in terms of dependence, but was forced to
distinguish between the ideal and the reality, as illustrated in the following excerpt:
Informant: A child is a child, someone who is still dependent on their parents,
who can't do anything without his parents.
Me: But what of the nyokas, they are not dependent on their parents but are they
still children?
Informant: Yes they are children but they are children who do not have a choice.
This echoes the words of nyokas themselves (8.1.1) who argued that children should not
work in the mines but that it was good for them as they had no alternatives.
Having illustrated local definitions of 'child' it is useful to explore the place occupied by
the child in the socio-economic and cultural system in Mirerani. The economic value of
children in Mirerani is paradoxical in that while children provide an important
contribution to the economic development of the area, they themselves gain little in
economic terms. In the words of one informant:
Children are very valuable economically but they are not paid, they are not
recognised. They sell stones, the child gets nothing, the system does. Some work
as house-girls, prostitutes selling things. They have nothing to keep, they always
give, what they have is little for eating but what they contribute is big. They cook
and clean and look after their brothers and sisters, even the boys, when their
parents go to work (pers. comm.).
This quote reveals the diverse ways in which children's work is valuable to the economic
system. Children contribute to the mining economy through their work in the sector,
providing stones for the market. Mine owners benefit economically from the labour of
the children, as does the government in the form of taxes and royalties and local traders
who benefit from any wealth generation. Children often sell the stones at prices well
below the market value, again contributing to the local economy, with dealers and
brokers making large profits from the children. Children also support the household
economy. Their unpaid labour at home allows both parents to work. Furthermore, most
children interviewed gave a significant proportion of their income to their parents. Other
children in Mirerani also engage in employment, as domestic workers, petty traders and
prostitutes. In this way they benefit their employers economically. This provides
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ethnographic evidence for the statement in Chapter 5.1 that children make important
contributions to both national and household economies through their work. The fact
that the value of their contributions is ignored has detrimental consequences in that they
remain in a weak bargaining position and are unequal within generational structures, not
just in the household, but in the work place and in wider society. This in turn leaves
them more vulnerable to exploitation252.
In terms of their socio-cultural role, children in Mirerani are often seen to be of negative
value, as seen by the relatively high rate of child abandonment. During my time in
Mirerani, there were frequent cases of children being abandoned. Although no figures
are available, this issue came up regularly with informants, as indicated in the quote
below which is also a useful illustration of the implications for many women of having
children:
Here having a baby is the beginning of prostitution and death. If you need to feed
your baby and a man asks you to bed you must and maybe he has AIDS. If a girl
comes to Mirerani to be a house-girl she must be careful, most of the men here
are bad. They like their babies but they can't keep them so they must throw them
away, you can't blame them. They can get pregnant without knowing who the
father is, that is why they throw them away, (female adult informant, pers.
comm.)
Children can therefore be seen as a burden: conceived by fathers who then abandon
them which may lead to the mother being forced into prostitution in order to feed her
child which in turn may lead to further pregnancies or even to AIDS. Where informants
did place a value on children, this was mainly seen in terms of long-term gain, as the
child would be expected to support the parents in later life:
A child is a gift who will help you when they grow up (female, adult informant,
pers. comm.).
252 It could also help explain White's (1994: 849) comment that although children are not the only group
who are vulnerable to exploitation in the labour market they are the only one of all the other structurally
disadvantaged groups whose exploitation is addressed by attempts to remove them from the labour
market. Perhaps if the true value of their work was ignored it would not be so easy to argue for their
removal from the workplace.
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Children will look after you when you are old, help you if you need help.
Children in Tanzania have a duty to take care of their parents when they are old.
(male, adult informant, pers. comm.)
In Mirerani, a child is a profit for later life, tegemezi la badai. They will help you
(female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
For me children must be taken to school, then they will be valuable. There they
study many things, they study life so that they can help themselves later even
without their parents, (female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
A male perspective reveals the value of having a child in terms of the respect it affords
to the parents:
I like children, I wanted children and was ready for one. For me to have a child
you get respect because you have responsibilities to look after your child. You
change your life from bachelorhood to be a man with responsibilities (young
miner, pers. comm.).
Value is also gender-differentiated:
No value, no there is a value, let me tell you about it. There is a value, mostly for
boys, as we depend on them to get stones for Mama and build houses for them,
so there is a value for the boys but for the girls there is no value. When you give
birth to a boy they say you have wanapollo, wanapollo (miner) and celebrate but
when I gave birth to my girl, nothing, (female, adult informant, pers. comm.;
gloss added)
It is also useful to consider the position of the child within the social hierarchy in
Mirerani. I would argue that the 'traditional' position of the child has changed
dramatically in recent years. Many children have decided to take their future into their
own hands, migrating away from their homes, where more 'traditional' kinship and
social hierarchical patterns oppress them or do not provide their perceived needs. As one
adult informant tells us, life for children living with their kin in the township is difficult,
illustrating perhaps why many children are choosing alternative and 'independent'253
lifestyles (8.1.1):
253
Independence is not a straight forward concept, however, as many children become involved in
alternative dependence or support structures with adult miners, or gangs of children and young people,
when they arrive in Mirerani.
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They have no say really, they are beaten for nothing. There is nothing for
children here, no games, they build and forget the children. They just build
houses for grownups, there are no spaces for children to play so they learn ugly
things, there is no-one to entertain them. Before, grandparents and their friends
would tell stories in the evening, now no-one tells stories. Children are not
allowed to choose their work. They receive orders only, they are like slaves, they
do not give ideas or say no. Everyone orders them, not just the boss. (Female,
adult informant, pers. comm.)
The child here have no rights to say yes or no when there is a command from
elders.(Male, adult informant, pers. comm.)
Children are not allowed to decide matters themselves, they are not consulted to
share their opinions, generally they make decisions when they get money and
their parents have not much to say. (Female, adult informant, pers. comm.).
This perspective is not shared by all, however, illustrating once more the impossibility
of coming to any generalised statement about child rearing and child work in Mirerani:
Children sometimes have good ideas, you need to listen to them and learn from
them. I don't know about other families in Mirerani but many families in
Machame, where I am from, people sit with their children and listen to them and
them compare ideas (Female, adult informant)254.
The changing cultural constructions of childhood are also important. To understand why
more and more children seem to be engaging in labour (Chapters 5 and 8.1.1), it was
important to ask Mirerani residents what they felt were the reasons for the increase in
child labour. One informant argued that it is the children themselves who have changed
through their adoption of a new culture:
The children have changed, they no longer follow local, tribal culture but all
follow one culture 'tv culture'. They have a different culture to their parents, a
culture common to all children. You cannot stop it. Children do not rush home
after school to help their parents anymore. They wander around looking for
stones everywhere they are. They want nice clothes, school bags, good things.
The parents don't complain as their children bring money (Male, adult elder,
pers. comm.).
~54 I did not myself witness any forms of punishment although children told me that caning at school was
common.
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Placing the blame on the children, however, is clearly too simple. There is also a
perceived cultural shift, to more individualistic values:
People are more individualistic now, there is no sense of Ujamaa. They want to
do things themselves which is good, before people were being driven. Ujamaa is
now dead. It was driven, it was Chinese socialism not African. The notion of
community never existed. Before tribes had one thing in common. If they wanted
to build a house, plow a field, they would make pombe (local brew) for everyone
and everyone would then help you for one day (Male, adult, ex govt official,
pers. comm.).
It is interesting that the above informant does not idealise the past as a time of
'community'. He argues that people worked together out of necessity. The contemporary
economic climate, however, is increasingly individualistic and working together is
perceived to be less important than before.
Growing poverty, declining education levels and rising divorce rates (Chapter 5) are also
seen by many to be important in driving children to engage in labour:
Poverty, there is more poverty now than before, I have seen it myself, there is no
money (..) Some children run away from their mothers and fathers because they
are poor, there is no money for school, divorced families, I don't know. Even we
people have changed. Before mothers would fight to look after their children,
now there is also AIDS disease, now they also let children look for their own
food. So many women get divorced, become brokers and if there are no stones
they go with men to feed their children, to buy gold earrings and things. There is
more prostitution than before (...) TV and videos have brought bad things too,
they think even fiction is the right thing, they believe everything (village resident
and business woman, pers. comm.).
This section has revealed the diversity of 'childhoods' in Mirerani in terms of cultural
constructions and expectations and has complemented the other ethnographic evidence
regarding 'work' and 'child labour'. What is most striking is the high degree of change
which is currently occurring in terms of the roles of parents and of children. This
evidence supports the findings in Chapters 5 and 3. Growing poverty, the decreasing
quality and increasing costs of education, the need for cash to purchase consumer items,
urbanisation and family breakdown have all led to a situation where more and more




This chapter has been revealing of a number of issues. Participatory research conducted
with the children highlighted a number of flaws with the common assumptions
surrounding 'child labour'. When I raised this with the ILO in Geneva, I was confronted
with the question: 'Do you think that we should just do everything that children tell us to
do?'. My answer to this is 'No'. While children clearly have expertise, we must question
whether their recommendations are feasible or realistic, just as with any group of
stakeholders (for a useful study on the benefits of child participation to project
effectiveness see Phillips 2000). We should always try to obtain the broadest possible
understanding before engaging in any action and should include all stakeholders within
the process. The participation of children is therefore essential in challenging our
assumptions (as shown in 8.1.1), but as no-one lives in a void, participation of other
stakeholders is also important in order to develop more appropriate and holistic action.
In this chapter, data collected from other stakeholders was extremely valuable in
illustrating the wider structures within which child labour operates.
Child labour in Mirerani is a clear result of the changing historical, socio-economic,
political and cultural context in Tanzania. Placing child labour within this context
illustrates the complexity of attempting to tackle the phenomenon and could help to
explain why so many Organisations choose to work with the disembodied, theoretical
and universal child. To contextualise action on the basis of the individual circumstances
of each child would clearly be impossible and would lead to even more stagnation than
was observed in Chapter 7. It is important, however, for children to become more visible
within the development and practice of intervention programmes. Children are not
objects of intervention but active and critical subjects. The alternatives provided by
intervention must at least match the perceived advantages of the labour in which the
child is engaging. It is useful to liken Tanzanite mining to a gambling addiction, the
possibility ofwinning and ofmaking a fortune clouds the low probability of this actually
taking place. Added to this is the real need for money: to pay for schooling, for food or
for a chosen lifestyle. Placed together these two factors make successful intervention
extremely difficult, although this in no way justifies the comedy of errors outlined in the
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previous chapter. With most of the Organisations' resources spent on power plays,
procedural problems and people issues, there is little time to consider the children
themselves and how best to develop appropriate policy and action. The balance clearly
needs to be redressed if the best interests of the children are ever to be met.
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9. Conclusions
The kind of complexity that ethnography highlights also gives good reason to be
cautious of simple prescriptive recipes; and rather than aping much current
practice, I think that anthropologists should be bolder in arguing for the potential
helpfulness of their perspectives. (...) Not just highlight 'how things are' but also,
crucially, 'how they might be otherwise' (MacDonald 2001: 93-94).
And so we come to the final chapter of the study. This thesis is the completion of a
personal and therefore subjective journey. Objectivity is an elusive concept, especially
for the anthropologist whose ethnography can only be based on a personal interpretation
of events, despite our best attempts at objectivity. I have therefore taken you along the
path which I chose to take, selecting the different signposts as I went along, in order to
illustrate not just 'how things are' but also 'how they might be otherwise'. The reader will
of course take from this study his or her own interpretations and perhaps even use them
in their own path.
The journey started with two hypotheses: Firstly, that the ILO does not export and
impose a 'Northern construction of childhood', as expounded by Boyden and others. This
hypothesis has been confirmed and it was shown that the vision of childhood used by the
ILO is based on a complex process of negotiation and re-negotiation between different
groups representing different countries and different interests. Evidence from fieldwork
confirmed my second hypothesis that it is not a particular vision or 'construction' of
childhood which is responsible for failure to translate good intentions into successful
programme implementation but specific bureaucratic procedures, power relations and
human failings within the machinations of international bureaucracies.
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It is perhaps time to take a step back from the ethnography itself and to place the two
central hypotheses into a wider context by considering how these findings contribute to
wider anthropological debates, knowledge and practice.
1. The ILO does not export and impose a 'Northern construction of childhood'.
Chapters 2 and 3 attempted to address the complex questions around the first hypothesis
and showed that while the anti-child labour campaigns originated in the nineteenth
century, the ILO itself was born almost a century and a half later, primarily out of post¬
war Europe, representing the first concerted international effort to provide workers,
including children, with labour rights. Since then there has been a proliferation of similar
initiatives, taken under the auspices of the United Nations, which aim to ensure that the
fruits of'development' can be shared by all. To date, however, these fruits continue to be
enjoyed by a narrowing minority. Commentators have focused blame on a number of
issues and with regard to child labour, one of the central criticisms has been the
inappropriate 'vision' being promoted by the likes of the ILO.
Chapter 3 revealed that the stereotypes often employed to describe international
development organisations are outdated and the situation is currently far more complex
than a 'conspiracy' of white colonialists aiming to sustain a particular system and to
promote a 'Northern construction of childhood'. I have revealed that there is no one
vision as to 'the child labourer' but a number of ideals towards which the ILO and its
members, be they governments, workers or employers, are fighting. Flexibility is central
to current legislation and this flexibility gives us reason for hope. I suggest it is time to
drop the stereotype of the Organisation as a monolithic, dehumanised and 'Northern'
institution seeking to impose one vision onto the rest of the world. Following Gardner
and Lewis (2000: 16), my ethnographic evidence revealed the need to recognise the
importance of individual agency in the development of policy and practice as well as the
power dynamics which occur when those with different ideas and backgrounds come
together to find a common goal with flexible implementation strategies.
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I suggest in Chapter 3 that it is important to recognise alternative 'visions' to which child
labourers are subject. In addition to the vision that children should not work in particular
conditions, child labourers are subject to the promotion of a far more powerful and
destructive vision: the American inspired capitalist dream, visible in the smiling faces of
happy children on the Coca-Cola boards which take pride of place in almost all public
spaces in Tanzania. To obtain the cash to engage in the 'Coca-Cola' dream children must
work, no matter what the circumstances. One ofmy primary conclusions is therefore that
it is essential to place child labour within the much wider context of the globalisation of
capitalism. The theoretical implications of this finding can be grouped into three areas.
Firstly, it is fundamental for development agencies such as the ILO and DFID to
recognise the fact that they are extremely small fish swimming against the global
capitalist tide, which has promoted reductions in public expenditures while tying the
economies of poor countries to a global system which promotes the survival of the
fittest. In a system where money is power, it is perhaps useful to remember that the
United Nations only employs one third of the staff ofMcDonalds and has a total budget
equivalent to five weeks British alcohol consumption. Only through recognition of these
limited resources can pressure be brought upon richer nations to meet the UN aim of
0.7% of GNP to be spent on development initiatives.
Secondly, it is time to move out of the impasse caused by the right to work v. the right
not to work distinction, discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, or what Lavalette and
Cunningham (2001) term the liberationists v. protectionists distinction (Chapter 3) and
recognise the limited value of both these approaches in the wider global economic
system (Lavalette and Cunningham 2001). Protectionists, including groups such as
Trade Unions and the ILO, argue that children have the right not to work, whereas
liberationists, including writers such as Boyden and NGOs such as Save the Children
Fund, argue that children have the right to work. These two groups have become
increasingly polarised, each accusing the other of taking more extreme positions than
either does in reality. 'Protectionists' do allow for children to work in certain conditions
and 'liberationists' do try to protect children working in extreme conditions.
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Lavalette and Cunningham (2001) point out the irony that these two groups are in fact
working on an identical premise: that child labour can be dealt with in isolation from the
wider social totality. Child labour, they argue in their seminal paper, must be seen as one
ofmany symptoms of a global capitalist system which has seen the development of the
inter-related issues of poverty, debt and growing global inequality. The authors suggest
that the liberationist perspective is a pessimistic one which assumes that the problems
leading to child labour are insurmountable and that through arguing for the right to
work, the bigger picture of a global capitalist system which means that children must
work, never mind choose to work, is lost. Choice, I would argue, is the clear issue here
and is above that of the right to v. right not to work polemic. The vast majority of the
nyokas with whom I worked had no choice as to whether or not they should work,
although they did have a limited choice as to the type of work they engaged in, be it
underground or surface mining or other forms of work. The concept of 'Rights' in this
case was therefore largely hypothetical.
Lavalette and Cunningham (2001) also argue that the emphasis put by the protectionists
on international agreement and social clauses has failed, since child labour exploitation
is increasing due to factors such as labour market de-regulation and structural
adjustment policies. In other words, while legislation could theoretically prevent child
labour within an appropriate economic context, the wider system means that factors such
as poverty, overburdened and under funded education systems, and the global consumer
market are forcing more and more children into the labour market, as discussed in
Chapters 5 and 8. Legislation therefore does not tackle the factors leading to child labour
nor does the 'cultural relativist' argument of the liberationists. Lavalette and Cunningham
do not propose a 'ready-made' answer but they do give us an alternative way forward,
out of the theoretical and practical impasse within which liberationists and protectionists
have found themselves, by forcing us to consider the bigger picture, rather than taking
child labour in isolation: 'By asking the larger questions, by linking the single issue (here
child labour) to other campaigns, the commonality of inequality and oppression under
global capitalism shines through' (2001: 13). My research findings would support such
an approach as I found the protectionist- liberationist divide particularly unhelpful in
moving forward my theoretical and practical understanding not only of what makes
children labour but also how to develop appropriate policy and practice. Seeing child
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labour within the wider context of global inequality allows us to move beyond the focus
on finding the cure for one isolated symptom and to develop a more holistic and long
term prevention policy.
This leads us to a related factor also discarded by the protectionist and liberationist
camps: the fact that children only remain children for a short while and therefore a more
encompassing long-term poverty alleviation strategy is required. After 'childhood', most
child labourers join the swelling ranks of other categories such as 'poor', 'marginalised',
'unemployed', 'underemployed', 'socially excluded'. Child labour must therefore be seen
within the wider system leading to poverty or we may well find ourselves proudly
advocating the fact that we have reduced 'child labour' while facing ever increasing
numbers of'poor', 'marginalised', 'unemployed', 'underemployed', 'socially excluded' 18,
19, 20 year olds.
The third theoretical implication of the answer to the first hypothesis relates to Gupta
and Ferguson's (1997b: 50) argument that 'we need to theorize how space is being
reterntorialised in the contemporary world'. It is no longer appropriate to depend on
physical location, i.e. North, South, Tanzania, England, as the only grid upon which to
map cultural difference. Instead Gupta and Ferguson argue that we need 'multiple grids
that enable us to see that connection and contiguity - more generally the representation
of territory- vary considerably by factors such as class, gender, race, and sexuality, and
are differentially available to those in different locations in the field of power' (Ibid.).
My research enables us to consider these multiple grids more clearly and illustrates the
extent to which anthropology is faced with an important challenge to its traditional
'culture as spatially bound' approach. It was seen in Chapter 3, that the 'distance' between
Coca-Cola culture promoters in Tanzania and those in London or New York can be
much shorter in tenns of business interests than between the child labour activist and the
business man in Dar Es Salaam, despite the fact that externally these would be viewed as
living within the same cultural grid, i.e. 'Tanzanian culture'. By adopting a multiple grid
perspective, we can see that certain factors may link Tanzanians territorially or in terms
of language or religion for example but other factors, such as particular value systems,
may link Tanzanian and British child labour activists in an alternative manner. For this
and other reasons discussed in Chapter 3, I therefore argue that it is important to
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abandon the cultural argument ofNorth v. South constructions of child labour altogether
and to consider alternatives to spatially bound distinctions, such as ideology. Social
movements have themselves taken this issue on board, as revealed by the recent wave of
anti-capitalist protests which have seen Mexican Zapatistas, Liverpool dockers,
Phillipino workers, Canadian students, European road protesters, Argentinian teachers,
Brazilian landless peasants and many other groups united within a similar ideological
grid despite their spatially determined 'cultural' distance. The challenge for anthropology
is to take this ideologically, rather than territorially, determined culture on board and to
attempt to place this within the context of a globalising world, which sees one particular
economic system determining the mutual future of very distinct groups of people.
2. It is not a particular vision or 'construction' of childhood which is responsible
for failure to translate good intentions into successful programme
implementation but specific bureaucratic procedures, power relations and
human failings within the machinations of international bureaucracies.
The second hypothesis was far harder to prove. The Mirerani case study in Chapter 7
provided one example of how good intentions can fail to live up to expectations. The
many factors which could lead to programme success or failure were grouped into three
categories: Power, Procedures and People. It was shown that bureaucratic procedures,
inappropriate use of power and the playing down of 'people' issues have led to a
situation where the needs of child labourers have fallen by the wayside, even though
resources are claimed in their name. While it would clearly be impossible for a public
organisation to abandon procedures altogether, for power only to be used in positive and
altruistic ways and for people to no longer manifest human failures, I would argue that a
number of steps can and must be taken if we are to move forward in a world which is
becoming increasingly cynical and individualistic. With falling aid budgets and aid
apathy on the one hand and an ever-increasing divide between rich and poor on the
other, Organisations such as the ILO must be prepared to look deep into themselves in
order to move forward.
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As shown below (Box 9), People are at the centre of what I have termed 'The People-
Procedures- Power Dynamic'. People create the Procedures as well as the Power
relations. I therefore argue that it is important to 're-embody/ re-humanise' the
Organisation and remember that people have created the procedures which have become
so problematic and people have created the power relations leading to the
marginalisation of child labourers and the activists fighting to improve their lives. I
suggest that such a recognition provides an enlightening perspective, taking us down the
Foucauldian line (1977), which sees power as not just repressive but productive.
Resistance can lead to change and therefore people who work within and outside
organisations such as the ILO can work for change. It is all too simple to criticise over
dinner or coffee but People created the system and it is therefore People who need to
change it to make it more effective in reaching its target of providing children with an
alternative to labour. While this may seem like stating the obvious, the obvious does
sometimes need to be stated and all my evidence suggests that this has yet to be done in
the ILO and many other development organisations.
Box: 9. The People - Procedures - Power Dynamic
255 When I use the term 'People' in this context I am referring not only to individual behaviour but to the
impact of social relations between different individuals and groups of individuals upon organisational
behaviour.
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In terms of 'Power', it was shown that policy in the ILO, as in other agencies, is
developed through complex and lengthy processes, although it is important to remember
that the ILO is more representative than many other United Nations agencies due to its
tripartite structure and policy-making and therefore involves even more complex
negotiations. Different interest groups have different claims, each attempting to use their
power and resources to gain the best possible outcome. Chapter 6 revealed the dangers
of using terms such as 'top-down' and 'imposed', in the context of North-South
relations, which serve only to over-simplify a complex situation. The 'top' itself is
varied and context dependent. IPEC may be the 'top' vis-a-vis government officials in
Tanzania, but the government and other elites in turn represent the top to their own
citizens. It is perhaps more relevant to refer to Chamber's (1997) concept of'Uppers' and
'Lowers' (6.1.1), when referring to power relations. This takes us back to our conclusion
to the first hypothesis in this Chapter regarding the importance of recognising alternative
grids to conventional distinctions based on spatially determined location. If we take
Chambers' concept of'Uppers' and 'Lowers' we can place the business men in Tanzania
and Britain within one grid and the child labour activists and others who campaign from
similar perspectives in another. The employer groups within the ILO probably have
more in common with each other in terms of their shared search for profit than with the
trade unionists within their own countries, for example256. Power, as well as ideology, as
opposed to spatial distinction, are therefore central to determining the grid in which
many people are found.
In terms of 'Procedures', an important conclusion relates to flexibility. My research has
shown that while large, public organisations need to retain a certain degree of
bureaucratic control in order to ensure that projects are managed in a quantifiable and
financially accountable manner, it is important to ensure that fulfilling procedures does
not become the end in itself. While such an approach may allow for detachment from the
nitty-gritty, complex and emotional aspects of 'real life', it is important not to separate
256 This of course is not to deny that different groups will share other commonalities by virtue of the fact
that they are holders of the same nationality, religion, language etc.
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the project or programme from the wider social realities, as was the case in this study
where the child labourers themselves became almost invisible within the intervention
development process.
One way of avoiding such a problem would be to improve evaluation systems.
Evaluation is a part of the project cycle which is often neglected (6.3.4). Development of
effective evaluation systems will facilitate greater continuity in projects that do work
and create a system which allows for improved organisational learning and space for
reflection. The adoption of a more processual approach to learning would also provide
staffwith the tools to consider 'bandwagon' ideas more effectively and avoid a situation
where many good projects are dropped without being given adequate time to establish
themselves. The challenge would be to ensure that process evaluation does not just
become another bureaucratic hurdle but an effective tool for improved practice. This of
course would involve recognising the fact that development takes time. Time, however,
is one thing that public organisations, dependent on fixed parliamentary terms, do not
have. For this reason, International Conventions are useful as they commit nation states,
whoever is in power, although, of course different governments may choose to invest
more or less or may even opt out altogether. It is also important to recognise that
countries such as Tanzania are implicated in a global system which is highly dynamic
and very different from that within which most 'developed' countries developed. It is
therefore important to allow for innovative approaches to development and not to rely on
previous models which may have served in a previous system but which are too rigid for
the needs of this century.
Part of the new global order has been an increase in the visibility and networking of
social movements, largely influenced by improvements in physical and electronic
communication and the recognition that events in one part of the world impact on other
parts. People are now expressing their desire to take part in the shaping of their own
lives in a more organised and concerted fashion. Development initiatives have started to
take this on board, with growing emphasis on 'participation' and 'ownership' but, as we
saw, this is often more rhetorical than practical. Accountability and reporting should
therefore be a two-way process. 'Clients' should be involved in developing success
indicators and should be able to evaluate the work of the agencies themselves. Although
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it is important to recognise the importance of public accountability to the taxpayers in
donor countries, it is as important to consider downward accountability to the 'clients'.
This would establish a greater system of trust and mutual respect and help overcome the
'gift giving' approach to development and would ensure that if projects are dropped the
agencies have some responsibility towards the community to at least explain their
actions.
It is now time to return to the central component of the diagram: People. Chapters 4 and
6 revealed the multiple discourses and practices of those responsible for implementing
the ILO 'visions' at headquarters in Geneva in an attempt to explore what lies under the
apparently rigid and 'de-humanised' organisational structures. It was shown that although
the ILO portrays itself as a 'de-humanised' entity which functions in a rational, non-
emotional and mechanical way it does in fact constitute a multi-dimensional body of
thought and practice which functions according to the various interactions between staff
and the outside world as well as among staff within the Organisation.
In recognition of the importance of 'people' issues it is important for organisations such
as the ILO to transform procedures for appointing people, as the private sector has been
obliged to do. There is a need to adopt a new management discourse, to move from
autocratic managers to facilitators, as shown by the growing importance of Emotional
Intelligence as a management skill (Chapter 4). Although it is important to recognise the
different responsibilities of the public sector as opposed to the private, as outlined in
Chapter 7, this does not mean that there is no scope for a new management style.
Innovation and flexibility should be rewarded rather than penalised, often the case with
the rigidity of annual performance plans (7.3.3). Ironically, in this case study the
manager with the most 'bureaucratic' form ofmanagement was in fact the most flexible,
which reflects that it is not enough to simply change the procedures. What is needed is a
combination of more flexible procedures implemented by a more flexible and open
management, prepared to listen to and act on the experiences of those on the ground
rather than merely jumping to be at the head of the next bandwagon in order to gain
promotion. While there are signs that this is happening, normative commitment must
also be built and sustained through more effective and influential 'human resource'
strategies. In the current system, staff who start out with good intentions may become
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trapped within a particular promotion system requiring them to adopt particular traits in
order to obtain promotion. As facilitators, managers should be able to consider the
problems of field staff and rely on their experience to improve impact as opposed to
imposing top-down decisions often made by those who have been away from the field
for a long time.
It is also important to recognise and make clear the realities of staff lives. The political
commitment of people may differ according to their life stage. Many informants, for
example, described how they were less prepared to follow through with their
commitment to working in communities when they had small children who need access
to health and education. It is important to recognise that people are not machines and
have ambitions and needs which fall outside of their work. In fact as one commentator
on an early draft ofmy thesis pointed out: 'It is a miracle that anything gets done at all
and that a proportion of staff continue to be engaged despite their having to deal with a
whole set of conflicts, from budgets, to politics and cultural norms!'
Another important 'people' issue which came through in this study was that of cultural
differences regarding expectations and what is meant by concepts such as 'participation'
and 'empowerment'. People's evaluations of impact may differ depending on their initial
expectations. For example, I felt that the Mirerani experience was extremely negative
with no impact on children themselves. People in Mirerani, however, expressed what a
positive experience theirs had been and that they really felt that they now had the power
to make a difference. In terms of awareness raising, there had therefore been a strong
impact which then allowed for the creation of space for local initiatives to develop.
'Failure' or 'success' is therefore in the eye of the beholder. With time, the awareness
raising may have a far stronger impact than a project designed by outside initiative in
that it allows for local initiatives to gain legitimacy and for locally determined action257.
Another example, was the way in which staff related to management, with non-
Tanzanians considering a certain management style as not participatory whereas
Tanzanians considered the style to be extremely participatory and empowering. This is
257
A lesson could be gained here from the experiences of the women's movement. Although a number of
local initiatives may have failed, the overall result has been one of immense success.
319
an important factor to note as many management and development texts convey the
impression that there is one particular format that can be used in any context. This thesis
shows that meaning is injected locally.
To the initial two hypotheses, I should have perhaps added a third: Children themselves
are invisible within policy and programme implementation. My failure to do so reflects
my naive assumption that, although I did not expect children to play a direct role in
policy development, I did assume that the reality of their situations would remain a
primary consideration in implementation. Instead, I found that children themselves
become almost irrelevant in the process. In Chapter 8, I argued that the complexity of
the child labour phenomenon could help to explain why so many Organisations choose
to work with the disembodied, theoretical and universal child. To contextualise action on
the basis of the individual circumstances of each child would clearly be impossible and
could lead to even more stagnation than was observed in Chapter 7. It is important,
however, for children to become more visible within the development and practice of
intervention programmes. Children are not objects of intervention but active and critical
subjects. With most of the Organisations' resources spent on power plays, procedural
problems and people issues, there is little time to consider the children themselves and
how best to develop appropriate policy and action. The balance clearly needs to be
redressed if the funding raised in their name is ever to reach them.
This final chapter has thus attempted to take the findings of this thesis one step further
and to not merely state 'how things are' but to consider 'how things might be otherwise'.
It is hoped that such findings are not seen as just another post-hoc development critique,
something which has become 'a kind of anthropological speciality' (Ferguson 1997:
165), but as a genuine attempt to consider how anthropological understandings of
development initiatives can be improved and consequently of how development practice
can become more effective, particularly with regard to child labour intervention.
Arguing for a recognition of complexity and context-dependent programming should not
give rise to feelings of hopelessness but to feelings of empowerment, in the truest sense.
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Appendix
The Discovery of Tanzanite:
A historical analysis
The exact dates of the finding of the first Tanzanite stone are disputed. One man, whom
I shall call Samuel, was a valuable informant as he was one of the first inhabitants of the
Mirerani township, arriving in 1961, and later became village leader for a number of
years. Between 1961 and 1965 he worked on the neighbouring sisal plantation. During
this time, the Wandorobo, a tribe indigeneous to Northern Tanzania (Mercer 1993), had
been finding gemstones on the ground and were selling them to visiting wazungus who
returned and started to survey the area for gemstones. In 1967, the new government
closed the large plantations as part of its nationalisation programme, as laid down in the
Arusha declaration:
The way to build and maintain socialism is to ensure that the major means of
production are under the control and ownership of the peasants and workers
themselves through the government (Arusha Declaration 1967 cited in Kimambo
1984:67).
The plantation employees were obliged to seek alternative employment and some started
to buy stones from the Wandorobo and to sell them at a profit. The same source revealed
that the first person to start organised mining was a Tanzanian, Ali Juawatu in 1967.
Soon after he started an Indian businessman, Manuel D'Souza, started to mine, followed
by two Greek men, George Papanicolaus and George Sakris.
This version is disputed by another pioneer who arrived to the village in 1970 and
became an important political figure as well as a key representative of the Muslim
community. He claims that Ali Juawatu was gamehunting with his porters, who were
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Wandorobo. One night the porters were digging a hole for the campfire and discovered
shiny stones which they showed to Juawatu. Juawatu showed these to his friend, a Goan
named D'Souza, who took them to Kenya to try to sell them. They eventually found
their way to America through a Greek man named Papanicolaus, where they were
valued and identified as being blue zoisite. Juawatu, D'Souza and Papanicolaus thus
started mining the area seriously, with the first prospecting right granted to Juawatu.
Masai history reveals a different story again, claiming that the first person seen mining
was a mzungu who came to the area in 1954 but left after a year and never returned,
'leaving big holes in the ground' (Masai informant, pers. comm.). According to my
informant, a Masai elder born in 1903 in a nearby Masai village, the Masai then copied
his activities and that is how the Wandorobo eventually found the stones which they
showed to Juawatu. This version is denied by townspeople, one of whom maintained
that the 'Masai don't know anything' and that 'that is just a story', revealing again the
conflict between the different groups of people seeking to use the land. The Masai do
not claim, however, that this mzungu was the first to find Tanzanite, just that he was the
first person seen to be mining in the area.
There is also little consensus amongst authors of texts on Tanzanite. Keller, for example,
claims that Tanzanite was first discovered by D'Souza and does not refer to Juawatu at
all (Keller 1992: 66-67) whereas another text, by a Tanzanian author, maintains that
D'Souza was accompanied by another man, Mayaya (Kimambo 1984: 205). Neither
Keller nor Kimambo reveal their sources but Kimambo does introduce a new element to
the oral histories given; a certain D. Mayaya. In view of the conflicting evidence, a focus
group discussion was held with 5 informants from the township. These comprised of
three of the first residents to the area and two more recent arrivals. Unfortunately, no
Masai were present due to logistical difficulties, primarily the distance between the
Masai villages and the township. There was eventually a consensus that the first person
was not in fact Juawatu as commonly stated in oral accounts but an old man, of 70 years
of age, named Daudi Mayaya. Mayaya was being funded by D'Souza but laid his own
claim in 1967. Kimambo's text (1984, see also Chachage 1995: 65) and subsequent
interviews with the Zonal Mining Office (ZMO) confirmed this version. According to
341
the ZMO, the first person to register a claim to mine Tanzanite was indeed Mayaya.
Unfortunately, the Office has no written records to confirm this, although it is interesting
how Mayaya has been so easily omitted from the commonly accepted oral history. When
questioned, informants said that it was because he was an old man and he did not mine
for long. Others said that although Mayaya's was the first legal claim, Juawatu was still
the first person to start mining Tanzanite unofficially. The focus group discussion then
revealed that a sample of the stone was sent to Germany by a mzungu called Wolfgang,
where it was identified as zoisite.
Juawatu's first wife provides yet another version. She claims that Juawatu was the one
who brought D'Souza, Papanikolaus, Mayaya and others and it was a hunter from the
Wakamba tribe, not the Wandorobo, who showed him the stone. According to Juawatu's
wife, Daudi Mayaya was in fact called Peter Yaya, a good friend of Juawatu's who
encouraged him not to give the licence claim to Papanikolaus but to get it under his own
name. Juawatu himself did not have sufficient funds to do this and Yaya assisted him
financially.
Interviews at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals failed to confirm that either Juawatu
or Mayaya discovered Tanzanite. Instead, they revealed that in 1989 they awarded
another man, a certain Jumanne Ngoma, with a certificate in recompense for being the
first man to discover Tanzanite in 1967. Discussions revealed, however, that the issue is
still contested even within the Ministry. Informants in Mirerani all denied that Ngoma
was the first to find the stone. It would therefore appear that the true identity of the first
person to discover Tanzanite will remain unclear. With Mayaya, Juawatu and D'Souza
dead it is impossible to confirm with them the various versions of events. Whatever the
truth, however, the discovery of Tanzanite is an important factor in the development of
the Mirerani area as well and the Tanzanian gemstone industry. Furthermore, the debate
surrounding the discovery of Tanzanite reveals the dynamics of the area as well as
highlighting the inherent difficulties of conducting oral historical research.
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